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Foreword – PhD thesis journey: a personal reflection 
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suggestions from Stremersch & Van Dyck (2009) and Liu, Gupta, Venkataraman & Liu 
(2016): the impact of a detailing ceiling on physician prescription behavior. This topic was 
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formalized in a thesis project. 
During the first 15 months of the program my dedication to the PhD was set at around 50%, 
where the other 50% were dedicated to consulting activies. During this stage, I finished the 
curriculum component, finished and defended the thesis project, did most of the literature 
review, and took the opportunity to meet with several pharmaceutical industry officers and 
consultants, to gain critical insights and have access to the dataset (several meetings with 
IQVIA officers).  
Then at the end of December 2017, I was invited by my current employer - Cegedim – to help 
launch a new business unit in Spain. After a period of reflection, I accepted the challenge and 
started working in Barcelona in May 2018, from Mondays to Thursdays, leaving Fridays to 
continue my research, in Portugal, where my family stayed. The intensity of 100+ flights per 
year and overall logistics (subway, train, taxi, and bags) was a challenge but did not provoke a 




My research week typically started on Mondays after work and after some weekly shopping 
in Barcelona, where with luck I was able to dedicate two hours to my thesis. The most 
efficient days were typically Tuesdays and Wednesdays, where I was able to study at least 
three hours per night. Fridays were dedicated to consolidate the research developed in the 
previous days, to meet with my supervisors, and to advance in new research topics. Saturdays 
and Sundays were typically dedicated to my family, but in periods of higher pressure and 
need for concentration I went to Universidade Europeia to study, especially during the 
morning. 
I started my quantitative research (data preparation) during the first quarter of 2018, merging 
two databases (sales and promotion investments), whose process seemed endless given the 
high number of products (18) and the need to create new variables (such as for instance sales 
in DDDs). This was a huge, very heavy process.  
After this process, I started applying the quantitative models to the time series, which was, 
again, an incredibly dense phase, given the high number of products, the high number of 
models applied, and the unexpected high number of issues detected with our data 
(multicollinearity in some models mainly due to interaction variables, and other). With the 
enthusiasm of applying previous models developed by other researchers and the curiosity of 
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During quarter three 2018 I consolidated the quantitative phase and performed the series 
break test, after a number of meetings with my co-supervisor. However, during a problem 
with heteroscedasticity with two products, I had to get back to the quantitative phase in July 
and August 2019, to fine tune Model 8.4 and run the Chow test again for these products, this 
time using the software Eviews. 
Going back to the end of 2018, and now with the global preliminary conclusions of the 
quantitative phase, it was time to develop the case study protocol including the qualitative 
script, which was finalized in the middle of December 2018. The interviews had to be 
scheduled to Fridays or Saturdays only, in Portugal (given my professional activity in 
Barcelona), and after a very intense period I was able to finish the last interview in March 
2019.  
Another very difficult process started, with the transcription of the interviews, but step by step 




the transcriptions, sound files and other sources at NVivo, where two additional meetings 
were made with my supervisor, this time in Aveiro.  
I always considered myself a tendentially quantitative person, but to my surprise the 
qualitative phase of my research gave me a colossal pleasure to evolve and complete, mainly 
the coding and content analysis to try to detect patterns, which provided clear and deep 
insights on a broader scope than the one typically provided by numbers only. This includes 
both endogenous and exogenous variables that affected the Portuguese pharmaceutical 
market. 
The final step of the thesis was a surprise. Probably saturated with the work-research-travel-
lack of sleep routine, I was not fully aware, before starting a two-week vacation period, of the 
level of completeness of my thesis, at that moment.  
During those two weeks I had some restleness, almost always thinking “Instead of being here 
at the beach I should be finishing my thesis, maybe I won´t be able to observe the deadline”. 
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th
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Thinking Machine, having the ability to find incredible science-based solutions for 
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astrophysics, human evolution, human intelligence, the evolution of species and the 
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 The moments when I received very negative feedback on my research topic idea, 




researching this topic in the last six months and now it is not suitable for a PhD 
thesis?” But then, after a meeting with my supervisor, during which I asked for help 
(literally “Please help!”), and additional preparation and structuring of the ideas and 
slides, I was congratulated by the senior professors in the next session, keeping the 
research topic; 
 The intense summer of 2017, where I most likely wrote 60 to 80 pages of my 
literature review, at the Public Library of Leiria; 
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09am to 04pm, with no break), in Barcelona, at my living room heated by the sun up 
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finishing my thesis 
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in March 2020, in the middle of the alert state with Covid-19 virus, working remotely 
from home, in Portugal. Hopefully I may approach the public evaluation soon and be 
granted the PhD title in Management. 
In my head, this journey makes me remember a very long train, one with 150+ cars 
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depending on the research phase -, different roles.  
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State of the art and research positioning 
In the pharmaceutical industry, physicians control more than four fifths of health care 
expenditures, situation leading to a high investment of the pharmaceutical companies in 
marketing, aiming to influence phsyicians in their prescription behavior. Marketing-related 
factors influencing prescription behavior include detailing and detailing ceilings are a form of 
government-imposed regulation on companies’ promotion. Counterfactual simulations made 
by previous researchers suggest that a detailing ceiling may have a negative effect on drugs 
sales. Our thesis focuses on the impact of detailing ceilings on physicians’ prescription 
behavior, contributing to this stream of research.  
Relevance and originality 
We observe the call for research made by Stremersch & Van Dyck (2009) in studying policy 
experiments, by Wieringa & Leeflang (2013) in providing empirical analysis on an EU 
country, and by Liu et al (2016) in providing evidence on an area of scant research, therefore 
securing the relevance. Our research also contributes to the work performed by Larkin, Ang, 
Avorn & Kesselheim (2014) and Larkin et al (2017) by providing empirical results using data 
from a country that has restricted the access to physicians simultaneously to all institutions at 
a national level. It also contributes with the study of novel variables not studied in previous 
research. These aspects guarantee the originality. 
Research question 
Our research question is, therefore: What is the impact of a detailing restriction policy on 
physicians’ prescription behavior? 
Methodological approach 
We used a mixed method approach, starting with a quantitative phase using a time series of 
drug sales and promotion investments (IQVIA). We used four models applied by Leeflang & 
Wieringa (2010) and applied seven other models to 18 products in four markets. We 
performed a series break test on detailing elasticities (before and after the ceiling). We then 
made 20 in-depth interviews with officers from the pharmaceutical market, to understand the 
quantitative results. 




Detailing is the most used promotion instrument and globally the preferred by physicians. 
Detailing flow is the most impactful instrument, but at a lower magnitude versus previous 
research. As the answer to our research question, our work did not find quantitative evidence 
to confirm the existence of changes in detailing flow elasticities before and after the entry into 
force of the 2013 detailing ceiling. The ceiling was apparently not fully implemented in all 
country, and its control varied substantially from region to region. Companies and PSRs used 
several tactics to mitigate the effect of the 2013 detailing ceilingin order to globally keep 
approximately the same call pressure on physicians. 
Discussion 
Our results globally adhere with previous theory on pharmaceutical marketing regarding the 
signals of the coefficients. However, they did not provide evidence to say that detailing 
elasticities were significantly different before and after the entry into force of ceiling. 20% of 
the drugs with the highests detailing intensity evidenced a reduction in detailing elasticity, and 
71,4% of the drugs with the lowest detailing intensity evidenced an increase in detailing 
elasticity (but the results were not significant). 
Contributions 
We contribute to the theory by confirming previous research on detailing, and by generating 
specificities. Our research also contributes with the discovery of the inexistence of a 
significant statistical effect of the detailing ceiling on physician prescription behavior, which 
was not a result we would expect based on literature and raises questions about the 
effectiveness of the detailing ceiling policy. We studied novel, unique new variables in the 
scope of pharmaceutical marketing. We contribute to the practice, by allowing pharmaceutical 
companies a better understanding of the effect of several promotion tools on physician 
prescription behavior. We contribute to the policy by allowing the tutelage relevant insights 
on the application and control of Order 8213-B/2013, in the scope of public policy. 
Limitations 
We did not execute a systematic literature review of papers covering pharmaceutical 
marketing and regulation policy, and mainly searched literature in English. Our models – as 
the ones applied by Leeflang & Wiering (2010) did not evidence a substantial number of 




interview young physicians and a more regional representation of some areas of the country 
would have allowed a higher representativeness. 
Further research 
Future investigations could address the effect of a detailing ceiling on competitive detailing, 
and study a ceiling impact on share-of-voice and on market share. Quantitative research in the 
scope of detailing ceilings in other countries or regions is also needed to understand whether 
this effect was due to the Portuguese context or due to the detailing ceiling policy per si. 
Further research on the implementation and control of nationally-wide detailing ceilings is 
welcome, especially in the sequence of an eventual adaptation of the Order. Further work can 
study more deeply the effect of exogenous variables in the evolution of medicines sales. The 
content and duration of pharmaceutical sales representatives (PSRs) calls and content should 
be studied. 
 
Keywords – detailing, pharmaceutical promotion, prescription, detailing ceiling, 
pharmaceutical policy, lifesciences marketing 






1.1.State of the art theoretical grounding 
The current thesis is theoretically framed in the life sciences industry, specifically in the 
pharmaceutical industry, and in life sciences marketing, adopting the approach proposed by 
Stremersch & Van Dyck (2009). 
The pharmaceutical industry presents several unique features when compared to other 
industries, especially consumer goods industry. While patients are the payers of the drugs (by 
their own money or through health insurance), they are not the deciders, since prescription 
medicines are chosen by physicians, who select a drug among a set of alternatives (Gönül et 
al, 2001), making prescription medicines market part of a captive market (Lexchin, 1997). 
The stakeholders who decide the product to prescribe, and to whom most promotional effort 
is directed, are not the purchasers, as underlined by Caplow & Raymond (1954). This industry 
is one of the most highly regulated ones by governments, aiming the protection of the health 
and well-being of the public (Handoo et al, 2012). 
The life sciences marketing is, according to Stremersch & Van Dyck (2009) a novel, nascent 
field in marketing, offering opportunities for scholars to research its specific issues and 
unique challenging problems, using high-quality available data and that have a significant 
impact transcending the typical problems generally investigated by marketing researchers. 
The key marketing decision areas framework developed by Stremersch & Van Dyck (2009) 
offer a perspective of the main dimensions scholars and industry professionals may observe in 
their academic investigation and managerial practices, and consist of 1 - therapy creation, 2 - 
therapy launch, and 3 - therapy promotion. Therapy promotion comprehends sales force 
management, communication management, and stimulating patient compliance. Following 
Stremersch & Van Dyck (2009) framework, sales force management encompasses decisions 
on optimal sizing and targeting of the sales force, decisions that optimize sales call quality, 
and the optimization of the use of drug samples, including sales response models such as the 
impact of detailing on prescription behavior. Figure 1.1 evidences the theoretical pavement 





Figure 1.1 - Marketing of the Life Sciences 
Source: adapted from Stremersch & Van Dyck (2009) 
Pharmaceutical manufacturers use, in the scope of their sales force management, sales force 
teams consisting of pharmaceutical sales representatives (PSRs), also called reps (Caplow & 
Raymond, 1954), who provide education and information to physician offices, hospitals, 
pharmacies, and other healthcare providers (Alkhateeb et al, 2011), acting as important 
marketing and sales instruments (Scharitzer & Kollarits, 2000), and trying to influence 
physicians to increase the promoted drugs sales (Fugh-Berman & Ahari, 2007). Their job is to 
introduce and market their companies’ products, using, in the interaction with physicians, 
several promotion instruments such as free drug samples, gifts, free meals and sponsorships 
(Salmasi et al, 2016). 
Physicians are health care professionals who have the statutory authority to prescribe 
prescription drugs, and consequently are the main deciders in the buying decision process 
(Gönül et al, 2001). Given their ability to write drug prescriptions, physicians control more 
than four fifths of health care expenditures, by prescribing or recommending products to their 
patients (Weeks, Wallace & Kimberly, 2001). 
Several factors can influence physicians’ prescribing behavior, and they may be marketing or 
non-marketing related.  
Non-marketing related factors include physician and profession (Cialdini, 1984; Pitt & Nel, 




al, 2006; Moynihan, 2008; Meffert, 2009; Katz, Caplan & Merz, 2010; Stros & Lee, 2015), 
market (Kalyanaram, 2008; Kremer et al, 2008), regulatory and institutional (Spiller & 
Wymer, 2001; Huskamp, Epstein & Blumenthal, 2003; Schumock et al, 2004; Kravitz et al, 
2005; Aronson, 2006; Andersson, Petzold, Allebeck & Carlsten, 2008; Stremersch & 
Lemmens, 2009; Fischer, Koch, Kostev & Stargardt, 2017; King & Bearman, 2017), and 
patients (Mintzes et al, 2002; Kravitz et al, 2005 ; Campo et al, 2006).  
Marketing-related factors include product (Pitt & Nel, 1988; Gönül et al, 2001; Schumock et 
al, 2004; Stros & Lee, 2015), promotion (Parsons & Abeele, 1981; Pitt & Nel, 1988; Berndt, 
Bui, Reiley & Urban, 1996; Spiller & Wymer, 2001; Narayanan et al, 2003; Narayanan, 
Desiraju & Chintagunta, 2004; Schumock et al, 2004; Kravitz et al, 2005; Chimonas, Brennan 
& Rothman, 2007; Gönül & Carter, 2009; Fugh-Berman & Ahari, 2007; Katz, Caplan & 
Merz, 2010; Stros and Lee, 2015; DeJong et al, 2016; King & Bearman, 2017), pricing / cost 
(Pitt & Nel, 1988; Gönül et al, 2001; Spiller & Wymer, 2001; Stros & Lee, 2015), and 
distribution (Pitt & Nel, 1988; Dimaculangan, 2011; Stros & Lee, 2015). 
Pharmaceutical promotion - which Stros & Lee (2015) considered the marketing instrument 
that appears to be considerably more relevant than price, product of place – is generally 
limited to drugs on patent (Datta & Dave, 2016), and is one of the focus of this thesis. 
Pharmaceutical manufactures use communication channels (personal and non-personal, 
traditional and digital) and promotion tools (commercial and non-commercial, push and pull) 
to interact with physicians. 
Detailing – a face-to-face meeting where PSRs present information to physicians (Molloy et 
al, 2002) – is the promotion tool with the higher investment by pharmaceutical manufacturers 
(Yi, Anandalingamb & Sorrell, 2003; Gagnon & Lexchin, 2008; Datta & Dave, 2016), and 
the promotion tool with the stronger impact on physicians’ prescribing behavior (Pitt & Nel, 
1988; Berndt, Bui, Reiley & Urban, 1996; Narayanan et al, 2003; Narayanan, Desiraju & 
Chintagunta, 2004; Narayanan, Manchanda & Chintagunta, 2005; Kalyanaram, 2008; Kremer 
et al, 2008; Kalyanaram, 2009; Dave & Saffer, 2012). It is a form of personal selling (Fischer 
& Albers, 2010), and a form of relational marketing (Gronroos, 1994). Its effect on physician 
prescribing behavior is on average significant, and positive (Kremer, Bijmolt, Leeflang & 
Wieringa, 2008), but modest (Stremersch & Van Dyck, 2009; Stremersch & Lemmens, 2009). 
Many European countries, with the goal of reducing the pressure on public health care 




2014). One of the forms of regulation is to limit the pharmaceutical manufacturers’ marketing 
practices, which can be self-imposed (Norris, Herxheimer, Lexchin & Mansfield, 2005; 
Francer et al, 2014), or government imposed (Stremersch & Lemmens, 2009). Government 
imposed regulation of marketing efforts to physicians has been addressed by several scholars 
including Brotzman & Mark (1992), Brotzman & Mark (1993), Wazana (2000), Brennan et al 
(2006), Liu et al (2016), and Karas, Bandari, Browning, Jacobs & Davies (2016), and have 
been demonstrated to have a negative effect on drug sales.  
The restriction on the number of detailing visits a manufacturer can make, in a given period of 
time – also called detailing ceiling (Liu et al, 2016; Liu, Liu & Chintagunta, 2017) is the form 
of regulation which will be more deeply addressed in our thesis. Despite the scant literature 
on this specific field, existing evidence suggests that constraining the number of detailing 
visits a pharmaceutical company can make can lead to a negative effect on the sales of the 
promoted drugs (Stremersch & Lemmens, 2009).  
This impact can be differentiated among drugs brands, as noted by Liu et al (2016). They 
estimated that, with a detailing ceiling, the drug with the largest detailing frequency suffers 
the most in terms of market share and profit decreases, while less detailed brand drugs appear 
to gain market share and profits, which suggests that a detailing ceiling may impact detailing 
elasticities differently among competing drug brands.  
We analyzed precisely the effect, on detailing flow elasticities and therefore physician 
prescription behavior -, of the entry into force of a detailing ceiling in Portugal in 2013 
through Order8213-B, to conclude whether it had any significant effect on the slope of the 
relation between detailing efforts and drug sales (using a Chow (1960) test, to search for 
eventual breaks in the time series). 
1.2.Research positioning 
The previous paragraphs presented the theoretical state-of-the-art grounding for detailing, its 
impact on physician prescription behavior, and the effect of a detailing ceiling on this impact. 
Based on the articles selected for the literature review, and in order to properly define our 
research positioning in the pharmaceutical marketing community, we analyzed the type of 
research method used by previous researchers studying detailing and its effect on physician 
prescription behavior. We created three groups: one group with articles using time series, with 
a list of 44 articles; one group using cross-sectional research or experiments, with eight 




time series will later be deeply analyzed, through a table characterizing the methods used, the 
variables analyzed, and the outcomes obtained in each article. 
Table 1.1, table 1.2 and table 1.3 below evidence the main journals, impact factor and number 
of citations of articles in each of the groups. 
Table 1.1 – Characterization of articles addressing detailing using a time series approach 
 
 
Note that 25 out of the 44 articles (or 57%) using time series approaches were published in 
top journals with a strong impact factor (weighted average of 3,05), and a high number of 
citations (weighted average of 110). 
Journal
Nr of articles using 
quantitative 






Average number of 
citations
(Google scholar, 08th 
February 2018)
Journal of Marketing 5 5,318 202
Journal of Marketing Research 4 3,654 131
Management Science 4 2,822 94
Marketing Science 6 2,123 96
Health Economics 2 2,301 40
Marketing Letters 2 1,818 80
Quantitative Marketing and Economics 2 1,333 21
Expert Systems with Applications 1 3,928 10
Journal of Political Economy 1 3,923 44
Social Science & Medicine 1 2,797 37
Technological Forecasting and Social Change 1 2,625 7
Journal of Advertising Research 1 2,034 1
International Journal of Research in Marketing 1 1,775 49
Health care management science 1 1,419 13
Applied Economics 1 0,648 7
The Journal of Law and Economics 1 N/A 227
Forum for Health Economics & Policy 1 N/A 227
The Economics of New Goods 1 N/A 159
HBS Marketing Research 1 N/A 107
Association of Medical Publications 1 N/A 56
Southern Economic Journal 1 N/A 52
International Journal of Pharmaceutical and Healthcare Marketing 1 N/A 25
Managerial and Decision Economics 1 N/A 27
International Journal of Pharmaceutical and Healthcare Marketing 1 N/A 25
SSRN Electronic Journal 1 N/A 15




Table 1.2 – Characterization of articles addressing detailing using cross-sectional research or 
experiments 
 
Having as a reference the articles selected for the literature review, only eight of them were 
identified as using either cross-sectional research (with questionnaires to physicians) or 
experiments (such as randomized control trials). 
Table 1.3 - Characterization of articles addressing detailing using a qualitative approach 
 
Also having as a reference the articles selected for the literature review, seven of them were 
identified as using qualitative research. 
In terms of research positioning in the community studying pharmaceutical marketing, this 
thesis will be framed, in the first phase, into previous quantitative research conducted by 
scholars using time-series data addressing detailing investments and drug prescriptions (or 
sales).  
Journal







Average number of 
citations
(Google scholar, 08th 
February 2018)
Annals of Internal Medicine 1 17,135 6
Journal of General Internal Medicine 1 3,701 141
British Journal of General Practice 1 2,760 66
Family Practice 1 1,804 70
Health Marketing Quarterly 1 N/A 46
Marketing Intelligence & Planning 1 N/A 1
International Journal of Pharmacy Practice 1 N/A 0
Articles on detailing and its effects on physician 
prescription behavior in the literature review perimeter
Journal








Average number of 
citations
(Google scholar, 08th 
February 2018)
Schizophrenia Research 1 3,986 9
British Journal of Clinical Pharmacology 1 3,493 18
European Journal of Clinical Pharmacology 1 2,902 49
Annals of Pharmacotherapy 1 2,748 109
The European Journal of Public Health 1 2,431 56
European Journal of Marketing 1 1,333 37
Health Marketing Quarterly 2 N/A 38
Articles on detailing and its effects on physician 




The first reason is the impact factor of the journals where previous research was published. As 
a second reason, the substantially higher number of articles using quantitative research, as 
opposed to qualitative research. Previous authors using the same research positioning include 
Gönül, Carter, Petrova & Srinivasan (2001), Narayanan, Manchanda & Chintagunta (2003), 
Manchanda & Chintagunta (2004), Mizik & Jacobson (2004), Manchanda, Rossi & 
Chintagunta (2004), Narayanan, Manchanda & Chintagunta (2005), Kalyanaram (2009), 
Leeflang & Wieringa (2010), Wieringa & Leeflang (2013), Ruiz-Conde, Wieringa & 
Leeflang (2014), Montoya, Netzer & Jedidi (2010), Datta & Dave (2016), and Liu et al 
(2016), to list a few.  
Third, the fact that research addressing detailing restriction policies, disclosure and regulation 
of direct-to-physician promotion activities has been gaining momentum, evidencing a 
growing dynamic as an area of interest in the research community, such as contributions from 
Stremersch & Lemmens (2009), Stremersch & Van Dyck (2009), Grande (2009), Alkhateeb 
et al (2011), Liu et al (2016), and Karas et al (2016), to highlight a few. 
Fourth, the fact that the quantitative research on pharmaceutical marketing is essentially 
circumscribed in the first group of articles, which is critical given that the current document is 
a thesis in Marketing. Despite the main focus being on quantitative research, we also 
performed a qualitative phase, to gain additional insights and help explain the results obtained 
with the quantitative phase. 
1.3.Research question: Relevance and originality 
The research question was set at the end of the literature review process, in the sequence of 
the analysis of the future research avenues of existing research on pharmaceutical marketing, 
promotion instruments and regulation policy. 
The research question is: 
 What is the impact of a detailing restriction policy on physicians’ prescription 
behavior 
Therefore, we argue that detailing ceiling policy has an impact on the prescription behavior of 
physicians (measured at the magnitude of the detailing flow elasticities), and this constitutes 
our thesis. 
Detailing impact on prescription behavior has been studied in the last decades, mostly using 




restrictions on pharmaceutical sales representatives’ access to physicians. Others are 
considering establishing such restrictions, as underlined by Stremersch & Van Dyck (2009). 
They suggested, as future research, the «development of models that allow for policy 
experiments (…) all models are estimated on data that show relatively little policy variance, 
which inhibits any extrapolation to policy shifts in detailing, either by the manufacturer /…) 
or by the regulator» (p. 13).  
Stros and Lee (2014) – who addressed the persistent rise of costs in the health sector – also 
stressed the need to implement policies «to reduce the high level of promotional influence on 
prescribers by inhibiting the companies’ promotional activities» (p. 330), while Wieringa & 
Leeflang (2013) asked for additional contributions to build empirical evidence whether the 
European pharmaceutical market is less or more responsive to marketing efforts than the US 
market.  
Liu et al (2016) developed research on the impact of simulated detailing restriction policies on 
prescription behavior and competitive detailing using counterfactual simulations from 
structural equations. They pointed to the importance of the study of the impact of detailing 
restriction policies, stressing that «(…) scant scholarly research has investigated how these 
restrictions on physician access impact physician prescription behavior and competitive 
detailing to physicians» (p. 2), and that «findings from counterfactual simulations provide 
rich implications for regulators and the pharmaceutical industry» (p. 18). All these calls for 
future research support the relevance of our research. 
Larkin, Ang, Avorn & Kesselheim (2014), when studying the impact of restriction of 
detailing activities in academic medical centers, found that a detailing restriction negatively 
impacts the market share of promoted drugs, and positively impacts the market share of 
nonpromoted drugs (antidepressants and antipsychotics in children). Three years later in a 
new article, Larkin et al (2017) found that detailing restriction policies had a modest but 
significant impact on physician prescription behavior (resulting in a reduction of on average 
1,67 percentage points in the market share of the detailed drug) in six of the eight drug classes 
studied, and in eight of the 11 academic medical centers who implemented detailing 
restriction policies.  
These two articles are recent contributions to the theory on detailing and restriction policies. 
However, they did not explicit whether the magnitude of the detailing restriction policy 




access to facilities. The extent to which the access had been limited (from a light access 
restriction to a full PSR ban in the centers facilities), might potentially have added additional 
insights on this research and magnify its generazability. They also lack the impact on 
competitive detailing, that is, how is the detailing dynamics affected by the entry into force of 
the policy restrictions (do all brands reduce their detailing efforts? Do the brands increase the 
usage of alternative promotion investments?). 
To the best of our knowledge, no additional research has been developed meanwhile, giving 
room to the analysis of the impact of detailing policy restrictions on prescription behavior, 
using data from a country – Portugal – that has actually set restriction access to physicians for 
detailing purposes, simultaneously to all institutions at a national level (Order 8213–B/2013 
imposed a detailing ceiling, setting limits to the number of visits pharmaceutical sales 
representatives can make to physicians and in each national health system infrastructure).  
In terms of research objectives, we divided in general and specific goals, associated to the 
research question: 
 General objective – Determine the impact of a detailing ceiling on physician 
prescription behavior 
 Specific objectives 
o Assess the relation between detailing flow and drug prescriptions 
o Assess the patterns of this relation among different therapeutic classes 
(markets) and products typologies 
o Assess the extent to which previous quantitative models are adequate to a 
Portuguese pharmaceutical industry dataset 
o Evaluate whether the moderating effect of a detailing ceiling negatively affect 
detailing flow elasticities 
o Generate a broader, holistic understanding of the Portuguese pharmaceutical 
market and the dynamics of the implementation of a detailing ceiling 
 
Our research adapts previous quantitative models to the Portuguese reality (models 8.1 to 
8.4), also using novel variables not studied in previous research, such as the effect, on 
physician prescription behavior, of the number of products presented during the calls, the 
percentage of calls where physicians declared they would increase or start prescribing the 




call. Our research also explores detailing elasticities in a new class – which we called “Blood” 
(respecting the request made by IQVIA for anonymity of classes and products) -, comprising 
very expensive recent drugs that noticed a substantial growth in terms of sales, and which 
represents, growingly from 2011-2012, a big burden on NHS budget.  
We argue that our thesis is the first work performed using a mixed method approach in the 
same research, to help understand the quantitative results in light of the specific market, 
social, economical and regulatory reality of the country and pharmaceutical industry, 
involving more than 20 participants from different stakeholders (pharmaceutical sales 
representatives, physicians, high officers from the NHS tutelage, NHS health care 
organizations, and pharmaceutical companies, physicians, and consultants). We argue it is the 
first time the effect of a nationally implemented detailing ceiling and its impact on physician 
prescription behavior is measured using both quantitative and qualitative data, and the first 
time the implementation and control of a detailing ceiling is addressed, to the best of our 
knowledge. All these aspects support the originality of our research. 
With our research, by analyzing the impact of a detailing restriction policy on detailing flow 
elasticities of several drugs, we argue that we generated not only quantitative robustness, but 




1.4.1. Literature review 
In the scope of the literature review of the state-of-the-art theories, EBSCO and b-on 
databases were used for articles search, using the following keywords: pharmaceutical 
marketing, pharmaceutical promotion, detailing and prescription, pharmaceutical regulation, 
detailing restriction policies.  
In a first moment, 123 articles were selected and abstracts were extracted and compiled into a 
single database in word processor format (DOC), with a balanced selection of less recent and 
more recent articles. The reading of these abstracts allowed a first understanding of the main 
concepts addressed by previous researchers in the pharmaceutical marketing and regulation 
and policy fields, and the most used methods for data analysis (quantitative using time series, 




focus groups). A special attention was given to the future research suggestions given by the 
scholars.  
As the literature review was developed, other references were extracted, adding articles from 
journals with high impact factors; articles with a substantial amount of citations; and articles 
often referenced by the most active researchers in this field.  
A special attention was given to the time horizon of the publication date, including as far as 
possible articles from 1980 to 2019, allowing the study of not only the historical references in 
this field, but also of more contemporaneous research.  
This process resulted in a final perimeter of 289 peer-reviewed articles analyzed. In the 
literature review process, we also analyzed a selection of 146 non-peer reviewed sources 
including pharmaceutical industry associations’ reports, pharmaceutical companies’ websites 
and reports, consulting companies’ reports, national health system legislation and reports, 
white papers from experts, reference books, and other, many of which cited in peer-reviewed 
articles (for instance, IQVIA syndicated data regarding medicines sales, promotion 
investment magnitude, and other). 
1.4.2. Research variables 
The performed literature review allowed the identification of the conceptual model, or 
theoretical pavement that permits the identification of the main variables involved, forming a 
research hypothesis, which specifies the relationship among variables in terms of direction 
(Creswell, 2014). The dependent variable is sell-in sales (measured as Ln Drug sales), the 
independent variable is the detailing intensity (measured as Ln Detailing flow), and the 
moderating variable is the policy measure consisting of the 2013 detailing ceiling (Order 
8213-B/2013). A visual representation of the conceptual model is presented below, in figure 





Figure 1.2 – Conceptual model 
Source: adapted from Liu et al (2016) 
 
1.4.3. Empirical study 
The empirical study observed a mixed research method, using a sequential explanatory 
design.  
The selection of this research approach was based on four main reasons: the search for 
comprehensiveness, as highlighted by O'Cathain, Murphy & Nicholl (2007), engaging with 
the «complexity of health, health care interventions, and the environment in which studies 
took place» (p. 85); a better understanding of the research problem «by converging broad 
numeric trends from quantitative research, and the detail of qualitative research», as 
underlined by Creswell (2009, p. 121); a more detailed understanding of the data by «using 
qualitative follow–up data to help explain a quantitative database», as pointed by Creswell 
(2014, p. 177); and the fact that «qualitative research may facilitate the interpretation of the 
relationship between variables», as suggested by Bryman & Bell (2015, p. 653).  
These last authors also underline the fact that «quantitative and the qualitative data deriving 
from mixed research methods research should be mutually illuminating» (p. 641), and that 
«triangulation involves using more than one method or source of data in the study of social 
phenomena» (p. 402). 





Figure 1.3 - Research method approach 
Source: adapted from Creswell (2009) 
The research objective was explanatory in the first phase, studying the causal effect of the 
detailing activities on the prescription behavior through time and the moderating effect of a 
detailing ceiling, on detailing elasticities. The research objective was then exploratory in the 
second phase, to help understand the specific results from the quantitative phase. The research 
was correlational in the quantitative phase, using a posteriori control (there was no control in 
the qualitative phase). In terms of context, both research phases were classified as field 
(natural).  
The selection of this research design (objective, control and context) for the quantitative phase 
was aligned with the designs used by the majority of the researchers in the pharmaceutical 
marketing community. These include (but not limited to) Fischer & Albers (2010), Liu et al 
(2016), Mizik & Jacobson (2004), Narayanan, Manchanda & Chintagunta (2003), Datta & 
Dave (2016), Gönül, Carter, Petrova & Srinivasan (2001), Kalyanaram (2009), Manchanda & 
Chintagunta (2004), Manchanda & Honka (2005), Montoya, Netzer & Jedidi (2010), 
Narayanan, Manchanda & Chintagunta (2005), and Riese et al (2015).  
For the qualitative phase, aimed at exploring insights on the behavior of healthcare 
professionals including physicians, the research design was aligned with previous work 
conducted by authors like Grundy, Bero & Malone (2016), Prosser & Walley (2013a), Prosser 
& Walley (2013b), Saavedra, O’Connor & Fugh-Berman (2017), and Skandrani & Sghaier 
(2016). 
The research used longitudinal data in the first phase, as observed by researchers in the 
pharmaceutical marketing community for quantitative research. A time series of drug sales 
and marketing investments was used (aligned with authors such as Fischer & Albers, 2010; 
Liu et al, 2016; Mizik & Jacobson, 2004; and Narayanan, Manchanda & Chintagunta, 2003). 
A data series of four years was used (19 months before the 2013 detailing restriction policy, 




measured on detailing flow elasticities, before and after the entry into force of a detailing 
ceiling. The research was then cross–sectional in the second phase. 
As we studied a specific European context (Portugal), we accounted for the fact that it has a 
very distinct reality regarding availability of prescription data, when compared to the USA. 
Physician-level prescription data is only available to SPMS (an institution in the perimeter of 
the NHS) and is not allowed, by law, for commercial purposes. Also, promotion data is only 
partially available to Infarmed through Placotrans, but at the moment we are writing this 
subchapter it is not organized and compiled properly, and misses the detailing activities 
(disclosure of detailing activities is not required).  
Therefore, we used secondary data collected by IQVIA, an American consulting company 
that resulted from the merger of IMS Health and Quintiles, providing services to the 
pharmaceutical industry. IQVIA (or companies acquired by former IMS Health, such as 
Verispan / Scott Levin, and SDI Health) has been the main data provider for research in the 
pharmaceutical marketing community, providing data for authors that studied detailing, 
including (but not limited to) Chintagunta & Desiraju (2005), Dave & Saffer (2012), Datta & 
Dave (2016), Dong, Chintagunta & Manchanda (2011), Dong, Manchanda & Chintagunta 
(2009), among others. Primary research was generated in the second phase, by exploring the 
moderation effect of a detailing ceiling on the impact of detailing on physician prescription 
behavior). 
The time series data IQVIA provided consisted of sales of eligible medicines through time, 
called sell–in data, defined as sales valued at the wholesale price (or price pharmacies pay to 
the wholesalers in the pharmaceutical marketing channels) – collected through agreements 
made with pharmaceutical wholesalers -, and promotion investments made by pharmaceutical 
companies (including detailing) – collected using a representative panel of physicians, whose 
data is extrapolated to the physician universes.  
Information from the quantitative phase was explored further using one case study consisting 
of the Portuguese pharmaceutical industry, for triangulation of results. The actors included 
prescribers (physicians), influencers (pharmaceutical sales representatives), regulators, and 
others that helped understand specificities of the quantitative results. A case study protocol 
was developed and implemented. Data collection methods and tools used were semi-
structured interviews, researcher observations, documental analysis, and non-structured 




1.5.Summary of results and conclusions 
This sub-chapter presents summarized insights on the results and conclusions of our thesis, 
allowing a preview of Chapter 15, where the complete set of results and conclusion have been 
presented in detail. 
After our research has been concluded, detailing remains the most used promotion instrument 
to interact with physicians, and generally the preferred one by physicians, especially more 
experienced ones, who tend to value the regular contact of PSRs and benefit from delivery of 
novelties and the prompt clarification of doubts. Detailing flow is on average the most 
impactful promotion instrument, with evidence coming both from the quantitative and 
qualitative steps of our research.  
The effect of detailing appears, however, to be smaller versus the effect observed in previous 
studies mainly conducted in the USA. Detailing is especially impactful in the case of younger 
drugs, which is consistent with the fact that most companies invest more heavily in detailing 
activities during the first stages of the drugs lifecycle. Also, detailing reduces the price 
elasticity of drugs, especially in the case of younger drugs. By other words, detailing appears 
to immunize, to a certain extent, doctors’ awareness and perception of drug price at the 
moment they prescribe a drug.  
Detailing is not only important in the case of current investments: past investments made in 
detailing activities generally have a positive impact on drug sales (carry-over effects of 
detailing), again especially in the case of younger or much younger drugs, while physicians 
are more prone to receive information about novelties. Detailing initiatives performed by 
competitor brands, or competitive detailing, generally have a negative impact on the own 
promoted drug.  
The usage of iPads / Tablets grew during the period of our analysis (2012-2015) and appears 
to bring positive effects to the sales of the promoted drugs, probably given the novelty effect 
of this new communication technology, with interactive screens. Physicians revealing more 
positive future prescription intentions regarding the promoted drugs are more likely to 
promote them. A high number of promoted drugs during a sales call may negatively impact 
the main drug promoted. 
Most likely, Order 8213-B/2013 was not entirely implemented on a national basis, given the 
difficulty to control PSRs access to the NHS in a conjuncture of reduced administrative and 




The 2013 detailing ceiling had a higher effect during the first year, then losing effectiveness 
due to some decompression of the control, apparently absent to many of the interviewees. The 
North, Center, and high population regions apparently had a higher control than the South 
(Alentejo and Algarve) regions. Control is likely higher in certain political scenarios (in 
ACES). Pharmaceutical companies reacted to the ceiling mainly by increasing the investment 
in group sessions, in digital channels and promotion tools.  
As seen in our quantitative phase with our time series, Order 8213-B/2013 apparently did 
not provoke a structural change in physician prescription behavior measured through 
detailing flow elasticities, given that not one single product evidence significant changes 
in its elasticities, before and after the entry into force of this ceiling, which represents 
the main conclusion of our thesis. At most, as addressed during the qualitative phase, it may 
have marginally impacted the beginning of the prescription of new medicines, less promoted 
in some NHS institutions. Much stronger than the detailing ceiling by itself are likely other 
measures including INN prescription, highly constraining prescription systems, expense 
ceilings, the economic crisis, Troika intervention, among other, who in fact created the 
ground for a new paradigm in the pharmaceutical industry, in Portugal.  
1.6.Summary of contributions 
This sub-chapter presents summarized insights on the contributions to the theory, to the 
practice, and to the public policy, allowing to preview the detailed presentation described in 
chapter 13.2. 
Our research contributes to the theory with several insights to management and marketing, by 
confirming, by the one hand, previous research on detailing (Pitt & Nel, 1988; Berndt et al, 
1995; Narayanan et al, 2003; Narayanan, Desiraju & Chintagunta, 2004; Narayanan, 
Manchanda & Chintagunta, 2005; Kalyanaram, 2008; Leeflang & Wieringa, 2010, and many 
others, and by the other hand generating new evidences such as for instance the stronger 
impact of detailing on price elasticities of younger versus older drugs (Rizzo, 1999; Gönül et 
al, 2001; Narayanan et al, 2004; Windmeijer et al, 2006), and the finding that detailing carry-
over effect on drug sales is more intense in the case of younger drugs (generating additional 
insights on research conducted by Narayanan et al, 2004; Zoltners, Sinha & Lorimer, 2004; 
Yi, 2008; Montoya, Netzer & Jedidi, 2010; Liu et al, 2016). Our research also contributed by 
studying novel, fresh data in the study of pharmaceutical marketing and specifically detailing 
(building on previous research in the field of pharmaceutical marketing developed by authors 




Chintagunta, 2004; Narayanan, Manchanda & Chintagunta, 2005; Kalyanaram, 2008; Kremer 
et al, 2008; Kalyanaram, 2009; Dave & Saffer, 2012). Our research also contributed with the 
discovery of the inexistence of a significant statistical effect of the detailing ceiling on 
physician prescription behavior, which goes against previous theory developed by Brotzman 
& Mark (1992), Brotzman & Mark (1993), Liu et al (2016), Karas et al (2016), and Larkin et 
al (2017). It also evidenced that the detailing ceiling benefited from several exogenous 
variables impacting much more the number of PSRs and physicians’ prescription behavior 
than the ceiling itself. 
Our research also contributes to the practice, considering several stakeholders scopes. It 
allows pharmaceutical companies a better understanding of the effect of several promotion 
tools (including detailing) on physician prescription behavior, using a European database, 
allowing a better sales force effectiveness policy. They can also benefit from the 
understanding of the implementation and impact of a national detailing ceiling. Marketing 
departments can most efficiently calibrate their communication and promotion activities, in 
order to meet stakeholders’ (especially prescribers) expectations. The new variables used in 
our research can provide critical insights for pharmaceutical and biotechnological companies 
in the scope of promotion and salesforce effectiveness. Associative institutions – such as 
APIFARMA – can benefit from the insights generated in our research, allowing them to be 
better prepared and backed by empirical evidence on the areas where the detailing ceiling may 
be improved. Physicians can benefit by confirming the existence, in several products 
analyzed, of a clear effect of detailing on prescription behavior, allowing doctors to become 
aware of this influence and be better equipped to interact with PSRs and the pharmaceutical 
industry in general. 
Our research also contributes to the public policy. Policy makers may benefit from our 
research by a series of reasons. The first is the realization that detailing initiatives do impact 
physician prescription behavior in Portugal, especially in the case of more recent (and 
typically more expensive, and reimbursed) drugs. This evidence may raise the attention on the 
topic of pharmaceutical marketing in general, in a scenario of very constrained budgeted costs 
with medicines. The tutelage can also understand that the ceiling may have not been totally 
implemented and controlled, allowing the study and launch of eventual corrective measures. 
The tutelage can clearly benefit from analyzing the delicate equilibrium between the need to 




the pharmaceutical companies assistance in training, raising awareness on pathologies, and 
assisting doctors on a regular base. 
1.7.Thesis structure 
This document is organized in chapters, each one starting with the content and logic of the 
chapter, addressing the main concepts, exploring the state of the art knowledge, ending with a 
synthesis of the main findings to help systematize the existing knowledge, also helping later 
to develop the conceptual model. 
Chapter two describes the main theories on the life science industry and life science 
marketing, providing the macro theoretical pavement for the development of the rest of the 
literature review.  
Chapter three addresses sales force management in the pharmaceutical industry, highlighting 
theories on sales force effectiveness, customer relationship management and sales force 
automation, and pharmaceutical sales representatives.  
Chapter four approaches the main theories on physicians (as the main professional class with 
prescription authority) and on medical prescription (and factors influencing it).  
Chapter five analyzes pharmaceutical industry promotion, highlighting theories on 
communication channels, promotion tools (specially detailing), promotion tools investment 
magnitude, and perspectives on pharmaceutical promotion such as push versus pull).  
Chapter six addresses regulation of pharmaceutical marketing activities, studying theories on 
self-regulation, government regulation, and regulation effectiveness.  
Chapter seven presents the conceptual model, built based on the literature review presented 
from chapters two to six.  
Chapter eight makes a brief analysis of health care in Portugal, covering bases on health 
economics, the pharmaceutical market in Portugal, and the Portuguese pharmaceutical 
legislative framework overview (years 2000 to 2017), to help understand the specific national 
framework and to help adjust the methodology to apply in the empirical study.  
Chapter nine presents the methodology observed in this thesis, from the literature review, to 




Chapter ten covers the quantitative empirical study and chapter eleven addresses the 
qualitative empirical study.  
Chapter 12 covers the discussion, comparing the results from the empirical study against the 
theory and the conceptual model, while chapter 13 addresses the contributions of our research 
to the theory, to the industry practice, and to the public policy.  
Chapter 14 presents the answer to the research question, chapter 15 explores the conclusions 
generated by our research and chapter 16 covers the limitations of our work.  
Finally, chapter 17 explores our suggestions for future research on the topics of our work, and 




















2. Life sciences industry and life sciences marketing 
2.1.Content and logic of the chapter 
This chapter addresses the theories on life sciences and life sciences marketing and has the 
goal of providing a theoretical framework where the pharmaceutical industry and its 
promotion activities are embedded. 
The chapter starts by addressing the reference literature on life sciences industry and its 
components, the drug research and development process, the distribution channels, and 
alliances in healthcare. Second, the life sciences marketing is addressed, and its main 
components are explained. At the end, a reflection on the main issues covered in the reviewed 
literature is made, as well as their implications on the study of detailing as a promotion 
instrument in the pharmaceutical industry. 
Appendix 1.1 explores the concepts of distribution channels and alliances in healthcare. 
2.2.Concepts 
Several main concepts are covered in this chapter. The life sciences industry includes three 
components, which are pharmaceutical industry, biotechnological industry, and therapeutic 
medical devices industry. Research and development is the process by which the life sciences 
industry discovers, develops and tests new compounds, which will lead to new medicines 
launches. Pharmaceutical industry supply chains consist of drug manufacturers, wholesalers, 
and pharmacies. Alliances represent a mechanism for companies to search for collaborative 
solutions to common problems, aimed at generating benefits and/or minimizing costs. The life 
sciences marketing is a novel field in marketing, offering opportunities to study its unique 
issues and problems. It includes therapy creation, therapy launch, and therapy promotion. 
2.3.Life sciences industry 
The life sciences industry represents a significant weight in world economy. Latest 2017 
global life sciences sector outlook developed by Deloitte (2017) estimates that, by the year 
2020, the life sciences weight on the GDP will reach 10,5%, an increase of 0,1 percentage 
points from the 2015 estimates. 
2.3.1. The uniqueness of the life sciences industry 
The life sciences industry has several uniqueness features when compared to buyer consumer 
goods industries. Patients are the payers of the drugs (by their own money or through heatlh 




who select a drug among a set of alternatives (Gönül et al, 2001), making prescription 
medicines market part of a captive market (Lexchin, 1997). By other words, the stakeholders 
who decide the product to prescribe, and to whom most promotional effort is directed, as not 
the purchasers, as underlined by Caplow & Raymond (1954). They also noted that it is an 
innovation-based industry where only a few products may have definite success in the market, 
and where elasticity of demand is low for many products. 
This industry is characterized by a peak in drugs’ sales trajectories, in terms of both height-of-
peak-sales and the time necessary to achieve the peak sales, as noted by Fischer, Leeflang & 
Verhoef (2010). They explained that this peak is justified by four reasons: first, sales 
dynamics are mainly driven by first-time prescriptions (physicians do not easily switch to 
another brand, once the patient is stable taking the first prescribed drug); second, companies 
employ the majority of their promotion investments in the first two years after the drug 
launch, which provokes a substantial acceleration on drug sales; third, there is a limit in the 
prevalence of the specific pathologies, that is, there is a limited number of patients who could 
benefit from the drug; fourth, new competitors entering the market such as generics and 
innovative competitors may limit the peak in sales. 
2.3.2. Components of the life sciences industry 
The life sciences industry comprises three components: pharmaceutical industry, 
biotechnological industry and therapeutic medical devices industry, all of three science and 
patent based (Stremersch & Van Dyck, 2009). While the pharmaceutical industry develops 
and markets inorganic compounds (chemically developed drugs such as statins, a class of 
medicines frequently used to lower blood cholesterol levels, or vasodilators, used in the 
treatment of hypertension), the biotechnological industry develops and markets organic 
compounds (such as Humira or Remicade, immunosuppressive agents used in the treatment of 
autoimmune diseases), and the therapeutic medical devices industry develops and markets 
instruments, materials, appliances, used for the prevention and treatment of diseases in the 
human body. Stremersch & Van Dyck (2009) present an example of a situation covering all 
three components of the life science industry at the same time: in the treatment of breast 
cancer, pharmaceutical drugs can be used in the chemotherapy process, biologics can be used 





Chung, Kim & Park (2017), based on data provided by QuintilesIMS, noted that the global 
market for prescription drugs is likely to grow from $1.1 trillion in 2016 to $1.5 trillion in 
2021, worldwilde. 
2.3.3. Drug research & development process 
The life sciences industry develops research and development discovering thousands of new 
compounds. As noted by Sedgwick (2014), the research and development process includes a 
series of stages, in which drugs are only tested in humans after they have been tested in 
laboratory. From human testing is then divided in sequential clinical trials called phase I, 
phase II, phase III and phase IV. According to Sedgwick (2014), «generally, phase I trials 
establish safety and tolerability in healthy volunteers; phase II trials determine the drugs’ 
efficacy and adverse effects at different dosages in patients; phase III trials establish the 
effectiveness and safety of the drug compared with placebo or current standard treatment; 
and phase IV trials determine general risks and benefits after the drug has been licensed» (p. 
1). Sedgwick (2014) also underlined that the number of participants in each consecutive phase 
generally increases, and that drugs that do not meet effectiveness and safety strict parameters 
during the drug development will not be eligible to advance to the next phases. 
The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America summarized the 
Biopharmaceutical Research & Development Process (PhRMA (2017), here shown in figure 
2.1. 
 
Figure 2.1 - The Biopharmaceutical Research & Development Process 




Of the new compounds discovered, only a small percentage of which (between 1 in 5000 to 1 
in 10000) will eventually enter the market (Stremersch & Van Dyck, 2009). These newly 
discovered compounds will experience a preclinical phase where they will be tested to 
evaluate whether they may potentially provoke serious harm, or cause toxicity, in vitro (in a 
test tube) and in vivo (in a body of a living organism), as explained by FDA (2017c). 
Compounds that successfully meet the preclinical requirements will move to the clinical trials 
phase, where they will be tested in humans. Considering only the compounds that enter phase 
1 clinic development, an average of only one out of ten (10,4%) will move to FDA approval 
(Hay, Thomas, Craighead, Economides, & Rosenthal, 2014), a situation referred by Ding & 
Eliashberg (2002) as a pipeline funnel. The estimate of the overall clinical success rate of new 
compounds that enter phase I and reach marketing approval was confirmed by more recent 
research conducted by DiMasi, Grabowski & Hansen (2016), suggesting a value of 11,83%. 
By diluting the costs on non-FDA approved drugs with the costs of approved drugs, DiMasi, 
Grabowski & Hansen (2016) estimated a cost of USD$1395 million per new marketing-
approved drug, but this estimate rises to USD$2,588 million when considering also the cost of 
capital invested, or USD$2870 million considering post-approval R&D costs too. Whenever a 
new drug receives marketing approval, 10 to 12 years on average have passed from the new 
compound application filling to the end of the clinical development, as highlighted by 
Stremersch & Van Dyck (2009). They also underlined patents of the new compounds are 
granted for 20 years before generics can enter the market. A direct implication is that 
pharmaceutical manufacturers that get their new drugs approved for commercialization will 
have approximately only 8 to 10 years of market exclusivity. 
2.4.Life sciences marketing 
The life sciences marketing is, according to Stremersch & Van Dyck (2009) a novel, nascent 
field in marketing, offering opportunities for scholars to research its specific issues and 
unique challenging problems, using high-quality available data and that have a significant 
impact transcending the typical problems generally investigated by marketing researchers. 
The life sciences industry key marketing decision areas framework developed by Stremersch 
& Van Dyck (2009) offers a perspective of the main dimensions scholars and industry 
professionals may observe in their academic investigation and managerial practices. The first 
consists of therapy creation, the second consists of therapy launch, and the third consists of 






Figure 2.2 - Key Marketing decision areas in the life sciences 
Source: Stremersch & Van Dyck (2009) 
More recently, Stros & Lee (2015) proposed a more traditional concept view of the 
pharmaceutical marketing model, shown in figure 2.3. Based in their systematic review of the 
marketing dimensions in the prescription pharmaceutical industry, they found that 
«pharmaceutical promotion as a marketing instrument appears to be considerably more 
relevant than price, product of place» (p. 322). They found that promotion policy was 
substantially more frequent in the literature (97 times mentioned), than price (25), product 
(16), and place (5). 
 
Figure 2.3 - Conceptual pharmaceutical marketing model 
Source: Stros & Lee (2015) 
We will now detail the life sciences marketing components proposed by Stremersch & Van 
Dyck (2009). 
Figure 1 - Key Marketing Decision Areas in Life Sciences Firms 
Therapy Creation        Therapy Launch               Therapy Promotion 
 - Therapy pipeline  - Global marketing           - Sales force 
   optimization     entry timings               management 
 
 - Innovation alliance  - Key opinion leader           - Communication 
   formation     selection              management 
 
 - Therapy positioning               - Stimulating patient 




2.4.1. Therapy creation, therapy launch and therapy promotion 
Therapy creation encompasses, as shown in figure 1, therapy pipeline optimization, 
innovation alliance formation and therapy positioning. Therapy pipeline optimization 
consists, as noted by Stremersch & Van Dyck (2009), of premarket decisions on portfolio or 
pipeline optimization, regarding all phases of drug development. Innovation alliance 
formation is related to decisions concerning alliances during the product development stages. 
And therapy positioning comprises, as highlighted by Stremersh & Van Dyck (2009), 
premarket decisions on segmentation and targeting of the product (which they refer to as 
competitive positioning.  
Therapy launch covers global marketing entry timings and key opinion leader selection. As 
explained by Stremersch & Van Dyck (2009), while the former «Includes decisions regarding 
optimal market entry timing, pioneer versus follower advantages, international launch 
strategy, and new product market potential forecasting» (p. 9), the later «includes the 
structuring of the company’s key opinion leader network for maximum effectiveness» (p. 9). 
Therapy promotion comprehends sales force management, communication management, and 
stimulating patient compliance. Stremersch & Van Dyck (2009) explained these three 
components. Communication management’s perimeter contains the creation of optimal 
communication strategies (such as medical publications, direct-to-consumer advertising, also 
known by DTCA (in the US and New Zealand, the only countries allowing DTCA advertising 
of prescription drugs), and on-line communication with both physician and patient 
communities. Stimulating patient compliance includes the design of optimized patient 
compliance programs, which aim, as noted by Stremersch & Van Dyck (2009), patient 
adherence and welfare to the prescribed treatments, and company profit. Sales force 
management, the first of the three sub-topics, will be addressed separately in the next topic. 
2.4.2. Co-marketing and co-promotion 
We will now highlight the concepts of co-promotion and co-marketing. 
As noted by Bronder & Pritzl (1992), co-marketing and co-promotion are forms of sales 
alliances. According to their definitions, while co-marketing is an alliance where a product is 
distributed and promoted by a company and business partners under a different name, co-
promotion involves the promotion of one brand name by a company and selected business 
partners. In both cases, business partners can be one or more of the company competitors. 




that while co-marketing involves direct competition by two or more trademarks, co-promotion 
«allows two companies to combine their resources and promote the product under one name» 
(p. 418). More recently, Liu, Liu & Chintagunta (2017) explained that a co-marketing is an 
«agreement in which two companies promote the same chemical but with different brand 
names» (p. 3). 
These types of alliances may be useful, as noted by Bronder & Pritzl (1992) when addressing 
the GSK case in the 1980’s, when a company may not have the sufficient sales force 
resources and marketing strength to promote a brand or a drug alone. Bronder & Pritzl (1992) 
noted that co-marketing may involve some potential for cannibalization, since two or more 
brands are competing for the same prescribers. Co-marketing may however involve higher 
costs in terms of marketing and organization, due to the establishment of two or more brands 
names, and has been losing ground to co-promotion, according to Moss (2001). Carter (2005) 
also underlined that whereas co-promotion has a greater financial role in the scope of such 
alliances (mainly when drugs have high sales potential), co-marketing may be more used in 
local agreements. 
Figure 2.4 evidences this increase in the number of deals, here shown as a sum of licensing, 
co-promotion and co-marketing agreements. 
 
Figure 2.4 – Total annual number of pharmaceutical deals 





2.5.Chapter synthesis of main findings 
In the present chapter a literature review on the components of the life sciences, its brief 
characterization, and the life sciences marketing was performed. The review allowed 
identifying the pharmaceutical industry as one of the components of the life sciences industry. 
The pharmaceutical industry has several characteristics which contribute to its uniqueness. It 
is a research and development intensive industry, dependent on a robust pipeline of new 
compounds discovery, from which only a small percentage will be commercialized, usually 
representing a cost of more than USD$2500 million per each market-approval new drug. 
This chapter also allowed the identification of therapy promotion as one of the pillars of the 
life sciences marketing. The convergence of pharmaceutical industry by the one hand, and 
therapy promotion by the other hand, allowed the outlining of the research perimeter to be 
developed in the empirical part of this thesis (study of detailing, a pharmaceutical marketing 

















3. Sales force management in the pharmaceutical industry 
3.1.Content and logic of the chapter 
This chapter addresses the theories on sales force management, and its application in the 
pharmaceutical industry. Its relevance is due to the fact that detailing is an instrument of sales 
force management (Stremersch & Van Dyck, 2009), which demands an analysis of 
pharmaceutical industry-related sales force theories. 
The chapter starts with the review of base concepts regarding sales force management. 
Appendix 1.2 addresses the concepts of sales force effectiveness, a central concept in sales 
force management in the pharmaceutical industry. Upstream in the sales process, this section 
addresses the physician profiling, segmentation and targeting, moving then to the 
development of the optimal frequencies for the interactions with clients, in order to define the 
optimal number of representatives in the sales force team. It also addresses the importance of 
the sales force structure and design, and the relevance of sales territory alignment. It covers 
additional processes regarding sales force effectiveness such as recruiting and selection, 
training, compensation, and supervision and evaluation. 
Appendix 1.2 also addresses the theories on customer relationship management (CRM) and 
sales force automation (SFA) in the pharmaceutical industry. The reasoning for this analysis 
resides in two main aspects: by the one hand, the importance of CRM as a philosophy in the 
management of the relationship between pharmaceutical manufacturers and their 
stakeholders, mainly physicians (the prescribers); by the other hand, SFA theories contribute 
to a broader understanding of the processes involving the interaction between PSRs and 
physicians. CRM and SFA concepts in the scope of the pharmaceutical industry will be 
addressed. It then addresses how manufacturers use information gathered in customer 
information databases, highlighting the main SFA tools covered in the literature. Closed-loop 
marketing is covered, highlighting its importance in the pharmaceutical marketing and sales 
management, since its usage can provide pharmaceutical manufacturers and their PSRs with a 
broader knowledge of their stakeholders. The sub-chapter then ends with the exploration of 
the main benefits and main barriers to the implementation of SFA in the scope of the 
pharmaceutical industry. 
Another sub-chapter covers theories on pharmaceutical sales representatives (PSRs), of high 
relevance due to the fact that they constitute pharmaceutical manufacturers sales force teams, 




both investment magnitude and effect on physicians’ prescription behavior. Therefore, the 
study of the main literature on PSRs allows for a broader understanding of the theoretical 
background of the current thesis. The sub-chapter begins by addressing the main concepts 
regarding PSRs, namely the definitions present in the literature, and persuasion and 
reciprocity which are involved in PSRs interactions with physicians. It then addresses PSRs 
roles (which are both informative and promotional), and explains the different typologies of 
PSRs (from general PSRs to key account managers). PSRs activities are also explored, with a 
characterization of the main tasks developed in their daily routine. The sub-chapter then 
examines the growing difficulty PSRs are facing in their contacts with physicians, due to a 
significant decline in the access to these stakeholders. 
A synthesis of the main findings gathered in the several sub-chapters will then be made. 
3.2.Concepts 
Kotler & Armstrong (2012) positioned sales force management as part of the personal selling 
concept, defining the latter as «the interpersonal arm of the promotion mix. A company’s 
sales force creates and communicates customer value through personal interactions with 
customers» (p. 464). They continued by noting that «personal selling involves interpersonal 
interactions between salespeople and individual customers—whether face-to-face, by 
telephone, via e-mail, through video or Web conferences, or by other means» (p. 465), also 
underlining the two main roles of the personal selling: linking the company with its 
customers, and coordinating marketing and sales. 
Following Stremersch & Van Dyck (2009) framework, sales force management encompasses 
decisions on optimal sizing (number of pharmaceutical sales representatives) and targeting 
(selection of the right physicians to impact with detailing activities) of the sales force, 
decisions that optimize sales call quality (defining the optimal drug attributes to be discussed 
with the physicians during a sales call), and the optimization of the use of drug samples, 
including sales response models such as the impact of detailing on prescription behavior. 
Figure 3.1, developed using Stremersch & Van Dyck framework, evidences detailing as one 





Figure 3.1 - Marketing of the Life Sciences 
Source: adapted from Stremersch & Van Dyck (2009) 
Kotler & Armstrong (2012) defined sales force management as «analyzing, planning, 
implementing, and controlling sales force activities. It includes designing sales force strategy 
and structure and recruiting, selecting, training, compensating, supervising, and evaluating 
the firm’s salespeople» (p. 468). According to Drexl & Haase (1999), «sales force deployment 
involves the concurrent resolution of four interrelated subproblems: sizing the sales force, 
salesman location, sales territory alignment, and sales resource allocation» (p. 1). 
Another concept in the scope of sales force management is sales force effectiveness (SFE, 
appendix 1.2). As noted by Zoltners, Sinha & Lorimer (2008), sales force effectiveness 
involves a series of drivers including a set of basic decisions, processes, systems, and 
programs that impact the sales structure, salespeople, and activities. Sales force effectiveness 
addresses sales analytics and profiling, segmentation, targeting, call planning, sales force 
sizing and structure, territory alignment, salesforce recruiting, evaluation, compensation, and 
supervision and evaluation, concepts that are individually covered in the SFE sub-chapter 
(appendix 1.2). 
Customer relationship management and sales force automation concepts are also covered in 
appendix 1.2. Pharmaceutical companies have the need of handling substantial amounts of 
data from their clients (physicians and other stakeholders), which needs to be gathered, 




effectiveness processes. In this scope, a customer relationship management (CRM) vision is 
important, in order to enhance customer relationships, through sales force automation (SFA) 
technological tools. CRM consists of processes and technologies that enhance customer 
relationships, and SFA handles only with technological tools. Consequently, CRM is a more 
comprehensive concept than SFA. A full sub-chapter addresses CRM and SFA theories in 
more detail (appendix 1.2). 
Pharmaceutical sales representatives (PSRs), also called reps, or detail men (Caplow & 
Raymond, 1954; Williams & Hensel, 1991), are trained salespersons employed by 
pharmaceutical companies. They visit physicians providing them information, education, 
gifts, drug samples, and free meals, with the goal of both provide scientific support and 
promote medicines. PSRs try to persuade physicians to prescribe the promoted medicines. 
 
3.3.Pharmaceutical sales representatives 
Pharmaceutical sales representatives, also called reps, or (formerly) detail men (Caplow & 
Raymond, 1954), are trained salespersons employed by pharmaceutical companies. As 
suggested by Alkhateeb et al (2011), PSRs «are employed to provide education specific 
information and material to physician offices, hospitals, pharmacies, and other healthcare 
providers» (p. 224), in an attempt to increase prescription volume by influencing prescribers. 
The regular contact PSRs have with physicians, presenting scientific information, but also 
providing free office and sometimes personal gifts, as well as free meals, may be discussed 
under Gass & Seiter (2016) complete model of persuasion, in the sense that detailing can be a 
situation of face-to-face persuasion. The relation between PSRs and physicians can also be 
analyzed using Cialdini (1993) principles of persuasion. 
Roughead, Harvey & Gilbert (1998), when studying general practitioners audiotapes of 
encounters between PSRs and physicians (detailing), found that the reciprocity principle was 
the most frequent principle observed in the audiotapes, including «sample supply, gifts, 
printed material, patient information leaflets and invitations» (p. 308). By the virtue of the 
reciprocity rule, physicians may feel obligated to reciprocate PSR regular assistance and free 
meals by increasing the likelihood of prescribing the medicines brands they promote. 
Roughead, Harvey & Gilbert (1998) presented an example of a reciprocation act: «Doctor: 
I’ve used ‘Your Brand’ on a couple of occasions when I’ve had samples of it and had a good 




bound to reciprocate PSRs, due to their support. Other researchers have addressed Cialdini’s 
principle of reciprocity in the scope of detailing. Sah & Fugh-Berman (2013) synthetized 
pharmaceutical industry influence tools on prescribers in three levels: national (through 
industry grants to medical organizations and public-private partnerships), institutional 
(educational grants, continuous medical education, travel expenses) and individual (fees for 
research, consulting, speaking, gifts of meals, medical equipment and books). 
Other Cialdini (1993) principles of persuasion may apply to the interactions between PSRs 
and physicians. Roughead, Harvey & Gilbert (1998) found evidences of the principles of 
authority (by quoting professors, medical specialists, specialist groups and specialist 
hospitals), social validation (using “other doctors” reference as a peer group), and 
commitment/consistency (involving a direct request for prescriptions, or a series of questions 
or statements that conducted physicians to express an agreement to prescribe the drug), 
frequently used by the PSRs in order to influence physicians’ prescription behavior. 
3.3.1. Roles 
PSRs provide a series of roles in the pharmaceutical industry, in their interactions with 
physicians. One of which is to provide physicians with important information about a drug's 
composition, its therapeutic value and side effects, and adequate dosage, as noted by Parsons 
& Abeele (1981). Wright & Lundstrom (2004) referred that PSRs responsibility is to provide 
credible product information to physicians, in a more and more controlled environment such 
as reduced access to physicians. 
PSRs also have a role in pharmaceutical marketing, as important marketing and sales 
instruments, according to Scharitzer & Kollarits (2000). PSRs role is also to «assess 
physicians’ personalities, practice styles, and preferences, and to relay this information back 
to the company», since «personal information may be more important than prescribing 
preferences» (Fugh-Berman & Ahari, 2007, p. 621). Caplow & Raymond (1954) explained 
that PSRs primary role is to «describe products and to maintain good public relations so that 
the physician will be favorably disposed to the company and its products when he comes to 
the writing of prescriptions» (p. 18). 
3.3.2. Typologies 
Alkhateeb et al (2011) distinguished three types of PSRs: general PSRs, specialized PSRs, 





General pharmaceutical sales representatives  
General PSRs visit physicians usually at their offices and are typically seen visiting 
prescribers and pharmacists. As noted by Alkhateeb et al (2011), general PSRs usually have a 
high knowledge not only about the drugs they promote, but also about competitor drugs, and 
hand physicians with merchandising materials such as pens and pads, aimed at increasing 
physician awareness of the promoted products. 
Specialized pharmaceutical sales representatives 
Specialized PSRs generally work in hospital settings. As noted by Alkhateeb et al (2011), 
hospitals present a very specific situation to pharmaceutical companies, since physicians 
usually may not have the ability of prescribing all the drugs available, due to the existence of 
hospital formularies, regulated by a pharmacy and therapeutics (P&T) committee, which 
includes «physicians, pharmacists, nurses, and other appointed healthcare professionals» (p. 
224). This main difference to the ambulatory market demands a specific type of PSR, more 
focused on negotiation in order to get the promoted products available in the hospital 
formulary. Alkhateeb et al (2011) also noted that these specialized PSRs may be involved in 
group purchasing organizations (GPO), created to take advantage of volume discount 
contracts. 
Medical science liaisons 
Medical liaisons are a type of PSR with a clinical background. As explained by Alkhateeb et 
al (2011), medical liaisons can promote products alongside or as opposed to general PSRs. 
They also highlighted that medical liaisons usually have scientific or healthcare degree such 
as a PhD, a MD, or a PharmD, and that they receive sales training too. According to Moss & 
Black (2013) survey of academic and practicing KOLs, MSLs’ role is also important in 
providing KOL with education, information, professional network, and engaging in 
intellectual conversations. Baker (2010) suggested that medical science liaisons may be 
considered as “glorified sales representatives”, and underlined the main differences between 
PSRs and MSLs: while both must be prepared to explain the drugs or devices mechanism of 
action, the MSL goes beyond this, being able to «discuss in the background science, related 
research, and pharmacokinetics of the product» (p. 395). Nair, Manchanda & Bhatia (2010) 




MSLs roles can include, as noted by Jacob (2018), preparation and review of drug literature, 
guaranteeing its compliance with regulation, training of the PSRs team on scientific and 
medical aspects of the promoted drugs, and keeping good relations with KOLs in the industry. 
Key account managers 
The increased pressure on medicines prices, the generics competition, and eroding margins of 
branded medicines led pharmaceutical companies, as noted by Alt, Österle, Puschmann, 
Barak & Huber (2003), to adopt a new type of PSR – Key account managers (KAMs). KAM 
role has expanded from simple promotion activities, to include, as highlighted by Padhy & 
Patnaik (2008), «local account strategy, team selling, focused expertise, training, coaching 
and mentoring activities» (p. 7). Key account management is a sales channel, and typically 
takes care of big customers including hospitals, wholesalers, and pharmacies (Puschmann & 
Alt, 2001). As underlined by Padhy & Patnaik (2008), the key account management approach 
allow sales and medical representatives to build strong relationships not only with key 
prescribers, but also with prescribers’ influencers, by analyzing and understanding their 
professional needs and factors underlying their prescription decisions. 
3.3.3. Activities 
PSRs typically have a panel of 200 physicians, of which 120 should be visited in four to six 
weeks cycles (Sfetcu, 2014). They do not sell drugs directly to buyers (patients), targeting 
instead physicians, trying to influence them to increase the promoted drugs sales (Fugh-
Berman & Ahari, 2007). Salmasi et al (2016) noted that PSRs job is to introduce and market 
their companies’ products, using, in the interaction with physicians, several promotion 
instruments such as free drug samples, gifts, free meals and sponsorships. 
Pharmaceutical sales representatives can make between five and ten visits per day (Datta & 
Dave, 2016). Parsons & Abeele (1981), and Yi, Anandalingam & Sorrell (2003) suggest that 
PSRs visit, on average, seven physicians per day. The number of visits per day can however 
vary depending on the medical specialties visited, geographic dispersion of the doctors to 
visit, and other factors. For instance, oncology PSRs typically are assigned five visits per day, 
but only can perform an average of less than three (ZS Associates, 2013). 
In each visit, the reps can present more than one detail (one detail is one product mention), so 
a single sales call can produce several detail contacts with phsycians (Berndt, Danzon & 
Kruse, 2007). Parsons & Abeele (1981) suggested that the number of details per visit is three 




3.3.4. Declining access to physicians 
According to a ZS Access Monitor report (ZS, 2016a), based on call activity of more than 
40,000 sales representatives on more than 400.000 prescribers, 44% of physicians are 
considered accessible in 2016. This number compares to 47% in 2015, 51% in 2014, 55% in 
2013, 65% in 2012, and nearly 80% in 2008, meaning that pharmaceutical reps may be facing 
some challenges regarding access to some physicians. The same report states that «38% of 
reps were ‘access-restricted’ (…) and 18% were severely ‘access-restricted’” (p. 1). 
Figure 3.2 evidences the higher difficulty PSRs are experiencing in reaching physicians, 
showing an almost linear tendency. 
 
Figure 3.2 – PSRs declining access to physicians – Years 2008 to 2016 
Source: ZS (2016a). Access MonitorTM and Affinity MonitorTM 2016 Executive Summary 
Analysing the trend of the curve, it may be likely that in the near future the accessibility to 
physicians may become even more difficult. This observation is aligned with the ascension of 
alternative communication channels and promotion tools, as will be covered later in this 
thesis. 
 
3.3.5. Sub-chapter synthesis of main findings 
Pharmaceutical sales representatives are salespersons hired by pharmaceutical companies to 
provide health care practitioners (mainly physicians) to provide information, education, 
materials, but also gifts and free meals. They are also known as reps or detail men and have 
the roles of delivering scientific content to prescribers (on drug composition, therapeutic 




marketing and sales instrument, maintaining good relations with physicians. Research has 
demonstrated the reciprocity rule in the interactions PSRs keep with physicians. There are 
four types of PSRs: general PSRs (which typically visit physicians and pharmacists, having a 
high knowledge of their company drugs and their competitors’), specialized PSRs (which 
typically work in hospital settings, and may be involved in group purchasing), medical 
science liaisons (which have a clinical background, and promote products alongside or as 
opposed to general PSRs), and key account managers (whose roles include local account 
strategy, team selling, focused expertise, training, coaching and mentoring activities, 
managing big customers or accounts). 
A PSRs’ normal panel reaches around 200 physicians, 60 per cent of which is visited monthly 
or every one and a half months. PSR normally visit five to ten physicians per day, but this 
number depends on a series of factors (medical specialties, geographic dispersion, and other). 
In each visit, PSRs present approximately three products (three different product mentions, or 
three details). The detailing activity has however been suffering some difficulties, mainly due 
to a growing decline in the access to physicians. 
Table 3.1, developed after the literature review on pharmaceutical sales representatives and 

















Table 3.1 – General PSR characterization 
 
Source: own elaboration 
3.4.Chapter synthesis of main findings 
In the present chapter a literature review on sales force management and its application to the 
pharmaceutical industry was performed. Several relevant evidences were gathered from this 
Brief description Theoretical grounding (non-exhaustive)
Provide education and material to physician offices; credible product 
information about a drug's composition, therapeutic value, side effects, dosage
(Parsons & Abeele, 1981; Wright & Lundstrom, 2004; 
Alkhateeb et al, 2011)
Act as marketing and sales instrument in promoting medicines, to influence 
physicians increase prescriptions; maintain good public relations to increase 
physician willigness to prescribe the promoted medicines
(Caplow & Raymond, 1954; Scharitzer & Kollarits, 2000; Fugh-
Berman & Ahari, 2007)
Collect information about physicians and relay it to the company (Fugh-Berman & Ahari, 2007)
Typologies
General PSRs, specialized PSRs, medical science liaisons (MSLs), key 
account managers (KAMs)
(Puschmann & Alt, 2001; Alt, Österle, Puschmann, Barak & 
Huber, 2003; Alkhateeb et al, 2011)
Friendliness and trustiness (Andaleeb & Tallman, 1996)
Warm, easy going, and cooperative; dominant and shrewd (Sager & Ferris, 1986)
Agreeableness and openness to experience (Thoresen, Bradley, Bliese & Thoresen, 2004)
Adequate non-verbal skills (Peterson, Cannito & Brown, 1995; Leigh & Summers, 2002)
Innovative (creative) personality type; higher emotional commitment (Fraenkel, Haftor & Pashkevich, 2016)
Typical: college (bachelor or associate) degree  (Alkhateeb et al, 2011)
Business, marketing, chemistry, biochemistry, and biophysics (and some 
cases of English, public speaking, finance, economics and law)
 (Alkhateeb et al, 2011)
Hard skills: medical terminology, pharmacology, sales, marketing, diseases 
and pharmacology, and general knowledge of the human body
 (Alkhateeb et al, 2011)
Soft skills: non-verbal skills (Peterson, Cannito & Brown, 1995; Leigh & Summers, 2002)
Fixed + variable component (quota-based bonus)
(Mantrala, Sinha & Zoltners, 1994; Goldberg & Davenport, 
2005; Alkhateeb et al, 2011; Fraenkel, Haftor & Pashkevich, 
2016; Santiago, 2017)
Typical situation: fixed component weights 85%, variable weights 15% (Mantrala, Sinha & Zoltners, 1994)
Σ (Base salary + bonus) = average $81,700 per year (Goldberg & Davenport, 2005)
Company car, medical and tuition reimbursement, and retirement plans  (Santiago, 2017)
Direct report to regional sales chief or district sales manager (Mantrala et al, 2010)
60% of the bonus based on the individual sales performance in territories 
(against sales goals) + 40% based on management assessment (qualitative)
(Mantrala, Sinha & Zoltners, 1994)
Bonus applicable after a minimum threshold (ex: 90%), and capped if 
performance is higher than a maximum threshold (ex: 110%)
(Mantrala, Sinha & Zoltners, 1994)
Client panel
Typical panel: 200 physicians, of which 120 should be visited in four to six 
weeks cycles
(Sfetcu, 2014)
Typical detailing activity: between five and ten calls (visits) per day, with an 
average of 7 visits per day
(Parsons & Abeele, 1981; Yi, Anandalingam & Sorrell, 2003; 
Datta & Dave, 2016)
Average number of details (product mentions) per call (visit): three (Parsons & Abeele, 1981)
Typical call duration declining (1997 = 8 minutes; 2001 = 4 minutes; 2007 = 
up to five minutes)
(Yi, Anandalingam & Sorrell, 2003; Steinman, Harper, Chren, 
Landefeld & Bero, 2007)
Pre-call planning (call preparation) (Mehta, 2004; Ahmad, 2013)
Sales call reports (insert data with SFA tools) (Widmier, Jackson & McCabe, 2002)
Post-call analysis (analyze the call and prepare the follow-up call (Morgan & Inks, 2001; Mehta, 2004)








































































chapter. The first was the evidence that detailing, a form of face-to-face personal selling 
(Fischer & Albers, 2010), is a promotion tool pharmaceutical manufacturers use to interact 
with physicians through salespersons known as pharmaceutical sales representatives or PSRs 
(Mizik & Jacobson, 2004), and therefore is an instrument of sales force management 
(Stremersch & Van Dyck, 2009). The second is the evidence that sales force management in 
the pharmaceutical industry is a complex process. 
Pharmaceutical sales representatives are salespersons hired by pharmaceutical companies to 
promote medicines, and to provide physicians information, education, materials, promotional 
gifts, and free meals. They represent the promotion vehicles of detailing activities 
pharmaceutical manufacturers develop with physicians, and therefore are critical players from 
the companies’ side. Depending on the pharmaceutical company, degree of specialization 
needed, type of client (individual or institutional), companies may use more than type of PSR. 
These types include general PSRs, specialized PSRs, MSLs and KAMs. PSRs’ main task is to 
visit physicians, an activity called detailing, where PSRs present information about several 
products (each product mentioned represents one detail) to an average panel of 200 
physicians. PSRs usually make an average of seven calls per day (in an interval between five 
to 10 calls per day), yet have been growingly experiencing a decline in the access to 
physicians, and a decline in the average duration of each sales call. 
This chapter therefore sets the pavement for the further analysis of theories on physicians (the 
main targets of pharmaceutical marketing activities), medical prescription (the medical act 
that is almost exclusive of physicians, since they are granted the statutory authority to 















4. Physicians and medical prescription 
4.1.Content and logic of the chapter 
This chapter addresses the theories on physicians and on medical prescription. The relevance 
of these theories is founded in two main pillars: first, physicians are the pharmaceutical 
industry stakeholders with statutory authority to prescribe prescription drugs, which makes 
them the main targets of pharmaceutical marketing; second, prescription is a medical act with 
a very complex nature, influenced by several factors. The study of these two issues will help 
generate important understanding to subsequent chapters in the literature review, regarding 
pharmaceutical marketing promotion tools. 
The chapter starts by addressing theories on physicians and their roles in the pharmaceutical 
industry including prescription, communication and participation in health care management. 
The chapter then addresses medical prescription, explains the difference between prescription 
and non-prescription drugs, and explores the factors influencing physicians’ prescription 
behavior, which can be marketing and non-marketing related. Following, it will address the 
prescription decision making process, ending with a synthesis of the main findings gathered in 
this chapter. 
4.2.Concepts 
Physicians have the statutory authority to prescribe prescription drugs. This privilege is only 
shared with some non-physician professional categories in some countries such as the US and 
Australia, where some nurses and physician assistants may prescribe some prescription drugs 
too (Ladd & Hoyt, 2016). Given this authority, physicians are the main deciders in the buying 
decision process regarding prescription drugs (Gönül et al, 2001), and due to their ability to 
write drug prescriptions, physicians control more than four fifths of health care expenditures, 
by prescribing or recommending products to their patients (Weeks, Wallace & Kimberly, 
2001). 
According to Belknap et al (2008), a prescription «is a health-care program implemented by a 
physician or other qualified practitioner in the form of instructions that govern the plan of 
care for an individual patient» (p. 385). A simpler, more direct definition of medical 
prescription – which appears to be more common among the practitioners in the 
pharmaceutical industry – is proposed by the Oxford dictionary: «an instruction written by a 




(Oxford Dictionaries, 2017a). The term “prescription” is usually abbreviated by the Rx 
symbol, shown in figure 4.1 below. 
 
Figure 4.1 – Medical prescription symbol 
While in some countries, such as the US and Australia, some nurses and physician assistants 
have the statutory authority to prescribe drugs (Ladd & Hoyt, 2016), the authority to write a 
prescription for prescription drugs is generally a privilege attributed to physicians. Gönül et al 
(2001) noted that physicians have the privilege of prescribing, as the main deciders in the 
buying decision process regarding prescription drugs. Weeks, Wallace & Kimberly (2001) 
indicated that, due to their ability to write drug prescriptions, physicians control more than 




As noted by Williams & Hensel (1991), physicians have long been considered as gatekeepers 
in the process of purchasing pharmaceutical products, since consumers cannot purchase 
ethical medicines (those who need a prescription) without a prescription written by a 
physician. 
4.3.1. Roles in the pharmaceutical industry 
Communication with patients can be seen as the main ingredient in medical care, as one of the 
most important roles of physicians, as addressed by Ong, De Haes, Hoos & Lammes (1995) in 
their review of doctor-patient communication. They underlined that there are three purposes 
of communication, which are the creation of a good inter-personal relationship between the 
physician and the doctor, the exchange of information, and the physician decisions on 
treatments. As noted by Classen & Kilbridge (2002), physicians’ participation is the basis of 
any health care delivery organization’s efforts to improve the safety of care provided to 
patients. In addition to decisions in the scope of physician-patient relation, physicians’ role 
can include other areas of health care. Leatt (1994) addressed physicians’ increasing 
responsibilities for the «management of human and financial resources in health care, 




teaching, research and management roles, underlining their importance in the shaping of the 
future of health care. Leatt (1994) also addressed processes where physicians will 
increasingly participate, including policy and political processes, client or patient-focused 
approaches, decisions based on data, program definition and management, strategic alliance 
building, systems-level quality improvement, and human resources management. 
Physicians are the main targets of pharmaceutical marketing. The relation developed with the 
pharmaceutical industry starts many times at the academy and continues during full 
professional life. As the main prescribers in a multi-billion-dollar market, it is important to 
study their perception about their relationship with the pharmaceutical industry. As noted by 
Gönül et al (2001), prescribers are the deciders in the buying decision process, not the 
patients. Patients are the users and payers (out-of-pocket or through health insurance). This 
difference from the drug choice process and the traditional decision buying process seen on 
consumer goods highlights the importance of physicians in the pharmaceutical marketing. The 
pharmaceutical industry understands this specificity, using multiple promotion instruments, 
including detailing. Wazana (2000) noted that most physicians receive pharmaceutical sales 
representatives about four times a month. 
4.3.2. Generalists and specialists 
According to Oxford Dictionaries (2017b), a physician is «a person qualified to practice 
medicine, especially one who specializes in diagnosis and medical treatment as distinct from 
surgery». Generally, physicians can be classified as generalists (or general practitioners, or 
GPs), or specialists, having different but complementary knowledge and skills (Marshall, 
1998). The World Health Organization (2008), in its Health Workers Classification, defined 
both generalists and specialists, which include the responsibility perimeter and disease 
specificity of each doctor category: «Generalist medical doctors (including family and 
primary care doctors) diagnose, treat and prevent illness, disease, injury, and other physical 
and mental impairments and maintain general health in humans through application of the 
principles and procedures of modern medicine. They plan, supervise and evaluate the 
implementation of care and treatment plans by other health care providers. They do not limit 
their practice to certain disease categories or methods of treatment, and may assume 
responsibility for the provision of continuing and comprehensive medical care to individuals, 
families and communities», and «specialist medical doctors diagnose, treat and prevent 
illness, disease, injury and other physical and mental impairments using specialized testing, 




principles and procedures of modern medicine. They plan, supervise and evaluate the 
implementation of care and treatment plans by other health care providers. They specialize in 
certain disease categories, types of patient or methods of treatment, and may conduct medical 
education and research activities in their chosen areas of specialization». Traditionally, 
generalists were educated by specialists in postgraduate courses, although currently specialists 
are considered more as consultants to GPs, as underlined by Berendsen et al (2009). 
According to Bowling & Redfern (2000), a substantial amount of work is performed by 
generalists, prior to the eventual decision of referring patients to hospitals, asking for the 
opinion of a specialist. Generalists typically refer patients to specialists such as orthopedic 
surgeons and gynecologists, as addressed by Piterman & Koritsas (2005), the main reasons 
being diagnosis or investigation, treatment and reassurance (reassurance for the generalists 
themselves, as well as reassurance for the patient). Piterman & Koritsas (2005) noted that 
generalists will choose specialists based on the specialists’ skills and generalists’ previous 
experience with the specialist, quality of communication, specialists’ office location, and 
patient preference on specific specialists. They also explained that the referral process is 
usually made by telephone or by letter, which specialists expect to contain information about 
the patient problem and patient history. 
4.3.3. Prone to detailing profile 
Alkhateeb, Khanfar, & Clauson (2009) studied the characteristics of physicians who 
frequently see PSRs. Using a survey answered by 671 doctors and multiple regressions to 
analyze the impact of doctor and practice setting characteristics on frequency of monthly 
visits by PSRs, they found that primary care doctors are more likely to see PSRs, as well as 
high volume prescribers. They also found that doctors working at small and urban practices 
are more likely to see PSRs. Other conclusions that emerged from Alkhateeb, Khanfar, & 
Clauson (2009) research were that doctors who practice in organizations that do not pose 
restrictive policies for pharmaceutical detailing are more likely to receive PSRs visits, as well 
as doctors who do not have academic affiliations. 
4.3.4. Heavy prescriber profile 
Physicians’ prescription behavior in terms of number of prescriptions may be related to 
certain physician characteristics. Gönül & Carter (2012), when analyzing how physicians 
respond to marketing promotion tools, studied the heavy prescribers’ profile for established 
and new drugs. They found that heavy prescribers for established drugs are typically 




pressure from the pharmaceutical industry), having a greater ratio of patients in HMOs, and a 
higher number of prescriptions from all therapeutic classes. This type of prescribers also 
receive a higher number of patients in their practices, tend to receive more drug samples from 
PSRs, receive more PSRs at their offices, and typically allow for longer than average visits 
duration by PSRs. They also found that heavy prescribers for new drugs typically have more 
affiliations with health maintenance organizations (HMOs), and tend to work at solo practice 
(that is, not in groups or with partners),  
4.4.Medical prescription 
4.4.1. Prescription vs non-prescription drugs 
In terms of prescription, the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) classifies 
drugs as prescription and non-prescription (or over-the-counter, or OTC), as underlined by 
Gabay (2013). Gabay (2013) also noted that a prescription medication, according to the FDA, 
must be «dispensed under a valid prescription if, because of its toxicity or other potentiality 
for harmful effect, or the method of its use, or the collateral measures necessary to its use, it 
is not safe for use except under the supervision of a practitioner licensed by law to administer 
such drug» (p. 198). 
Non-prescription, or OTC drugs are, on the opposite, drugs than can be purchase directly in a 
retail pharmacy, where the term originated, without a prescription (Cooper, 2013). The FDA 
describes an OTC drug as a «medicine that you can buy without a prescription. They are safe 
and effective when you follow the directions on the label and as directed by your health care 
professional» (FDA, 2017a). 
The FDA (2017b) summarizes the concepts of prescription and non-prescription drugs in a 
straightforward and clear way: while prescription drugs are prescribed by a doctor, bought at 
a pharmacy, prescribed for and intended to be used by one person, and regulated by FDA 
through the New Drug Application (NDA) process, non-prescription (or OTC) drugs are 
drugs that do not require a doctor's prescription, bought off-the-shelf in stores, and regulated 
by FDA through OTC Drug monographs. 
4.4.2. Computerized prescription and clinical decision support systems 
In the last two decades, the development of computers and software has allowed new 
possibilities to aid the prescription process. Computer-based physician order entry (CPOE) 
systems referred by Berner & La Lande (2016), also known by electronic prescription, have 




the introduction of CPOE systems reduced the rate of non-intercepted serious medication 
errors significantly (by more than 50%), and also substantially reduced adverse drug events 
(though this reduction was more modest). Teich, Merchia, Schmiz, Kuperman, Spurr & Bates 
(2000) analyzed the impact of the usage of CPOE in prescribing practices, by studying a time 
series of prescriptions and comparing it to non-CPOE prescribing history. They found that, by 
providing support and suggestions in the CPOE system, the proportion of cases where the 
prescribed dose exceeded the maximum recommended dose were significantly reduced, and 
that a higher proportion of prescriptions observed the suggested options provided by the 
system, contributing to better physician prescription practices. 
Physicians may benefit from clinical diagnostic decision support systems (DDSS), which 
consists of «a computer-based algorithm that assists a clinician with one or more component 
steps of the diagnostic process» (Miller & Geissbuhler, 1999, p. 101). This concept is also 
known by clinical decision support systems (CDSS), which according to Berner & La Lande 
(2016) consist of «computer systems designed to impact clinician decision making about 
individual patients at the point in time that these decisions are made» (p. 3). These systems 
are designed to assist on medical prescription and minimize prescription errors, providing 
support before, during and after the prescription decision has been made by the physician. As 
referred by Berner & La Lande (2016), these systems may be knowledge based (that rely on a 
base of rules such as IF-THEN, of for instance drug-food interactions, and probabilistic 
associations of signs and symptoms with diagnoses), or non-knowledge based (systems using 
machine learning from past experiences and pattern recognition). As noted by Berner & La 
Lande (2016), the later include artificial neural networks, which emulate human thinking in a 
non-linear form, and genetic algorithms, where sets of solutions are tested until a final, 
optimal solution is reached. According to Berner & La Lande (2016), CDSS «have been 
shown to improve both patient outcomes, as well as the cost of care» (p. 8), by minimizing 
prescription errors (alerting physicians to drug interactions) and improving physician 
diagnoses (using reminders and alerts). 
Wolfstadt, Gurwitz, Field, Lee, Kalkar, Wu & Rochon (2008), in their systematic review on 
the effect of computerized physician order entry with clinical decision support, had already 
evidenced that in half of the eligible studies selected for analysis there was a significant 




4.4.3. Factors influencing prescription behavior 
Campo, Staebel, Gijsbrechts & Van Waterschoot (2006) concluded that prescription decision 
making may be a very sensitive and complex process, underlining that «for pharmaceutical 
companies and their sales representatives, this would imply that persuading prescribers to 
switch to another–existing or newly introduced–drug is not an easy task» (p. 97). Spiller & 
Wymer (2001) had already suggested that «physician prescription choice behavior is 
complex» (p. 102). 
Several researchers have studied the factors impacting physicians’ prescribing decisions of 
prescription drugs. Campo et al (2006) developed qualitative research aimed at understanding 
the mechanics driving drug prescription behavior, how physicians make the decision to 
prescribe. They developed in-depth interviews with physicians, using projective techniques 
(asking them to comment on prescription decision alleged made by a fellow physician). One 
of their conclusions is that prescription decisions seem to be hybrid in nature, incorporating a 
series of decision rules, also suggesting that physicians tend to consider a limited number of 
drug possibilities, and even a smaller number of drugs they usually prescribe. Spiller & 
Wymer (2001) noted that profession (such as journals, and other physicians, but also the 
government with for instance drug prescribing restriction policies), pharmaceutical industry 
promotion activities (including detailing, samples and journal ads), personal experience of the 
physician, consumers, and affordability (such as cost of drug, insurance possession, and 
reimbursement) also impact physicians prescription decisions. Figure 4.2 summarizes these 





Figure 4.2 – Influences on physicians’ prescribing behavior 
Source: Spiller & Wymer (2001) 
Stros & Lee (2015). In their conceptual pharmaceutical marketing model, suggested that 
prescription decisions may be influenced (descending order of relevance) by pharmaceutical 
promotion, order-of-entry of drugs in the market, drug price, drug characteristics and place 
(distribution). The magnitude in terms of relevance is shown in table 4.1. 
Table 4.1 – Marketing relevance of marketing factors 
Marketing categories n 
Promotion 97 
Order of market entry 93 
Price 25 
Product 16 
Place (distribution) 5 
 
Source: adapted from Stros & Lee (2015) 
More recently, Murshid & Mohaidin (2017) proposed a model of physician prescribing 




behavior, and the social power theory. Their model includes marketing efforts, patient 
characteristics and pharmacists’ factors explaining physicians’ decisions to prescribe drugs, as 
shown below in figure 4.3. 
 
Figure 4.3 - Murshid & Mohaidin proposed model of physician prescribing decision 
Source: Murshid & Mohaidin (2017) 
Murshid & Mohaidin (2017) model appears however to lack additional variables explaining 
physician prescription decisions, as for instance regulation, and other variables related to 
physicians and their profession, and additional marketing-related activities. 
Based on the literature review, several other factors were identified, which we organized into 
two categories: non-marketing related and marketing-related factors. Regarding the former, 
these can be framed into a physicians and their profession scope, to a market scope, to a 




framed into product scope, promotion scope, pricing scope and distribution scope. A 
description of those factors will now be presented. 
 
Non-marketing related 
- Physician and profession 
Pitt & Nel (1988) found that the most influential prescription decision determinants, based on 
physicians’ opinions, are experience with the product, and informal discussions with 
colleagues. Spiller & Wymer (2001) noted that «physicians primarily choose patient 
medications based on their personal preferences and prior experience with drugs (…) also 
rely upon drug compendiums and medical journals» (p. 102), and that apparently advertising 
may not evidence a substantial influence. Spiller & Wymer (2001) also studied what were the 
information sources that appeared to influence physicians’ drug choices when prescribing. 
They found that the most declared influential factors in physicians’ prescription choices were 
previous experience (with a category mean of 3,6 out of 4) and physician experience (3,4). 
Pitt & Nel (1988) highlighted scholarly articles by specialists in scientific medical journals as 
a declared source of influence do doctors, in the scope of their prescription decisions. Key 
opinion leaders may influence doctors’ prescribing decisions, given their credibility among 
colleagues, behaving many times as instructors to their colleagues, speakers at meetings, and 
senior editors of textbooks (Meffert, 2009), impacting their colleagues’ prescribing habits. 
Switching costs may be another influence to physicians’ prescription decisions. According to 
Bain (1956), buyers may prefer to choose already established products over new ones, which 
may benefit incumbent firms, while new entrants may have to decide a lower price, or higher 
promotion costs. This may be related to consumer switching costs, since new entrants have to 
persuade consumers to switch for their brand (Stros & Lee, 2015). Porter (1980) had defined 
switching costs as «one-time costs facing the buyer of switching from one supplier’s product 
to another’s» (p. 10), suggesting that switching costs raise barriers to entry. These switching 
costs addressed by Porter (1980) included employee retraining costs, cost of new ancillary 
equipment, cost and time in testing or qualifying a new source, need for technical help as a 
result of reliance on seller engineering aid, product redesign, or psychic costs of severing a 
relationship. More than two decades after, Burnham, Frels & Mahajan (2003) proposed three 




up costs, and learning costs), financial (benefit loss costs, and monetary loss costs), and 
relational (personal relationship loss costs, and brand relationship loss costs). 
Campo et al (2006) suggested that a high level or inertia or resistance may be present in 
prescription decisions, both for a group of products, and for specific patients. Coscelli (2000), 
when analyzing the empirical factors determining individual physicians’ and patients’ choices 
among a group of equivalent drugs, suggested that physicians’ prescriptions evidence habit 
persistence. By other words, he proposed that time dependence make prescribers far from 
indifferent from any point in time (p. 367). Reciprocity is another factor influencing 
physicians’ prescription behavior. According to Cialdini (1984), we are obligated to the future 
repayment of favors, gifts, and invitations. Roughead, Harvey & Gilbert (1998) noted that the 
reciprocity principle was present regarding PSRs offers of drug samples, gifts, printed 
material, patient information leaflets and invitations. Physicians may feel obligated to 
reciprocate PSR regular assistance and free meals by increasing the likelihood of prescribing 
the drug brands they promote. Katz, Caplan and Merz (2010) also referred the reciprocity 
rule, where physicians may feel «compelled to reciprocate by supporting their benefactors’ 
products» (p. 10). 
- Market 
Order-of-entry in the market may also significantly impact prescription decisions. Kremer et 
al (2008), in their review on the effectiveness of pharmaceutical promotional expenditures, 
suggested that the «pharmaceutical market is characterized by strong order-of-entry effects, 
creating barriers for new entrants» (p. 235). Kalyanaram (2008), studying three therapeutic 
classes of drugs, from both prescription and over-the-counter markets, found a significant 
order of entry effect on market share. 
- Regulatory and institutional 
Clinical guidelines and drug formularies may impact physicians’ prescription patterns. 
Guidelines main goal is to help prescribers select appropriate therapies for specific health 
conditions (Aronson, 2006). As an example from the United Kingdom, the NHS West Essex 
Clinical Commission Group defined clinical guidelines’ aim as to «address the whole medical 
management of a particular therapeutic area for example, osteoporosis, asthma etc» (UK 
NHS West Essex Clinical Commission Group (2017)). As proposed by Huskamp, Epstein & 
Blumenthal (2003), drug formularies are «lists of drugs that are preferred by a health plan or 




incentives for prescribing medicines that are included in the list: the first type are known as 
open formularies, which have a more educational role; the second type are known as closed 
formularies, where a compulsory list of medicines is available for specific pathologies of the 
patients (exceptions may however apply, given that physicians are authorized a waiver for 
very specific patient situations); and a third type, as intermediate one (intermediate 
arrangement), which, as noted by Huskamp, Epstein & Blumenthal (2003), is an incentive 
formulary which offers financial incentives for patients (less expensive drugs) and their 
physicians, by having characteristics of both previous types, in the sense that, by the one 
hand, they are compulsory in nature, and by the other hand, they allow for a certain level of 
coverage or acceptance of non-preferred of non-listed drugs. 
According to the Academy of Managed Care Pharmacy (AMCP), a «drug formulary, or 
preferred drug list, is a continually updated list of medications and related products 
supported by current evidence-based medicine, judgment of physicians, pharmacists and 
other experts in the diagnosis and treatment of disease and preservation of health. The 
primary purpose of the formulary is to encourage the use of safe, effective and most 
affordable medications» (AMCP, 2017). A similar definition is proposed by UK NHS West 
Essex Clinical Commission Group (2017), defining prescription formulary as «a list of 
medicines from the British National Formulary (BNF) which have been approved for 
prescribing by MOPB. The aim of MOPB is to promote rational evidence-based and cost-
effective prescribing within West Essex health economy». 
As highlighted by Huskamp, Epstein & Blumenthal (2003), drug formularies may achieve 
cost savings in two main ways. The first, by allowing patients to be prescribed less expensive 
drugs or higher copayments. The second, by allowing a higher bargaining price of public and 
private health providers when negotiating with drug manufacturers, stimulating price 
competition. Huskamp, Epstein & Blumenthal (2003) also suggest that closed formularies, 
given their essentially compulsive scope, usually result in directing the «volume of 
prescriptions among competing products (or in industry jargon, “move market share”) 
according to price and thus extract larger price discounts from manufacturers» (p. 150). 
Clinical guidelines, and especially drug formularies, may therefore impact physicians’ 
prescription patterns, especially the second as it may assume, in closed formularies, a 
compulsive character in its observation of a specific drug list available for prescription by 
physicians. Schumock et al (2004) research confirmed that formulary status was the third 




Drug prescription policies can have an effect on prescription behavior, as noted by Schumock 
et al (2004). These restrictions can be of different types. As noted by Fischer, Koch, Kostev & 
Stargardt (2017), physician prescription budgets can contain pharmaceutical spending, as the 
most direct way of interceding in the prescribing process, limiting the total number of 
prescriptions issued by a physician (Stremersch & Lemmens, 2009). Prescription budgets can 
influence doctors to choose brands more selectively and to increase the generic share on 
prescriptions (Fischer et al, 2017). Restriction on direct-to-consumer advertising can also 
have impact on prescription behavior, even if physicians are not the targets of this type of 
promotion. Stremersch & Lemmens (2009) found that countries prohibiting DTCA have 
significantly lower sales on new drugs when compared to countries where DTCA is allowed. 
Regulation of marketing efforts to physicians also impacts prescription behavior. Stremersch 
& Lemmens (2009) suggested that the impact of restricting pharmaceutical marketing efforts 
pharmaceutical manufacturers develop with physicians tends to have a negative effect on 
sales, although the coefficient obtained was non-significant. King & Bearman (2017) found 
that the uptake of new expensive medications was significantly lower in US states with 
marketing regulation, versus in states with unrestricted pharmaceutical marketing. These 
regulations and their effects will be more deeply analyzed in chapter 6. Mandatory generic 
substitution can also have a significant impact on physician prescription behavior. Andersson, 
Petzold, Allebeck & Carlsten (2008) studied the impact of the implementation of a mandatory 
generic substitution program in Sweden, and found that sales of substitutable pharmaceuticals 
evidenced proportionally larger growth when compared against sales of non-substitutable 
pharmaceuticals (that is, drugs that do not have yet generics competing against), suggesting 
that the impact of the substitution program was significant and positive in terms of sales 
growth of less expensive prescription options. 
Drug reimbursement, in the sense that patients can pay a lower value for their medicines, can 




Drug requests from patients – either influenced by DTCA as noted above, or by other source 




may accept, in some occasions, to prescribe the drug requested by the patients. This evidence 
had already been addressed by Mintzes et al (2002), where they stated that «patients’ requests 
for medicines are a powerful driver of prescribing decisions» (p. 279). Patient and 
prescription situation (either routine or non-routine) may also influence physician prescription 
behavior, according to Campo et al (2006), who concluded that while for routine situations 
physicians prefer to trust their own experience and knowledge on a limited number of drugs 
for each specific situation, for non-routine situations involving new patients with a complex 




Drug efficacy is one of the factors impacting physician prescription behavior, as highlighted 
by Gönül et al (2001). Schumock et al (2004), using a questionnaire administered to 
physicians, clinical pharmacists, and formulary committee members, found that the factors 
considered as most influential in prescribing decisions were, to all three types of health care 
practitioners participating in the research, drug safety and drug effectiveness. Drug 
characteristics such as effectiveness and side effects can moderate the effect of detailing in 
prescription behavior, as demonstrated by Venkataraman & Stremersch (2007). 
Stros and Lee (2015) highlighted the importance of product design as a key role for successful 
marketing, since it is appears to be a determinant of the sales success of both early and later 
market entrants. As key pharmaceutical product attributes, they highlight the innovativeness, 
the quality, the branding and, to a much lesser extent, the packaging, underlining two product 
design strategies that may be useful, whether applied to early or to late entrants in a 
pharmaceutical market: while for an early entrant product innovation appears to be the main 
aspect, for a later entrant it may be more beneficial to stress the product differentiation. Pitt & 
Nel (1988) noted that ease in remembering the brand name was one of the reasons doctors 
underlined as influencers of their prescription decisions (though much less influential than 
promotion activities). Fischer, Leeflang & Verhoef (2010) demonstrated that product quality 






- Price / cost 
According to Stros & Lee (2015) review, pricing occupies the third place in terms of 
relevance of the marketing factors in the prescription pharmaceutical industry. Physicians are 
mostly price sensitive, when comparing the impact of price with other aspects such as drug 
efficacy and patients’ conditions (Gönül et al, 2001). Price sensitivity – measured as price 
elasticity - seems to decrease in the presence of promotional activities such as detailing 
(Rizzo, 1999; Windmeijer et al, 2006). Spiller & Wymer (2001) underlined that affordability 
(such as cost of drug, insurance possession, and reimbursement) is one of the factors 
impacting physician prescription behavior. Pitt & Nel (1988) also noted that drug price to the 
patient influences doctors’ decision on which drug to prescribe. 
Prescription drugs price is one of the most regulated marketing instruments and will be further 
addressed in this thesis. 
- Promotion 
Promotion is the most relevant marketing dimension in pharmaceutical marketing, in terms 
prescription decisions (drug sales), as highlighted by Stros and Lee (2015), while also 
suggesting that pharmaceutical promotion serves at least two functions: one consists of habit 
formation, and other consists of information provision. 
The most important promotion tool in terms of pharmaceutical marketing, both in terms of 
volume (IMS Health, 2015a) and in terms of influence (Berndt, Bui, Reiley & Urban, 1995; 
Narayanan et al, 2003; Narayanan, Desiraju & Chintagunta, 2004), is detailing through PSRs. 
The study of the importance of detailing has been made not only by quantitative research 
using time series (such as the authors now listed), but also by quantitative detailing using 
cross-sectional studies. Among these, we find Pitt & Nel (1988), Andaleeb & Tallman (1996), 
Schumock et al (2004), and Spiller & Wymer (2001), to list a few. Pitt & Nel (1988), in their 
research involving physicians’ perception of promotion instruments influence on their 
prescribing decisions, noted that, of promotion tools, sales calls (detailing) were considered 
by doctors as the most influential. Andaleeb & Tallman (1996) confirmed that physicians saw 
PSRs as an important source of information, but also considering they could access 
information using other information sources without PSRs’ support. Schumock et al (2004), 
using a questionnaire administered to physicians, clinical pharmacists, and formulary 
committee members, found that physicians scores on face-to-face detailing as an influencing 




Likert scale, scoring 17
th
 most influential in a total of 31 factors evaluated. Spiller & Wymer 
(2001), in their research, found that advertising (which includes PSRs activities) scored the 
lowest average (1.8) among all promotion initiatives listed in their questionnaire. 
Drug sampling (Parsons & Abeele, 1981; Fugh-Berman & Ahari, 2007; Chimonas, Brennan 
& Rothman, 2007) and gifts and meals (Katz, Caplan & Merz, 2010; King & Bearman, 2017; 
DeJong et al, 2016) are other promotion instruments that have been demonstrated to have 
impact on physicians prescription behavior. E-detailing, despite relatively scant literature 
available, has also been demonstrated to influence prescription behavior, as noted by Gönül & 
Carter (2010). Pharmaceutical promotion, including detailing and other promotion 
instruments (both traditional and digital) will be further developed in higher detail later in this 
thesis. Direct-to-consumer advertising can also have an impact on physicians’ prescription 
behavior, as noted by Kravitz et al (2005). They found that patients’ requests to physicians 
have a strong effect on physician prescribing, influencing their choices for prescription drugs. 
Seminars, conferences and lectures may impact physicians’ prescription choices too, as noted 
by Pitt & Nel (1988). These researchers also highlighted the credibility and reputation of the 
company as an influential factor of prescribing decisions. 
It is interesting to note that, by the one hand, empirical studies evaluating the impact of 
pharmaceutical promotion in prescription behavior using quantitative datasets (drug sales or 
prescriptions vs promotion investments) typically point to positive impact on drug sales, 
whereas studies directly addressing physicians with questionnaires generally appear to point 
to a small effect of pharmaceutical promotion in prescription decisions. These surveys 
administered to physicians, explicitly asking them for their opinion, may not represent the real 
influence magnitude of the impact on their prescription decisions. 
- Distribution 
Stros & Lee (2015) studied the relevance of marketing dimensions on prescription drugs and 
found that distribution is the least relevant marketing mix component. They suggested that the 
role of distributional marketing policies do not appear to represent a significant role in 
pharmaceutical success. Product availability at the point of sale appears however to be a 
relevant factor impacting physicians prescription decisions, as noted by Dimaculangan 
(2011), allowing physicians’ clients (patients) place and possession utilities through the 




suggested that doctors recognized product availability as one of influencing factors of their 
prescribing decisions (though much less influential than promotion activities). 
Table 4.2 summarizes the factor influencing prescription behavior, compiled after the 
literature review. The division in marketing and non-marketing related is aimed at facilitating 
the interpretation of the multiple influences on prescription behavior, as a very complex 
process. It is not intended to be, however, a hermetic separation, since there are many 
interactions between the two groups. As a first example, pricing / cost is related to regulatory 
and institutional (drug reimbursement). As a second example, promotion is related to 




















Table 4.2 – Factors influencing physicians’ prescription behavior 
 
Source: own elaboration 
 
4.5.Chapter synthesis of main findings 
Chapter 4 addressed literature on physicians and medical prescription. Some main 
conclusions were gathered from the study of theories on these fields. Despite the existence of 
Scope
Influencers of physician prescription behavior of 
prescription drugs
Theoretical grounding (non-exhaustive)
Personal preferences and prior experience with drugs (Spiller & Wymer, 2001)
Experience with the product, and informal discussions 
with colleagues
(Pitt & Nel, 1988; Spiller & Wymer, 2001)
Drug compendiums and medical journals (Pitt & Nel, 1988; Spiller & Wymer, 2001)
Switching costs / state of dependence, leading to a habit 
formation
(Coscelli, 2000; Campo et al, 2006; Stros & Lee, 2015)
Reciprocity (to pharmaceutical sales representatives) (Cialdini, 1984; Roughead, Harvey & Gilbert, 1998; Katz, Caplan & Merz, 2010)
Key opinion leaders (Moynihan, 2008; Meffert, 2009)
Market Order of entry in the market (Kalyanaram, 2008; Kremer et al, 2008)
Formulary status and drug prescribing restriction policies (Spiller & Wymer, 2001; Schumock et al, 2004)
Clinical guidelines (Aronson, 2006)
Drug formularies (Huskamp, Epstein & Blumenthal, 2003)
Drug reimbursement (Spiller & Wymer, 2001)
Mandatory generic substitution (Andersson, Petzold, Allebeck & Carlsten, 2008)
Physician prescription budgets (Stremersch & Lemmens, 2009; Fischer, Koch, Kostev & Stargardt, 2017)
Restrictions on direct-to-consumer advertising (Kravitz et al, 2005; Stremersch & Lemmens, 2009)
Restrictions on pharmaceutical marketing efforts to 
physicians
(Stremersch & Lemmens, 2009; King & Bearman, 2017)
Patients' requests (Mintzes et al, 2002; Kravitz et al, 2005)
Routine vs non-rountine patient and situation (Campo et al, 2006)
Drug safety / side effects, drug efficacy / effectiveness (Gönül et al, 2001; Schumock et al, 2004; Venkataraman & Stremersch, 2007)
Product (innovativeness, quality, branding and packaging) (Fischer, Leeflang & Verhoef, 2010; Stros & Lee, 2015)
Ease in remembering the product brand name (Pitt & Nel, 1988)
Pharmaceutical promotion in general (Stros and Lee, 2015)
Credibility and reputation of the company (Pitt & Nel, 1988)
Direct-to-consumer advertising (Kravitz et al, 2005)
Detailing and competitive detailing
(Pitt & Nel, 1988; Berndt, Bui, Reiley & Urban, 1995; Spiller & Wymer, 2001; 
Narayanan et al, 2003; Narayanan, Desiraju & Chintagunta, 2004; Schumock 
et al, 2004)
Drug sampling
(Parsons & Abeele, 1981; Spiller & Wymer, 2001; Chimonas, Brennan & 
Rothman, 2007; Fugh-Berman & Ahari, 2007)
Gifts and meals (Katz, Caplan & Merz, 2010; King & Bearman, 2017; DeJong et al, 2016)
E-detailing (Gönül & Carter, 2009)
Pricing / cost
Drug price, patient’s financial situation / conditions, 
insurrance coverage
(Pitt & Nel, 1988; Gönül et al, 2001; Spiller & Wymer, 2001; Stros & Lee, 
2015)
















some medical professionals (including physician assistants, and nurses) that have limited 
prescription privileges in some countries, physicians are the main medical professional with 
the statutory authority and privilege to write prescriptions of prescription-only drugs, making 
them the main deciders in the buying decision process of prescription drugs, controlling more 
than four fifths of health care expenditures. Physicians have a series of roles in the 
pharmaceutical industry, including medical prescription, communication with patients, and 
increasing responsibilities for the management of human and financial resources in health 
care, especially in hospital settings. Physicians can be generally classified as generalists 
(family and primary care doctors), or specialists. While the first typically provide continuing 
and comprehensive medical care to individuals, families and communities, but without a 
specific specialization in terms of therapeutic areas, the second generally specialize in 
providing medical care in the scope of certain diseases, types of patients and methods of 
treatment, acting also as educators and consultants to generalists. 
Drugs can be prescription-only, when a medical prescription is needed, written by a physician 
or other medical professional with the authority to do so, or non-prescription (OTC), which 
does not require a medical prescription and can be bought directly by patients in retail 
pharmacies. In the last two decades, with the advent of the internet and with the digitalization 
of many processes in health care, electronic prescription has been implemented by health 
tutelage as a means to contribute to better prescription practices. Clinical decision support 
systems also have been applied, consisting of computer-based algorithms that assist clinicians 
in the diagnostic and prescription process, helping them minimize errors (including adverse 
drug events), and contributing to improve patient outcomes. 
Physicians’ prescription choice is a very complex and sensitive process, which can be 
influenced by several factors. The review that was performed allowed the classification of 
these factors in two groups: non-marketing related, and marketing related. Non-marketing 
related factors can then be divided in physicians and their profession scope (including the 
influence of physicians’ personal preference and personal experience with a drug, informal 
discussions with other physicians, drug compendiums, physicians’ state of dependency and 
switching costs given the habit formation, and physicians’ reciprocity toward PSRs visits, 
drug samples, and gifts and meals), market scope (drug order of entry in the market, where 
drugs launched first typically create barriers to new entrants), regulatory and institutional 
scope (including drug reimbursement typology, formulary status and drug prescription 




prescription budgets, intended to directly affect prescription decisions through a variable 
degree of enforcement, and restrictions on direct-to-consumer advertising and on 
pharmaceutical marketing efforts to physicians, intended to indirectly condition physicians’ 
prescription behavior), and patients’ scope (where patients’ requests for specific drugs may 
influence physicians to prescribe them, and patient and prescription situation, either routine or 
non-routine, may also influence physician prescription behavior). 
Marketing related factors can be divided in product scope (including drug safety and 
effectiveness, physician perception on product innovativeness, quality, branding and 
packaging, and drug efficacy), promotion scope (including DTCA, detailing, drug sampling, 
gifts and meals and e-detailing, all shown to influence physicians’ prescription behavior), 
pricing scope (including physicians’ perception on drug prices, evaluation of patient financial 
situation and patient possession of insurance coverage), and distribution scope (where product 
availability at the point of sale appears to be an important factor impacting physicians 
prescription decisions). 
Figure 4.4 below illustrates and summarizes these factors influencing medical prescription. 
 
Figure 4.4 – Physician prescription behavior influencing factors 









5. Pharmaceutical industry promotion 
5.1.Content and logic of the chapter 
This chapter addresses the theories on pharmaceutical industry promotion of prescription 
drugs to physicians and is aimed at providing a theoretical framework where detailing is 
rooted. 
The chapter starts by addressing the main concepts in the scope of pharmaceutical industry 
promotion. It then addresses marketing communication as a process to deliver messages from 
senders (pharmaceutical manufacturers) to receivers (pharmaceutical stakeholders). The 
chapter then follows with the analysis of communication channels and promotion tools, 
underlining their differences and interactions. In this topic, several classifications of 
communication channels and promotion tools are addressed, and a summary table is presented 
to help understand these concepts. The concepts of multichannel marketing and omnichannel 
marketing are also explained. The chapter then approaches promotion tools using traditional 
communication channels, with the analysis of each tool and a special focus on detailing, given 
the specific theme of this thesis. Detailing is analyzed in higher detail, with the presentation 
of a series of theoretical generalizations that were compiled through the analysis of reference 
literature from the last decades, and mainly from the last 15 years. It follows with promotion 
tools using digital communication channels – more recent tools that appeared after the 
development of information technologies and the advent of the World Wide Web – with a 
particular focus on e-detailing. 
The chapter also addresses the magnitude of investments made by pharmaceutical 
manufacturers, and approaches additional perspectives on pharmaceutical marketing, 
highlighting stakeholders perspectives on pharmaceutical marketing directed at physicians, 
push versus pull promotion, physicians preference and prescription attitude on digital 
communication channels. It also addresses promotion activities effectiveness, and discusses 
ethical considerations related to pharmaceutical promotion of prescription drugs to 
physicians. 
The chapter ends with a synthesis of the main findings, where a summary of the most relevant 
aspects of the literature review on pharmaceutical marketing will be highlighted. 
5.2.Concepts 
Pharmaceutical promotion represents one of the marketing mix dimensions pharmaceutical 




will be given to pharmaceutical promotion. Promotion expenditures (of which detailing is the 
most important instrument) can not only impact physician prescription behavior, but also can 
have an impact on the sales behavior of the promoted drugs in terms of its peak. Fischer, 
Leeflang & Verhoef (2010), in their research where they studied calcium channel blockers 
and ACE inhibitors (antihypertensives) in four European markets, found that promotion 
expenditures (detailing, which represented more than 90 per cent of the total, but also journal 
advertising and direct mailing) can increase the level of peak sales of a drug (historical sales 
maximum), while also decreasing the time-to-peak-sales (time between the beginning of the 
drug commercialization and peak sales). 
Pharmaceutical industry promotion is generally limited to drugs on patent and can be 
classified as direct-to-physician promotion (DTPP) or direct-to-consumer advertising 
(DTCA), as noted by Datta & Dave (2016). 
Pilarczyk (2011) addressed pharmaceutical promotion in the light of Kotler, Keller, Brady, 
Goodman & Hansen (2009, p. 762) classification of marketing tools, dividing it in advertising 
(specialist press publications addressed to physicians and pharmacists, leaflets), personal 
selling (pharmaceutical sales representatives), sales promotion (free samples of drugs for 
physicians, discounts for wholesale purchases, package deals for pharmacies, loyalty 
programs), public relations (marketing events, training for doctors and pharmacists, lobbying, 
sponsorship, media relations, consulting programs for pharmacies), and e-pharma marketing. 
Pharmaceutical manufacturers use promotion tools to interact with their stakeholders, through 
communication channels. 
Pharmaceutical marketing interactions can occur not only after physicians’ graduation, but 
before too. Pharmaceutical sales representatives detail medical students and offer gifts 
(Sarikaya, Civaner & Vatansever, 2009; Austad et al, 2013), books (Wazana, 2000) and meals 
(Austad et al, 2013). The interactions appear to continue during medical internships and 
training, as demonstrated by Zipkin & Steinman (2005) and Riese et al (2014). 
Pharmaceutical manufacturers use a variety of promotion tools to impact and interact with 
their clients, mainly physicians. Promotion tools using traditional communication channels 
include detailing, drug sampling, and advertising in professional journals (Datta & Dave, 
2016), gifts, conference travel, paid meals, PSR speakers, in the scope of continuing medical 
education (CME) funding and event sponsorship, and research funding (Wazana, 2000), direct 




Promotion tools using traditional channels also include direct-to-consumer advertising, or 
DTCA (Iizuka & Jin, 2005), given the non-digital part of it. Promotion tools using digital 
communication channels include e-detailing (Alkhateeb & Doucette, 2008), e-sampling 
(Kumar & Panigrahi, 2014), company websites and healthcare portals (Puschmann & Alt, 
2001), health social networks (Swan, 2009), e-mailing (Pedroso & Nakano, 2009), online 
continuing medical education (Wutoh, Boren & Balas, 2004), and e-Direc-to-consumer 
advertising in the scope of Web 2.0 (o’Reilly, 2005). 
5.3.Marketing communication 
Pharmaceutical manufacturers communicate with several stakeholders in the pharmaceutical 
industry. These include physicians, pharmacists, nurses, wholesalers, payers (both public and 
private) and patients. Companies use several promotion tools through communication 
channels to interact with the stakeholders, mainly physicians. Figure 5.1, adapted from the 
one proposed by Pilarczyk (2011), evidences this communication process in the 
pharmaceutical market. 
 
Figure 5.1 – Marketing communication process in the pharmaceutical market 
Source: adapted from Pilarczyk (2011) 
5.4.Communication channels and promotion tools 
The literature on pharmaceutical marketing does not appear to explicitly separate the concepts 
of communication channels and promotion tools. Some scholars seem to address 




proposing a framework that combined, in a table format, promotion tools and forms, and 
communication channels. Bernewit (2001) also appeared to address interchangeably 
communication channels and promotion tools, when discussing the trade-offs between in the 
selection of promotion tools and resource optimization of the communication mix. 
Auruskeviciene, Butkeviciene & Salciuviene (2015), when approaching communication 
channels in the pharmaceutical industry, referred pharmaceutical sales representatives’ visits 
(detailing), conferences, and dedicated websites as communication channels. However, these 
can be considered, instead, promotion tools or instruments. Rod & Saunders (2009), in their 
article addressing the informative and persuasive components of pharmaceutical promotion, 
listed direct-to-consumer advertising, detailing and conferences as promotion channels, but 
they most likely should be considered promotion tools. 
5.4.1. Definitions 
Given this apparent lack of clear differentiation between communication channels and 
promotion tools, we propose clarification by attempting to delineate a concept perimeter, and 
the relations between the two concepts. Analyzing Kotler & Armstrong (2012) approach, 
communication channels can be defined as the means through which the message moves from 
the sender to the receiver. Therefore, communication channels may be interpreted as the 
vehicles that make possible the usage of the promotion tools, or the agents that allow the 
message to be carried from the sender to the receiver. In the scope of the pharmaceutical 
industry and its promotion of prescription drugs, communication channels include face-to-
face, television, telephone (both fixed and mobile), online (including e-mail, websites, social 
media), print, and mail. 
Promotion tools definition appears naturally, as instruments used by companies to develop 
interaction with clients and reach promotion goals, using communication channels. Kotler & 
Armstrong (2012) explained that companies use a specific blend or combination of promotion 
tools, to convincingly communicate customer value and build relationships with customers, 
and this specific blend is called the promotion mix. They also noted that companies need to 
deliver a «clear, consistent, and compelling message about its organization and its brands» 
(p. 406). Promotion tools used by pharmaceutical manufacturers include detailing, e-detailing, 
direct-to-consumer advertising, drug sampling, e-sampling, gifts and meals, mailing, e-
mailing, continuing medical education (both off and on-line), medical journal advertising, 
medical social networks, health care portals, and other, later discussed in this thesis, exploring 





It is also of interest to understand how communication channels are classified. Kotler & 
Armstrong (2012) classified communication channels as personal, or non-personal. They 
explained that personal communication channels are «channels through which two or more 
people communicate directly with each other, including face-to-face, on the phone, via mail 
or e-mail, or even through an internet “chat”» (p. 419), deriving their effectiveness through 
individualized presentation and feedback (Kotler et al, 2009). Conversely, nonpersonal 
communication channels are, as proposed by Kotler & Armstrong (2009), «media that carry 
messages without personal contact or feedback. They include major media, atmospheres, and 
events. Major media include print media (newspapers, magazines, direct-mail), broadcast 
media (television, radio), display media (billboards, signs, posters), and online media (e-mail, 
company Web sites, and online social and sharing networks). Atmospheres are designed 
environments that create or reinforce the buyer’s leanings toward buying a product (…) 
Events are staged occurrences that communicate messages to target audiences. For example, 
PR departments arrange grand openings, shows and exhibits, public tours, and other events» 
(p. 419). 
Williams & Hensel (1990) had already addressed the distinction between the personal and 
nonpersonal nature of the information source, underlining the fact that personal interaction 
may occur or not. Personal sources include face-to-face (personal selling through detailing, 
and events such as conventions and meetings), and nonpersonal sources include print. 
Communication channels can also be traditional, or alternative (electronic and mobile-based), 
as noted by Auruskeviciene, Butkeviciene & Salciuviene (2015). Alternative channels are 
also called as digital or electronic channels (Katsanis, 2015). Gibson (2014) also 
differentiated between traditional (such as print and television) and digital (such as the 
internet) channels. Auruskeviciene, Butkeviciene & Salciuviene (2015) explained that the 
main traditional communication channel used by pharmaceutical companies is face-to-face 
personal selling through pharmaceutical sales representatives. They also explained that 
electronic and mobile-based communication channels have become more popular tools. 
Pilarczyk (2011) precised that these new (digital) communication channels are typically 
interactive and allow contacts regardless of distance. 
It is also of relevance to understand how promotion tools have been classified in previous 
research. Williams & Hensel (1990) analyzed the findings of many studies on pharmaceutical 




physicians’ prescription choices. After identifying the main promotion tools covered in the 
literature, they classified them in commercial and non-commercial. Commercial instruments 
include direct mail, journal advertising, detailing (personal selling), and sampling, whereas 
noncommercial instruments include journal articles, colleagues (peers), pharmacists, 
conventions, and meetings. Using this framework from William & Hensel (1990), the more 
recent promotion instruments can also be classified as commercial or noncommercial, which 
will be presented in table 5.1. Williams & Hensel (1990) also used another classification for 
promotion instruments: marketer-controlled sources and non-marketer-controlled sources. 
The former include direct mail, medical journals, detailing and sampling, and the latter 
include journal articles and popular press articles. 
5.4.3. Single, multi and omnichannel marketing 
While single channel marketing consists of the usage of one communication channel to 
interact with customers, multichannel marketing, according to Rangaswamy & Bruggen 
(2005), allows companies to build long-term customer relationships by «simultaneously 
offering their customers and prospects information, products, services, and support (or any 
combination of these) through two or more synchronized channels» (p. 6). Katsanis (2015) 
proposed a multichannel definition in the scope of the pharmaceutical industry, as the use of 
more than one communication channels to reach a target audience, in the case, primarily the 
physician audience. She noted that multichannel includes both traditional and electronic 
channels. Pharmaceutical companies use multichannel approach by using several 
communication channels to impact physicians. For instance, ZS (2014b) report referred a very 
simple example where a pharmaceutical company may start with a PSR detail to doctors 
(face-to-face channel), followed by an e-mail with on-line sampling offer (on-line channel). 
The advent and growth of multichannel marketing in the pharmaceutical industry does not 
necessarily imply a reduced importance of the PSR. Capgemini (2013) research concluded 
that more than five out of ten (52%) doctors consider that PSRs’ roles will evolve into a 
coordinator or director of multichannel information sources. 
Kotler & Armstrong (2012) explained that communication channels must be integrated and 
coordinated by companies to «deliver a clear, consistent and compelling message about the 
organization and its products» (p. G4), calling this the integrated marketing communication, 
or IMC. Kotler & Armstrong (2012) noted that companies communicate with customers using 
a variety of channels, but the message must be consistent and coherent across channels, 




marketers must carefully manage all touchpoints where customers may interact with the 
company and its brands. In the scope of the prescription drugs promotion, there is the need of 
carefully manage the messages conveyed through all communication channels that were 
chosen to interact with physicians, either face-to-face, mail, television, on-line, telephone, or 
printed media, where each contact opportunity must deliver a positive and consistent message, 
image and experience. 
This integrated marketing experience addressed in the previous paragraph is related to another 
concept called omnichannel. Kotler, Kartajaya & Setiawan (2016) explained that omnichannel 
involves the usage of both online and offline channels to interact with customers, regardless 
of touchpoints, which can include face-to-face points of contact, online (applications and 
websites), telephone (call center), or other channels. They explained that, more than impact 
customers with many touchpoints, omnichannel is aimed at allowing customers to have a 
hassle free, seamless and consistent experience when moving from one channel to another, by 
developing a concerted effort across multiple online and offline channels. Omnichannel 
marketing uses data to optimize channel operations, by learning where customers spend their 
time and how they react to different channels and promotions, allowing marketers to tailor 
specific messages to each individual customer, as noted by Kotler, Kartajaya & Setiawan 
(2016). They also underlined that, by using this type of customer-related data, marketers can 
predict what customer will buy in future moments. In this scope, and considering the 
pharmaceutical industry, closed loop marketing (CLM) - previously addressed in this thesis - 
is a concept related to multichannel and to omnichannel marketing, since CLM can integrate 
the utilization of multiple channels such as on-line (websites and social media), added to 
detailing (face-to-face), helping companies to close the loop in the process of information 
provision to physicians (Katsanis, 2015). Vechhione (2008) had already highlighted the link 
between CLM and multichannel, underlining that CLM «is the ability to use multichannel 
communications to drive several channels to create interactions with customers and to get a 
better understanding of what their needs are» (p. 41). 
5.4.4. Linking communication channels and promotion tools 
Pharmaceutical promotion tools can therefore use personal and non-personal, traditional and 
digital communication channels. We will now explore are the most relevant promotion tools 
for each communication channel. 
Personal communication channels include face-to-face personal selling (Kotler & Armstrong, 




chat when communicating directly (Kotler & Armstrong, 2012). Nonpersonal communication 
channels include television, print media, on-line (e-mail when not communicating directly, 
websites, and online social and sharing networks), and events (Kotler & Armstrong, 2012; 
Pilarczyk, 2011). 
Traditional communication channels include face-to-face personal selling (Auruskeviciene, 
Butkeviciene & Salciuviene, 2015), phone, mail, television, and print media. Digital 
communication channels include on-line (Pilarczyk, 2011). The division between traditional 
and digital may become however increasingly blurred. As underlined by Pilarczyk (2011), 
«television is becoming interactive, the printed press has electronic issues, while 
advertisements have their multimedia editions and are available to countless computer users» 
(p. 7). 
The interaction between communication channels and promotion tools may provide a better 
understanding of both concepts. Table 5.1 summarizes the communication channels and 
promotion instruments, and their classification and interactions. The classifications shown in 
the table both for communication channels and for promotion tools were based on the 
literature review performed, and adapted from the classifications addressed by Williams & 
Hensel (1990), Bernewit (2001), Kotler et al (2009), Pilarczyk (2011), Kotler & Armstrong 






Table 5.1 - Communication channels, promotion instruments, and their classification and interactions 
 











(Pitt & Nel, 1988; Berndt, Bui, Reiley & Urban, 1995; Narayanan et al, 2003; 
Narayanan, Desiraju & Chintagunta, 2004; Narayanan, Manchanda & Chintagunta, 
2005; Kalyanaram, 2008; Dave & Saffer, 2012)
Commercial
Drug sampling
(Parsons & Abeele, 1981; Mizik & Jacobson, 2004; Fugh-Berman & Ahari, 2007; 
Kumar & Panigrahi, 2014; Salmasi et al, 2016)
Commercial
Gifts and meals




Continuing medical education (CME) & Event 
sponsoring (Conventions / Meetings / Conferences / 
Seminars / Lectures / Symposia)
(Pitt & Nel, 1981; Evans & Beltramini, 1986; Williams & Hensel, 1991; Noble, 1992; 
Davidoff, 1997; Wazana, 2000; Holmer, 2002; Relman, 2008; Steinbrook, 2008; 
Meffert, 2009)
Non-commercial Both
Telephone Personal Traditional Tele-detailing (Macaluso, 2000;Berndt et al, 2007; Steinman et al, 2007; Calvagna, 2013) Commercial Push
Mail Nonpersonal Traditional Direct-mail advertising (Parsons & Abeele, 1981; Williams & Hensel, 1991) Commercial Push
Medical journal advertising (Parsons & Abeele, 1981; Pitt & Nel, 1988; Othman, Vitry & Roughead (2010) Commercial Push
Direct-to-consumer advertising (DTCA) (Iizuka & Jin, 2005) Commercial Pull
Television Nonpersonal Traditional Direct-to-consumer advertising (DTCA)
(Kravitz et al, 2005; Iizuka & Jin, 2005; Liang & Mackey, 2011; Liu & Gupta, 2011; 
Salmasi, Ming & Khan, 2016)
Commercial Pull
Nonpersonal Digital Virtual (interactive) e-detailing (self-detailing)
(Bernewitz, 2001; Heutschi et al, 2003; Trucco & Amirkhanova, 2006; Alkhateeb & 
Doucette, 2008; Montoya, 2008)
Commercial Pull
Personal Digital Video (live) e-detailing (Heutschi et al, 2003; Trucco & Amirkhanova, 2006; Alkhateeb & Doucette, 2008) Commercial Push
Both Digital e-Mailing (e-mail marketing) (Pedroso & Nakano, 2009) Commercial Both
Nonpersonal Digital e-Continuing medical education (e-CME) (Wutoh, Boren & Balas, 2004; Buxton, Burns & De Muth, 2012) Non-commercial Both
Nonpersonal Digital Company websites and healthcare portals
(Shepherd, Zitners & Waters, 2000; Puschmann & Alt, 2001; Fischer, Stewart, 
Mehta, Wax & Lapinsky, 2003; De Leo, LeRouge, Ceriani & Niederman, 2006)
Both Pull
Nonpersonal Digital Health social networks (Swan, 2009; Barlas, 2010; Sarasohn-Kahn, 2008; Domingo, 2010) Both Pull
Nonpersonal Digital e-Sampling (Puschmann & Alt, 2001; Doyle, 2007; Vecchione, 2008; Kumar & Panigrahi, 2014) Commercial Pull
Nonpersonal Digital
e-Direct-to-consumer advertising (e-DTCA) / 
Web 2.0
(Sarasohn-Kahn, 2008; Liang & Mackey, 2011; DeAndrea & Vendemia, 2016; 











5.5.Promotion tools using traditional channels 
We will now analyze the promotion tools pharmaceutical manufacturers use to interact with 
physicians. For this analysis, we selected one of the classifications discussed before, 
regarding traditional and digital communication channels. Therefore, topic 5.5 will cover 
promotion tools using traditional communication channels, and topic 5.6 will address 
promotion tools using digital communication channels. 
5.5.1. Detailing 
As addressed previously, detailing is the most important instrument in terms of 
pharmaceutical promotion, in terms of investment magnitude. 
5.5.1.1.Sales call and detailing: theoretical foundations 
A sales call is an occasion where a PSR interacts with a prescriber (usually a physician), 
presenting information about a medicine. Lodish, Curtis, Ness & Simpson (1988) noted that 
in each sales call, or visit, several presentations (or details) can be made by the PSR. Mantrala 
et al (1994) explained that «sales calls tend to be short in repetitive buying environment and 
therefore, sales forces actively promote only a few selected products at a time in sales cycles 
lasting several months» (p. 122). Oldani (2004) explained that, in the past, detail men reps 
were mostly male and called mainly male doctors, and that the term detail men is linked to the 
nature of the sales presentation. He also described that pharmaceutical sales representatives 
(or sales reps) present “details” of a drug to doctors (and therefore the term “detailing”), and 
typically use visual aids which they keep at a book called “detail book”, and then store in a 
bag called “detail bag”. In each sales call (or visit), PSRs can present more than one detail 
(one detail is one product mention), up to three or four details per visit. The first product to be 
detailed is usually the most important for the pharmaceutical company promoting it, and 
typically consumes most of the time of the sales call. Montgomery & Silk (1972) noted that 
detailmen (PSRs) tyoically leave product samples and medical literature with the physicians, 
when they visit them. 
Before visiting a doctor, PSRs can perform the preparation of the call, which consists of pre-
call planning, a critical component of the sales call (Ahmad, 2013). Mehta (2004) suggested 
that effective pre-call planning should involve reviewing past call notes, review sales data, 
define a precise call objective, anticipate probable objections, and paly role the call. 
The typical duration of a pharmaceutical sales call has been declining. Yi, Anandalingam & 




circa eight minutes, in 2001 the average had contracted to approximately four minutes (a 50% 
reduction, reflecting the less time physicians are spending with PSRs). John (2008) underlined 
that there is anecdotal evidence showing that the average time PSRs spend on a detailing visit 
may have dropped to less than one minute in 2004. Bernewitz (2001) proposed that the 
average duration of a PSR sales call is about three minutes. According to research conducted 
by Steinman, Harper, Chren, Landefeld & Bero (2007), typical pharmaceutical sales call lasts 
five minutes or less in duration. According to Cegedim (2012), the average call duration has 
been suffering relevant reduction from 2006 (where more than 22% of sales calls to Internists 
were longer than 10 minutes) to 2011 (only 9% were longer than 10 minutes). 
Post-call analysis consists of the evaluation of the result of the PSR sales call, so that the next 
call can be more efficient. Mehta (2004) suggests that, after the call, PSRs should record the 
call immediately, analyze the call and prepare the follow-up call. 
Molloy et al (2002) defined detailing as «face-to-face meetings where pharmaceutical 
representatives (PRs) present information to physicians» (p. 825). Other authors have 
proposed more complete definitions of detailing. Yi, Anandalingam & Sorrell (2003) 
suggested that «in physician detailing, each sales representative targets physicians in an 
effort to provide accurate and latest product information, and to encourage them in 
prescribing the presented prescription drugs for their patients who fit the specific diagnosis 
criteria» (p. 533). Steinman, Harper, Chren, Landefeld & Bero (2007) proposed a more 
complete definition, underlining that «detailing involves direct visits from drug company 
representatives to individual doctors, during which the representative would provide 
information about their company's drugs» (p. 751). Rao & Yamada (1988) explained that 
PSRs visit doctors, describing their portfolio of drugs, providing free samples, scientific 
literature, trying to combat the efforts of PSRs from competing pharmaceutical companies. 
Dingus, Agnihotri & Hu (2017) explained that with detailing, PSRs «make multiple rounds of 
presentations informing and educating physicians in hopes that these physicians will consider 
their drug when writing prescriptions» (p. 1). They also explained that pharmaceutical 
companies typically use detailing more heavily during the first years after a new product 
launch so that it can educate physicians on the new products, and that later in the drug life 
cicle companies tend to reduce detailing efforts and increase DTCA investments, reminding 
patients about the brand. 
Detailing can also take place as a teleconference encounter (Steinman et al, 2007; Berndt, 




tele-detailing, and starts with a phone call, as explained by Calvagna (2013). The PSR then 
calls the doctor’s office and tries to schedule an appointment for a phone call. Tele-detailing - 
at least in its more basic form, with no digital content transfer - appears to be a rudimentary 
form of e-detailing. As noted by Macaluso (2000), tele-detailing is a less costly version of 
detailing to reach a wide range of physicians, and can be used to preserve market share, or to 
promote an older, mature and profitable product, but with no detail time due to newer 
products recently launched. 
According to the Pharma Marketing Network, a «Detail means that part of an in person, face-
to-face sales call during which a sales representative, who is trained and knowledgeable with 
respect to the applicable product, including its label and package insert, and the use of the 
applicable promotional materials, makes a presentation of such product to a medical 
professional with prescribing authority. When used as a verb, detail means to engage in 
detailing activities» (Pharma Marketing Network, 2017). 
Iizuka (2004) addressed the concept of detailing intensity, which consists of the number of 
details (measured as an office visit with physician contact), in which a drug is detailed, in a 
given period (Manchanda, Rossi & Chintagunta, 2004; Liu et al, 2016). 
From a sales theory point of view, detailing is a form of personal selling (Fischer & Albers, 
2010), defined as the promotion of a firm’s drugs to physicians, by pharmaceutical sales 
representatives (Mizik & Jacobson, 2004). It is however a specific type of personal selling 
called missionary selling, where the focus is not on the actual completion of a sales 
transaction and winning a sale, but rather on stimulating demand for the promoted product 
and on the development of goodwill, through pharmaceutical sales representatives 
(Weilbaker, 1990). Pharmaceutical sales representatives do not sell drugs to prescribers, but 
instead introduce and market their companies’ products through interactions with physicians 
and making use of several promotion instruments such as free drug samples, gifts, free meals 
and sponsorships (Salmasi et al, 2016). 
From a marketing theory point of view, detailing can be considered a form of relational 
marketing, as it builds on the development of relationships between pharmaceutical 
companies (through the sales representatives) with prescribers. This is consistent with 
Gronroos (1994) definition of relational marketing, in the sense that this relation is established 
between several parties, by a mutual exchange and fulfilment of promises. This type of 




proposed by Morgan & Hunt (1994). This theory is based on commitment, where «the 
committed party believes the relationship is worth working on to ensure that it endures 
indefinitely» (p. 23), and on trust, «as existing when one party has confidence in an exchange 
partner’s reliability and integrity» (p. 23). Relationship commitment and trust are mediated 
by a series of variables, shown in Figure 5.2. 
 
Figure 5.2 - The Commitment-trust theory of relationship marketing 
Source: Morgan & Hunt (1994) 
Homburg, Bornemann & Kretzer (2014) also addressed detailing in a relational scope. They 
addressed detailing as a long-term relational exchange, where PSRs visit physicians regularly 
and proactively, with the goal of influencing them to consider their company brands at the 
moment of selecting which drug to prescribe, reducing physicians’ available market options, 
and as a consequence trying to commit physicians into a long-term relationship. 
Wazana (2000) evidenced, in his review, that physician-industry interactions appear to affect 
prescribing and professional behavior, addressing the relation between detailing and 
physicians’ prescriptions. In a more recent review, Spurling et al (2010) found that physicians 
that have experienced exposure to information provided directly by pharmaceutical 
companies display a higher prescribing frequency, or lower quality of prescription (in some of 
the papers no significant association was found). 
Several researchers highlighted the association between detailing and prescription behavior, 
and its magnitude has been subject of discussion. For instance, Mizik & Jacobson (2004) 




& Srinivasan (2001) had evidenced physicians fairly limited price sensitivity regarding 
detailing and samples, where these promotion instruments appear to have a mostly 
informative role. Wieringa & Leeflang (2013), studying several products in the Dutch market, 
found that the impact of marketing efforts (including detailing) is significant for only a small 
portion of the brands, and are moderate in size. 
Conversely, other researchers found detailing to have a stronger impact on physicians’ 
prescription behavior. For instance, Berndt, Bui, Reiley & Urban (1995) analyzed the impact 
of detailing and several other marketing initiatives such as DTC advertising, journal ads, and 
found that not only detailing has a positive impact on the number of prescriptions, but also it 
had the largest significant effects among the marketing initiatives. 
5.5.1.2.Evidence from the literature on detailing 
To the best of our knowledge, there is no explicit theory regarding detailing and its effect on 
prescription behavior. Yet, based on the literature review on detailing, some evidences can be 
extracted, summarizing the scholars’ findings, interpretations and explanations, here inferred 
as assumptions. 
Detailing is the pharmaceutical promotion tool with highest total investment magnitude, used 
by pharmaceutical manufacturers to interact with physicians. This evidence was underlined by 
Gagnon & Lexchin (2008), Yi, Anandalingamb & Sorrell (2003), and Datta & Dave (2016). 
These last researchers noted that more than four fifths of promotion directed to physicians is 
in the form of visits by PSRs (detailing) 
 
Commonly accepted evidence about detailing suggests that the effect of detailing on brand 
prescriptions is on average positive, but modest (Kremer et al, 2008; Stremersch & Van Dyck, 
2009; Stremersch & Lemmens, 2009). Table 5.2 below helps generate additional perspective 









Value Elasticity? Comment Main findings (detailing related)
Parsons & Abeele 
(1981)
Steroid group of prophylactic 
medicines for women
- -0.148 Yes Regression coefficient (elasticity)
Sales call (detailing) elasticity is negative when no samples or handouts 
are given
Mackowiak & Gagnon 
(1985)
Benzodiazepines and diuretics Neutral 0 Yes
No correlation between changes in detailing 
expenditures, and demand (new 
prescriptions)
There was no correlation between changes in detailing or journal 
advertising expenditures and primary or selective demand (detailing 
elasticity is zero)
Berndt, Bui, Reiley & 
Urban (1996)
Antiulcer (H2-antagonists) + 0.553 Yes Detailing estimate elasticity Detailing is the most effective promotion instrument
Rizzo (1999) Antihypertension + 0.16 Yes
Included a dummy variable for generics, 
whenever a drug experienced a patent loss
Heavier detailing makes sales substantially less responsive to price
Gönül, Carter, Petrova 
& Srinivasan (2001)
Chronic condition among elderly + 0.1085 Yes Linear (-0.007 for detailing squred)
Exposing a physician to personal selling can become counterproductive 
beyond a certain amount of cumulative detailing
Wittink (2002)
Hypertension, asthma, arthritis, 
erectile dysfuntion, other
+ ROI estimates No
Article presents ROI estimates for detailing 
and three other promotion instruments
Detailing evidences a positive average return on investment (ROI)
Wosinska (2002)
HMG-CoA Reductase Inhibitors 
(Statins; cholesterol)
+ 0.152 to 0.185 Yes
Detailing elasticities using two different 
models
The estimated marginal impact of detailing is significantly larger than the 





0.1143 | 0.0971 | 
0.0978
Yes Allegra, Craritin and Zyrtec (respectively)
On average, physicians are most sensitive to detailing relative to other 
promotional activities. Detailing plays a primarily informative role in the
introductory phase, but the persuasive role dominates later on
Rosenthal, Berndt, 
Donohue, Epstein & 
Frank (2003)
Anti-depress., anti-hyperlipidemics, 
proton pump inhibit., nasal sprays, 
antihistamines
Neutral 0* Yes
Detailing elasticity estimates did not 
approach statistical significance (*coefficient 
of 0.443) for individual products
Detailing elasticities for the aggregate information by drug class were 




Mature product category + 0.17 Yes Average coefficient
There seems to be over-detailing in this product category (negative 
quadratic term)
Manchanda, Rossi & 
Chintagunta (2004)
Mature product category + 0.038 Yes Average coefficient
Detailing elasticity is much higher among Specialists than among non-
specialists
Mizik & Jacobson 
(2004)
N/A +
0.17 | 0.07 | 
0.115
Yes
Estimated elasticities for Drug A, B and C 
(respectively)
Detailing and free drug samples have positive and statistically significant 













0.1772 | 0.095 | 
0.144
Yes
Allegra, Craritin and Zyrtec (respectively).
* Nerlove-Arrow exponential decay goodwill 
model
Detailing has a much higher impact no shares than DTCA. There is a 
positive interaction between detailing and DTCA (synergy)
0.20 | 0.28 | 0.30
0.55 | N/S | 0.59
0.17 | 0.30 | 0.23
2.43 | 2.33 | 2.32





0.0912 | 0.0867 | 
0.0795
Yes
Allegra, Craritin and Zyrtec (respectively; 
direct effects)
There are both indirect and direct effects of detailing. The indirect effect 
dominates in the introductory stages, whereas the direct effect dominates 
in the subsequent stages
Windmeijer, de Laat, 
Douven & Mot (2006)
11 therapeutic classes + 0.3 Yes
Promotion expenditures elasticity 
(aggregation of detailing + advertising + direct 
mail)
Promotion expenditures have a positive effect on drug demand (elasticity of 
0.3), and competitive promotion expenditures have a negative effect 
(elasticity of -0.12)





0.00 | '0.055 | 
0.00
Yes
Elasticities for antihypertensives, 
antidepressants, and antiepileptics. The 1st 
and 3rd were non-significantly ≠ 0
Promotion of new drugs positively affects the new drug share, while 
promotion of old drugs negatively affects the new drug share
Venkataraman & 
Stremersch (2007)
Statins, gastrointestinal and 
coagulation, and erectile 
dysfunction
Neutral*
0.01 | 0.00 | -
0.11
Yes
*Mean detailing elasticities for categories 1, 2 
and 3 (four drugs in each category)
Detailing has a positive effect on prescriptions for 7 out of the 12 brands. 
Drug characteristics, such as effectiveness and side effects, moderate the 
response by physicians to both marketing efforts and detailing
Kalyanaram (2008)
Anti-depressants, proton pump 
inhibitors, and antihistamines drugs
+ 0.81 Yes
Elasticity of direct-to-physician advertising 
(detailing + journal advertising)
The effect of direct-to-physician advertising (constituted by detailing and 
medical journal advertising) is significant in explaining market share
Manchanda, Xie & 
Youn (2008)
Chronic condition among 6% of the 
USA population
+ 0.35 | 0.44 No
Detailing coefficients for two different 
territories
The effect of current detailing, detailing stock, and sampling stock is  
significant and positive





* Instead, the authors used square root, to 
account for diminishing marginal returns
** Non-significant detailing coefficient
Detailing evidenced lack of significance. Relative ineffectiveness of 
detailing could be due to higher saturation
John (2008) N/A  ---  ---  ---  ---
The average value of the effect of detailing is found to be 0.73 (the effect of 
details made in previous periods have on the current period)
Dong, Manchanda & 
Chintagunta (2009)
Proton pump inhibitor 
(gastroesophageal reflux)
+
0.115 | 0.128 | 
0.131 | 0.120
Yes
Mean detailing elasticities for Nexium, 
Prevacid, Aciphex, Protonix (respectively)
Detailing has a positive effect on drug prescriptions. Ignoring strategic 
behavior underestimates the detailing elasticity
Kalyanaram (2009)
Anti-depressants, proton pump 
inhibitors, and antihistamines drugs
+ 0.62 Yes
Elasticity of direct-to-physician promotion 
(detailing + journal advertising)
The coefficient of DTPA (direct-to-physician advertising) has the biggest 
impact on market share
Detailing coefficient
+
Detailing elasticities are different in different countries, for the same 
products promoted. United States, Germany, and Italy have comparable 
own-detailing elasticities, whereas in the U.K. and especially in France 
elasticities are uniformly higher. Accross market interactions were found
Detailing elasticities for Prozac, Zoloft and 
Paxil (respectively)
* Instead, the authors used square root for 












Value Elasticity? Comment Main findings (detailing related)
Narayanan & 
Manchanda (2009)
Erectile dysfunction  + 0.6113 Yes
Mean of the physician-specific detailing stock 
parameter
There is a significant amount of variation across physicians in terms of 
how their responsiveness to detailing varies over time
Fischer & Albers 
(2010)
N/A + 0.33 Yes Total detailing elasticity (short + long term)
On average, detailing is the most potent driver of primary demand among 
the three communication-mix elements analyzed
Fischer, Leeflang & 
Verhoef (2010)
Calcium channel blockers and ACE 
inhibitors (antihypertensives)
+ 0.099 | 0.507 Yes
Elasticities for stock of own marketing vs 
Time-to-peak-sales and Height-of-peak-sales, 
respectively | * Quarterly discount rate
Marketing (promotion) expenditures increase the level of peak sales, while 
they decrease the time-to-peak-sales
Gönül & Carter (2010) 6 classes + 0.509 No
Standardized regression coefficient; *Used 
cumulative discounted detailing
Both e-detailing and traditional (face-to-face) detailing have
positive effects on the number of new prescription sales, but detailing 
effect is dominant
Leeflang & Wieringa 
(2010)
11 classes + 0.014 Yes
Detailing average coefficient for all drug 
brands. *Used detailing discount rate
Detailing is effective for more brands than the other instruments. However, 
the effects sizes are modest and occur infrequently
Montoya, Netzer & 
Jedidi (2010)
Medical condition in 
postmenopausal women
+ 0.654 Yes Total detailing elasticity (short + long term)
Detailing is most effective as an acquisition tool, whereas
sampling is most effective as a retention tool
Nair, Manchanda & 
Bhatia (2010)
Serious chronic disease that affects 
1/4 of the US adult population
+ 0.825 No
OLS regressions coefficient (physician 
prescriptions on opinion leader’s 
prescriptions)
Estimate of the detailing coefficient is large and strongly statistically 
significant. This social multiplier of detailing is economically significant
Dong, Chintagunta & 
Manchanda (2011)
Proton Pump Inhibitor (PPI) and 
antidepressants (AD)
+
0.13 to 0.28 | 
0.09 to 0.20
Yes
Range of own detailing elasticities for PPI and 
AD drugs
A firm’s detailing level in a category appears to be influenced by how much 
that physician was detailed by that and the rival firms in the previous time 
period; and by the firm’s detailing in other categories (spillover effect)
Ching & Ishihara 
(2012)
ACE inhibitor with diuretic 
(antihypertensives)
+ 0.183 No
Detailing coefficient for the partner cumulative 
detailing efforts
The informative role of detailing is mainly responsible for the diffusion 
patterns, whereas the persuasive role plays a crucial role in determining 
the demand for brands that co-market the same chemical
Dave & Saffer (2012)
Analgesics / musculoskeletal, anti-
lipidemics, gastrointestinal acid 
reducers, insomnia aids
+ 0.51 Yes Detailing elasticity Ddetailing is more effective at raising own-sales than is DTCA
Wieringa & Leeflang 
(2013)
Ulcers, hypertension, cholesterol, 
depression, and asthma
+ 0.001 Yes
Mean of brand level elasticity coefficient for 
marketing flow
Several models can be applied to study the effects of promotion 
expenditures on drug sales
Ruiz-Conde, Wieringa 
& Leeflang (2014)
Rhinitis, arthritis, asthma + 0.005 Yes
Direct-to-physician (detailing + medical 
journal advertising; physician meetings; 
DTCA) coefficient, for the informative role
During the first 12 months after the introduction of a new drug, managers
should concentrate their efforts mainly on direct-to-physician activities, 










Value Elasticity? Comment Main findings (detailing related)
Datta & Dave (2016) Antivirals + 0.06 Yes Estimated elasticity
Detailing has a significant and positive effect on the number of new scripts 
written for the detailed drug
Kappe & Stremersch 
(2016)
HMG-CoA Reductase Inhibitors 
(Statins; cholesterol)
+ 0.042 Yes
Short + long-term detailing elasticity 
(controlling for information content)
In the first 6 months following generic entry, it is more
effective for incumbent brands to detail on drug contraindications and 
indications
Liu, Gupta, 
Venkataraman & Liu 
(2016)






Detailing stock effects for Crestor, Zocor and 
Lipitor (respectively)
For all three brands, the estimates of detailing stock effects are positive 




HMG-CoA Reductase Inhibitors 
(Statins; cholesterol)
+ 0.000112 No
* Nerlove-Arrow exponential decay goodwill 
model for detailing carryover + square root for 
detailing wearout
The detailing parameter is positive and significant
Chung, Kim & Park 
(2017)
Chronic pathology  + 0.092 to 0.251 Yes
Detailing elasticities were calculated for each 
of the six doctor specialties. Prescriptions as 
sum of all brands
Specialist physicians exhibit a greater long-term effect but only modest 




HMG-CoA Reductase Inhibitors 
(Statins; cholesterol)
 +
1.73, 0.35, 0.80, 
0.82
Yes
Elasticities for Crestor, Lipitor, Pravachol, and 
Zocor
A detailing decrease for market-leader (Lipitor) triggers competitors to 
often decrease their detailing as well, while a decrease in detailing for 
Pravachol triggers competitors more often to increase their detailing
Liu, Liu & Chintagunta 
(2017)
HIV / AIDS  + 0.002 to 0.189 Yes
Elasticities consistent with previous findings 
from other researchers
Detailing for one drug can increase demand for other drugs that are often 
combined with the focal drug. Such spillover effects could lead to free 
riding by the drugs benefitting from the spillover
Shapiro (2018)  Antipsychotics  + 0.3 No
Each detailing visit causes roughly 0.12 
prescriptions in the month of the visit and 0.3 
over time






As expressed above in table 5.2, the literature on pharmaceutical marketing suggests that 
detailing has a significant and positive impact on physicians’ prescribing behavior, but several 
studies point to a neutral impact, or even a negative one. According to Venkataraman & 
Stremersch (2007), «one reason why this may happen is that physicians’ response to 
marketing efforts may actually depend upon drug characteristics, such as a drug’s 
effectiveness and side effects» (p. 1699). By studying the effects of detailing, meetings, 
patients’ drug requests, drug samples, and drug characteristics (effectiveness and side effects) 
on drug sales, they found that «drug characteristics, such as effectiveness and side effects, 
moderate the response by physicians to both marketing efforts and detailing, both in their 
prescription and their sampling behavior» (p. 1699). As an implication for the pharmaceutical 
industry practice, Venkataraman & Stremersch (2007) underlined that detailing activities will 
more likely produce positive impacts on physicians’ prescribing behavior if these activities 
are supporting drugs that are effective or that have many side effects. 
Neutral elasticities have been found on detailing impact on prescription behavior. Mackowiak 
& Gagnon (1985) studied the effect of expenditures in detailing and medical journal 
advertising, on the number of new prescriptions of several drugs in the benzodiazepines and 
diuretics class. Using ARIMA time series analysis, they found no correlation between 
changes in detailing and journal advertising expenditures, and demand (new prescriptions), 
suggesting that these investments had, for the data series studied, an elasticity of zero. 
Rosenthal, Berndt, Donohue, Epstein & Frank (2003) studied five therapeutic classes of 
drugs, analyzing the impact of DTCA, detailing, and other variables (order of entry, drug 
price, drug age (measured as time remaining with patent)) on the number of prescriptions 
(sales), and found that detailing had a very small elasticity (0,017 to 0,034), regarding 
information aggregated by drug class. However, when they analyzed the drug brands 
separately, detailing elasticities were not statistically significant, and therefore not different 
from zero. 
Vakratsas & Kolsarici (2008) studied the relation between new prescriptions and detailing, 
medical journal advertising, and DTCA using data from a non-US country, aggregating data 
from a drug class, and found that only medical journal advertising and DTCA produced 
significant elasticities. They suggested that perhaps the detailing non-significant coefficients 
were explained either by the fact that they were using class-aggregation, or due to the possible 




Some research produced even negative detailing elasticities. For instance, Parsons & Abeele 
(1981), using data from Belgium regarding steroid group of prophylactic medicines for 
women, studied the effect of detailing and other promotion instruments such as mailing, 
samples, and handouts, on drug sales, and found that detailing had a negative elasticity (-
0,148) when drug samples and handouts are not give to doctors. They also found that 
detailing only had a positive (however very low) positive effect in interactions with samples 
(0,030) and handouts (0,029) when combined separately, but a negative effect when including 
both drug samples and handouts (-0,005). Venkataraman & Stremersch (2007) also found 
that, for some of the products included in their data set, some products evidence detailing 
negative elasticities, suggesting that effects of marketing efforts on prescription behavior vary 
by drug brand. 
However, despite the few cases where detailing elasticities are neutral or negative, the 
majority of the previous research points to a positive elasticity, as found by Kremer, Bijmolt, 
Leeflang & Wieringa (2008), reaching an average elasticity of 0,326. 
Despite the apparent modest effect on prescription behavior, detailing appears to be the 
promotion instrument that generates a higher effect on prescription behavior, which has been 
covered by several researchers. Pitt & Nel (1988) were one of the first ones and found that 
doctors recognize detailing (sales calls by pharmaceutical sales representatives) as the most 
powerful and significant promotion tool in terms of its ability to influence prescription. 
Berndt, Bui, Reiley & Urban (1995) found that not only detailing has a positive impact on the 
number of prescriptions, but also it had the largest significant effects among the marketing 
initiatives. Wosinska (2002), when analyzing the impact of detailing and DTCA on the 
number of new prescriptions, concluded that «the estimated marginal impact of detailing is 
significantly larger than the marginal impact of consumer advertising (on the order of five 
times)» (p. 2). Narayanan et al (2003) found that detailing is relatively more impactful than 
other promotion activities, in terms of drugs prescriptions. Narayanan, Desiraju & 
Chintagunta (2004) found that detailing has a much higher impact on shares than does DTC. 
Narayanan, Manchanda & Chintagunta (2005), found that detailing elasticities have a higher 
magnitude than DTC and other marketing expenses Kalyanaram (2008) concluded that direct-
to-physician (DTP) advertising has a much higher elasticity than DTC advertising. In another 
similar analysis, Kalyanaram (2009) concluded again that DTP advertising has a much higher 
elasticity than DTC advertising. Dave & Saffer (2012) also found evidence of a much higher 




Jaimakiraman, Dutta & Rajiv (2017) also highlighted that detailing is the most impactful tool, 
playing a larger role than DTCA in individual drug choice. The magnitude of the effect of 
detailing and other promotion instruments on prescription behavior will be more deeply 
analyzed in a specific topic, later in this thesis. This evidence will be further analyzed in topic 
5.8.5. Comparative effectiveness of the promotion tools. 
Detailing appears to reduce price elasticity of drugs. Gönül et al (2001), when studying a drug 
and diagnosis data, personal selling data, and retail price data, found that physicians are 
characterized by fairly limited price sensitivity, since, globally, physicians' price sensitivity 
appears to come second to considerations about drug efficacy and patients' conditions. This 
conclusion is consistent with results obtained by Rizzo (1999), who studied the effect of 
product promotion through detailing to antihypertensive grugs, concluding that it inhibits 
price competition, leads to higher prices, lowering price elasticities of demand (price 
elasticities using a model with no detailing were substantially higher than price elasticities 
using detailing and detailing stock). Windmeijer et al (2006), when studying several products 
from different therapeutic classes using data from The Netherlands, also concluded that 
promotion expenditures (where detailing accounted for 63% of the total expenditures) 
adversely affect the own-price elasticity of drugs, reducing price elasticities to practically 
zero, shifting the demand curve outwards. Narayanan et al (2004) found a somewhat converse 
evidence applicable in the scope of high levels of detailing. When studying the interaction 
between price and detailing, they suggested that that, «because a higher price adversely 
affects demand, the negative interaction implies that at higher levels of detailing, the demand 
is even more sensitive to higher prices» (p. 103). 
Detailing effect on prescription behavior seems to evidence diminishing marginal returns. 
This was addressed by Berndt et al (1995), where they found that marketing initiatives 
(including detailing) appear to display overall decreasing returns to scale. Gönül et al (2001) 
highlighted that physician prescription probability curve showed an inflection after a detailing 
threshold (detailing squared showed a negative signal). Nevertheless, there seems to be room 
to increase detailing as some pharmaceutical companies may be operating on the increasing 
part of the curve. Manchanda & Chintagunta (2004) also found evidences of diminishing 
returns of the impact of detailing on the number of prescriptions (for two thirds of the 
physicians in their panel), somewhat more frequent among specialists. They argue that after a 
certain point, detailing may provoke a negative effect on prescriptions, where excessive 




overdetailing may be an issue of worry to pharmaceutical companies, because it translates 
into “wasted” marketing expenditures. Dong, Manchanda & Chintagunta (2009). When 
computing non-aggregated (nominative) information from a physician panel, also found this 
behavior regarding detailing impact on physicians’ prescription behavior, noting that every 
physician has his or her own response curve to detailing activities. They exemplified this 
evidence in figure 5.3. X axis represents the number of details (visits) per quarter, and Y axis 
the number of prescriptions. 
 
Figure 5.3 – Response curves for two individual physicians 
Source: Dong, Manchanda & Chintagunta (2009) 
John (2008) found in his research that detailing has a concave sales-response curve, stating 
that «a plateauing effect with increasing detailing frequency can lead to not only wasting 
resources but also decreasing sales to irritated customers» (p. 1750). Yi, Anandalingam & 
Sorrell (2003) had already addressed this issue, noting that detailing activity typically reaches 
a plateau, after which its effectiveness is questionable. Liu et al (2016) also noted, in their 
research of detailing under counterfactual detailing restriction policies, that pharmaceutical 
companies tend to «direct less detailing to a physician if they already have a high detailing 
stock at that physician», and that «because of the diminishing marginal returns to detailing, it 
is less profitable for a firm to detail a physician if there is already a high level of detailing 
stock at the physician» (p. 14). Figure 5.4 evidences the typical concave-shaped response 
curve, where Xi represents the number of details to a i doctor, Yi represents the average 
number of prescriptions of a i doctor, and Ki represents the plateau prescription amount for 





Figure 5.4 - Concave-shaped promotional response curve 
Source: Yi, Anandalingam & Sorrell (2003) 
Detailing efforts appear to have a higher effect on prescriptions at the initial stages of the 
product life cycle. Narayanan et al (2003) concluded that detailing plays a primarily 
informative role in the 9-18 months post drug introduction – or the introductory phase –, 
whereas the persuasive role dominates later on for the growth, maturity and decline phases. 
They suggest that pharmaceutical companies should concentrate their detailing effort more 
heavily at the introduction phase, followed by lower levels of detailing in later stages of the 
product life cycle. Two years later, the same authors (Narayanan et al, 2005) demonstrated 
that detailing seems to impact drug prescriptions in a stronger way in the early stages of the 
product life, showing that not only detailing effect on prescriptions is larger in the early stages 
of the product life cycle, but also that detailing plays a more informative (indirect) role in 
these stages, while in later stages of the product life cycle detailing plays a more persuasive 
(direct) role. Manchanda, Rossi & Chintagunta (2004) suggested that detailing may be more 
important, in terms of its effect on drug sales, regarding drugs in the growth phase of the 
product life cycle (comparing to drugs in the near end of their patent life). Dave (2013) 
highlighted that pharmaceutical promotion has both informative and persuasive elements. 
Despite the effect may be stronger in the initial stages of the life cycle, detailing appears to 
impact prescriptions in all stages of the product life cycle, as noted by Manchanda & Honka 
(2005) in their review. They explain that in addition to provide a “reminder effect”, constant 
interaction between the pharmaceutical sales representatives and the physicians may build a 
stock of goodwill based on social and cultural factors, which can be translated into a positive 
prescription behavior by the prescriber. 
Detailing is known to have significant carryover effects, as noted by Liu et al (2016). 
Zoltners, Sinha & Lorimer (2004) had already noted that the impact of sales force effort on 




period, but also in future periods. They explained that carry-over can be explained because of 
habit, because of long-term contracts (which in the pharmaceutical industry is linked to 
formularies, which impose a specific drugs and brands perimeter for physicians), or because 
of high switching costs. Figure 5.5 illustrates a Zoltners, Sinha & Lorimer (2004) example of 
carry-over. 
 
Figure 5.5 - Illustration of carry-over 
Source: Zoltners, Sinha & Lorimer (2004) 
John (2008) defined carry over as the impact of the details made in previous periods on those 
made in the current period, meaning that current detailing investments appear to affect 
prescribers’ goodwill in future periods too. Liu, Liu & Chintagunta (2017) explained that 
detailing carryover is created via goodwill accumulation «from one period to another even for 
drugs that have been on the market for a while» (p. 3), also noting that detailing activities 
made today may influence physicians’ prescription behavior (decisions) in the future. 
Detailing carryover was addressed by Narayanan et al (2004), when analyzing the effect of 
marketing investments in the current period and in multi periods. By allowing their model to 
incorporate the impact of current detailing activity not only in the current period but also in 
future periods, for example in the case of antihistamines class, the carry over reached 86% for 
detailing and 75% for DTC advertising, with detailing return of investment ranging from 7,6 
to 9,1, and from 2,7 to 3,8, respectively. John (2008), when studying the carry over effect at 
the customer level in a relatively new therapeutic area, obtained a carryover effect for each 
responsive physician of 0,73 on average, or, 73% of the current effect of detailing was 
originated in previous quarters. Montoya, Netzer & Jedidi (2010) demonstrated the different 




suggested that the duration of the effectiveness of one detail may reach 10 months (5 months 
for sampling), after which the increase in the number of prescriptions is less than 1% (short-
term elasticities appear lower than long-term elasticities). This effect can be seen below in 
figure 5.6. 
 
Figure 5.6 – Duration of the effect of detailing and sampling 
Source: Montoya, Netzer & Jedidi (2010) 
Detailing stock is, as noted by Ching & Ishihara (2012), the cumulative effects of detailing 
over a period of time. Rizzo (1999) explained why detailing builds a stock, pointing two 
reasons: first, given that patients need a prescription from a physician, and that the latter is 
most likely unware of all indications and side effects of all competing drugs in the market, 
drug promotional activities directed at physicians in one period (influencing them to initiate 
the prescribing of a specific drug) will probably have long-lasting effects. Second, since most 
drugs treat chronic conditions, when a patient starts taking a specific drug with a specific 
dosage that keeps him or her medical condition stable, the physician will not likely switch the 
drug for a competing one, except important side effects arise. Therefore, as underlined by 
Rizzo (1999), «if promotional activities can encourage patients to start using a product in 
one period, sales will likely extend into the future» (p. 96). 
Detailing stock has however a depreciation rate (or forgetting rate), which accounts for the 
fact that physicians may forget drug attributes over time, as underlined by Ching & Ishihara 
(2012), therefore evidencing the importance of «reminding physicians of the most updated 




1999), detailing stock discount (Gönül et al, 2001), detailing stock decay (Narayanan, 
Manchanda & Chintagunta, 2003), and wearout (Mukherji, Jaimakiraman, Dutta & Rajiv, 
2017; Wosinka, 2012; Manchanda & Chintagunta, 2004). Gönül et al (2001) explained that 
discounting «enables us to include effects such as memory decay and the fading impact of 
past detailing and samples with time» (p. 85), and Windmeijer, de Laat, Douven & Mot 
(2006) noted that the «stock of promotion expenditures depreciates faster for new products» 
(p. 21). Gönül & Carter (2010) also noted that doctors are «most likely to be influenced by 
more recent sales calls than by those in the past» (p. 103), and therefore «the discounting 
formula accounts for both memory decay and the receding impact of past promotion efforts 
with time» (p. 103). Previous research used detailing stock depreciation montlhly rates of 1% 
(Gönül et al, 2001), 4,1% (Ching & Ishihara, 2012), 4,2% (Berndt, Bui, Reiley & Urban, 
1996), 4,6% (Windmeijer, de Laat, Douven & Mot, 2006), 5,8% (Manchanda, Xie & Youn, 
2008), 14% (Narayanan, Desiraju & Chintagunta, 2004; Liu et al, 2016), 20% (Datta & Dave, 
2016), and 30% (Narayanan, Manchanda & Chintagunta, 2005), to name a few authors. 
In the case of the research conducted by Berndt, Bui, Reiley & Urban, 1996), the monthly 
depreciation rate of 4,2% meant that the yearly detailing stock depreciation reached about 40 
percent. They explained that «relative detailing efforts have a long-lived rivalrous impact that 
depreciates at about 40 percent per year» (p. 26). Narayanan, Manchanda & Chintagunta 
(2003) noted that, by using a carryover coefficient of 70% (representing a discount of 30% 
per month), the effect of expenditure on a marketing activity is diminished by approximately 
90% in 6 months (1 – 0,7^6 = 88,2%). Rizzo (1999) had proposed the use of a detailing stock 
discount rate (consumer price index), and Leeflang & Wieringa (2010), analyzing data from 
the Netherlands, also incorporated a discount rate for detailing stock. 
Detailing effect on prescriptions appears to be more on drug shares, rather than on drug 
category volume. Narayanan et al (2004) found that detailing has a significantly higher impact 
on drug shares than DTC, whereas DTC has a significant impact on category volume only), 
and Datta & Dave (2016) suggest that direct to physician promotion (including detailing) 
cannot induce untreated consumers to visit the physician, and therefore its impact on class-
level demand is inherently limited. 
Detailing may have different effects on prescription, depending on the type of prescription 
payer. The possession of prescription drug insurance may impact detailing elasticities, as 
evidenced by Gönül et al (2001), where physicians mostly seeing patients with private health 




seeing Medicare (federal) insurance. Similar conclusions were driven from Datta & Dave 
(2016) research, where detailing effects on prescription were higher for physicians whose 
patients were privately insured, suggesting that, if physicians are aware of the cost to the 
patients, then they may likely be more prone to prescribe a more expensive branded drug 
when the patients have drug insurance. 
Detailing elasticities depend on the therapeutic or disease classes. Table 5.2 evidenced the 
analysis of 44 articles studying detailing impact on prescription behavior, and showed a 
diverse number of elasticities, considering several drug classes or categories. Kremer, 
Bijmolt, Leeflang & Wieringa (2008) in their review, found that different disease categories 
evidenced different impacts on physicians’ prescriptions, on the presence of promotional 
instruments. The predicted elasticities of direct-to-consumer advertising, detailing, advertising 
(medical journal advertising), and other direct-to-physician promotion instruments are shown 
below in figure 5.7: 
 
 
Figure 5.7 – Predicted elasticities for combinations of promotional instruments and disease 
categories 
Source: Kremer, Bijmolt, Leeflang & Wieringa (2008) 
Kremer, Bijmolt, Leeflang & Wieringa (2008) found that direct-to-physician (DTP) 
instruments (mainly detailing) were most effective than DTCA, and that detailing elasticity is 
higher in skin diseases (1,069) and inflammations (0,549) categories. Stremersch & Van Dyck 
(2009) also suggested that detailing effect can be different by with physician and drug. 
Detailing may have a different impact on different medical specialties. Chung, Kim & Park 
(2017) studied data gathered from a panel of close to 10 thousand physicians in India and 
found that specialist physicians tend to reveal a higher long-term effect of detailing, revealing 




found that generalists are more likely to be more responsive to detailing in the short term, 
with however a lower lasting effect in time. 
Detailing may be linked to nonrational prescription behavior. Wazana (2000) noted in his 
review that most studies addressed some negative outcomes associated with the interaction 
between the pharmaceutical industry and physicians. These included a series of effects, 
including a negative impact on physicians’ ability to identify wrong claims about medication; 
effects on «awareness, preference, and rapid prescription of a new drug» (p. 378); effects on 
physicians’ behavior, by «making formulary requests for medications that rarely held 
important advantages over existing ones» (p. 378); also included «nonrational prescribing 
behavior; increasing prescription rate; prescribing fewer generic but more expensive, newer 
medications at no demonstrated advantage» (p. 378). Some of these evidences were 
explicated by Haayer (1982), in their research on the impact of different sources of drug 
information on general practitioners prescribing rationality, where they found that physicians 
who relied on pharmaceutical representatives evidenced a lower likelihood of a rational 
prescribing. Brax et al (2017) developed a literature review of the impact of pharmaceutical 
manufacturers’ interactions on physician prescription behavior, and found evidence, on 15 of 
the 19 selected articles, an association between promotion interactions and a inappropriate 
increase in prescribing rates, lower quality in the prescription activity, and / or higher 
prescription costs. 
Detailing promotional instrument effect may be leveraged by selecting the right key opinion 
leaders to impact. Nair, Manchanda & Bhatia (2010) demonstrated a social multiplier of 
detailing to opinion leaders, where targeting these specialists may generate a 5%-35% 
increase on detailing return on investment. Key opinion leaders are «influential doctors 
engaged by industry to advise on marketing and help boost sales of new medicines (…) in 
hospitals and universities (…)» (Moynihan, 2008, p. 1402), and which are paid fees to 
influence their peers on behalf of pharmaceutical companies. Jacob (2018) defined KOLs (or 
Thought Leaders) as «those clinicians who are considered as experts in their respective fields 
by their peers by virtue of their subject expertise, experience, research, publications, speaking 
and overall influence» (p. 6). Tan (2003) noted that key opinion leaders assist the complex 
research and marketing activities, and typically are doctors who published peer-reviewed 
articles, have an academic title, and benefit from credibility among colleagues. Key opinion 
leaders are in many occasions instructors to their colleagues, speakers at meetings, and senior 




pharmaceutical manufacturers’ new product commercialization budget (Nair, Manchanda & 
Bhatia, 2010). Meffert (2009) noted that key opinion leaders can significantly influence 
prescribing habits and increase relationships with the pharmaceutical industry, based on their 
positions of honor and respect among their peers. 
Gifts and meals associated with detailing may impact prescription behavior. Katz, Caplan & 
Merz (2010) suggest that even small gifts called reminder gifts (pens and notepads) and meals 
may influence doctors’ drug choice. They explored the effect of gifts on behavior, in the sense 
that gift recipients may feel the need to reciprocate, even if he or she is not aware or conscious 
that this may influence their behavior. According to Cialdini (1984), «by virtue of the 
reciprocity rule, then, we are obligated to the future repayment of favors, gifts, invitations, 
and the like» (p. 13). DeJong et al (2016) studied the impact of pharmaceutical industry-
sponsored meals and physician prescribing patterns for Medicare beneficiaries, finding an 
association between the receipt of those meals (with an average value of less than US$20) and 
an «increased rate of prescribing the promoted brand-name medication relative to 
alternatives within the drug class» (p. 1121). King & Bearman (2017) studied the association 
between prescription of psychotropic medications and gifts receiving, finding that the uptake 
of new expensive medications was significantly lower in US states with marketing regulation, 
when compared to states allowing unrestricted pharmaceutical marketing. In states that were 
banning all gifts, the drop in market shares ranged from 39% to 83%. They suggested that gift 
bans and gift restrictions were much more powerful in terms of prescription reduction, than 
disclosure policies. 
Recipients of the detailing activities (prescribers) do not consider themselves as influenced as 
their colleagues. Research conducted by Steinman, Shlipak & McPhee (2001) pointed to more 
than 60% of the physicians stating that pharmaceutical industry promotions and contacts did 
not have influence on their own prescribing, while only 16% believed other physicians were 
unaffected. Sah & Fugh-Berman (2013), in their paper on physicians influence by the 
pharmaceutical industry, reinforced this evidence, by underlining that «Physicians’ mistaken 
belief that they are immune to marketing aligns with research showing that people rationalize 
and believe what they want to believe. For example, studies consistently show that promotion 
increases the prescription of targeted drugs, yet research also finds that physicians believe 
their own prescribing behavior is unaffected by industry influence, although they concede that 
other physicians are susceptible to such influence» (p. 666). Riese et al (2015) also found 




industry interactions have no impact on their own prescribing behavior, versus the prescribing 
behavior of other physicians. This pattern is also underlined by Salmasi et al (2016) in their 
review, as a certain perception of own immunity against pharmaceutical companies’ 
promotion initiatives. 
Detailing effectiveness can be optimized, in order to reach higher levels of sales force 
efficiency. Several authors have researcher detailing optimization. Yi, Anandalingam & 
Sorrell (2003), using data mining in neural networks, and also non-linear programming, 
studied and optimized sales response functions for several physician segments (deciles), 
reaching a higher level of profits when comparing the base scenario. The optimized physician 
detailing planning allowed an increased profit of 10%. Manchanda, Rossi & Chintagunta 
(2004) referred, in their paper addressing response modeling with nonrandom marketing-mix 
variables, that «high-volume physicians are detailed to a greater extent than low-volume 
physicians without regard to responsiveness to detailing» (p. 467), and that high-volume 
physicians, but unresponsive to incremental detailing efforts, are detailed the most. The 
results obtained were an optimization of the number of details per physician, inducing a 
higher number of prescriptions. 
Several years later, Montoya, Netzer & Jedidi (2010), in the scope of a new drug introduction 
by a major pharmaceutical company, and studying the short and long-term effects of 
pharmaceutical promotion activities in a sample of 300 physicians, found that the company 
could significantly increase its profits by optimizing the number of calls to physicians, even 
reducing the overall spending with detailing activities. The detailing dynamic allocation to 
physicians allowed a 61,9% increase in prescription versus the base scenario, representing 
incremental USD$412 per month, per physician, decreasing spending with detailing in 20%. 
Optimizing the number of calls may however be challenging for most companies. A first 
reason is that marketing resource allocation decisions are complex (Montoya, Netzer & 
Jedidi, 2010). A second reason is that, as noted by Manchanda, Rossi & Chintagunta (2004), 
these models and skills are not generally accessible since the have only recently been 
proposed in academic literature. And a third reason is that, except for the USA and New 
Zealand, physicians-level prescription data is not available for pharmaceutical companies. 
Venkataraman & Stremersch (2007) demonstrated, in their research, that drug characteristics 
can moderate the effect of detailing in prescription behavior. As an implication for the 
pharmaceutical industry practice, Venkataraman & Stremersch (2007) underlined that 




behavior if this activities are supporting drugs that are effective or that have many side 
effects. Kappe & Stremersch (2016) also demonstrated that detailing effectiveness can be 
optimized. They studied the effects of information content in sales calls promoting statins, in 
the scope of entry of competing brands and generics, and found that in the first semester after 
generic entry, branded incumbent companies should detail doctors stressing drug 
contraindications and indications, compared to the period after the first semester, to positively 
differentiate, as they explained, the brand from generics. They also found that, in the scope of 
a competitive brand entry (not generic), and in the first semester following this new entry, it 
will be less effective for branded incumbent companies to detail doctors stressing drug 
indications and costs, considering the added competitive pressure. 
There are physician profiles and situations that increment the likelihood of a more frequent 
engagement of physicians with PSRs. Primary care doctors are more likely to see PSRs, as 
well as high volume prescribers, and doctors working at small and urban practices are more 
likely to see PSRs too, as addressed by Alkhateeb, Khanfar, & Clauson (2009). They also 
underlined that doctors who practice in organizations that do not pose restrictive policies for 
pharmaceutical detailing are more likely to receive PSRs visits, as well as doctors who do not 
have academic affiliations. High prescribing physicians have a higher propensity to receive 
PSRs in detailing activities (Gönül & Carter, 2012). 
Detailing effectiveness can be attenuated by a form of detailing called academic detailing. 
Some countries such as the US (states of Pennsylvania, Columbia, Massachusetts), Canada 
and Australia (Fischer & Avorn, 2012) have tested a different form of detailing, called 
academic detailing programs (Grande, 2009). These programs are also known as educational 
outreach visits, university-based educational detailing, or educational visiting (O’Brien et al, 
2007). As proposed by Fischer & Avorn (2012), academic detailing «takes the effective 
outreach strategies of pharmaceutical marketing and applies them to the service of promoting 
unbiased, noncommercial reviews of the totality of the existing evidence on a particular 
clinical topic, along with practice recommendations based on that evidence» (p. 2207) using 
trained nurses, pharmacists or physicians to meet with prescribers at their own offices. In 
these publicly-funded programs, the goal is not to regulate, but rather to substitute 
pharmaceutical detailing, trying to counter its influence, as noted by Grande (2009). 
According to the researcher, these programs – using the same sales tactics applied by the 
pharmaceutical industry to impact physicians’ prescribing behavior and attitudes, but using 




to the larger challenge of moderating the influence of pharmaceutical gifts on physicians» (p. 
81). O’Brien et al (2007) reviewed literature on academic detailing and found that it can 
produce moderated but potentially important effects in improving health professional practice, 
reducing the difference in compliance against desired medical practice. 
Detailing efforts performed by competitor drug brands affect own brand number of 
prescriptions. These detailing efforts are called, in the pharmaceutical literature, as 
competitive detailing, and will be covered further in this thesis. We present, however, two 
articles addressing competitive detailing impact. The first is the research performed by Dong, 
Manchanda & Chintagunta (2009). They found that the higher the intensity of competitors 
detailing, the lower the sales of the own brand and that the effects are different for different 
competitor brands. Finally, they found that the competitive effects were the strongest in the 
zero to two details range. Liu et al (2016) found that detailing leaders will suffer the highest 
reduction in share of voice and market share (against other competitors and generics, when 
available). 
Direct-to-physician promotion – from which detailing is the most important component – can 
have an impact on companies’ stock returns, when there are unexpected schocks (increase in 
direct-to-physician promotion) investors were not counting on, as explained by Osinga, 
Leeflang, Srinivasan & Wieringa (2011). Dingus (2014) studied the impact of detailing 
investments and stock returns of six of the top pharmaceutical manufacturers in the USA, and 
found that «the growth rate of detailing does have a positive, significant impact on firm 
valuation» (p. 20). Dingus, Agnihotri & Hu (2017) studied the effect of detailing and DTCA 
investments in the top 6 pharmaceutical companies in the US, with data from the period of 
1995 to 2012, and found that both promotion instruments did have a significant and positive 
effect on the firms’ value (measured as Tobin’s Q and stock return). 
Detailing can have spillover effects. Dong, Chintagunta & Manchanda (2011) studied the 
effect of detailing on multi-category physician prescription behavior, and found that a 
company detailing level in one drug category may be influenced by the company detailing 
level in other categories, which constitutes a spillover effect of detailing, that is, the reach and 
impact of detailing may not be circumscribed to the drug category being impacted. They 
suggest managers to incorporate these findings into the doctors’ segmentation to achieve 
higher levels of responsiveness to the company detailing efforts, and to its profitability. More 
recently, Liu, Liu & Chintagunta (2017) studied detailing spillovers in the scope of 




treat a single disease» (p. 1), or by other words situations where there is a bundle of products 
typically from different companies. They studied several product bundles and ran 
counterfactual simulations to test several scenarios in HIV / AIDS drug class, and found both 
detailing spillovers and free riding effects. They concluded that the detailing efforts a 
company makes for its brand (focal) may not only benefit its prescription volume, but also 
benefit the prescription volume of drugs used in combination with this focal brand. In these 
situations, Liu, Liu & Chintagunta (2017) noted that those brands from other companies 
benefit from the focal brand promotion efforts, which they call a free ride from the detailing 
spillover. 
5.5.1.3.Competitive detailing 
The concept of competitive detailing was addressed by Liu et al (2016) in their article 
covering an empirical model of drug detailing, studying dynamic competition and policy 
implications. Competitive detailing can be interpreted as the detailing activity dynamics of the 
competitors in a specific drug class. By other words, it translates the dynamic and reactions of 
competitors regarding their detailing investments decisions and is directly related to the 
concept of share of voice (as the percentage of the detailing effort of one company, on the 
sum of the detailing efforts of all competitor companies for a specified class). One interesting 
conclusion drawn from Liu et al (2016) was that it is more profitable for a pharmaceutical 
company to detail a physician, when its competitors’ detailing activity is low at that 
physician. The opportunity to cause a higher impact on the number of prescriptions is 
therefore higher in these cases. Liu et al (2016) assumed, in their research, that competitive 
detailing implies that companies know competitors’ detailing activities applied in the past 
periods. Companies such as IQVIA (former IMS Health and Quintiles, before the merger of 
the two companies in 2017) provide such competitive information on promotion tools 
investments, including detailing (a study called ChannelDynamics
TM
), on an aggregate or 
disaggregate basis. 
Rao & Yamada (1988) had already addressed the concept of competitive detailing. In their 
research, they had access to data on detailing and detailing share. By multiplying the two, 
they obtained the competitive detailing investments for each firm, that is, the investment 
magnitude in detailing for each competing firm. They found that competitive detailing (the 
increase in detailing of a specific drug) «is most effective against drugs that are very 
frequently prescribed» (p. 749). By other words, «the more a drug is prescribed, the more 




albeit indirectly, the concept of competitive detailing, underlining the importance of having a 
data set that includes competitive promotion information about manufacturers. Mizik & 
Jacobson (2004) too emphasized that competitive detailing analysis implies having access to 
data on competitive promotion tools investments (such as detailing, drug sampling, and 
other), and Manchanda et al (2005) underlined the need of further research in the scope of 
competitive detailing. 
Dong, Manchanda & Chintagunta (2009), using nominative data from a panel of physicians 
(on acid reflux disease market), found that competitive detailing impacts the number of 
prescriptions of drugs, affecting them adversely. The higher the intensity of competitors 
detailing, the lower the sales of the own brand. Figure 5.8 below evidences this effect. Dong, 
Manchanda & Chintagunta (2009) noted that competitive detailing effects are different for 
different competitor brands, as seen in figure 5.9. 
 
Figure 5.8 – Cross detailing (mean) elasticities - competitive detailing 
Source: Dong, Manchanda & Chintagunta (2009) 
As noted by Dong, Manchanda & Chintagunta (2009), while Prevacid detailing has a very 
small effect on Nexium prescriptions, Aciphex has a much stronger effect. Another relevant 
conclusion pointed by Dong, Manchanda & Chintagunta (2009) was that the competitive 
effects were the strongest in the zero to two details range (number of details per quarter), as 





Figure 5.9 – Competitive detailing effects 
Source: Dong, Manchanda & Chintagunta (2009) 
Leeflang & Wieringa (2010) used not only brand detailing, but also competitive detailing 
(adapted Rizzo OLS regression model) to study the impact of several variables (including 
detailing, advertising and direct mail) on prescription drug sales. This adapted model had 
already been used by Windmeijer, de Laat, Douven & Mot (2006), when they analyzed the 
effect of several variables in drug demand (measured as defined daily doses, or DDD). They 
found that promotion expenditures (aggregation of detailing – the most representative 
promotion tool -, advertising, and direct mail) have an elasticity of 0,3, while the competitive 
promotion expenditures (made by competitors) have an elasticity of -0,12. They noted, about 
these results, that «a sizeable proportion of promotion efforts is about establishing or 
maintaining market share» (p. 20). 
Liu et al (2016) also found that changes in competitive detailing may affect competitors’ 
market shares. Using counterfactual simulations testing several detailing restriction policies, 
they estimated that detailing leaders would suffer the highest reduction in share of voice and 
market share (against other competitors and generics, when available). 
 
5.5.1.4.Approach to research on detailing 
Most of the papers covering the effect of detailing on prescription behavior analyze the 




be drawn from Wazana (2000), Kremer et al (2008), and Spurling et al (2010) reviews. The 
number of papers covering the effect of detailing on physician prescription behavior using 
European-level data is limited, mainly targeting, at single country level, the Netherlands 
(Greving et al, 2006; Windmeijer, de Laat, Douven & Mot, 2006; Wieringa & Leeflang, 
2013), France (Auvray, Hensgen & Sermet, 2003; Verdoux, Cougnard, Grolleau & Begaud, 
2005), the UK (Freemantle, Johnson, Dennis, Kennedy & Marchment, 2000; Prosser & 
Walley, 2003a), Belgium (Berings, Blondeel & Habraken, 1994), and Spain (Caamano, 
Figueiras & Gestal-Otero, 2002). Moreover, the great majority of these authors using 
European-level data do not use longitudinal, time series data, with some exceptions such as 
Auvray, Hensgen & Sermet, 2003, Windmeijer, de Laat, Douven & Mot, 2006, Leeflang & 
Wieringa (2010) and Wieringa & Leeflang (2013). The others used cross-sectional data and 
experiments such as randomized control trials. 
These papers can be grouped into two categories, using Spurling et al (2010) classification in 
their tables: the first category encompasses studies that specifically analyzed the effect of 
detailing on the prescribing frequency (Berings et al, 1994; Caamano et al, 2002; Verdoux et 
al, 2005). Berings et al (1994), evaluating three intervention groups of GPs in Belgium, in the 
scope of benzodiazepines prescription, observed that the tendency to prescribe 
benzodiazepines was associated with the utility of commercial information provided by 
pharmaceutical companies, and by the number of pharmaceutical sales representatives 
received. Caamano et al (2002) analyzed 234 self-administered survey questionnaires to 
Spanish primary care physicians in Galicia, addressing the perception of physicians on the 
quality of information about drugs obtained from pharmaceutical sales representatives (and 
other marketing instruments), and the influence of this information on drug selection. They 
found that physicians who gave more weight (in a Likert scale) to the information provided 
by pharmaceutical sales representatives evidenced a larger number of prescriptions. However, 
the number of pharmaceutical sales representatives received by physicians showed no relation 
to drug prescription quantities, suggesting that PSRs’ credibility is more important than the 
number of visits. Verdoux et al (2005) analyzed 848 anonymous self-administered survey 
questionnaires returned from French GPs and found that physicians who declared having 
received a visit of a pharmaceutical representative promoting a newer antipsychotic drug in 
the previous month were more likely to have initiated an antipsychotic drug treatment during 




The second category contains studies that analyzed the effect of total promotion investment 
(sum of all commercial investments including detailing) on the prescribing frequency 
(Freemantle et al, 2000; Auvray et al, 2003; Windmeijer et al, 2006; Greving et al, 2006; 
Wieringa & Leeflang, 2013). Freemantle et al (2000) studied the results of collaboration 
between a UK Health Authority and pharmaceutical companies to influence prescribing 
decisions of an intervention group consisting of 140 physicians, on proton pump inhibitors. 
They found that the pharmaceutical sales representatives’ visits delivering the agreed 
marketing evidence-based guidelines pre-defined by the Health Authority did not produce a 
significant impact on prescribing behavior attributable to the intervention. Auvray et al (2003) 
analyzed the correlation between prescription and promotional investments data regarding 
new drugs launched in France from two therapeutic classes (antidepressants and antibiotics) 
and concluded that there was a strong correlation between the total investments made by 
pharmaceutical companies, and the number of prescriptions by quarter. The correlation 
between the number of prescriptions and investments in detailing separately was however not 
addressed, but appeared to be much lower, if existent (based in the interpretation of one chart 
showed in the article). 
Windmeijer et al (2006) studied the responses by GPs to drug promotion activities by 
pharmaceutical companies in The Netherlands. They analyzed a set of aggregated data 
including prices, promotion investment, and prescriptions for the years 1994 to 1999 for 11 
therapeutic classes, and found that promotion expenditures (consisting of the sum of detailing, 
advertising and direct mail) shifted the demand curve outwards, suggesting that a 
considerable percentage of promotion investments is directed at establishing market share. 
Greving et al (2006) combined data from a survey sent to GPs and a retrospective database 
consisting of prescribed drugs (including angiotensin II receptor blockers, or ARBs) by those 
physicians, in The Netherlands, and using a multilevel logistic regression found that GPs who 
reported frequent use of commercial information sources (comprising pharmaceutical sales 
representatives, journal advertisements, direct mailings, and sponsored meetings) were more 
likely to prescribe ARBs routinely, versus other antihypertensive drugs. Using a qualitative 
approach, Prosser & Walley (2013a) conducted 30 semi-structured interviews with 30 GPs in 
the UK. In this research, they suggest that high drug prescribers’ relative willingness to 
prescribe new drugs may be shaped by the pharmaceutical industry. This article does not 
offer, however, quantitative evidence for this suggestion. As seen before, Wieringa & 




marketing efforts (including detailing) is significant for only a small portion of the brands, 
and are moderate in size. 
Some conclusions can be drawn from these articles which used European-level data, which 
used manily cross-sectional data: in both categories the association between detailing quantity 
and drug prescription quantities is not undisputed. In the first category, two articles suggest an 
association between detailing quantity and an increase in drug prescription (Berings et al, 
1994; Verdoux et al, 2005) and one article suggests the inexistence of a significant association 
between the number of reps received and drug prescription quantity (Caamano et al, 2002). In 
the second category, three articles present empirical evidence of an association between total 
marketing investments and prescription behavior (Auvray et al, 2003; Windmeijer et al, 2006; 
Greving et al, 2006), one shows no evidence of such association (Freemantle et al, 2000) and 
one presents evidence of a moderate association, but only in specific drug brands (Wieringa & 
Leeflang, 2013). 
These findings, especially the ones from the first category using separate detailing data, 
appear to be partially different from finding generated by research using US-level data by 
authors such as Gönül et al (2001), Manchanda & Chintagunta (2004), Mizik & Jacobson 
(2004), Narayanan et al (2005), Datta & Dave (2016), among others. Limited research has 
been developed analyzing data from more than one country. Chintagunta & Desiraju (2005) 
analyzed the detailing behavior and impact on drug revenues in a group of five countries (US, 
UK, France, Germany and Italy), using data regarding three antidepressant drugs. They found 
that drug detailing elasticities are quite similar in three of the countries, and substantially 
higher in two of the countries. While the US, Germany and Italy evidence own detailings 
elasticities ranging from 0,17 to 0,32 (depending on the drug), the UK evidenced own 
elasticities in the 0,55 to 0,59 range, and France in the 2,32 to 2,43 range. Equally relevant 
was the outcomes of the ROI calculation, measured as the increment in revenues caused by an 
increase of US $1 in detailing: Germany and Italy evidenced noticeably lower ROIs (ranging 
from $0,56 to $1,79), the US and the UK showed intermediate values (oscillating between 
$4,58 and $9,13), and France evidenced prominently higher values (from $5,22 to $19,3). 
These results suggest that different structures, regulations, health sector institutional 
frameworks, as well as potential different cultural and economic realities (that might differ 
considerably across the targeted countries) may well highlight the interest in the development 
of additional research using European-level data, where diverse results on the outcomes of the 




It would be of interest a contribution to build empirical evidence whether the European 
pharmaceutical market is less or more responsive to marketing efforts than the US market, 
following Wieringa & Leeflang (2013) notes for future research. In fact, Wieringa & Leeflang 
(2013) had already underlined that «the US pharmaceutical market may be more responsive 
to marketing efforts» (p. 3398). Leeflang & Wieringa (2010) did not find statistically 
significant evidence that the elasticities of non-US countries are higher than the ones in US. 
Previous research on detailing impact on prescription behavior has been made using both 
nominative and market (aggregated) level data. Nominative data on detailing frequency and 
prescription activity was used by several scholars including Narayanan et al. (2003), Dong, 
Manchanda & Chintagunta (2009), John (2008), Nair, Manchanda & Bathia (2010), Keppe & 
Stremersch (2016), and Liu et al (2016), to list a few. Nominative data is typically collected in 
countries where this individual-level approach to data is allowed, mainly the USA, from 
where most of the research in this field comes from. Other scholars have been using aggregate 
level data, which sums data from a region or territory (as the sum of detailing visits and 
prescriptions from a specific area). According to Manchanda et al (2005), aggregate data 
consists of «sales (dollars or units measured as either new or total prescriptions) and 
marketing instrument data (dollars or units) for detailing» (p. 305). They also highlighted 
that there is also aggregate data regarding physician meetings and events, free sampling, and 
journal advertising. They noted that aggregate data has been more available to academic 
researchers than nominative level data, and that research data is usually provided by market 
research firms such as IMS Health, or by large pharmaceutical manufacturers. Scholars using 
aggregate level prescription and detailing data include Narayanan, Desiraju & Chintagunta 
(2004), Narayanan, Manchanda & Chintagunta (2005), Rosenthal, Berndt, Donohue, Epstein 
& Frank (2003), Vakratsas & Kolsarici (2008), Leeflang & Wieringa (2010), and Wieringa & 
Leeflang (2013), to list a few. 
5.5.1.5.Challenges to traditional detailing 
Detailing, as a traditional promotion instrument, has been facing substantial challenges in the 
pharmaceutical industry, due to several factors or drivers. Detailing is a very expensive 
promotion instrument, as noted by Davidson & Sivadas (2003), referring a Cap Gemini Ernst 
& Young study, suggesting that traditional face-to-face detailing can cost between USD$150 
and USD$200 per visit. Narayanan, Manchanda & Chintagunta (2003) suggested that 
marginal detail costs should be in the range of USD $60 and $100. Liu et al (2016) used an 




Stremersch (2017) noted that the average cost of an average detailing visit is $150, based on 
Quintiles records. These cost magnitudes per visit suggest that these figures, when multiplied 
by dozens or even hundreds of PSRs, may imply millions of USD dollars in fixed promotion 
costs (or semi-fixed, in the case of contract sales organizations). 
The number of PSRs reps increased substantially from the nineties to the mid 2000’s. 
According to Montoya (2008), there were 40.000 PSRs in the US market in 1996, and this 
number climbed to 85.000 in 2005, an increase of 112,5%. ZS Associates, which publishes 
regular commercial studies on PSRs number and access to physicians, calculated the number 
of PSRs in 2005 to be 102.000, then falling to 63.000 in 2014, a 38% reduction (ZS, 2014a). 
According to IMS Health (2016), the number of full-time equivalent (FTE) PSRs in the US 
was 68.998 in 2015 (declining 0,9% from 2014), and 71.164 in Europe top five countries 
(declining 2,7% from 2014). Globally, the worldwide number of PSRs was, according to IMS 
Health (2016), 450.539 (an increase of 0,1% from 2014). Figure 5.10 evidences the evolution 
of the number of PSRs in the USA, from 1996 to 2014. 
 
Figure 5.10 – Number of PSRs in the USA – 1996 to 2014 
Source: ZS Associates 
Considering the period of 1995 to 2005, while the number of PSRs more than doubled, the 
number of active physicians only increased 18% (from 625.443 to 762.438, according to 
Statista, 2017a), which generated more pressure on PSRs and on physicians. As a result, the 
average duration of a PSR sales call has fallen, as covered above, from eight minutes in 1997 
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2001). Trucco & Amirkhanova (2006) addressed this increased competition between PSRs for 
physicians’ time, which provoked a reduction in the detailing return on investment, realizing 
that, with more compressed sales calls, PSRs may not be able to promote four products 
(details) in their portfolio, ending in many situations presenting one detail only, in each visit. 
From the year 2005, the decline in the number of PSRs may be related to the lower economic 
return on R&D investment. According to McKinsey (2012), who studied the R&D for top 10 
biopharma players, the return of R&D investments has been falling since the nineties, a 
tendency aggravated in the 2000’s (figure 5.12). Carter (2005) had already noted that many 
pharmaceutical companies are experiencing a drop in R&D productivity (figure 5.11). 
 
Figure 5.11 – New compounds approved by the FDA 
Source: Carter (2005) 
Yet, the evolution on the number of PSRs appears to evidence some resistance from 
companies, from 2011. A possible explanation may be companies’ fear of losing share of 
voice by reducing the number of PSRs, while competitor companies may decide to keep their 





Figure 5.12 – Economic return on R&D investment for top10 biopharma players 
Source: McKinsey (2012) 
Other factors may have contributed to additional hurdles to traditional detailing. As stressed 
by Davidson & Sivadas (2003), managed care organizations (hospitals and other institutions), 
in an effort to increase their profitability, have been reducing the amount paid to physicians, 
«forcing them to see more patients daily and leaving little time for sales representatives» (p. 
22), which may lead to PSRs to spend hours in hospitals and clinics waiting rooms and 
possibly not seeing any physician at all. Many PSR may not even be able to get past the 
receptionist (Alkhateeb & Doucette, 2008). Montoya (2008) also addressed the issue 
regarding doctors’ time pressure, stating that, because Managed Care Organizations have been 
limiting the amount of physicians’ reimbursements, they are forced to attend more patients, 
having much less time to receive visits from PSRs. This situation has been especially present 
in the case of high prescribing physicians, which gather the interest of most pharmaceutical 
companies, and end up being visited much more often than the average physician (Montoya, 
2008). This increased physician opportunity cost and time pressure may erode the 
effectiveness of the interaction generated between PSRs and physicians, since by the one hand 
it may be difficult for the PSR to properly detail a physician in a short period of time, and by 
the other the physician’s attention might not be easy to capture in such a situation (Davidson 
& Sivadas, 2003). Paired with this factor, some countries have already started to impose 
detailing restriction policies, limiting the access of PSRs to institutions and to physicians, 





Finally, the advent of new technologies and promotion tools such as e-detailing, much more 
convenient to physicians than traditional detailing (Alkhateeb & Doucette, 2008), and which 
can contribute to the share of voice of the promoted drugs, may also contribute to the 
discussion about the traditional detailing cost effectiveness. 
 
5.5.2. Drug sampling 
Williams & Hensel (1991) explained that drug sampling is the «provision of small amounts of 
pharmaceuticals to physicians» (p. 48). Drug sampling occurs when pharmaceutical sales 
representatives dispense drugs samples to physicians (Mizik & Jacobson, 2004), that they will 
use at their practices (offering them to patients). Parsons & Abeele (1981) noted that samples 
are distributed by PSRs and have the purpose of familiarizing doctors with a drug, providing 
them with starter doses. They also noted that samples are well seen by doctors and seen as a 
service since patients can benefit from them by beginning treatments immediately, and 
samples give doctors the opportunity to evaluate a drug. Samples are usually distributed by 
medical representatives. Fugh-Berman & Ahari (2007) also evidenced that physicians 
appreciate samples, which can be used to reduce the cost of a prescription to a patient. 
Williams & Hensel (1991) explained why pharmaceutical manufacturers provide samples to 
physicians. They noted that drug samples have been given altruistically so that physicians can 
give them to patients that otherwise would not be able to afford them, and to allow physicians 
to experiment the drug’s alleged efficacy. Fugh-Berman & Ahari (2007) explained that the 
goal of providing drug samples is to gain entry into physicians’ offices, and to habituate them 
to prescribing targeted drugs. The researchers also noted that even “sample-grabbers”, that is, 
doctors who refuse or resist to receive PSRs, appreciate drug samples, and highlighted that 
patients tend to like an offer from their doctors. Fugh-Berman & Ahari (2007) also addressed 
an additional explanation to the doctors’ willingness to receive samples: «the convenience of 
an in-house pharmacy increases loyalty to both the reps and the drugs they represent» (p. 
624). As noted by Kumar & Panigrahi (2014), samples help physicians engage into a routine 
practice for the particular drug brand being sampled, helping them to recognize its name, 
which continues present in their minds. Drug samples are the second most important 
promotion instrument in terms of investment to pharmaceutical companies (IMS Health, 




Drug sampling can have a significant and positive effect on the number of prescriptions. 
Mizik & Jacobson (2004), when studying the effect of detailing and drug sampling on new 
prescriptions, found that both promotion instruments yielded positive effects on the number of 
new prescriptions. However, detailing had a stronger effect, with coefficients (for the three 
brands analyzed) of 1,56 (brand A), 0,32 (brand B) and 0,153 (brand C) for detailing, and 
0,155 (brand A), 0,039 (brand B) and 0,014 (brand C) for drug sampling, meaning that, in 
order to achieve one additional prescription, the number of sales calls (visits) should increase 
0,64 (drug A), 3,13 (drug B) and 6,54 (drug C), and the number of drug samples should 
increase 6,44 (drug A), 25,64 (drug B), and 73,04 (drug C). Gönül et al (2001) also had 
demonstrated the positive effect of drug sampling on prescription behavior. When studying 
five years of data coming from a physician panel, they found that both detailing and drug 
sampling have a positive effect on the number of prescriptions of the promoted drug. The 
coefficients obtained using a multiple regression were 0,1085 for detailing and 0,0345 for 
drug sampling. Montoya, Netzer & Jedidi (2010), when studying data from a new drug in the 
USA, and with the goal of dynamically allocating detailing and sampling activities, found that 
drug sampling had a significant and positive effect on the number of prescriptions. They 
found that drug sampling elasticity was 0,253, while detailing elasticity was 0,654. 
As covered above, sampling occurs when pharmaceutical sales representatives dispense drugs 
samples to physicians (Mizik & Jacobson, 2004), that they will use at their practices (offering 
them to patients). But sampling must be managed properly and target to the most interesting 
prescriber segments, since excessive sampling for an entire course of treatment could lead to 
sales cannibalization (Fugh-Berman & Ahari, 2007). Chimonas, Brennan & Rothman (2007), 
in their research using focus groups with physicians, studying the dynamics of the relationship 
kept with PSRs, underlined the importance given by physicians to the provision of drug 
samples. One of the focus group participants argued that «sometimes you tend to return a 
favor when you get a lot of samples, thinking of patients who are self-pays. You tend to write 
a little more so they will come back and give you more samples» (p. 187). On page 188, the 
researchers provide additional transcripts underlining the importance and influence of drug 
samples to physicians: «They’ve got you because they gave you the samples, you [dispensed] 
it, you start a patient on the samples» (p. 188), and «The drug companies give them out for a 
reason...they want you to become accustomed to the medication. They want it embedded in 




5.5.3. Gifts and meals 
Gifts are offers given by the sales representatives to physicians, and can be of small value, or 
higher value. These can include ballpoint pens, medical books, dinner out, spouse’s meal at 
dinner, conference and/or travel expenses, free drug samples, and golf tournament fees 
(Jastifer & Roberts, 2009). Gifts can range from simple brand reminders such as stationery 
with manufacturer’s name and product logo, to more expensive gifts, jewelry or iPads 
(Salmasi et al, 2016). Katz, Caplan & Merz (2010) suggest that even small gifts called 
reminder gifts (pens and notepads) and meals may influence doctors’ drug choice. The 
researchers explore the effect of gifts on behavior, in the sense that gift recipients may feel the 
need to reciprocate, even if he or she is not aware or conscious that this may influence their 
behavior. According to Cialdini (1984), «by virtue of the reciprocity rule, then, we are 
obligated to the future repayment of favors, gifts, invitations, and the like» (p. 13). 
Recent research has been made to assess eventual influence of gifts and meals from 
pharmaceutical industry and the effect on physicians’ prescriptions. King & Bearman (2017) 
studied the association between prescription of psychotropic medications and gifts receiving. 
They found that the uptake of new expensive medications was significantly lower in US states 
with marketing regulation, when compared to states allowing unrestricted pharmaceutical 
marketing. In states that were banning all gifts, the drop in market shares ranged from 39% to 
83%. The conclusions also suggested that gift bans and gift restrictions were much more 
powerful in terms of prescription reduction, than disclosure policies. DeJong et al (2016) 
studied the impact of pharmaceutical industry-sponsored meals and physician prescribing 
patterns for Medicare beneficiaries, finding an association between the receipt of those meals 
(with an average value of less than US$20) and an «increased rate of prescribing the 
promoted brand-name medication relative to alternatives within the drug class» (p. E8). 
5.5.4. Direct-to-consumer advertising 
DTCA is directed at impacting the consumer or user of a drug, as noted by Salmasi, Ming & 
Khan (2016). DTCA in prescription drugs is only permitted in two countries in the world 
(USA and New Zealand), as highlighted by Liang & Mackey (2011). It can be used to impact 
consumers via several traditional communication channels, including television, newspapers 
and magazines (Iizuka & Jin, 2005). DTCA was facilitated in the USA since August 1997, 
when the FDA mitigated the restrictions on this type of promotion instrument, as noted by 




DTCA can not only influence patients’ behaviors but also physicians’ prescription choices. 
While some research suggests that higher DTCA expenditures may increase the number of 
visits to doctors (Iizuka & Jin, 2005), other find strong evidence that DTCA can influence 
physicians’ drug choices when prescribing. For instance, Kravitz et al (2005) found that 
patients’ requests to physicians for a specific drug brand have a strong effect on physician 
prescribing in major depression and adjustment disorder pathologies. Liu & Gupta (2011), in 
their analysis of DTCA expenditures effects using data from the anti-hyperlipidemic market 
in the US, found that DTCA has a positive and long-term effect on the number of visits to 
physicians by newly diagnosed patients. They also found that own-brand DTCA expenditures 
increase the number of patient requests for two of the three drug brands analyzed. Bala & 
Bhardwaj (2010) noted that DTCA appears to have two distinct effects: to inform patients that 
there as drugs to treat specific diseases (constructive, as a market expansion), and to persuade 
patients to request specific drug brands at their visits to physicians (combative, in an attempt 
to increase market share). More recently, Mukherji, Jaimakiraman, Dutta & Rajiv (2017), 
analyzing the impact of a policy change in DTCA in the US (prior DTCA 1992-1997 and post 
DTCA 1998-2001) in the sales of four cholesterol-reducing drugs (statins), suggested that 
DTCA led to category expansion as well as enhanced sales of each brand. Figure 5.13 
evidences the conceptual map of potential DTCA effects on patients’ actions for a chronic 
disease. 
 
Figure 5.13 - Conceptual map of potential DTCA effects on patients actions for a chronic 
disease 




In the US pharmaceutical industry, DTCA represented $800 million in 1996, reaching $4,2 
billion in 2005, as underlined by Bala & Bhardwaj (2010). A report developed by ZS 
Associates (figure 5.14), compiling information from several sources including Nielsen, 
Kantar, and IMS Health, evidences the evolution of DTCA investments in the USA, in the 
period of 1997 to 2015 (ZS, 2016b). In 2016, the investment in DTCA had reached $6.4 
million, according to Kantar Media (2017). 
 
Figure 5.14 – Evolution of investment in DTCA in the US 
Source: ZS (2016b) 
 
5.5.5. Medical journal advertising 
Medical journal advertising, as underlined by Montgomery & Silk (1972), consists of 
advertisements placed in medical publications. Othman, Vitry & Roughead (2010) underlined 
that pharmaceutical companies use advertisements in medical journals with the goal of 
sharing medicine information to physicians, and that the disseminated medical information 
comprises product characteristics, marketing claims, and references to support the 
communicated claims. 
Parsons & Abeele (1981) suggested that medical journal advertising «enables the 
manufacturer to target doctors by specialty, is the least expensive medium in terms of 
theoretical potential exposures, allows repeated use of the same material to gain awareness, 
and provides a supportive editorial environment» (p. 108). Medical advertising can include 
advertising in journals and direct mail advertising (Pitt & Nel, 1988). Williams & Hensel 
(1991) concluded, after their review on pharmaceutical promotion instruments, that this 
promotion instrument was found to have either a positive or no significant influence on 
physician prescribing behavior. But research conducted by Montgomery & Silk (1972), when 




direct mailing, and samples and literature), found evidence of positive elasticities of journal 
advertising both in the short (0,146) and the long run (0,365). 
 
5.5.6. Direct mail advertising 
As noted by Williams & Hensel (1991), direct mail advertising was one of the promotion 
instruments that received the earliest attention in the scientific literature. 
Parsons & Abeele (1981) discussed the value of direct mail, which involves «medical 
publications, reprints, leaflets, brochures carrying product information, and letters with new 
drug announcements» (p. 108). Direct mail is, as underlined by Parsons & Abeele (1981), the 
quickest tool to reach a total target population (for instance a medical specialty universe, 
granted that an address list of all physicians is available), can be a tool of special interest to 
complement the PSRs detailing activities covering non-detailed products (medicines not 
included in the presentations), and can allow a segmentation by geographic area, physician 
age, specialization, prescription habits (when nominative prescription information is 
available). Since many companies use direct mail to promote medicines to physicians, these 
can dislike this promotion tool. The promotion instrument may appear to be declining as a 
source of pharmaceutical information to physicians (Williams & Hensel, 1991). 
Direct mail advertising may have a positive effect on the number of prescriptions. Leeflang, 
Mijatovic & Saunders (1992) analyzed the effect of detailing, medical journal advertising and 
direct mail advertising. They found that a promotion category which included the sum of the 
investments in medical journal advertising and direct mail advertising had a positive effect on 
the number of prescriptions (detailing had also a positive, stronger effect). The isolated effect 
of direct mail advertising was however not able to quantify, due to the referred data 
aggregation. Leeflang & Wieringa (2010), analyzing data from the Dutch pharmaceutical 
industry for 49 drug brands, studied the effect of three promotion tools, consisting of 
detailing, medical journal advertising, and direct mail advertising. They found no significant 
coefficients for the majority of the brands, but for the ones where the coefficients were 
significant and with the correct (positive) sign, direct mail advertising had the lowest mean 
coefficient (0,007, comparing with 0,014 for detailing and 0,027 for medical journal 
advertising). Montgomery & Silk (1972) also found, when analyzing the dynamic effects of 




literature), that direct mail advertising had the lowest elasticity (0,018 for long-run) among 
the three promotion instruments analyzed. 
5.5.7. Continuing medical education & event sponsoring 
Sponsored continuing medical education (CME) is another promotion instrument used by 
pharmaceutical manufacturers to impact physicians. Davidoff (1997) defined continuing 
medical education (CME) as the opportunities and mechanisms which allow medical 
practitioners to keep up to date in practice, by formal programs. Davidoff (1997) explained 
that CME involves «hundreds of thousands of faculty and learners hours, and hundreds of 
millions of dollars, each year» (p. 16). He also explained that there are two types of CME: 
formal, and informal. While the formal system runs under standards created and imposed by 
the Accreditation Council on Continuing Medical Education (ACCME), which exerts a 
central control and supervision, and participants receive CME credits on a hour-for-hour 
basis, the informal CME is characterized by «local, distributed control that rests principally 
with individual physicians and health care organizations; no consistent or national criteria 
for educational credit; no formal requirement in connection with or credentialing (…) lack of 
definition of costs in time and dollars; and (so far) limited connection with industry» (p. 15). 
Manufacturers can interact with physicians in conventions, meetings and conferences, as 
noted by Evans & Beltramini (1986) and by Williams & Hensel (1991). These interactions 
can also take place at seminars and lectures or symposia organized or sponsored by 
pharmaceutical manufacturers (Pitt & Nel, 1981). Venkataraman & Stremersch (2007) noted 
that manufacturers can organize symposium meetings to present drugs and its efficacy and 
side effects to physicians. They found that these meetings have a significant and positive 
impact on prescription behavior (physicians attending more of these meetings prescribed 
significantly more of the drugs promoted in the meetings).  
Conventions are usually events such as annual scientific meetings of professional societies, 
and medical specialty colleges, and meetings can be defined as an event from a local medical 
association with a pharmaceutical manufacturer representative (Evans & Beltramini, 1986). In 
their research, Evans & Beltramini (1986) found that when assessing the quality of 
information of conventions and conferences, physicians considered that the most important 
attribute was the reputation of speakers, and specialists tended to give more importance to 
these types of events than general practitioners. They also concluded that physicians tended to 




concluded that physicians were likely to ask for product information after having participated 
in conventions and conferences, which confirms the potential of this instrument. 
Events can have a promotion component if they are sponsored by a pharmaceutical 
manufacturer, and the speaker is paid by this company. But it can also be subject to a less 
direct promotion, should a series of situations occur, such as a low registration fee or none, 
free food, hospitality, or entertainment, or a pharmaceutical sales representative is present in 
the back of the room (as underlined by Noble (1992). Physicians can be granted funding for 
travel and registration to conferences or lodging for educational symposia and meals, as 
reviewed by Wazana (2000). Conference travel sponsorship can have a substantial impact on 
physicians’ prescription behavior, as reviewed by Wazana (2000), highlighting that 
physicians who requested a sponsorship to a manufacturer are much more likely to prescribe 
the manufacturer’s drug (several magnitudes versus non-sponsored physicians). 
The pharmaceutical industry strongly supports CME for physicians, by providing industry-
supported conferences, seminars, and symposia (Holmer, 2002). Relman (2008) suggested 
that the pharmaceutical industry sponsors more than 50% of the total CME initiatives. 
Steinbrook (2008) noted that CME initiatives supported by the pharmaceutical industry are 
usually free or funded for physicians attending to those initiatives. 
One of the examples of a CME learning portal is Univadis, provider of online health care 
resources, where users (physicians and other health care practitioners) can register to have 
access to learning contents (Schroter et al, 2011). According to Univadis (2017) website, it is 
provided by Aptus Health, a Merck & Co subsidiary, which operates outside the US and 
Canada as Merck Sharpe & Dohme (MSD). 
5.5.8. Other 
Research funding exists when investigators receive funding in the scope of pharmaceutical 
industry affiliations, as noted by Bekelman, Li & Gross (2003). They noted that there is an 
association between industry sponsorship and pro-industry conclusions (odds ratio of 3,60), 
subject that will be addressed further in the topic Ethical considerations. 
Engelberg, Parsons & Tefft (2014) analyzed the impact of payments to physicians and their 
prescription behavior relative to brands vs generics adoption. Studying the effect of payments 
including meals, gifts, speaking fees and other transfers of value, they found that doctors who 
received payments from the industry tended to evidence higher prescriptions of branded drugs 




Bergman (2017) studied the impact of payments typically associated with detailing activities 
on physician prescription behavior, using data collected from Centers of Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS) and from Open Payments dataset. The payments data included 
transfers valued at $10 or more (in cash, products or services and consisted of food and 
beverage (the great majority, representing 96,4% of the payments, and 71,7% of the total 
payments value), education, speaking fees, honoraria, travel and lodging, and consulting fees. 
Bergman (2017) found that «drug-related payments (which are associated with detailing) 
increase the likelihood that the physician would prescribe from the class of drugs» (p. 31), 
and that «physicians who stopped receiving drug related payments at a given year, were less 
likely to prescribe aminosalicylate drug therapy of any kind in the following years» (p. 15), 
with reductions up to 9,2 percentage points two years after payments cessation, thus 
demonstrating a causal relation between payments and physician prescription behavior. 
Carey, Lieber & Miller (2017) also found an association between payments to physicians and 
those physicians’ prescriptions, when studying a combined dataset of Medicare Part D 
prescriptions and payments data (which consisted of especially meals, but also travel, 
speaking fees, consulting, gifts, honoraria, and payments related to research). By using a 
binary variable to represent whether a physician has received or not any payment, found that 
physicians receiving payments from a company were more inclined to prescribe drugs from 
that company. 
5.5.9. Sub-chapter synthesis of main findings 
This sub-chapter covered promotion tools using traditional communication channels, used by 
pharmaceutical companies to promote prescription medicines to physicians, but also to 
patients. These tools include detailing, drug sampling, gifts and meals, medical journal 
advertising, continuing medical education (CME) and event sponsoring, direct mail 
advertising, and direct-to-consumer advertising (DTCA). The first three involve a more 
personal interaction with physicians, whereas the others are less personal in nature. 
The most important promotion instrument, both in terms of investment magnitude, and in 
terms of impact on prescription behavior, is detailing. Detailing is a form of personal selling 
and a form of relational marketing, where a pharmaceutical sales representative visits 
individual doctors, and provides information about his or her company’s drugs. Detailing has 
been shown to impact physicians’ prescription behavior. Table 5.3 presents definitions on 





Table 5.3 – Detailing definition 
 




Face-to-face meetings where pharmaceutical representatives present 
information to physicians; each sales representative targets physicians in 
an effort to provide accurate and latest product information, and to 
encourage them in prescribing the presented prescription drugs for their 
patients who fit the specific diagnosis criteria
(Molloy et al, 2002; Yi, 
Anandalingam & Sorrell, 2003; 
Mizik & Jacobson, 2004)
Detailing involves direct visits from drug company representatives to 
individual doctors, during which the representative would provide 
information about their company's drugs, free samples, scientific 
literature, trying to combat the efforts of PSRs from competing companies
(Rao & Yamada, 1988; Steinman, 
Harper, Chren, Landefeld & Bero, 
2007)
Detailing is a form of personal selling (sales theory point of view), and a 
form of relational marketing (marketing theory point of view)


















Table 5.4 – Evidences gathered from the literature on detailing 
 
Brief description Theoretical grounding (non-exhaustive)
Detailing is the pharmaceutical promotion tool with highest total investment magnitude, used by 
pharmaceutical manufacturers to interact with physicians
(Yi, Anandalingamb & Sorrell, 2003; Gagnon & Lexchin, 2008; Datta & 
Dave, 2016)
The effect of detailing on brand prescriptions is significant and on average positive, but modest
(Kremer, Bijmolt, Leeflang & Wieringa, 2008; Stremersch & Van Dyck, 
2009; Stremersch & Lemmens, 2009)
Detailing appears to be the promotion instrument that generates a higher effect on prescription 
behavior
(Pitt & Nel, 1988; Berndt, Bui, Reiley & Urban, 1995; Narayanan et al, 
2003; Narayanan, Desiraju & Chintagunta, 2004; Narayanan, Manchanda 
& Chintagunta, 2005; Kalyanaram, 2008; Kremer et al, 2008; 
Kalyanaram, 2009; Dave & Saffer, 2012)
Detailing appears to reduce price elasticity of drugs (reduces physicians' price sensitivy)
(Rizzo, 1999; Gönül et al, 2001; Narayanan et al, 2004; Windmeijer et al, 
2006)
Detailing effect on prescription behavior seems to evidence diminishing marginal returns
(Berndt et al, 1995; Gönül et al, 2001; Yi, Anandalingam & Sorrell, 2003; 
Manchanda & Chintagunta, 2004; Dong, Manchanda & Chintagunta, 
2009; Yi, 2008; Liu, Gupta, Venkataraman & Liu, 2016)
Detailing efforts appear to have a higher effect on prescriptions at the initial stages of the product 
life cycle
(Narayanan et al, 2003; Manchanda, Rossi & Chintagunta, 2004; 
Manchanda & Honka, 2005; Narayanan et al, 2005; Dave, 2013)
Detailing seems to evidence carry-over effects
(Narayanan et al, 2004; Zoltners, Sinha & Lorimer, 2004; Yi, 2008; 
Montoya, Netzer & Jedidi, 2010; Liu, Gupta, Venkataraman & Liu, 2016)
Detailing effect on prescriptions appears to be more on drug shares, rather than on drug category 
volume
(Narayanan, Desiraju & Chintagunta, 2004; Datta & Dave, 2014)
Detailing may have different effects on prescription, depending on the type of payer (physicians 
mostly seeing patients with private health insurance seem to be more prone to be influenced by 
detailing)
(Gönül et al, 2001; Datta & Dave, 2014)
Detailing elasticities depend on the therapeutic or disease classes (Kremer et al, 2008; Stremersch & Van Dyck, 2009)




















Source: own elaboration 
Brief description Theoretical grounding (non-exhaustive)
Detailing may be linked with physician nonrational prescription behavior (Haayer, 1982; Wazana, 2000; Brax et al, 2017)
Detailing effect may be leveraged by selecting the right key opinion leaders to impact (social 
multiplier)
(Nair, Manchanda & Bhatia, 2007; Meffert, 2009)
Gifts and meals associated with detailing may impact prescription behavior
(Katz, Caplan & Merz, 2010; Engelberg, Parsons & Tefft, 2014; DeJong 
et al, 2016; Bergman, 2017; Carey, Lieber & Miller, 2017; King & 
Bearman, 2017)
Recipients of the detailing activities (prescribers) do not consider themselves as influenced as 
their colleagues
(Steinman, Shlipak & McPhee, 2001; Sah & Fugh-Berman, 2013; Riese 
et al, 2015; Salmasi et al, 2016)
Detailing effectiveness can be optimized, in order to reach higher levels of sales force efficiency
(Yi, Anandalingam & Sorrell, 2003; Manchanda, Rossi & Chintagunta, 
2004; Montoya, Netzer & Jedidi, 2010; Kappe & Stremersch, 2016)
Certain physician profiles and situations increment the likelihood of a more frequent interaction 
between physicians and PSRs
(Alkhateeb, Khanfar, & Clauson, 2009; Gönül & Carter, 2012)
Detailing effectiveness can be attenuated by a form of detailing called academic detailing (O’Brien et al, 2007; Grande, 2009; Fischer & Avorn, 2012)
Detailing efforts performed by competitor drug brands (competitive detailing) affect own brand 
number of prescriptions
(Dong, Manchanda & Chintagunta, 2009; Liu, Gupta, Venkataraman & 
Liu, 2016)
Direct-to-physician promotion – from which detailing is the most important component – can have 
an impact on companies’ stock returns
(Osinga, Leeflang, Srinivasan & Wieringa, 2011; Dingus, 2014; Dingus, 
Agnihotri & Hu, 2017)
Detailing efforts can have spillover effects (in other drug categories not promoted, and in drugs 
prescribed with the focal brand in combination therapies)



















Research on detailing is relatively recent, with the majority of articles written since the early 
2000s, and using mainly US-based data, with access to nominative-level data. European 
research is less common, with some papers published using Dutch, French and Spanish data. 
Detailing faces several challenges as a pharmaceutical promotion tool. It is quite expensive, 
representing a strong burden of fixed costs. Access to physicians has increasingly been more 
and more difficult, since the huge increase in the number of PSRs was not accompanied by a 
proportional increase in the number of physicians. This situation put additional pressure on 
the average duration of a PSR visit, challenging the return on investment of this promotion 
tool. An additional hurdle to detailing is the lower payment hospitals and other institutions are 
giving to doctors, forcing them to see more patients, letting less time to receive PSRs. 
Another challenge is the implementation of detailing restriction policies in some countries, 
limiting the access of PSRs to institutions and to physicians. These challenges can pose both a 
threat and an opportunity to pharmaceutical manufacturers, since with the advent of new 
technologies, a newer version of detailing – e-detailing – may be explored. 
Drug sampling is typically used in conjunction with detailing and is aimed at providing 
doctors with drug samples for their use with patients, familiarizing the former with a drug, 
and allowing access to physicians’ offices. Drug sampling has been demonstrated to impact 
physicians’ prescription behavior in favor of the offered drug samples. Gifts and meals are 
another tool that is generally used in the scope of detailing. Gifts can range from a small 
reminder ruler or ball pen, to more expensive gifts such as fees for conference or events 
participation. Both gifts and meals have been shown to influence physician prescription 
behavior. Medical journal advertising is one of the least expensive promotion tools, and direct 
mail advertising can reach a substantial number of physicians, complementing detailing 
activities. Continuing medical education has been used by pharmaceutical manufacturers to 
help physicians keep up to date in their practices, including funding for travel or lodging for 
educational symposia and meals). Direct-to-consumer advertising can be used in the USA and 
in New Zealand and has been demonstrated to impact both patients’ behavior (increased 
number of visits to doctors, and request of specific drugs) and physicians’ prescribing 





5.6.Promotion tools using digital channels 
This subchapter will address promotion tools using digital communication channels, which 
were allowed by the advent of information technologies. It will include e-detailing, e-
sampling, healthcare portals, health social networks, e-mailing, online continuing medical 
education (CME), in a Web 2.0 philosophy. 
5.6.1. e-Detailing 
e-Detailing definition and characterization 
Electronic detailing (e-detailing), as noted by Alkhateeb & Doucette (2008), was introduced 
by the pharmaceutical industry as a new communication channel to promote medicines to 
physicians. Alkhateeb, Khanfar, Doucette & Loudon (2009) defined e-detailing - a newer 
form of detailing - as the use of «digital technology, such as internet, video conferencing, and 
interactive voice response, by which drug companies target their marketing efforts toward 
specific physicians with pinpoint accuracy» (p. 98). 
The cost of an e-detailing contact can be substantially lower than the cost of a traditional 
detailing interaction. Davidson & Sivadas (2003) noted, referring a Cap Gemini Ernst & 
Young study, that while traditional face-to-face detailing can cost between USD$150 and 
USD$200 per visit, an e-detailing interaction can cost only around USD$100. Trucco & 
Amirkhanova (2006) referred an initiative deployed by the company Lilly in the UK, in 2003, 
using live e-detailing, where live e-details were estimated to cost 80% of a traditional detail 
visit, but with a substantially longer duration (an average of more than 15 minutes per e-
detail). 
Characteristics of physicians using e-detailing 
Alkhateeb & Doucette (2008), in their review, addressed commercial, non-peer reviewed 
studies where a physician profile of e-detailing was studied. They concluded that typical 
physicians using e-detailing are young (with less than 45 years old), that e-detailing usage by 
physicians is more common among physicians working in rural areas, and that e-detailing 
adopters usually tend to be higher prescribers, in contrast to their peers who do not use e-
detailing. Alkhateeb & Doucette (2008) also stress the importance of gifts and incentives in 
the scope of e-detailing adoption. Moreover, they addressed the medical specialty as one 
important driver for the usage of e-detailing by physicians: primary care physicians appear to 
be more likely to use e-detailing, when compared to other medical specialties. Finally, they 




Alkhateeb, Khanfar, Doucette & Loudon (2009) developed research to identify the 
characteristics of physicians targeted by the pharmaceutical industry to participate in e-
detailing, using a survey of 671 physicians. They found, using a binary logistic regression 
model, that primary care physicians evidenced a higher likelihood to be targeted for e-
detailing, versus other specialties. Older males, prescribing more than average, was also a 
significant predictor of higher probability to be invited to participate in e-detailing activities. 
Other significant explanatory variables were the frequency of pharmaceutical sales 
representative interaction (the higher the frequency, the higher the likelihood of being invited 
for e-detailing), peer influence (physicians with peers using e-detailing are more likely to be 
invited), and size of practice (doctors working in small practices are more likely to be 
invited). 
Using the same study but analyzing additional variables, Alkhateeb & Doucette (2009) 
studied the influences on adoption of e-detailing by physicians, and found that the significant 
variables were perceived relative advantage (doctors who identify an advantage for obtaining 
drug information by using e-detailing are more prone to adopt it), peer influence (peers 
already using e-detailing can have a positive effect on physician adoption of e-detailing), 
attitudes (doctors who had attitudes such as credibility, understandability and applicability 
towards the usefulness of e-detailing were more likely to adopt e-detailing), type of specialty 
(primary care physicians appear to be more likely to adopt e-detailing, when compared to 
specialists), years in practice (doctors with less experience seem to be more prone to use e-
detailing, than more experienced ones), and presence of restrictive policy for traditional 
detailing (doctors practicing in institutions that have restrictive access policies are less likely 
to adopt e-detailing, as well as detailing). Another interesting conclusion of this article was 
that physicians who are visited more frequently by traditional detailing are more likely to 
participate in e-detailing interactions (four fifths of the e-detailing users were from the group 
who met PSRs more frequently), which Alkhateeb & Doucette (2009) underlined could mean 
that physicians may consider e-detailing as a complementary channel to traditional detailing, 








Types of e-detailing 
Alkhateeb & Doucette (2008), in their review of electronic detailing of pharmaceuticals to 
physicians, addressed two types of e-detailing: virtual (interactive) e-detailing, also known by 
self-detailing (Trucco & Amirkhanova, 2006), and video (live) e-detailing. 
The former – virtual e-detailing, or self-detailing - was defined by Heutschi et al (2003), in 
their research on challenges of e-detailing in Europe, as an interactive multimedia experience 
that doctors access to, in a mixture of Flash-based online presentation and online training for a 
specific medicine. According to the researchers, the presentations can be subject to additional 
requests from the physicians, such as demand for additional information, request samples or 
ask for a face-to-face visit with a PSR (detailing). As underlined by Trucco & Amirkhanova 
(2006), in these self-contained multimedia presentations physicians can be exposed to 
information on medicines side effects, clinical trial data, and prescription guidelines, at their 
own pace and at the most suitable time for each physician. The usual duration of a virtual e-
detailing presentation is between four and fifteen minutes: Alkhateeb & Doucette (2008) 
suggest the duration to be between four and eight minutes, Montoya (2008) suggests a 
duration of 10 minutes, Trucco & Amirkhanova (2006) suggest a duration of between five 
and fifteen minutes. Another source, closer to the e-detailing practice, advocates an average of 
eight minutes for a virtual e-detail presentation (Bernewitz, 2001). 
The later – video (live) e-detailing – consists, as underlined by Alkhateeb & Doucette (2008), 
of a face-to-face PC-based video conferencing between a PSR and a physician. According to 
Heutschi et al (2003), with video e-detailing physicians PSRs and physicians communicate 
using computers with internet access, camera and microphone. They also noted that this type 
of e-detailing is closer to the personal traditional detailing in the sense that it also allows a 
high proportion of analogue communication elements such as image and speech. This type of 
e-detailing can be particularly useful to communicate with physicians based in more remote 
geographic areas who see very few PSRs, or physicians not allowed to receive PSRs at their 
practice (Alkhateeb & Doucette, 2008). In terms of duration of a video e-detailing, this 
interaction can last over 15 minutes on average, with some interactions reaching up to 30 
minutes (Trucco & Amirkhanova, 2006), which represents several times the duration of a 






Drivers for the ascension of e-detailing 
As reported by IMS Health (2015a), promotion tools using digital communication channels, 
including e-detailing, represented 3,2% of the total pharmaceutical industry investment in 
2014, 59% of which allocated to e-detailing activities. Despite the strong growth rate (+37,2% 
from 2013 to 2014), e-detailing is still a marginal promotion instrument. In data published 
regarding the year 2015, IMS Health (2016) reported that digital channels weight increased to 
3,8%, increasing 15% from 2014. 
Several scholars have addressed the reasons for the growth of e-detailing as a promotion tool 
to impact physicians. Davidson & Sivadas (2003) proposed three reasons for this growth. The 
first reason consists of the increased physician use of the internet, turning the internet into a 
new channel that pharmaceutical companies can use to interact with physicians. The second 
reason is related to the increased opportunity costs of physicians (time premium), where 
pharmaceutical companies try to find alternative channels to keep their share of voice among 
physicians. The third reason pointed by Davidson & Sivadas (2003) has to do with the fact 
that pharmaceutical companies do not want to be left behind in the ascension of this digital 
channel, since many of their competitors already have deployed such digital interaction 
channels with physicians. They state that companies have fear of losing marketing share to 
competitors, by not “playing” digital. 
Alkhateeb & Doucette (2008) underlined that a major factor explaining the ascension of e-
detailing is its convenience to physicians. Other drivers pointed include time savings, ability 
to follow up (with a face-to-face visit) and the fact that e-detailing may be less disrupting that 
traditional detailing. In their review of e-detailing of pharmaceuticals to physicians, 
Alkhateeb & Doucette (2008) also highlighted that the quality of the information provided 
through e-detailing may be higher than the quality delivered through detailing, as well as its 
consistence in quality and quantity. 
Gönül & Carter (2010) suggested that pharmaceutical companies may choose to use e-
detailing as a «way to overcome the challenge faced by sales representatives to meet with the 







Benefits of using e-detailing 
Previously in this thesis, we addressed some challenges to traditional detailing. In this topic, 
we will now highlight some of the benefits of using e-detailing, which have been covered in 
the literature. 
E-detailing can reach physicians at an hour of the day they typically are not working anymore. 
A study developed by Manhattan Research in 2005 concluded that physicians who engage 
into e-detailing do it between 8pm to midnight, as noted by Trucco & Amirkhanova (2006). 
QuintilesIMS (2016b) study on UK and Spanish specialists concluded that 57% of those using 
video e-detailing were at home. Trucco & Amirkhanova (2006) also addressed other benefits 
pharmaceutical companies can reach by using e-detailing. One benefit is that it can support or 
complement traditional detailing, helping fill gaps between PSRs visits, helping increase the 
share of voice of a drug amid online physicians, especially in the scope of a product launch. 
Another benefit is the ability, in the post-launch phase, to help correct positioning problems 
for drugs in complex indications, also allowing impacting physicians typically not visited 
with regular detailing, or out-of-target physicians. Another benefit referred by Trucco & 
Amirkhanova (2006) is the fact that e-detailing can offer a cost-effective communication for 
older of off-patent drugs that have lower budgets than newly launched strategic ones. 
Montoya (2008) also addressed why e-detailing is becoming more popular among 
pharmaceutical companies. He suggested that it «maximizes the time of the sales force, cuts 
down the cost of detailing and increases physician prescribing» (p. 635). 
Physicians also recognize benefits of using e-detailing. QuintilesIMS (2016b) research on UK 
and Spanish specialists using e-detailing described the main benefits stated by doctors when 
using e-detailing. The four main benefits were: easier to reschedule contacts, fits well into 
doctors’ schedules, saves doctors time versus face-to-face detailing, and able to download 
information from the online facility. 
E-detailing impact on prescription behavior 
In terms of efficacy, e-detailing also seems to impact physician prescription behavior, as 
noted by Gönül & Carter (2010), where pharmaceutical companies seem to benefit in terms of 
prescription from increasing both e-detailing and face-to-face detailing (with both 
standardized coefficients positive, 0,509 for detailing and 0,384 for e-detailing). There is 
however the need to optimally balance e-detailing and detailing to certain physicians, as the 




(2008) has also addressed the efficacy of e-detailing, or return on investment (ROI) referring 
three commercial studies. The first was conducted in Japan by Aventis, with a control group 
(traditional detailing only) and a test group (traditional detailing and e-detailing), where the 
test group evidenced a substantially higher number of promoted drug prescriptions (between 
+19% and +25%), when compared to the control group, allowing e-detailing to reach a 
revenue:cost ratio of 3,2:1, while traditional detailing only reached a ratio of 2,5:1. The 
second was conducted by Physician Interactive, using a test group of more than five thousand 
physicians impacted by a e-detailing program that allowed an interaction between the PSR 
and the physicians, and resulted in a 63% increase in the prescription of the promoted drug. 
The third, also highlighted by Montoya (2008), was performed by iPhysicianNet and involved 
the company Novartis, and resulted in an increase of 58% in prescription volume of the drug 
subject to e-detailing, also increasing not only the average duration of the call, but also the 
number of drugs detailed. 
Montoya (2008) summarized some differences between variables regarding traditional 
detailing and e-detailing. Table 5.5 shows these differences on ROI, reach to physicians, 
average length of interaction, and cost effectiveness of both promotion instruments. Gönül & 
Carter (2012) studied the physician profile more associated with heavy prescription potential 
for established and new drugs, and suggested that, for newer drugs, traditional detailing is not 
as effective as it is for more established drugs. In this scope, they proposed that 
pharmaceutical companies launching a new drug may want to try other forms of persuasion 
using alternative promotion tools, including e-detailing. 
Table 5.5 - Traditional detailing versus e-detailing trade-offs 
 




It is of importance, as stressed by Alkhateeb et al (2009), that e-detailing may be more 
effective to use considering certain physicians characteristics such as specialty, age, 
prescription volume and gender. 
 
5.6.2. e-Sampling 
As addressed by Kumar & Panigrahi (2014), e-sampling (or on-line sampling, or on-line 
sample ordering) is an on-line technique by which doctors can apply for samples in a request 
form, using a laptop or mobile devices. This new way of managing drug sample requests from 
physicians has been changing the process of sample delivery, according to Kumar & 
Panigrahi (2014). They explained this relatively simple process: after physicians insert their 
drug sample requests, PSRs can analyze doctors’ profile in terms of interest for particular 
drugs, allowing PSRs to adjust their products detailing, highlighting, during the visit with the 
doctors, trying to understand the reason for their interest in the drug samples’ molecules. Drug 
requests can be made in health care portals which doctors can access, requesting drug samples 
directly from the manufacturer (Puschmann & Alt, 2001), or directly in pharmaceutical 
companies’ websites. The information regarding e-sampling (nominatively by physician) can 
be integrated in CRM systems, as noted by Vecchione (2008). This can include drug molecule 
and medicine brand, number of samples requested, and historic drug sample request patterns). 
E-sampling can play an important role not only in attracting physicians to the company 
website, but also to encourage them to engage into e-detailing, as noted by Doyle (2007). He 
referred an example of a company where drug samples were only freely available to the 
physicians that agreed to participate in an e-detailing program. 
 
5.6.3. Company websites and healthcare portals 
As covered before in the closed loop marketing section (CRM and SFA), healthcare portals 
(represented below in figure 5.15) are internet-based solutions that help connect several 
players on the pharmaceutical industry, allowing value creation not only to pharmaceutical 
companies, but also to several players such as wholesalers, pharmacies, institutions (hospitals 
and other), and physicians, permitting the provision of individualized products and services 





Figure 5.15 – Healthcare portals 
Source: Puschmann & Alt, 2001 
Healthcare portals can be classified into four types (Puschmann & Alt, 2001). The first is 
process portals, characterized by a web-based integration of services for one specific customer 
process. This is the case of the previously referred ePharma, a service provided by 
Grasshopper, a company operating in Portugal, allowing pharmaceutical companies to 
manage the whole process of medicine orders. 
A second type of healthcare portal is information portals, which «offer information about 
diseases, symptoms, medicines, etc. for professional users and patients», as highlighted by 
Puschmann & Alt (2001, p. 4). They also noted that these portals’ business models are usually 
based on advertising and can have a significant influence on the doctor-patient relationship, 
since they provide accessible information on diseases and methods of treatment, helping 
balance power between physicians and patients, in terms of information. Medical portals are 
an example of information portals, providing web-based medical community with access to 
medical information, as noted by Shepherd, Zitners & Waters (2000), which also highlighted 
that these portals can be public, or corporate. Research conducted by De Leo, LeRouge, 
Ceriani & Niederman (2006) in the United States found that the main portals physicians’ 
access to gather medical information are Uptodate, Medscape, Webmd, Mdconsult and 
Emedicine. The researchers concluded that the vast majority of physicians (more than nine 
out of ten) tend to access a medical targeted site given their accuracy of on-line information, 
instead of using a generalist search engine. Figure 5.16 below presents a screenshot of one of 





Figure 5.16 – Example of a physician portal – Medscape.com 
Source: Medscape.com 
Epocrates (www.epocrates.com), a pharmacopoeia, or drug information database, is one of 
the most popular handheld drug databases in the United States, as highlighted by Fischer, 
Stewart, Mehta, Wax & Lapinsky (2003). They explained that physicians can download these 
drugs databases for free, but their demographics and practice information may be sold to 
pharmaceutical companies, who sponsor the service. This service offers pharmaceutical 
companies the possibility of doing drug advertising at multiple points across the care 
continuum, as highlighted below in figure 5.17. The service allows, for participating brands, 






Figure 5.17 – Example of a physician portal – Epocrates.com 
Source: Epocrates (2017) 
A third type of healthcare portal is sales portals, which transfer sales processes to the internet. 
As noted by Puschmann & Alt (2001), these include on-line pharmacies, and these can be 
business-to-business, or business-to-consumer. 
The fourth type is integration portals, as noted by Puschmann & Alt (2001), incorporate a 
series of stakeholders who are in constant interaction among themselves, such as healthcare 
institutions, payers (insurance companies), and other, allowing integration at three levels: 
clinical (physicians, pharmaceutical companies, pharmacies and insurance companies), 
administrative (hospitals, physicians, manufacturers of medical devices, pharmaceutical 
companies), and financial (insurance companies, physicians, hospitals and pharmacies). An 





Figure 5.18 – Architecture of a healthcare integration portal 
Source: Puschmann & Alt (2001) 
Healthcare portals can provide pharmaceutical companies advertising services directed at 
prescribers, and in the case of integrated portals may also allow for advertising and campaign 
management directed at pharmacies. 
 
5.6.4. Health social networks 
A health social network is «a website where consumers may be able to find health resources 
at a number of different levels (…). Services may range from a basic tier of emotional support 
and information sharing to Q&A with physicians to quantified self-tracking to clinical trials 
access» (p. 495), definition proposed by Swan (2009). She also noted that these social 
networks can be targeted not only to patients, but also to caretakers, researchers and other 
interested parties. 
Domingo (2010) also underlined that healthcare social networks can be either physician or 
patient oriented. She explained that while physician social networks allow doctors to share 
clinical cases, videos, images, and medical know-how, patient social networks put emphasis 




Examples of patient health social networks include, as referred by Swan (2009), 
PatientsLikeMe (www.patientslikeme.com) and Dailystrenght (www.dailystrenght.org), 
networks allowing patients to find other patients in comparable situations, exchanging 
information about their pathologies, whereas physician social networks examples include 
Sermo (www.sermo.com) and Medscape (www.medscape.com). 
Pharmaceutical companies may benefit from these networks in more than one way. For 
instance, Sermo offers «high impact banner ads with persistent targeted presence throughout 
the campaign with guaranteed 100% share of voice to support key brand objectives» (Sermo, 
2017), allowing companies to impact physicians during in a specified period of time. Even if 
some networks do not allow for direct promotion of drugs to patients or physicians, 
pharmaceutical companies can still benefit from developing for-profit partnerships. An 
example regarding PatientsLikeMe is data sharing with pharmaceutical and medical device 
companies to use data from permission-based access to patients, to provide these companies 
insights to improve treatment development and usage (Sarasohn-Kahn, 2008). An example 
regarding the way pharmaceutical companies can use platforms like Sermo was addressed by 
Barlas (2010). He explained that a company can monitor the conversations physicians 
develop in the platform, and when relevant topics emerge, the company can engage web-
based activity. He also referred a Pfizer and Sermo joint-developed tool that allows Pfizer to 
interact with doctors who request information from Pfizer, for instance medical inquiries, 
which are scientifically answered by Pfizer medical department. 
 
5.6.5. E-mailing (e-mail marketing) 
In the pharmaceutical marketing scope, e-mailing consists of the use of physicians’ e-mails to 
disseminate information about medicines, including promotional and scientific information. 
E-mailing is a non-personal channel, as addressed in ZS Affinity Monitor 2014 executive 
summary (ZS, 2014b). It is also known as e-mail marketing, as a promotion tool aimed at 
physicians (Pedroso & Nakano, 2009). 
There are two basic ways pharmaceutical companies can use to reach physicians by e-mail. 
One is using their own customer information databases, which can be populated with 
information regarding the physicians they interact with. E-mail accounts are then used in 
order to contact physicians. Another is using third part service providers such as healthcare 




As explained before, pharmaceutical companies can target physician groups with specific 
contents. 
IMS Health (2016), in its ChannelDynamics Global Reference 2016 edition, evidenced that 
the global investment of pharmaceutical companies in e-mailing reached USD$963 million in 
2015, a growth of 46,5% when compared with 2014. In terms of the weight on digital 
channels (measured by IMS Health as the sum of e-meetings, e-mailing and e-detailing), e-
mailing relative magnitude increased from 29,1% in 2014 to 37% in 2015. 
5.6.6. e-Continuing medical education (e-CME) 
Continuing medical education (CME) can also be one of the available promotion tools 
pharmaceutical companies may use to interact with physicians using digital communication 
channels. Wutoh, Boren & Balas (2004) reviewed the impact of internet-based CME 
interventions on physician performance and health care outcomes, finding that these internet-
based programs were equally effective to traditional formats of CME in communicating 
knowledge. In their review, they noted that on-line CME (or e-CME) may include several 
channels such as e-mail, and the internet. 
Webinars are also one type of e-CME. According to Buxton, Burns & De Muth (2012), 
webinars are «presentations, lectures, workshops, or seminars transmitted over the World 
Wide Web and are usually live and interactive» (p. 2), and usually include chat tools where 
the health care professional has the ability to ask questions and receive answers in real time. 
Buxton, Burns & De Muth (2012) noted that while webinars are typically live, Web casts are 
presentations that are viewed online, but previously prerecorded. 
5.6.7. e-Direct-to-consumer advertising and Web 2.0 
Web 2.0 is the network as platform, spanning all connected devices (o’Reilly, 2005). This 
evolution from passive or static content (Web 1.0), to dynamic content shared by users to 
develop new on-line services (web. 2.0). The spectrum of social networking tools used by 
drug companies is as broad as those available and can include Facebook pages, Twitter 
accounts, blogs or RSS feeds, dedicated YouTube channels, and Apple iTunes applications 
sponsored by drug companies. These tools and applications are accessible globally, despite 
the fact the DTCA in prescription drugs is only permitted in two countries in the world (USA 
and New Zealand), as highlighted by Liang & Mackey (2011). Southwell & Rupert (2016) 




Medicines Agency (EMA) and other agencies, regarding on-line promotion of prescription 
drugs. 
In their research on the prevalence and health implications of social media in DTCA, Liang & 
Mackey (2011) found that all 10 pharmaceutical companies selected to their panel had a 
presence of DTCA 2.0 (DTCA in the scope of Web 2.0), including Facebook, Twitter, 
sponsored blogs, and really simple syndication (RSS) feeds. Eight companies had youtube 
channels, and eight had mobile applications to health care communication. Considering the 
drugs perimeter selected by the researchers, nine out of ten had dedicated websites, eight had 
Facebook pages, nine had Twitter activity, and eight had DTCA on youtube. These 
conclusions evidence the substantially high prevalence of DTCA in on-line media. The 
implications for the pharmaceutical companies are clear: it is an additional tool for 
communicating and interacting with patients and health care professionals. The full extent of 
Web 2.0 philosophy can however only be implemented in countries where DTCA is allowed 
(the USA and New Zealand, as addressed before). It also requires sponsorship identification, 
so that patients can know the online sources of information, including financial funding, noted 
Liang & Mackey (2011). This is a sensitive theme, which was studied by DeAndrea & 
Vendemia (2016), whose research suggested that the disclosure of pharmaceutical companies’ 
affiliations and control of user-generated comments may affect how on-line users evaluate 
drug information, and also their behavior in terms of information dissemination using on and 
offline social networks, thus justifying the concern about these issues.  
Southwell & Rupert (2016) also addressed the online possibilities companies have to promote 
their prescription drugs. They highlighted several tools such as video testimonials, printable 
coupons, and hyperlinks to disease information or medical resources. 
These tools can not only be managed directly (using their own resources, websites and 
applications), but also indirectly (sponsoring third parties) by pharmaceutical companies. 
Sponsorship of blogs covering health related issues can allow pharmaceutical companies 
institutional promotion and support to specific pathologies. For instance, the blog Healthline 
(www.healthline.com) accepts sponsorships from pharmaceutical companies that fit with the 
mission and vision of the website (Sarasohn-Kahn, 2008). 
Search engine optimization, where search ranks are influenced by a search engine so that a 
certain result can appear more often is also an effective tool pharmaceutical companies can 




marketing. Also, they highlighted that search engines use social media activity for marketing 
purposes, aiding the promoted product position on search engine results pages, allowing a 
direct connection of the company with its consumers. 
5.6.8. Sub-chapter synthesis of main findings 
This chapter covered promotion tools using digital communication channels, utilized by 
pharmaceutical manufacturers to promote their prescription medicines to physicians. These 
tools – which are still marginal worldwide in terms of investment magnitude - include e-
detailing, e-sampling, company websites and healthcare portals, health social networks, e-
mailing, online continuing medical education (e-CME), and e-Direct-to-consumer advertising, 
in the scope of Web 2.0. 
There are two forms of e-detailing: virtual (interactive) e-detailing, also known by self-
detailing, and video (live) e-detailing. E-detailing has been growing its penetration as a 
promotion tool, given some reasons: increased physician use of the internet, increased 
opportunity costs of physicians, and fear of pharmaceutical manufacturers to lose the digital 
presence. E-detailing can bring several benefits to both physicians (including convenience, 
additional information) and to manufacturers (complementing traditional detailing, reaching 
out-of-target physicians, in a cost-effective manner). E-detailing has been shown to positively 
impact prescriptions of the promoted drugs, when combined with traditional detailing. 
E-sampling allows physicians to request drug samples through a website or a health care 
portal and contributes to increase the knowledge manufacturers have about drug sample 
requesters. Pharmaceutical manufacturers can also use company websites and health care 
portals to connect several players, providing adequate services, content and applications, but 
also advertising services impacting physicians and pharmacies. Physician-oriented health 
social networks can offer manufacturers the ability to post high impact banner ads targeted to 
specific physicians. E-mailing (or e-mail marketing) allows manufacturers to send targeted 
content to specific physician audiences. On-line continuing medical education can be used by 
pharmaceutical manufacturers to interact with physicians in the scope of training and 
education, through internet-based programs (including webinars and web casts). 
Pharmaceutical manufacturers can also take advantage of the Web 2.0 approach to interact 







Manufacturers investments are typically monitored by companies such as IMS Health, which 
aggregates them in categories including detailing, samples, meetings, advertising, clinical 
trials, direct to consumer marketing (DTC), mailing and digital (IMS Health, 2015a). The 
most important instrument is detailing, reaching 62,5% of the total investment. The second 
most important instrument according to IMS Health (2015a) is samples (11,1%), and then 
followed by meetings (11,1%) and DTC (6,5%). The digital channel reaches only 3,2% of the 
total investment but evidences a growth of 32,2% over the previous year. 
According to Gagnon & Lexchin (2008), the total pharmaceutical industry promotion spent to 
impact medical practitioners reached US$57,5 billion in 2004 in the United States, of which 
US$20,4 billion on detailing and US$15,9 billion on samples, meaning that detailing is the 
promotion tool with the highest total investment, used by pharmaceutical companies to 
interact with physicians. Yi, Anandalingamb & Sorrell (2003) had already noted that 
pharmaceutical manufacturers’ biggest investment is on their sales force (detailing activities). 
More recently, Datta & Dave (2016) also underlined that «most of (83%) of Rx promotion is 
directed at physicians in the form of visits by pharmaceutical representatives (known as 
detailing))» (p. 1). Gagnon & Lexchin (2008) compiled data from independent private market 
research agencies, pharmaceutical companies and other sources -, these investments represent 
US$61.000 in promotion per physician. When divided by the US domestic sales of US$235,4 
billion, pharmaceutical industry promotion reaches a percentage of 24,4%, almost twice as 
R&D which represents 13,4% of domestic sales. As reported by IMS Health (2015a) on its 
Global Pharmaceuticals Marketing Channel Reference report, the worldwide pharmaceutical 
industry promotion investment in sales force and marketing channels reached almost US$71 
billion in constant US dollars, dropping by -1,4% from 2013. 
Physicians are the main targets of pharmaceutical marketing teams (Salmasi et al, 2016), as 
they are the main prescribers. A study conducted by Cegedim Strategic Data revealed that the 
top 20 pharmaceutical companies’ promotion investment on professional detailing was five 
times the investment on DTCA (82% vs 18% weight), in 2013 (Cegedim, 2014). IMS Health 
(2015a) data also suggests physicians are, by far, the main targets of pharmaceutical industry 





5.8.Additional perspectives on pharmaceutical promotion 
In this sub-chapter, we will address additional perspectives regarding pharmaceutical 
promotion tools. The first addresses stakeholders’ perspectives on detailing activities to 
physicians, proving a perspective from pharmaceutical manufacturers, physicians, 
pharmaceutical sales representatives, nurses, pharmacists and patients. The second will 
address multichannel marketing, or the use of several marketing channels by pharmaceutical 
companies, aimed at creating and maintaining interactions with physicians. It then will 
approach push and pull promotion approaches in the pharmaceutical industry using not only 
traditional but also digital communication channels, physicians’ preference on digital 
channels, physicians’ prescription attitude on digital channels, evaluation of the effectiveness 
of the promotion activities, ending with a discussion of the main ethical issues raised when 
addressing pharmaceutical industry promotion directed at prescribers. 
5.8.1. Stakeholders’ perceptions 
Manufacturers 
The pharmaceutical industry is a major player in healthcare management. The last European 
Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations report for the year 2015 (EFPIA, 
2016c) estimates that this industry employs more than 723 thousand people in Europe (eight 
thousand in Portugal) and generates three to four times more employment indirectly – 
upstream and downstream, investing more than €30 thousand million in research and 
investment, ranking second on the top industrial sectors by overall R&D intensity in 2016 
(EU R&D Scoreboard, 2016). The cost of developing a new drug (including the cost of 
failures) reaches an average of US $2.588 million (DiMasi, Grabowski & Hansen, 2016), and 
by the time a drug reaches the market, an average of 12–13 years will have passed since the 
first synthesis of the new active substance (EFPIA, 2016c). 
The health expenditure (current expenditure on health, as a percentage of the gross domestic 
product) reached an average of 9,0% in 2014, in OECD countries (OECD, 2016a). As a 
comparison between some countries, in the US reached 16,9%, in the UK 9,8%, in Germany 
11,1%, in France 11,0%, in Portugal 8,9%, in Spain 9,0%, in Italy 9,1%, and Greece 8,2%. 
The other proportion of health expenditure costs relates to outpatient care & others, and in-
patient care (hospital). 
But what is the real weight of the pharmaceuticals in the GDP? Current expenditure on 




as a percentage of current expenditure on health, reached an average of 16,3% in OECD 
countries (OECD, 2016a). The US reached a proportion of 12,3%, the UK 12,2%, Germany 
14,5%, France 15,0%, Portugal 15,4%, Spain 17,9%, Italy 17,0%, and Greece 28,4%. This 
means that, for the OECD countries, the average proportion of GDP allocated to 
pharmaceuticals is 1,5% (US 2,1%, UK 1,2%, Germany 1,6%, France 1,7%, Portugal 1,4%, 
Spain 1,6%, Italy 1,5%, and Greece 2,3%). 
PhRMA, the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, issued a report in 2008 
called Pharmaceutical Marketing in Perspective, where it defended the pharmaceutical 
perspective on pharmaceutical marketing. One of the main arguments written consists of the 
value it provides to physicians by providing FDA-regulated educational and scientific 
information about new drugs. In order to preempt some arguing about the possible 
pharmaceutical marketing impact on the prescriptions of new medicines, PhRMA states, 
based on a survey requested to KRC Research, that marketing is only one factor considered 
by physicians in the moment of choosing a drug, since physicians’ judgement and 
experiences, as well as other sources of information, also impact the drug choice. KRC 
Research was commissioned again by PhRMA in 2011, and the report highlighted that 
physicians classified information from pharmaceutical company representatives and 





 places out of a list of 15 possible factors that physicians consider when 
prescribing (KRC Research, 2011). In the same report, 92% of physicians considered the 
information provided by pharmaceutical company representatives as useful (32% strongly 
agree + 60% somewhat agree), and 84% considered the information received as reliable (27% 
strongly agree + 57% somewhat agree). 
PhRMA (2008) also states that pharmaceutical marketing «plays an important role in 
providing information about brand medicines and helps balance other factors that emphasize 
promoting older treatments and that reduce use of needed medicines». An article from 
Manchanda & Honka (2005) underlined the importance of detailing as an important 
information source for physicians. PhRMA (2008) suggests that, without pharmaceutical 
marketing, health care professionals would be «less likely to have the latest, accurate 
information available regarding prescription medicines, which play an increasing role in 
effective health care», enabling pharmaceutical research companies to «inform health care 
professionals about the benefits and risks of their products, provide scientific and educational 




consultation with medical experts». PhRMA (2008) also stresses the investment 
pharmaceutical companies make by developing marketing activities aimed at bringing new 
information about new treatments into the health care system, defending that «even many 
years after new types of medicines are introduced, a large share of patients who should be 
using them according to clinical practice guidelines go untreated. In fact, these treatment 
gaps are often viewed as serious public health problems that lead to poor patient outcomes 
and high health costs—both human and economic—that could have been avoided». 
PhRMA presents another strong argument: the fact that public and private payers (such as 
insurers) strongly influence which medicines patients will receive. EFPIA (2016c) refers, in 
its report The Pharmaceutical Industry in Figures – Key Data 2016, the pharmaceutical 
industry contribution to the increase in life expectancy. Research conducted by Lichtenberg 
(2014a) was in the base of this argument, whose findings suggest that 1,74 years of additional 
mean life expectancy at birth were gained from 2000 to 2009, across 30 OECD countries, and 
73% of this improvement was generated by innovative medicines (with other factors taken 
into account such as education, income, immunization, health system access and reduction of 
risk factors). In another research, Lichtenberg (2014b) analyzed the impact of pharmaceutical 
innovation in the US mean number of work loss days, school loss days, and hospital 
admissions, finding that there was a more rapid decline, on those indicators, among medical 
conditions that increased the use of new post-1990 drugs. Another conclusion was that 
pharmaceutical innovation impact on the reduction in work loss days and hospital admissions 
is estimated to be three fold the cost of the new drugs consumed by patients. 
A recent article from Jacob (2018) discussed the legitimacy of the pharmaceutical industry to 
promote the drugs they develop. He noted that the industry argument to continue the 
promotion efforts is simple, where the lack of promotion would lead to lower drug sales and 
profits, which would imply a reduction in R&D, and which ultimately would negatively 
impact the drug discovery and development outcomes. 
All these arguments, from the research and development risks and costs, to the benefits given 
to health care practitioners, patients and society, seem to be intended to demonstrate the 








This topic will address physicians’ perceptions on the interactions developed between them 
and PSRs. Both positive and negative perceptions can be found in research conducted 
involving physicians on their opinion about PSRs promotion activities. 
- Positive perceptions 
According to research conducted by Andaleeb and Tallman (1996), using a structured-
undisguised questionnaire to inquiry a sample of 95 physicians, physicians see the PSR «as 
an important source of information, yet they feel they could get the needed information 
without the PSR’s assistance» (p. 87). They also argued that «physicians had friendly 
relations with the PSRs and did not distrust them, yet they did not view them as a vital part of 
their practice» (p. 87). Prosser & Walley (2003b) developed a qualitative study where they 
found that general practitioners consider that pharmaceutical representatives bring them new 
drug information promptly, bringing convenience and accessibility to their practice. Cegedim 
(2011) developed a report consisting of results from a panel of 5,6 million product detailing 
mentions in 30 countries, showing that 93,8% of physicians (both general practitioners and 
specialists) classified sales representative calls as useful and of value to their professional 
practice. 
Spiller & Wymer (2001) studied the importance given by physicians to different promotional 
tactics used by the pharmaceutical industry. Using a sample of 109 physicians attending a 
medical conference, they found that the highest levels of usefulness to physicians were 
medical books (with a category mean of 3,7 out of 4), medical journals (3,4), symposia / 
conferences (3,4), free samples (3,2), other physicians (3,1), PSRs (2,8) and pharmaceutical 
brochures / ads (2,7). 
As reported by Prosser & Walley (2003b), several physicians commented that they retained 
information better when it was communicated verbally by PSRs, which attributes an 
important role to the face to face characteristic of detailing. Using qualitative research through 
focus groups, Chimonas, Brennan & Rothman (2007) found that physicians maintained 
favorable views of exchanges kept with PSR through detailing, and presented some excerpts 
of the transcriptions of the group dynamics: «they just tell you about their product and you 
learn about it. A lot of the things I know about the new drugs, I learned from the 
pharmaceutical representatives» (p. 187). Anderson, Silverman & Loewenstein (2009) 




sales representatives. They found that more than three fourths of the physicians consider 
PSRs’ information as at least somewhat valuable. They also found that almost three out of ten 
physicians allege using PSRs often or almost always in the scope of the prescription of a new 
drug, and 44% use PSRs sometimes. 
Regarding gifts provided by PSRs, physicians tend to consider educational gifts higher in 
terms of appropriateness, compared to recreational gifts given by the pharmaceutical industry 
(Brett, Burr & Moloo, 2003). Drug samples are usually well accepted as highlighted by 
Salmasi et al (2016). These researchers found that «physicians generally see meetings with 
pharmaceutical representatives as advantageous to everyone: the patients, because they 
receive free drug samples, the hospital/clinic, because they would receive stationery, books, 
and most important, themselves, as these meetings help they stay up-to-date and aware of 
newly launched medications» (p. 11). 
- Negative perceptions 
PSRs may provoke some time pressure on some physicians’ agendas, as noted by Prosser & 
Walley (2003b). They also found that some physicians had objections regarding PSRs’ 
behaviors, including alleged «commercially-biased information, representatives’ 
confrontational and argumentative approach, and a lack of legitimacy as information 
providers and thus subsequent undue influence on prescribing» (p. 309). 
Manchanda & Chintagunta (2004) found that, over a certain level of detailing pressure, some 
physicians (approximately 15%) may reduce their prescriptions of the over-detailed drug. 
This evidence may suggest that PSRs activities, at this extremely high magnitude, may be 
perceived negatively by physicians, given their opportunity cost of time. 
- Perception of immunity against promotion initiatives 
Prosser & Walley (2003b) highlighted that «although findings suggest that GPs were highly 
aware that representatives could influence prescribing, in the main they did not attribute 
negative influence to their own prescribing» (p. 310). This is consistent with quantitative 
research conducted by Steinman, Shlipak & McPhee (2001), where more than 60% of the 
physicians stated that pharmaceutical industry promotions and contacts did not have influence 
on their own prescribing, while only 16% believed other physicians were unaffected. Riese et 
al (2015) also found similar evidence among trainees, as they were more likely to believe that 




the prescribing behavior of other physicians. This pattern is also underlined by Salmasi et al 
(2016) in their review, as a certain perception of immunity against pharmaceutical companies’ 
promotion initiatives. 
Pharmaceutical sales representatives 
Malhotra, Kondal, Shafiq, Sidhu & Pandhi (2004) concluded, after deploying a research to 
study pharmaceutical sales representatives’ perceptions of factors inducing prescription 
writing, that an important number of representatives believed they had a considerable 
influence on physicians’ prescription patterns (impacting more than 50% of their 
prescriptions). This result is contrary to physicians’ perceptions of representatives’ influence 
on their prescriptions, as seen in Steinman et al (2001). However, Malhotra et al (2004) also 
find that representatives elect the provision of scientific information to physicians as the most 
effective sales promotion. Parker & Pettijohn (2006) developed research comparing 
physicians and PSRs differences in perceptions regarding a battery of 23 parallel questions 
that were answered by both stakeholders’ types. When evaluating the effect of push 
promotion, PSRs were much more confident on the impact of their promotion activities in the 
prescription likelihood of drug categories promoted, compared to physicians’ answers 
(statistically significant differences, p=0,02). Interestingly, PSRs were also much more 
confident in the value of their activities in providing enough information for a drug 
prescription, than physicians (average of 3,7 vs 2,6, using a Likert scale of 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 5 (strongly agree)). The 2,6 average of physicians’ answers to this last point may 
suggest that the information provided by PSRs may not be considered as sufficient, in the 
scope of a prescription decision. It appears that PSRs seem to consider their influence on 
physicians higher than the declared influence recognized by the physicians in relation to the 
formers’ activities. 
Malhotra et al (2004) also evidenced that representatives consider the communication skills as 
the most important attribute in drug promotion, and that younger physicians might be more 
easily influenced than physicians with more experience. Regarding representatives’ 
perceptions about physicians’ attitudes in relation to gifts, more than 30% of representatives 









In some countries, such as the US and Australia, some nurses and physician assistants have 
the statutory authority to prescribe drugs, according to Ladd & Hoyt (2016). Pharmaceutical 
industry has been targeting nurses for a long time (Ladd, Mahoney & Emani, 2010). This 
targeting directed at nurses may seem counter-intuitive, as most of the nurses do not have the 
authority to prescribe drugs. However, as highlighted by Jutel & Menkes (2010) after 
addressing a sample of 100 senior registered nurses (of which only 2% had prescription 
rights), four out of five (79%) nurses reported recommending treatments to physicians and 
providing advice to patients about OTC medications; three out of four (77%) nurses reported 
that they have participated in the development of guidelines or policies including the use of 
medications. In the same research, all (100%) surveyed nurses reported that they can 
influence prescriptions of drugs in one way or another. 
Ladd et al (2010) found, after studying results of a sample of 263 nurses, that more than 19 
out 20 nurses (96%) reported having regular contact with pharmaceutical sales 
representatives. Regarding the reliability of the received information from the pharmaceutical 
industry, four out of five nurses (83%) considered it reliable and more than nine out of ten 
nurses (93%) received free gifts given by the sales representatives, but stated it had no effect 
on the probability to prescribe the emphasized drug. Ladd et al (2010) also found that almost 
six out of ten nurses (59%) reported regular attendance at pharmaceutical industry sponsored 
lunch events (one to five times in the previous six months), and almost two thirds (64%) 
reported regular attendance at dinner events during the same period. Almost all (96%) nurses 
had attended continuing education programs over the past 5 years. 78% of the respondents 
considered meal events as a good-to-excellent way to receive information about a new drug, 
and 69% considered those events encourage the use of those new drugs. Approximately half 
(48%) of respondents stated that they were more likely to prescribe a new drug, after 
attending to an industry-sponsored event. Regarding ethical issues related to the relation of 
the pharmaceutical industry and nurses, six out of ten nurses (61%) stated that the practice of 
providing small gifts and meals to clinical offices by the pharmaceutical industry was 
acceptable. 
Grundy, Bero & Malone (2016) developed a qualitative study which suggested nurses had a 




all interviewed nurses (56) reported interactions with the industry in the previous year, 
including face to face meetings, on an average of 13 times in the same period. The forms of 
interaction similarly included industry-sponsored lunches, dinners or events (39 out of 56), 
offers of gifts (40 out of 56) or product samples (34 out of 56). 15 out of 56 nurses declared 
having received paid travel. The interactions seemed to be more frequent with medical 
devices industry (47 out of 56), but also with the pharmaceutical industry (31 out of 56). 
In another study, Grundy, Fabbri, Mintzes, Swandari & Bero (2016b) have demonstrated that 
four out of ten (39,4%) nurse practitioners in Australia were present at a subset of industry-
sponsored events, twice as much as primary care physicians (21.1%). The researchers also 
found that nurses were present at 35% of all events that included healthcare practitioners from 
several disciplines (physicians, nurses, and other). 
Previous research conducted by Crigger, Barnes, Junko, Rahal & Sheek (2009) had already 
highlighted the relation between pharmaceutical industry and nurses. They found that the 
majority of nurses who answered to their questionnaire frequently receive samples, office 
supplies, equipment and educational items. A great majority of nurses considered that 
industry-sponsored lunches and dinners, as well as sponsored trips to educational programs 
are ethical. The authors also found that nurses who responded to the survey perceived 
themselves as less influenced by the pharmaceutical industry, than other nurses. Despite the 
differences in scope, this finding is consistent with the ones highlighted by Steinman et al 
(2001), Riese et al (2015) and Salmasi et al (2016), regarding physicians. 
Jutel & Menkes (2009) also found that almost two out of three (65%) nurses had contact with 
pharmaceutical sales representatives, three out of four (75%) had accepted gifts from these 
representatives, and two thirds (67%) declared they believed information coming from the 
pharmaceutical industry improved their practice. In the same research, one out of three (35%) 
nurses thought it is ethically acceptable to receive gifts and sponsorship. 
- Pharmacists 
Pharmacists too have been targeted by pharmaceutical industry marketing. Farthing-Papineau 
& Peak (2005) conducted a survey on pharmacists’ perception of the pharmaceutical industry 
and found that half of the surveyed pharmacists had a positive image about the 
pharmaceutical industry, one quarter had a neutral image, and one quarter had a negative 
image. Saavedra, O’Connor & Fugh-Berman (2017), in their qualitative research, documented 




company representatives. While the interviewed pharmacists recognized physicians as the 
main targets for pharmaceutical marketing, most have been given free resources or services 
from industry, such as educational courses. As underlined by Saavedra et al (2017), 
«expanding roles for pharmacists may make them even more attractive targets for future 
industry attention» (p. 1). Some pharmaceutical companies are using alternative 
communication channels to impact pharmacists, such as telemarketing. For instance, IQVIA 
and 2Logical have been offering telemarketing services to pharmaceutical companies in 
Portugal, aimed at promoting specific products and promotions to pharmacies. 
Pharmacists have the ability to dispense drugs prescribed by physicians and recommend OTC 
medications to patients and in some cases can change the generics brand prescribed by the 
physicians (as seen in Portugal, in some situations). Saavedra et al (2017) noted that one 
pharmacist stated that pharmacists practicing at rural areas may have much more influence on 
physicians. Another interviewee stated that pharmacists can make recommendations to 
physicians based on what the pharmacist know about the patient. 
The results from the referred authors underline the fact that physicians are not the only 
professionals being target by pharmaceutical industry marketing. 
Patients 
As underlined by Gönül et al (2001), patients are the users and payers of medical products 
and services by excellence, so their role seems to be limited regarding the choice of the drug 
prescribed. Being at the end of the buying decision process, it is relevant to study patients’ 
awareness and perceptions about pharmaceutical industry relation with physicians, especially 
about gifts. Mainous, Hueston & Rich (1995), in a survey deployed on patients, demonstrated 
that 82% of the respondents were aware that physicians received office-use gifts, and only 
32% were aware that physicians received personal gifts. In the same research, patients’ 
attitude toward personal gifts given by the pharmaceutical industry to physicians was more 
critical than toward office-use gifts, having a perceived negative effect both on healthcare cost 
(42% vs 26% of respondents) and quality (23% vs 13%). 
More than 10 years later, Jastifer & Roberts (2009) surveyed patients on similar questions, 
regarding awareness and attitudes in relation to gifts given by sales reps to physicians. The 
researchers found relatively high levels of patient awareness of gifts such as drug samples 
(93,9% of respondents) and ballpoint pens (76,2%). However, the awareness of other gifts 




(19%) was much lower. Approval rates varied immensely from 69,1% regarding drug samples 
and 54,2% regarding ballpoint pens, to 7,3% regarding spouse meal and dinner out and 3,7% 
regarding golf tournament fees. These results confirm, as underlined by the authors, a great 
majority of patients not approving most of the gifts, especially those with a higher perceived 
monetary value. 
Green, Masters, James, Simmons & Lehman (2012), using a different methodological 
approach regarding data collection (survey to patients at clinics waiting rooms), also 
evidenced different patient awareness levels depending on the type of gifts, from 48% 
regarding patient education materials with drug company logos on them, to 7% regarding 
office staff eating lunches paid for by drug companies. Results from this research also show 
that almost six out of ten respondent patients (59%) would have less trust in their physician if 
they learned the physician had accepted gifts with a monetary value higher than $100 or went 
on pharmaceutical industry-sponsored trips (58%) or sporting events (54%). 
Fadlallah et al (2016) highlight, in their review, that patients usually report lower awareness 
for personal gifts relative to office-use gifts, and that patients would more easily accept the 
fact of physicians receiving educational and office-use gifts, compared to receiving personal 
gifts. They also found an association between perceived relationships with the pharmaceutical 
industry and lower trust in physicians. 
 
5.8.2. Push vs Pull 
As addressed by Parker & Pettijohn (2006), the pharmaceutical industry constitutes a very 
good example of an industry combining combines both push and pull strategies in their 
promotional efforts. They explained that while push strategies rely «primarily on personal 
selling and sales promotion as a means to “push” a product through the marketing channel» 
(p. 28), pull strategies «rely on advertising and sales promotion to the end user to “pull” the 
product through the marketing channels» (p. 28). Here the end user is the patient, in the scope 
of DTCA, promotional activity allowed in the USA and in New Zealand. Parker & Pettijohn 
(2006) also explained that when pharmaceutical companies combine both push and pull 
strategies, having as a goal increases in product awareness and prescriptions. 
Wieringa & Leeflang (2013) explained that direc-to-consumer advertising constitutes the 
“pull” effect, and detailing, medical journal advertising and physician meetings constitute the 




strategy, which targeted mainly the physicians, includes physician meetings and seminars, 
medical journal advertising, samples, direct mail, and detailing» (p. 51). 
 In the scope of direct to physician promotion, pull strategy concept also applies. Puschmann 
& Alt (2001) explained that the traditional sales organization in the pharmaceutical industry 
has been based in a cost-intensive push strategy, but a shift to a pull strategy may increase 
efficiency, where doctors will more and more search and satisfy their information needs via 
on-line sources such as healthcare portals. Digital communication channels have allowed 
pharmaceutical companies to direct pull promotion strategies to physicians, who actively 
search, on their own choice, for contents through several promotion tools. One example is e-
sampling, where doctors can apply for samples in a request form, using a laptop or mobile 
devices (Kumar & Panigrahi, 2014). Another example is self-detailing, a form of e-detailing, 
where doctors receive an interactive multimedia experience training for a product, and can 
then, on their initiative, request additional information, apply for samples, or ask for a face-to-
face visit with a PSR (Heutschi et al, 2003). Pull strategy can also be seen in physicians’ 
search for drug-related information in pharmaceutical companies websites or health 
information portals, as addressed previously. 
Bernewitz (2001) addressed the several push (contact initiative starting from the 
pharmaceutical company) and pull (contact initiative starting from the physician) promotion 
tools available to pharmaceutical companies in their interaction with doctors, combining them 
into a chart with one axis as personal interaction, and another axis as control of information 
flow, seen below in figure 5.19. Most pull promotion tools appear at the upper right quadrant 





Figure 5.19 – Pharmaceutical companies’ spectrum of communication options 
Source: Bernewitz (2001) 
 
5.8.3. Physicians preference on digital channels 
QuintilesIMS, on its Channel preference versus promotion reality white paper, surveyed 
physicians from 35 countries addressing them on which channels were more preferred, in the 
scope of their interactions with the pharmaceutical industry. QuintilesIMS (2016b) not only 
analyzed the stated preferences in terms of channels, but also the current reality of channel 
utilization by pharmaceutical companies (shown in figure 5.20). They found very diverse 
realities by country, and by physician specialty. For instance, in the USA, most of the 
specialties indicate a percentage of preference for digital channels in the 0% to 10% range, 
with however some very different results from diabetologists, cardiologists, rheumatologists, 





Figure 5.20 – Volume versus preference on digital channels – USA 
Source: QuintilesIMS (2016b) 
The results from the USA contrast with the ones from Japan, where the great majority of 
medical specialties are mainly impacted by digital channels, in a higher proportion than the 
one they stated as first preference for contact. Table 5.6 evidences the proportion of 
specialties receiving their preferred amount of digital activity. The UK and France appear to 
be more aligned in terms of what medical specialties want as digital meeting their activity 
preference. 
Table 5.6 – Proportion of specialties receiving their preferred amount of digital activity 
 
Source: adapted from QuintilesIMS (2016b) 
ZS Associates Affinity Monitor study (ZS, 2014) evidenced that while face to face channels 
still have the highest affinity, digital channels (both push and pull) already have high levels of 
affinity too. The study also showed that the percentage of doctors expressing favorable 
attitudes toward non-personal channels was substantially different within specialties. For 
Japan USA UK France Spain Germany Italy China
Exceeds demand 94% 50% 17% 8% 0% 7% 0% 0%
Meets demand (within +/-10%) 6% 36% 61% 53% 24% 7% 0% 0%




instance, Cardiologists were the specialty showing the highest percentage of unfavorableness 
regarding face to face interactions (11%), while only 16% expressed unfavorableness 
regarding non-personal promotion (the remaining 54% of physicians were PSR and non-
personal promotion favorable). Conversely, 64% of dermatologist expressed unfavorableness 
regarding non-personal promotion interactions. 
HealthLink Dimensions, a US company providing healthcare data solutions to healthcare and 
life science organizations, surveyed over 700 physicians and nurse practitioners to understand 
which practices they prefer in terms of communication. Their study found that 68% of 
physicians and nurses alleged preferring e-mail for initial contacts, while 11% want physical 
interactions such as direct mail or visits from PSRs (Healthlink, 2016). 
A study conducted by Quantia and Capgemini Consulting in 2013, using a sample of almost 
three thousand physicians, addressing how physicians prefer to interact with pharmaceutical 
companies, evidenced some relevant results: one of the conclusions was that two thirds (67%) 
of physicians alleged they prefer digital access for pharmaceutical companies product 
information; another was that four out of ten physicians considers that digital media offers the 
most relevant and personalized content (Capgemini, 2013). 
5.8.4. Physicians prescription attitude on digital channels 
It is also relevant to understand whether physician prescription attitude will be impacted by 
the use of digital channels. Channel Dynamics, a regular study conducted by IMS Health, on 
physicians’ declared intention to prescribe, highlighted that, for most of the countries 
analyzed, the relative impact of digital channels on prescription intention was lower than the 
impact of traditional channels. For instance, as seen in figure 5.21, in China physicians 
declared prescription intention was higher for digital than for traditional channels. France was 





Figure 5.21 - Impact of digital contacts on intent to prescribe relative to traditional contacts 
Source: IMS Health (2015b) 
 
5.8.5. Comparative effectiveness of the promotion tools 
Pharmaceutical companies make use of a series of tools to evaluate their promotion 
investments in terms of drug sales effectiveness. Manchanda, Rossi & Chintagunta (2004) 
highlighted that both academics and pharmaceutical industry practitioners develop sales 
response models in which sales measures are related to different levels of marketing mix 
variables. They demonstrated that, using physician level detailing response curves, detailing 
effectiveness can be improved in terms of additional drug sales generation (up to 12% higher 
volume), by optimizing the detailing intensity given each physician’ responsiveness to this 
promotion instrument. This physician-level prescription information is available, as addressed 
later in this thesis, from companies like IMS Health (rebranded as IQVIA since the fourth 
quarter of 2017, after the merger with Quintiles), which purchase and compile prescription 
information records gathered through agreements with community pharmacies (Fugh-Berman 
& Ahari, 2007). 
As covered by Stremersch & Van Dyck (2009), sales force management (where detailing is 
included) can be subject of decisions on optimal sales force sizing and targeting, decisions to 
optimize sales call quality, and the optimized use of drug samples, including sales response 
models such as the impact of detailing on prescription behavior. Sah & Fugh-Berman (2013) 
also underlined the fact that detailing – just as other promotional instruments – can be 




benefit. They referred that pharmaceutical companies develop response curves to study the 
marginal impact of different promotions on drugs sales, having as a goal the optimization of 
investments «by targeting the right doctors with the right message at the right frequency 
through the right channel» (p. 670), with a very high marketing sophisticated behavior. 
In their research on physicians influence by the pharmaceutical industry, Sah & Fugh-Berman 
(2013) made a very interesting and pragmatic consideration about the interest of 
pharmaceutical companies in developing promotional activities targeting prescribers: 
«Pharmaceutical companies and medical device manufacturers anticipate a return on their 
investment of billions of dollars on promotion. The effectiveness of specific marketing 
messages is calculated on the basis of uplifts in prescriptions or medical device sales from 
sales rep visits, gifts, meetings, continuing medical education seminars, and so on» (p. 670). 
To the extent of our knowledge, and based on the literature perimeter selected for analysis, no 
research is available comparing the effectiveness, on physicians’ prescribing behavior, of a 
thorough set of promotion instruments using a time-series approach of prescriptions and 
promotion investments. There are however generalizations on the effectiveness of 
pharmaceutical promotional expenditures. An extremely relevant and useful article from 
Kremer, Bijmolt, Leeflang & Wieringa (2008) helped generate insights about the relative 
influence of promotion tools on drug sales. They performed a meta-analysis on the main 
pharmaceutical promotion instruments covered in the literature and found that detailing 
evidences the highest elasticities, followed by medical journal advertising, DTCA, and other 
direct-to-physician promotion tools such as meeting expenditures, direct mail, and drug 
samples. The average predicted elasticities they found are shown below in table 5.7. 





Detailing (sales calls) 0,326






Source: Adapted from Kremer, Bijmolt, Leeflang & Wieringa (2008) 
There is also research developed using time series, nonetheless comparing the effectiveness of 
a limited number of promotion instruments, adding to Kremer, Bijmolt, Leeflang & Wieringa 
(2008) previous research, by contributing with a higher granularity of promotion instruments, 
for instance including drug sampling, direct mail advertising, and e-detailing, however in a 
non-exhaustive manner. In the following pages, a series of previous research outcomes will be 
presented, to allow for additional insights on the relative magnitude of the effect of 
pharmaceutical promotion instruments, in their ability of influencing physician drug 
prescribing behavior. 
Montgomery & Silk (1972) analyzed the effect, on prescription behavior, of three promotion 
instruments consisting of medical journal advertising, direct mailing, and samples and 
literature, and found significant and positive short and long-run elasticities for all three 
instruments. Table 5.8 below explicits the long-run elasticities. 
Table 5.8 – Long-run elasticities - Montgomery & Silk (1972) 
 
Source: Adapted from Montgomery & Silk (1972) 
 
Berndt, Bui, Reiley & Urban (1995) analyzed the factors affecting the growth of H2-
antagonist drug market, and found that, among the promotion instruments, detailing had not 
only a positive impact on the number of prescriptions, but also it had the largest significant 
effects, higher than medical journal advertising and DTCA. Table 5.9 below evidences the 













Table 5.9 – Promotion tools elasticities - Berndt, Bui, Reiley & Urban (1995) 
 
Source: Adapted from Berndt, Bui, Reiley & Urban (1995) 
Gönül et al (2001), when studying the effect of a series of variables to explain variations in 
physician prescription choices, found that detailing had a much stronger effect than drug 
sampling. The coefficients obtained are shown below in table 5.10. 
Table 5.10 – Promotion tools regression coefficient estimates - Gönül et al (2001) 
 
Source: adapted from Gönül et al (2001) 
Narayanan, Manchanda & Chintagunta (2003), in their research of second-generation 
antihistamine brands, and using data from several promotion tools, found that detailing is 
relatively more impactful than other promotion activities, in terms of drugs prescriptions, 
discovering evidence for both informative and persuasive effects on physicians’ prescription 
comportment. The instrument that ranked second in terms of impact on prescription behavior 
was a category composed by meetings, seminars and medical journal advertising, and in the 
third place were DTCA. The elasticities found by Narayanan, Manchanda & Chintagunta 















Table 5.11 – Promotion tools elasticities - Narayanan, Manchanda & Chintagunta (2003) 
 
Source: Adapted from Narayanan, Manchanda & Chintagunta (2003) 
Mizik & Jacobson (2004) studied data from a physician panel with 24 months of 
observations, in order to quantify the magnitude of the effects of two promotion instruments 
on the number of new prescriptions. They found that both detailing and drug sampling 
provoked positive effects, with detailing having the highest effect 1,56 for brand A, 0,32 for 
brand B, and 0,153 for brand C, whereas the coefficients for drug sampling were 0,155, 0,039 
and 0,014 for brands A, B and C, respectively (table 5.12). 
Table 5.12 - Promotion tools regression coefficients - Mizik & Jacobson (2004) 
 
Source: Adapted from Mizik & Jacobson (2004) 
Narayanan, Desiraju & Chintagunta (2004), when studying the interactions of promotion 
instruments using data from the anti-histamines market, also found that detailing has the 
stronger effect on sales. In their model, DTCA appears second, and an aggregation of 





Detailing 0,1143 0,0981 0,0978
Meetings and seminars + 
medical journal advertising
0,0519 0,0364 0,0453
Direct-to-consumer advertising 0,0147 0,0169 0,0137
Elasticities
Brand A Brand B Brand C
Detailing 1,56 0,32 0,153





Table 5.13 - Promotion tools elasticities - Narayanan, Desiraju & Chintagunta (2004) 
 
Source: Adapted from Narayanan, Desiraju & Chintagunta (2004) 
Narayanan, Manchanda & Chintagunta (2005) studied the changing role of marketing 
communication over the life cycle of a new product category, and analyzed three drugs in the 
antihistamines market. When assessing the comparative importance of promotion tools in 
terms of physicians’ prescribing behavior, they found that detailing score first in terms of 
elasticities, followed by a category consisting of meetings, seminars and medical journal 
advertising, and by DTCA. The elasticities found in their research are shown below in table 
5.14. 
Table 5.14 – Promotion tools elasticities - Narayanan, Manchanda & Chintagunta (2005) 
 
Source: Adapted from Narayanan, Manchanda & Chintagunta (2005) 
Kalyanaram (2008) studied the effects of order of market entry on market share in 
prescription and over-the-counter market, using data on sales, direct-to-physician promotion 
(aggregating detailing and Medical Journal advertising), and DTCA. They found that direct-
to-physician promotion has a much higher elasticity than DTCA, both for prescription and 










Detailing 0,0912 0,0867 0,0795
Meetings and seminars + 
medical journal advertising
0,0389 0,0191 0,0317





Table 5.15 – Promotion tools elasticities - Kalyanaram (2008) 
 
Source: Adapted from Kalyanaram (2008) 
Vakratsas & Kolsarici (2008) studied a therapeutic class using class aggregated data, using 
detailing, DTCA and medical journal advertising. They found that detailing coefficients were 
not significant (probably due to saturation, or to the fact that the data was aggregated by 
class). Medical journal advertising and DTCA yielded positive elasticities (table 5.16). 
Table 5.16 - Promotion tools elasticities - Vakratsas & Kolsarici (2008) 
 
Source: Adapted from Vakratsas & Kolsarici (2008) 
Kalyanaram (2009), when analyzing promotion elasticities for three therapeutic classes of 
prescription drugs, concluded again that direct-to-physician promotion has a much higher 
elasticity than DTCA. The elasticities are shown below in table 5.17 
Table 5.17 – Promotion tools elasticities - Kalyanaram (2009) 
 





Detailing + medical journal 
advertising aggregation
0,81 0,69
















There is however a limitation inherent to these two research articles (Kalyanara, 2008; 
Kalyanara, 2009), on the relative magnitude of importance of detailing and medical journal 
advertising. Because the two promotion instruments were grouped into one single tool called 
direct-to-physician promotion, it is not possible to isolate the detailing elasticity in both 
papers. 
Leeflang & Wieringa (2010) studied the impact of detailing, medical journal advertising, and 
direct mail advertising on the number of prescriptions of 49 drug brands in the Netherlands. 
On the very limited number of brands which produced significant and positive elasticity 
coefficients (of the right signal), medical journal advertising had the highest elasticity, 
followed by detailing and direct mail advertising (all three promotion tools evidenced, as 
shown in table 5.18 below, very modest elasticities). 
Table 5.18 - Promotion tools elasticities - Leeflang & Wieringa (2010) 
 
Source: adapted from Leeflang & Wieringa (2010) 
Montoya, Netzer & Jedidi (2010), in their research of a dynamical allocation model of 
detailing and drug sampling, found that both promotion tools yielded positive elasticities, as 
seen in table 5.19. 
 
Table 5.19 - Promotion tools elasticities - Montoya, Netzer & Jedidi (2010) 
 
Source: adapted from Montoya, Netzer & Jedidi (2010) 
Elasticities
Medical Journal advertising 0,027
Detailing 0,014







Very limited research has been conducted addressing the effectiveness of e-detailing in terms 
of drug sales. Gönül & Carter (2010) investigated the impact of both detailing and e-detailing 
on the number of new prescriptions for 21 prescription medicines, and found that both 
promotion tools had positive standardized coefficient in a multiple regression. Detailing had a 
stronger coefficient than e-detailing (0,509 vs 0,384). Interestingly, the coefficient of the 
interaction of both promotion tools appeared negative, as shown below in table 5.20. 
Table 5.20 - Promotion tools regression standardized coefficients - Gönül & Carter (2010) 
 
Source: Adapted from Gönül & Carter (2010) 
Dave & Saffer (2012) studied the effect of DTCA on pharmaceutical prices and demand, 
controlling for physician-directed promotion. Analyzing four therapeutic classes using US-
based data, they found that detailing is much more influential than drug sampling and DTCA 
in impacting sales. The elasticities found are shown below in table 5.21. 
Table 5.21 - Promotion tools elasticities - Dave & Saffer (2012) 
 
Source: Adapted from Dave & Saffer (2012) 
More recently, Mukherji, Jaimakiraman, Dutta & Rajiv (2017) studied DTCA effect on 
prescriptions of four branded cholesterol-reducing drugs (statins), and found that detailing has 
a substantially higher effect than DTCA in individual drug choice (approximately 2,3 times 















Table 5.22 - Promotion tools parameters - Mukherji, Jaimakiraman, Dutta & Rajiv (2017) 
 
Source: Adapted from Mukherji, Jaimakiraman, Dutta & Rajiv (2017) 
Based on the research addressed in the last pages regarding the effectiveness of several 
promotion instruments (by means of previous research using time-series), a summary table 







Table 5.23 – Comparative analysis of promotion instruments effectiveness on impacting physician prescription behavior 
 
Source: own elaboration
Detailing (sales calls) 1st 1st 1st 1st 1st 1st 1st 1st 2nd 1st 1st 1st






1st 2nd 2nd 1st 1st
Drug sampling 2nd 2nd 2nd 2nd
Meetings and seminars 
+ medical journal 
advertising aggregation
2nd 3rd 2nd
DTCA 3rd 3rd 2nd 3rd 2nd 3rd 2nd 2nd 3rd 2nd
e-Detailing 2nd
Direct mail advertising 2nd 3rd
Meetings + Direct mail 
advertising + drug 
sampling
4th
Comparative analysis of promotion instruments effectiveness on impacting physician prescription behavior (time-series based)
(prescription vs promotion investments data)
           Theoretical                       

























































Some conclusions can be drawn from table 5.23. First, detailing – as seen before - appears to 
be the most influential promotion tool. By considering the predicted elasticities proposed by 
Kremer, Bijmolt, Leeflang & Wieringa (2008), detailing is 2,7 times as influential as medical 
journal advertising (second in terms of influence), 4,5 times as influential as DTCA (ranked 
third), and 5,3 times as influential as other direct-to-physician promotion tools. Using a 
similar approach, we computed the averages of the elasticities of the promotion instruments 
covered in the last pages (excluding research that did not present elasticities), and the results 
are shown in table 5.24 below (by memory, elasticity translates the percentage change in sales 
(or prescriptions), for every percentage change in the promotion tool investments, as 
explained by Narayanan, Desiraju & Chintagunta, 2004). 
Table 5.24 – Calculated average elasticities of promotion instruments 
 
Source: own calculations based on previous tables 
Table 5.24 evidences that detailing appears to be the most effective pharmaceutical promotion 
instrument, followed by drug sampling, medical journal advertising, and DTCA. This analysis 
incorporates a series of limitations that should be considered. First, the literature review 
conducted was not systematic, and therefore a substantial fraction of the literature on 
pharmaceutical marketing may not be reflected; second, the number of cases (articles) in each 
Average elasticity Nr of cases
Detailing + medical journal 
advertising aggregation
0,71 3
Detailing (sales calls) 0,25 12
Drug sampling 0,16 5
Medical Journal advertising 0,15 5
DTCA 0,08 13
Meetings + Direct mail advertising + 
drug sampling
0,06 1
Meetings and seminars + medical 
journal advertising aggregation
0,04 7




promotion instrument is not the same (in some cases there is only one eliglble article), which 
demands the necessary prudence in interpreting the calculated averages; third, some of the 
promotion tools are aggregated, which does not allow a deeper individual level analysis; 
fourth, the selected papers do not address the impact of other promotion instruments such as 
gifts and meals, continuing medical education and event sponsoring (given that, to the best of 
our knowledge, previous research was not extant using time-series analysis), and more recent 
promotion tools using digital communication channels (such as e-detailing, e-sampling, or e-
mailing); fifth, and related to the previous limitation, the average elasticity coefficients shown 
here may not constitute the precise real values of the elasticities. Should all the covered 
promotion instruments had been evaluated in the same research using time-series data, 
individual elasticity coefficients would therefore not only be more precise, but also allow for 
a better comparison of the relative magnitude of their effect on prescription behavior. This 
situation allows definite room for future research on pharmaceutical promotion tools. 
However, and despite the listed limitations, the analysis evidenced in table 5.24 tries to fill a 
limitation present in Kremer, Bijmolt, Leeflang & Wieringa (2008) research, which is the 
aggregation of drug sampling (a very important promotion instrument with a substantial effect 
on the number of prescriptions) as an independent promotion instrument (their research 
merged it in a category named “Other direct-to-physician promotion tools”). Another point is 
that, more than analizing the precision of the individual elasticity coefficients, table 5.24 is 
intended at helping understand the relative magnitude of the impact of several promotion 
instruments. 
 
5.8.6. Ethical considerations 
Several authors have suggested that physicians may not be immune to pharmaceutical 
industry influence on prescription drugs choice. The possibility that this influence may 
negatively impact therapeutic decisions or involve additional costs to patients and health 
systems has been studied by some researchers. 
Wazana (2000) noted in his review that most studies addressed some negative outcomes 
associated with the interaction between the pharmaceutical industry and physicians. These 
included a series of effects, including a negative impact on physicians’ ability to identify 
wrong claims about medication; effects on «awareness, preference, and rapid prescription of 




medications that rarely held important advantages over existing ones» (p. 387); also included 
«nonrational prescribing behavior; increasing prescription rate; prescribing fewer generic 
but more expensive, newer medications at no demonstrated advantage» (p. 378). Datta & 
Dave (2016) hypothesized that, if the detailed drugs cost more than other alternatives, then the 
detailed-induced increase in prescriptions may contribute to higher overall prescription drug 
spending, at the expense of the patient (directly or indirectly) and of the health systems. 
Bekelman, Li & Gross (2003) studied, in their review of the scope and impact of financial 
conflicts of interest in biomedical research, highlighted that «approximately one fourth of 
investigators have industry affiliations, and roughly two thirds of academic institutions hold 
equity in start-ups that sponsor research performed by the same institutions» (p. 454). The 
researchers found an association between industry sponsorship and pro-industry conclusion, 
with an odds ratio of 3,60. 
Qualitative research developed by Skandrani & Sghaier (2016) highlighted some unethical 
behaviors of pharmaceutical sales representatives, such as providing misleading and 
incomplete information to physicians, giving incentives, discrediting competitors and 
misusing samples. 
A study developed by Johansen & Richardson (2016) suggested that an estimation of $73 
billion could have been avoided in excess of generic cost, when a generic alternative is 
available to substitute brand drugs, in the US in the period between 2010 and 2012. They also 
suggested that two thirds of this amount were born by the payers, and one third by the patients 
as out-of-pocket expenses. Given that restrictions on promotion activities developed by the 
pharmaceutical industry directed to prescribers have been demonstrated to increase the use of 
generic drugs (Larkin et al, 2017), and that promotion activities directed to patients (DTCA) 
can influence physicians’ prescription behavior toward the brand requested by the patient 
(Kravitz et al, 2005), a holistic discussion between the main stakeholders of the industry – 
from manufacturers to policy makers - may be opportune. 
Off-label promotion through detailing, that is, promoting of a drug for a different use that has 
not been authorized by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is illegal, as underlined by 
Shapiro (2018). He noted that, since 2004, more than 30 federal cases were settled involving 
off-label promotion activities by pharmaceutical manufacturers, in excess of $12 billion. 
Shapiro (2018) studied the extent to which detailing may cause undesirable prescriptions in 




physician prescriptions is modest, both in absolute and in relative terms. For instance, the 
marginal effect of one extra visit increases off-label prescriptions by only 0,038 in the present 
month. Radley, Finkelstein & Stafford (2006) studied phsycians prescribing patterns for 160 
commonly prescribed drugs, and found that off-label prescription is common in outpatient 
settings, and that in almost three out of four cases, there was either no scientific support or 
little scientific backup for the prescription choice. 
5.8.7. Sub-chapter synthesis of main findings 
This subchapter covered several perspectives concerning pharmaceutical promotion tools. It 
started with stakeholders’ perspectives about pharmaceutical manufacturers’ promotion of 
prescription drugs to physicians. Pharmaceutical manufacturers, through PhRMA, defend 
their legitimacy to promote prescription drugs based on the facts that they provide physicians 
with FDA-regulated education and scientific information. They also allege that 
pharmaceutical marketing is only one of the factors physicians consider in the prescription 
choice. They also state that a vast majority of physicians find information provided by PSRs 
as useful and reliable, and that marketing activities may allow more patients to have earlier 
access to innovative treatment options. Physicians’ perceptions about the interactions 
developed with PSRs evidence mixed results. Some literature highlights positive perceptions, 
consisting of the recognized importance as a source of information, and also convenience and 
accessibility, since the method typically uses a face to face contact. Physicians tend to 
consider educational gifts as appropriate, whereas recreational gifts are considered less 
appropriate. Physicians also tend to value the drug samples PSRs offer them, whose benefit is 
passed to the patient, and the knowledge gathered during meetings with PSRs. However, there 
are negative perceptions too. PSRs may constrain doctors’ agendas, present commercially-
biased information, and incorrect influence on prescribing. Interestingly, doctors do not 
perceive themselves as influenced by pharmaceutical marketing as their peers, revealing an 
apparent perception of immunity against pharmaceutical marketing initiatives. 
Pharmaceutical sales representatives consider their work as crucial, believing that they have a 
considerable influence on physicians’ prescription choices. PSRs consider the communication 
skills as the most important attribute in drug promotion. Non-prescribing clinicians’ 
perspectives were also approached. Nurses have also been targeted by pharmaceutical 
manufacturers through detailing, training, drug samples, gifts and meals. They may 
recommend treatments to physicians and provide patients with advice about non-prescription 




Pharmacists have also been targeted by pharmaceutical industry marketing, and generally 
have a positive perception of it. They too are visited by PSRs, receive education and other 
services, and can influence physicians prescription choices, based on what they know about 
the patients. Patients seem to reveal a high awareness of some of the promotion tools 
pharmaceutical manufacturers employ in their interactions with physicians. They reveal 
higher awareness about and acceptance of drug samples, and office gifts such as ball pens, but 
reveal a lower awareness and also lower acceptance of personal gifts and meals, considering 
more expensive gifts as less appropriate. These results confirm that physicians are not the 
only professionals being target by pharmaceutical industry marketing, and that other 
stakeholders are aware of the interactions between physicians and pharmaceutical 
manufacturers. 
The sub-chapter then explicated that the pharmaceutical industry is one of the industries 
where pharmaceutical manufacturers use a combination of both push and pull promotion, 
combining detailing and tools using digital channels to both push messages and encouraging 
physicians to have the initiative of retrieving and asking for additional contents. The literature 
on physicians’ preferences on digital channels is scant, and therefore some non-peer reviewed 
sources were consulted. Evidence from the practice suggests that different physician 
specialties react differently to promotion using digital channels, in terms of preference. The 
same evidence appears to be seen when considering different countries, where for instance 
doctors from European countries appear to evidence a higher willingness to be targeted by 
digital channels, when comparing results against Japan and the USA. Promotion using digital 
channels appears to evidence relevant affinity levels, with doctors appearing to reveal 
favorable attitudes, but varying substantially among medical specialties. A different concept 
is physicians’ prescription attitude on digital channels, which appears to evidence, according 
to research conducted by consulting firms, lower prescription intention when compared to 
promotion using traditional channels (again, with differences among countries). 
The sub-chapter ended with the discussion of ethical issues in the scope of pharmaceutical 
industry promotion of prescription drugs to physicians. The conclusion is that physicians are 
not immune to this promotion, which may negatively impact their prescription behavior. 
These negative outcomes include a negative impact on physicians’ ability to identify wrong 
claims about medication, effects on awareness, preference, and prescription of a new drug, 
effects on physicians’ behavior, nonrational prescribing behavior, increasing prescription rate, 




This may contribute to higher overall prescription drug spending, at the expense of both the 
patients and the payers. Unethical practices from the industry include providing misleading 
and incomplete information to physicians, giving incentives, discrediting competitors and 
misusing drug samples. 
 
5.9.Chapter synthesis of main findings 
The present chapter addressed literature on pharmaceutical industry promotion. It underlined 
the importance of marketing communication, process by which pharmaceutical manufacturers 
convey messages to several stakeholders including physicians. It also explained the difference 
between communication channels – means, or vehicles through which the message moves 
from the sender to the receiver – and promotion tools - instruments used by companies to 
develop interaction with clients and reach promotion goals, using communication channels. 
Communication channels – face-to-face, telephone, mail, print, television and on-line – can be 
classified as personal versus nonpersonal, and traditional versus digital. Promotion tools 
include a series of instruments used by pharmaceutical manufacturers to interact with 
physicians, including detailing, drug sampling, gifts and meals, continuing medical education 
(CME) and event sponsoring (conventions, meetings, conferences, seminars, lectures, 
symposia), direct-mail advertising, medical journal advertising, direct-to-consumer 
advertising (DTCA), e-detailing, e-mail marketing, e-Continuing medical education (e-CME), 
company websites and healthcare portals, health social networks, e-sampling, and e-Direct-to-
consumer advertising (e-DTCA) in the scope of Web 2.0. These promotion tools can be 
positioned in a communication channels foundation (here illustrated in figure 5.22, in a 





Figure 5.22 - Pharmaceutical companies’ spectrum of promotion instruments 
Source: adapted from Bernewitz (2001) 
 
The most important promotion instrument, both in terms of investment magnitude, and in 
terms of impact on prescription behavior, is detailing, a form of personal selling and a form of 
relational marketing, where a pharmaceutical sales representative visits individual doctors, 
and provides information about his or her company’s drugs. A series of theoretical evidences 
were shown, here listed: the effect of detailing on brand prescriptions is significant and on 
average positive, but small; detailing appears to be the promotion instrument that generates a 
higher effect on prescription behavior; detailing appears to reduce price elasticity of drugs 
(reduces physicians' price sensitivity); detailing effect on prescription behavior seems to 
evidence diminishing marginal returns; detailing efforts appear to have a higher effect on 
prescriptions at the initial stages of the product life cycle; detailing seems to evidence carry-
over effects; detailing effect on prescriptions appears to be more on drug shares, rather than 
on drug category volume; detailing may have different effects on prescription, depending on 
the type of payer (physicians mostly seeing patients with private health insurance seem to be 
more prone to be influenced by detailing); detailing elasticities depend on the therapeutic or 
disease classes; detailing may be linked with physician nonrational prescription behavior; 




multiplier); gifts and meals associated with detailing may impact prescription behavior; 
recipients of the detailing activities (prescribers) do not consider themselves as influenced as 
their colleagues; detailing effectiveness can be optimized, in order to reach higher levels of 
sales force efficiency; certain physician profiles and situations increment the likelihood of a 
more frequent interaction between physicians and PSRs; detailing effectiveness can be 
attenuated by a form of detailing called academic detailing. 
Detailing faces several challenges as a pharmaceutical promotion tool. It is quite expensive, 
access to physicians is increasingly difficult, health care institutions are putting pressure on 
doctors in terms of payment (resulting in more patients to attend), and restrictions on PSRs’ 
access to physicians have been implemented in some countries. 
Other promotion instruments using traditional communication channels were addressed. Drug 
sampling has been demonstrated to impact physicians’ prescription behavior in favor of the 
offered drug samples. Gifts and meals have also been shown to influence physician 
prescription behavior. Medical journal advertising is one of the least expensive promotion 
tools, and direct mail advertising can reach a substantial number of physicians, 
complementing detailing activities. Continuing medical education has been used by 
pharmaceutical manufacturers to help physicians keep up-to-date in their practices, including 
funding for travel or lodging for educational symposia and meals). Direct-to-consumer 
advertising has been demonstrated to impact both patients’ and physicians’ behavior 
regarding prescription drug choices. 
This chapter also covered promotion tools using digital communication channels, which still 
represent a very small percentage of the total promotion investments. These tools include e-
detailing, e-sampling, company websites and healthcare portals, health social networks, e-
mailing, online continuing medical education (e-CME), and e-Direct-to-consumer advertising, 
in the scope of Web 2.0. E-detailing – the most utilized promotion tool using digital channels 
– brings several benefits to physicians and to pharmaceutical manufacturers, and has been 
shown to positively impact prescriptions of the promoted drugs, when used in combination 
with traditional detailing. Other promotion tools using digital channels were addressed. E-
sampling allows physicians to request drug samples through a website or a health care portal, 
company websites and health care portals can be used to connect several stakeholders, health 
social networks can offer manufacturers the ability to post high impact banner ads targeted to 
specific physicians, e-mail marketing allows manufacturers to send targeted content to 




pharmaceutical manufacturers to interact with physicians in the scope of training and 
education. Pharmaceutical manufacturers can also use e-direct-to-consumer advertising to 
impact the general population, in the scope of Web 2.0. 
Several perspectives concerning pharmaceutical promotion tools of prescription drugs, 
directed at physicians, were also addressed. Pharmaceutical manufacturers defend their 
legitimacy to promote prescription drugs based on the facts that they provide physicians with 
FDA-regulated education and scientific information, that information provided by PSRs is 
useful and reliable, and that marketing activities may allow more patients to have earlier 
access to innovative treatment options. Physicians have both positive and negative 
perceptions about the interactions with PSRs. While these interactions can be a source of 
information, convenience and accessibility to doctors, PSRs may constrain doctors’ agendas, 
present commercially-biased information, and incorrect influence on prescribing. 
Nevertheless, research has demonstrated that physicians tend to consider themselves immune 
against pharmaceutical marketing initiatives. PSRs consider their work as crucial, believing 
that they have a considerable influence on physicians’ prescription choices. Non-prescribing 
clinicians’ perspectives were also approached. 
Nurses have also been targeted by pharmaceutical manufacturers through detailing, training, 
drug samples, gifts and meals. Pharmacists have also been targeted by pharmaceutical 
industry marketing, through detailing, education and other services. Patients seem to reveal 
high awareness and acceptance of some of the promotion tools pharmaceutical manufacturers 
employ in their interactions with physicians (office-based gifts), but reveal a lower awareness 
and acceptance of personal gifts and meals, considering more expensive gifts as less 
appropriate. 
The chapter then addressed the push and pull character of prescription drugs pharmaceutical 
promotion, highlighting that this industry is one of the ones using a combination of both push 
and pull promotion, combining detailing and tools using digital channels to both push 
messages and encouraging physicians to have the initiative of retrieving and asking for 
additional contents. Different physician specialties react differently to promotion using digital 
channels, in terms of preference, and the same when considering physicians from different 
countries. In terms of its declared impact on prescription behavior, promotion using digital 
channels appears to evidence lower prescription intention, when compared to promotion using 
traditional channels. The chapter also addressed ethical issues related to prescription drug 




doctors reduced ability to identify wrong claims, nonrational prescribing behavior, increased 
prescription rate of expensive drugs at the expense of generics, and provision of misleading 

























6. Regulation of pharmaceutical marketing activities 
6.1.Content and logic of the chapter 
This chapter addresses the theories on regulation of pharmaceutical marketing activities on 
prescription drugs, directed at physicians. A first sub-chapter will address the main concepts 
related to this research area. Then, it will approach self-regulation, highlighting the several 
initiatives pharmaceutical manufacturers, pharmaceutical manufacturers associations, 
physician chambers and healthcare organizations have taken to self-regulate promotional 
activities in their interactions with physicians. Following, the chapter will address government 
regulation initiatives, aimed at regulating drugs price, physician prescription budgets, patient 
payment policies, direct-to-consumer advertising, and marketing efforts to physicians. The 
chapter also includes an analysis of the effectiveness of the several regulation initiatives, 
ending with the synthesis of the main findings gathered during the chapter. 
6.2.Concepts 
Several types of initiatives have been developed in the last decades, with the goal of 
regulating the pharmaceutical marketing activities deployed by pharmaceutical manufacturers 
in their interactions with health care providers, especially physicians. These initiatives can be 
self-imposed in the sense that they are voluntarily developed and implemented (in the case of 
pharmaceutical manufacturers, pharmaceutical manufacturers’ national and international 
associations, physician chambers, and healthcare institutions), or legally compulsory (if 
imposed by the government through the health tutelage). 
A series of reasons may explain these initiatives to regulate pharmaceutical marketing. 
Patients are becoming more demanding in terms of transparency and empowered regarding 
information about the industry. Shaw & Whitney (2016) noted that «as consumers become 
more enlightened and empowered to learn about the industry, many companies have 
developed their strategies to ensure a transparent relationship between industry and 
consumer» (p. 201). Patients and the general public are also more alert to physician 
interactions with the industry. Fadlallah et al (2016) acknowledged, in their review, that 
patients and the general public supported the disclosure of these interactions through easy-to-
read printed documents and verbally during the consultations. These reasons, allied to 
growing literature demonstrating the effects of promotion activities on prescription behavior, 
and of health expenditures rising pressure on public budgets, contributed to the need to 






In this topic, we will address self-regulation developed by pharmaceutical manufacturers, 
pharmaceutical manufacturer national and international associations, physician chambers and 
health care organizations, to regulate the interactions between manufacturers and physicians. 
6.3.1. Pharmaceutical manufacturers 
Pharmaceutical manufacturers have been proactively developing initiatives (mainly self-
regulatory codes of conduct) to auto-regulate their activities with HCPs and HCOs. At 
individual company level, many companies have been creating their own codes of conduct, 
such as Johnson & Johnson (2016), Pfizer (2016), Merck (2016), Novartis (2016), Roche 
(2016), Sanofi Aventis (2016) and AstraZeneca (2016), to list a few of the top pharmaceutical 
and biotech companies in terms of revenues (Forbes, 2015). These regulations may not 
however be impactful in terms of effect production. Roughead, Gilbert & Harvey (1998) 
studied tape recorded interactions between GPs and PSRs, concluding that PSRs presentations 
to physicians may not always comply with standards defined by companies’ codes of conduct. 
They suggested that policy regulation of PSRs activities is necessary to contribute to the 
adequate use of medicines. Norris, Herxheimer, Lexchin & Mansfield (2005) reviewed 
studies on drug promotion and concluded that the guidelines and regulations that should 
control PSRs activities are not effective. Francer et al (2014) called these initiatives company 
standards, where manufacturers develop and implement codes of conduct and internal 
compliance and audit organizations to impose them. 
6.3.2. Pharmaceutical manufacturers associations 
According to Lexchin (1997), some or the totality of the promotional activities of 
pharmaceutical companies are generally governed by self-regulatory codes administered by 
industry associations. He explained that «industry self-regulatory codes lay down principles 
and practices to be observed in promotion in an attempt to balance commercial objectives 
with the ethical and scientific objectives of providing accurate information to prescribers» (p. 
352). 
At national level, associations representing the manufacturers have been developing Codes of 
practice governing pharmaceutical companies. Francer et al (2014) called this independent 
local industry codes of practice. For instance, Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of 
America (PhRMA) with its Code on Interactions with Healthcare Professionals (in the US), 
Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI) and its Code of Practice for the 




of Conduct, and Interfarma with its Brazilian Code of Conduct. In Canada, the 
Pharmaceutical Advertising Advisory Board (PAAB) has to give clearance to journal 
advertising, and to other promotion activities such as advertising and promotional messages 
carried via audio, visual, audiovisual, electronic and computer means of communication with 
physicians. From the pharmaceutical manufacturers’ side, there is the Code of Marketing 
practices of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of Canada (PMAC). Lexchin 
(1997) explained that PMAC member must agree to accept the PAAB code, and also the 
journal insert guidelines from the Association of Medical Media. In Portugal, APIFARMA is 
the association representing the pharmaceutical manufacturers. APIFARMA has been 
developing and updating its code of ethics since 1987, adapting it to national and European 
Union legislation. This code of ethics is called “Código deontológico para as práticas 
promocionais da indústria farmacêutica e para as interacções com os profissionais de saúde e 
instituições, organizações ou associações constituídas por profissionais de saúde”. 
As highlighted by Francer et al (2014), at global level, International Federation of 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Associations has developed its IFPMA Code of Practice, 
and at regional level there are two main associations, one at Central America scope 
(Federación Centroamericana de Laboratorios Farmacéuticos (FEDEFARMA), with its Code 
of Good Practices for the Promotion of Medicines), and one at European scope (European 
Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EPFIA)). EFPIA, an institution 
representing the national industry associations from European countries, developed a 
transparency code called EFPIA code on disclosure of transfers of value from pharmaceutical 
companies to healthcare professionals (HCPs) and healthcare organizations (HCOs). 
Pharmaceutical manufacturers associations not only are developing initiatives to regulation 
their interactions with HCPs and HCOs, but also to manage the disclosure of their activities to 
the general public. In order to comply with EFPIA, members were asked to transpose the code 
to their national codes, at the same time observing national laws and regulations on 
disclosure. APIFARMA adapted its code of ethics to incorporate EFPIA’s best transparency 
practices, resulting in APIFARMA current code of ethics for promotion practices of the 
pharmaceutical industry and interaction with health care professionals and institutions, 
organizations or associations comprising health care professionals (EFPIA, 2016b). In 
Portugal, APIFARMA members are now obliged to observe not only the national legislation 
on transfers of value disclosure, but also APIFARMA’s code of conduct, which requires 




This disclosure is made at PLACOTRANS (2017), an INFARMED on-line platform 
dedicated to transparency. 
Figure 6.1 below, proposed by Francer et al (2014), highlights the different codes and 
regulatory mechanisms applying to international pharmaceutical companies. 
 
Figure 6.1 - Different codes and regulatory mechanisms applying to international 
pharmaceutical companies 
Source: Francer et al (2014) 
6.3.3. Physician chambers 
Francer et al (2014) addressed another system for controlling prescription medicines 
advertising, called professional bodies’ codes of practice. Professional HCPs chambers also 
have developed codes of conduct to guide the interactions of their members with 
pharmaceutical manufacturers. For instance, the Portuguese Physician Chamber (Ordem dos 
Médicos) deontological code sets not only the standard for proper medical care given by 
patients, but also the principles for the physicians relations with the pharmaceutical industry 
(Ordem dos Médicos, 2016). The US, British and French equivalents are the American 
Medical Association Code of Medical Ethics (AMA, 2016), the British Medical Association 
(BMA) Ethics (BMA, 2016), and the French Ordre National des Medicins (ONM) Code of 




Chambers guidelines may be developed to raise professional standards and transparency, with 
the goal of keeping high levels of credibility in the medical profession. How do the general 
public view healthcare practitioners ethical standards? Gallup, a US private company 
delivering analytics, has been developing Gallup Poll Social Series since 2001, monitoring 
U.S. adults' views on social, economic, and political topics. One of the surveyed topics is 
related to the surveyed participants’ perceptions about the honesty and ethical standards of a 
selection of professions. Nurses scored first and have been reaching at least 80% of “Very 
high” plus “High” classifications since 2005. In 2016 wave, Pharmacists and Medical doctors 
ranked second and third, respectively (Gallup, 2017). 
6.3.4. Healthcare organizations 
Healthcare organizations have also been developing guidelines to regulate their collaborators 
(physicians and other healthcare professionals) interactions with pharmaceutical 
manufacturers. These guidelines vary substantially between institutions though, as noted by 
Norris, Herxheimer, Lexchin & Mansfield (2005), in their review, when analyzing guidelines 
to regulate interactions between pharmaceutical manufacturers (through PSRs) and medical 
trainees. 
Austad, Avorn, Franklin & Kesselheim (2011) found, in their review, that medical students 
have substantial contact with pharmaceutical companies marketing, and that marketing is 
associated with positive attitudes and skepticism about negative implications of this contact. 
Some authors suggest that medical students’ education on how to deal with pharmaceutical 
industry marketing might result in higher awareness about potential medical inducements. 
This was demonstrated by Vinson, McCandless & Hosokawa (1993) where a one-hour lecture 
and discussion about the appropriateness of pharmaceutical gifts resulted in higher awareness 
of students and higher resistance to accept gifts from the pharmaceutical industry. Wilkes & 
Hoffman (2001) demonstrated that medical student’s attitudes in relation to pharmaceutical 
industry marketing changed after students received an educational program on the effect of 
pharmaceutical manufacturers on physicians’ behavior. Significant results were found 
between a first survey and a second survey on ethical considerations regarding some 
pharmaceutical industry marketing tools. 
Siddiqui et al (2014) highlighted the imperativeness that every medical college may 
«incorporate guidance regarding doctor pharmaceutical interactions, practice clear ethical 
policies which medical students should be aware of, and help foster a supportive environment 




demonstrating a high level of medical students’ acceptability towards incentives and gifts 
given by the pharmaceutical industry» (p. 9), given that medical students revealed a high level 
of acceptability in relation to incentives given by pharmaceutical industry. 
Sarikaya et al (2009) had also demonstrated that deliberate targeting of students by 
pharmaceutical companies’ representatives was correlated with being less sensitive to the 
negative effects of, and having favorable opinions about interactions with pharmaceutical 
companies. Lieb & Koch (2013) also evidenced that students have a widespread contact with 
the pharmaceutical industry even during their first years as medical students. Similarly, the 
authors address the need to include specific curriculum regarding the pharmaceutical industry 
influence on prescription behavior, helping students to be aware of this influence and be have 
a more critical attitude. Steinman et al (2001) suggested that there is lack of formal education 
on pharmaceutical industry relations with residents, also underlining that doctors in training 
may be influenced by observing their mentors and colleagues receiving gifts from the 
industry, giving it an “implicit seal of approval”. 
Research has therefore demonstrated the importance of formal education on interactions 
between residents and pharmaceutical manufacturers. As noted by Sergeant, Hodgetts, 
Godwin, Walker & McHenry (1996), institutions that have guidelines to regulate the 
interactions between the pharmaceutical industry and residents, and that hold a formal session 
for residents on their policy, generate a higher awareness of these guidelines, in comparison 
with residents from institutions where a formal session is not available. This underlines the 
importance of teaching residents on these guidelines. Sergeant et al (1996) concluded that 
«formal discussion of the issues and role-modelling by faculty members may increase 
residents' compliance» (p. 1247). This aspect was later addressed by Norris, Herxheimer, 
Lexchin & Mansfield (2005). In their review on pharmaceutical drug promotion, underlined 
that education on pharmaceutical industry promotion, even of short duration (from 40 minutes 
to three-hour modules, sometimes with discussion and role playing) may change health 
professionals attitudes and improve skills on dealing with PSRs claims, allowing a more 
structured approach. 
6.4.Government regulation 
Government regulation is compulsory in nature, with legally required observation by 
pharmaceutical industry stakeholders. Pharmaceutical industry regulation is substantially 




they positioned the USA, as a non-regulated pharmaceutical market, and in the other extreme 
they positioned Belgium and France, fully regulated pharmaceutical markets (figure 6.2). 
 
Figure 6.2 - Pharmaceutical Regulation by selected countries 
Source: Stremersch & Lemmens (2009) 
The pharmaceutical industry may be regulated in more than one dimension, as described in 
the following topics, following Stremersch & Lemmens (2009) framework. 
6.4.1. Manufacturer price regulation 
Price regulation is exerted by governments to control the manufacturers’ price of drugs, 
imposing price restrictions irrespective of drug research and development and production 
costs, strategy applied in countries like Portugal, Greece, Belgium, Luxembourg, Ireland, The 
Netherlands, Switzerland, Norway and Finland, as highlighted by Stremersch & Lemmens 
(2009). These restrictions are higher in the European Union than in the US, where there is no 
price regulation (Golec & Vernon, 2010). 
The impact of price regulation on the launch delay of new drugs was studied by Danzon, 
Wang & Wang (2005). Comparing data from 25 countries, including 14 European Union 
countries, they found that in countries with lower expected prices, or smaller expected market 
size, have less new drug launches and lengthier launch delays. They suggest a «low price in 
one market may ‘spill-over’ to other markets, through parallel trade and external referencing, 
(and) manufacturers may rationally prefer longer delay or non-launch to accepting a 
relatively low price» (p. 2). Danzon, Wang and Wang (2005) suggest their findings tend to 
validate the hypothesis that price regulation affects the timing and occurrence of drugs launch 




pricing also have habitually been key parallel exporters, where Portugal is included (as well 
as Italy, France, Belgium, Spain, and Greece). 
Kyle (2007) has also studied the effect of pharmaceutical prices and entry strategies. She 
found that the use of price restrictions has a statistically and quantitatively substantial effect 
on the extent and timing of new drug launches: not only a delay or reduced probability in 
countries that impose the restrictions, but also into other markets as well, due to carry over 
effects, since these effects are not isolated in a single market, influencing global drug launch 
decisions. Kyle (2007) also suggests that drug launches in low price countries may suffer 
from additional delay after the legalization of parallel imports (approved in the EU in 1995), 
by which medicines wholesalers can purchase drugs in other EU countries, and develop price 
arbitrage (for instance buying in low-price countries and selling in high-price countries). 
Manufacturer price regulation can have an impact on research and development spending, as 
evidenced by Golec & Vernon (2010), when analyzing the relationship between price 
regulation and R&D spending in EU and US firms. They found that EU price pharmaceutical 
restrictions have led to lower «profitability, stock returns and R&D spending by EU than with 
US firms. And this may have led to 46 fewer new medicines and 1680 fewer research jobs, in 
the EU. 
Drug sales on countries with manufacturer price controls tend however to be higher than in 
countries without price controls (Stremersch & Lemmens, 2009). They suggest that price 
controls do not appear to constrain medicines availability to patients after a drug is launched. 
6.4.2. Regulation on physician prescription budgets 
Another type of regulation is physician prescription budgets, which have been set to contain 
pharmaceutical spending (Fischer, Koch, Kostev & Stargardt, 2017). This is the most direct 
way in which regulators can intercede in pharmaceutical markets for prescription drugs, 
through limitations on the total number of prescriptions issued by a physician, as suggested by 
Stremersch & Lemmens (2009). They referred the cases of Germany, where a collective 
budget for prescription drugs was implemented in the 1990s, and later reformed to physician-
level prescription budgets, and Latvia, where a fixed budget by physician is calculated 
considering the number of patients in their practice. 
Granlund, Rudholmand & Wikstrom (2006) studied the impact of a prescription fixed budget 
on two health centers in Sweden who have implemented a strict responsibility over the 




impact physicians’ prescription behavior, neither in volume (quantity of drugs prescribed) nor 
in the cost of the prescriptions. 
Conversely, other authors have demonstrated evidence of the impact of prescription budget 
regulation on the cost of prescriptions. Stremersch & Lemmens (2009) evidenced that 
regulation on physician prescription budgets had a significant negative impact on drug sales, 
but apparently more effective for mature drugs, while for more recently launched drugs the 
impact was smaller of inexistent. They also suggested that in regulated markets prescribers 
will feel more pressure to prescribe less expensive drugs to patients with milder symptoms or 
who can tolerate traditional alternatives well, prescribing more expensive drugs to patients 
with more severe symptoms. Fischer et al (2017) studied the cost and quality of prescribing, 
considering the level of utilization of drug budget using a panel of several hundred physicians 
in Germany, with data from 2005 to 2010. They found that physicians appear to be sensitive 
to the utilization of their drug budget in the previous year, by selecting brands more carefully 
and by increasing the generic share on prescriptions (but the total number of prescriptions did 
not suffer significant variations). They advocate that the German prescription budget (with 
sanctioning mechanics) did not change the number of prescriptions per medical consultation, 
but the average cost of the prescription was lower. 
A government initiative that may appear in the scope (directly or indirectly) of physician 
prescription budgets is the mandatory generic substitution. It happens when, with the goal of 
reducing costs for off-patent medicines and increase the prescription of cheaper medicines 
(generics), physicians are obliged to prescribe a generic version of a drug (whenever 
applicable) which may have a significant impact on physician prescription behavior, as noted 
by Andersson, Petzold, Allebeck & Carlsten (2008). They studied the impact of the 
implementation of a mandatory generic substitution program in Sweden, and found that sales 
of substitutable pharmaceuticals evidenced proportionally larger growth when compared 
against sales of non-substitutable pharmaceuticals (that is, drugs that do not have yet generics 
competing against), suggesting that the impact of the substitution program was significant and 
positive in terms of sales growth of less expensive prescription options. Another effect was 
the reduction of prices of many substitutable products, due to increased competition. 
6.4.3. Patient payment policies 
According to Reuveni et al (2002), co-payment is a policy in which patients cover part of the 
cost of the medication. Luiza et al (2015) addressed, in their review, four types of payment 




amount of money patients are expected to pay and the ways in which they are expected to 
pay. These can be a cap policy, where patients are reimbursed for the prescribed medicines up 
to a maximum amount in a certain period of time (and therefore pay the market price of 
medicines thereafter); can be a fixed co-payment policy, where patients pay a fixed amount 
per medicine or prescription, independently of the brands prescribed (it is also know by 
prescription charge, consumer charge, prescription fee, patient fee or cost sharing); can be a 
co-insurance policy, where patients pay a defined percentage of the price of the prescription 
or medicine, instead of a fixed fee (policy also known by co-payment or cost sharing); and 
can also be a ceiling policy, in which patients pay the full cost or part of the cost up to a 
certain threshold, above which patients are given medicines for free or at smaller cost. 
The rationale behind the introduction of patient payment policies is to reduce medicines 
misuse, overuse and underuse, leading to a reduction in wasted resources and health hazards 
(Luiza et al, 2015). 
Stremersch & Lemmens (2009) had already highlighted that patients may be requested to pay 
some form of co-payment for prescription drugs, system applied in countries like Portugal, 
Italy, and Hungary. For instance, in Portugal – a country using co-insurance payment -, the 
beneficiaries of the National Health System are eligible for drug price reimbursement, which 
can vary depending on the pathology and group of patients. Decree-Law no. 48-A / 2010, of 
May the 13
th
, amended by Decree-Law no. 106-A / 2010 of October the 1
st
, defines the 
possibility of reimbursement of medicines through a general and through a special scheme 
(dispensing of drugs both in pharmacies and in hospital pharmacies). The State's contribution 
to the price of the medicinal products for sale to the public is set according to four levels: A, 
with a reimbursement of 90%, B, with 69%, C, with 37%, and D, with 15%. In pharmacies, 
patients pay the differential price not covered by the reimbursement, and the pharmacy is later 
reimbursed by the State budget. The reimbursement levels vary according to the therapeutic 
indications of the drug, its use, the entities that prescribe it and even the increased 
consumption for patients suffering from certain pathologies (Ordinance no. 924-A / 2010, of 
September the 17
th
, amended by Administrative Rule no. 994-A / 2010, of September the 29
th
 
and by Ordinance no. 1056-B / 2010, of October the 14
th
) in the case they are not included in 
the list of medicines considered crucial for sustaining life (whose price is 100% reimbursed). 
In terms of impact of patient payment policies, Reuveni et al (2002) suggested that co-
payment for prescription drugs may lead to decreased drug use. Italy may be an example of 




co-payment policy was abolished, and in the first months of 2001 there was a very significant 
growth (30%) in pharmaceutical spending, as addressed by Stremersch & Lemmens, 2009. 
They found that patient co-payment regulation seems to result in a negative and constant 
effect, suggesting that in co-payment policies patients may be monetarily penalized for 
medicines usage. Luiza et al (2015), in their review of patient payment policies, proposed that 
«cap and co-payment policies may reduce the use of medicines and reduce medicine 
expenditures for health insurers» (p. 2). They also stressed that these policies «may also 
reduce the use of life-sustaining medicines or medicines that are important in treating 
chronic, including symptomatic, conditions and, consequently, could increase the use of 
healthcare services» (p. 2). 
6.4.4. Regulation of direct-to-consumer advertising 
Direct-to-consumer advertising (or DTCA) of prescription drugs, only permitted in New 
Zealand and the USA, and forbidden in all other countries, is another tool pharmaceutical 
marketers can use to influence patients (Stremersch & Lemmens, 2009). 
A study conducted by Cegedim Strategic Data revealed that the top 20 pharmaceutical 
companies’ promotion investment on professional detailing was five times the investment on 
DTCA (82% vs 18% weight), in 2013 (Cegedim, 2014). 
As covered previously, DTCA can have an impact not only on patients’ behaviors (increasing 
the number of requests for drugs subject to DTCA, and the number of visits to doctors, whose 
effect is positive and long-term), but also physicians prescription behavior (influencing 
physicians’ drug choices to some extent). Research has also shown that DTCA can lead to 
category expansion and a sales increase of the drug subject to DTCA. 
Stremersch & Lemmens (2009) found that countries prohibiting DTCA have significantly 
lower sales on new drugs when compared to countries where DTCA is allowed, and that this 
negative effect seems to be more noticeable for newly launched drugs than for maturing 
drugs. They found that this impact appears to be more intense around one year after a new 
drug in launched. These findings may contribute to generating insights on how a potential 
policy restriction on DTCA may impact the sales of new drugs. 
6.4.5. Regulation of marketing efforts to physicians 
Pharmaceutical companies marketing investments may represent twice the investment made 




By the one hand, pharmaceutical companies’ associations have been trying to demonstrate the 
benefits of pharmaceutical marketing. An example of the former can be seen in the 
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) report issued in 2008, 
called Pharmaceutical Marketing in Perspective, where, as covered before, it defended the 
pharmaceutical manufacturers’ perspective on pharmaceutical marketing. By the other hand, 
regulators have been developing initiatives to limit the marketing efforts to health care 
professionals and institutions, which can be classified into three subgroups, according to 
Stremersch & Lemmens (2009): constraining the number of detailing visits a pharmaceutical 
company can make; constraining the number of meetings a pharmaceutical company can 
organize; or constraining the number of samples a pharmaceutical company can dispense. 
They pointed some countries where marketing restriction policies had already been 
implemented, such as the UK, Spain, and Poland. 
Research conducted by Stremersch & Lemmens (2009) evidenced that marketing efforts 
appear to be lower in countries with marketing efforts restriction (Belgium and UK) than in 
countries without those marketing efforts restrictions (US, Germany and Switzerland). They 
also found that the impact of restricting pharmaceutical marketing efforts firms develop with 
physicians tends to have a negative effect on sales (illustrated in figure 6.3). 
 
Figure 6.3 - Pattern of marketing efforts to physicians vs time since medicine introduction 
Source: Stremersch & Lemmens (2009) 
As seen above, Stremersch & Lemmens (2009) addressed some pharmaceutical promotion 




number of detailing visits, restrictions on the number of meetings, restrictions on number of 
samples, restrictions on marketing / promotion efforts, and restrictions on promotion 
(proportion of sales). Brennan et al (2006) and Grande (2009) had also addressed restrictions 
on gifts offered to physicians, and Grande (2009) addressed licensing of pharmaceutical sales 
representatives. 
In order to more deeply approach restrictions on pharmaceutical promotion, we selected seven 
countries for comparison: France, Italy, Germany, Spain, UK, Portugal and the USA. The 
reason for this country perimeter was to include the big five European countries, the USA as 
the country with most research in the field of pharmaceutical marketing, and Portugal, as the 
country where the empirical component of the thesis will be developed. Data sources were 
previous work developed by scholars, a non-exhaustive analysis of national legislations, and 
analysis of legislation compendiums from Baker Mckenzie (2016) and Thomson Reuters 
Practical Law (2017). 
Restrictions on gifts 
All the six selected European countries have implemented restrictions on gifts. For instance, 
in the UK, inexpensive gifts are those up to £6 + VAT and may include pens, notepads, 
calculators, computer accessories, diaries, calendars, surgical gloves, tissues and coffee cups 
(this limit can increase to £130 in special situations, including books, training material, 
journal subscriptions, and other). 
In France, gifts to health care professionals are considered acceptable when simultaneously 
directly related to the practice of medicine or pharmacy, and of negligible value, up to €30 + 
VAT, per health care professional, per year. 
In Portugal, professionals can be given gifts up to €60, above which disclosure to the public 
must be made (in an INFARMED platform called Placotrans), according to Order 20/2013 of 
February the 14
th
, later precised by Decree-Law 5/2017 of January the 6
th
 (eliminating the 
double registry of benefits, both from entities offering the benefits, and from the recipients of 
benefits). The 60€ limit was set by Order 12284/2014 of October the 6
th
, and then revoked by 
Order 1542/2017, of February the 15
th
, which defined the concept of objects of insignificant 
value to the practice of health professionals (60€). 
In Italy, legislation demands that gifts can only be of modest value, not explicating however 




three conditions are observed: their value does not exceed €60, the materials are relevant to 
the doctors’ practices, and they can benefit the patient. In Germany, as expressed in Thomson 
Reuters Practical Law (2017) compendium, both the Advertisement of Healthcare Products 
Act (Heilmittelwerbegesetz) (HWG) and industry guidelines prohibit the offering of gifts 
except they are inexpensive and relevant to the practice of human medicine, and following 
FSA guidelines gifts are considered as "inexpensive" if their purchase price is up to EUR5. 
Restrictions on drug samples 
Also, all six European countries have set restrictions on free drug samples offered to 
physicians. In the UK and France, no more than four drug samples per particular medicine 
can be given to physicians, during the course of one year. In Portugal, the maximum number 
of samples for a specific medicine is twelve per year, per doctor, but only in the first two 
years after the commercialization of the medicine (Deliberation nr. 44/CD/2008, of 7
th
 
February). In Italy, physicians can receive up to eight samples of a drug, in the first 18 
months after the first marketing of a product, at a maximum of two samples per visit. In 
Spain, physicians can be given a maximum of 10 samples of a product per year, per 
physician, but only during the first two years from the date of authorization. In Germany, the 
limit is two samples per year, per medicine, per doctor. 
Restrictions on DTCA, marketing expenditures, number of visits (detailing) and 
meetings, and PSR licensing / accreditation 
Direct-to-consumer advertising is forbidden in all six European countries selected for 
analysis. Based on the legislation and compendiums analysis, only two of the countries 
selected for analysis have implemented restrictions on PSRs visits to physicians. These are 
Portugal, under Order 8213-B/2013, 24
th
 June (which entered into force on August the 1
st
 
2013), and Spain, where limits can be imposed in some of the autonomous regions. In 
Portugal, limits on detailing were set for PSRs access to the NHS institutions and physicians 
(with a maximum of two PSRs per day in Hospital services, or three PSRs per day in other 
NHS settings; a maximum of eight visits per day per PSR; a maximum of six visits per year, 
per company to NHS, or eight visits, subject to special procedures and requests). In Spain, 
according to Baker Mckenzie (2016), some regions established a maximum number of visits 
per pharmaceutical manufacturer, per year, or established specific days and hours when PSRs 
visits are permitted. These restrictions are called detailing ceilings, as explained by Liu et al 




for a drug, which can be made to a physician, within a certain period of time. Baker Mckenzie 
(2016) also explicated that some regions in Spain demand that sales calls from PSRs must be 
made to a panel of doctors (collective calls). In the USA, some academic medical centers have 
implemented policies to limit the access of PSRs to doctors, with the goal of reducing the 
influence of detailing on prescription behavior. 
Larkin, Ang, Avorn & Kesselheim (2014) noted that some health institutions such as 
academic medical centers restrict detailing activities with the goal of reducing the impact of 
this promotion tool on physicians’ prescription behavior. They studied the impact of 
restriction of detailing activities in academic medical centers in the scope of antidepressants 
and antipsychotics in children, and found that, after the entry into force of the detailing 
restriction policies, on-label prescriptions of promoted drugs dropped by 34 percent; off-label 
prescriptions of promoted drugs dropped by 11 percent; on-label prescriptions of 
nonpromoted drugs rose by 14 percent; and off-label prescriptions of nonpromoted drugs rose 
by 35 percent. They concluded that PSRs «promoted drugs not approved for pediatric use 
and that policies that restrict detailing by those representatives reduced such off-label 
prescribing» (p. 1014). 
A recent study conducted by Larkin et al (2017) analyzed the impact of these restrictions 
using a difference in difference multivariate regression model, to compare changes before and 
after the entry into force of the detailing restriction policy, in five states (California, Illinois, 
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and New York), using an intervention group (composed of 
physicians who were affected by the detailing restrictions), and a matched control group 
(composed of physicians not impacted by a detailing restriction policy). Analyzing data from 
2006 to 2012, Larkin et al (2017) found that detailing restriction policies had a significant 
impact on physician prescription behavior in six of the eight drug classes of the drug classes 
studied. They found that, on average, there was a 1,67 percentage points drop in the market 
share of the detailed drugs, and a 0,84 percentage points increase in the market share of non-
detailed drugs. They also found that these changes were observed in eight of the 11 academic 
medical centers whose data was used in the research. Larkin et al (2017) concluded that the 
«implementation of policies at AMCs that restricted pharmaceutical detailing between 2006 
and 2012 was associated with modest but significant reductions in prescribing of detailed 
drugs across 6 of 8 major drug classes» (p. 1785). 
Another recent research was developed by Liu, Liu & Chintagunta (2017), using simulated 




Contrary to what policy makers intend when they set detailing restrictions to reduce 
pharmaceutical expenditures and encourage generics prescriptions in opposition to more 
expensive drugs under patent, they found that a detailing ceiling in the scope of combination 
therapies using generics benefiting from spillover effects from the focal (promoted drug) may 
have unplanned effects, by reducing the number of generics prescriptions.  
Liu et al (2016)’s counterfactual simulations on the effect of several detailing ceilings 
suggested that a detailing ceiling may impact competing brands’ detailing elasticities 
differently, moderating them. By other words, a detailing restriction policy could attenuate the 
positive effect of the detailing impact on prescription behavior for the drug with the highest 
detailing intensity, and the opposite for the drugs with lower detailing intensities, as 
illustrated in figure 6.4 below. 
 
Figure 6.4 – Expected impact of a detailing ceiling on detailing flow elasticity 
Source: own elaboration based on Liu et al (2016) 
Liu et al (2016) estimated that, under a detailing restriction policy, detailing leaders will 
suffer the highest reduction in share of voice and market share, and drug brands with lower 
detailing frequency will increase their share of voice and market share. 
Limits on the number of meetings organized were not identified considering the selected 
country perimeter. Limits on the global marketing / promotion efforts have been implemented 
in the UK and in Spain, as noted by Stremersch & Lemmens (2009). In the UK, marketing 
investments cannot be higher than a percentage of profits (as a marketing allowance), and in 
Spain, promotion investments cannot be higher than a percentage of sales. Several countries 




Association of Pharmaceutical Sales Representatives (NAPSR) created a Certified National 
Sales Representative (CNSR) certification, which can be given in partnership with some 
colleges and universities. This certification, despite not being compulsory yet, may become 
rapidly a condition to access the PSR profession (Alkhateeb et al, 2011). In Spain, as 
underlined by Thomson Reuters Practical Law (2017) in their compendium of legislation on 
marketing of prescription drugs, PSRs must receive adequate training and sufficient scientific 
knowledge. In the UK, PSRs must receive full training so that they can promote medical 
products to prescribers. In Italy, a scientific service from each marketing authorization holder 
must verify that their PSRs have received adequate training and perform according to the 
regulations. In Portugal, article 156 from decree-law 176/2006 (30
th
 August) foresees that 
pharmaceutical manufacturers must ensure that PSRs promoting medicines on their behalf 
have the appropriate qualifications and professional training necessary for the full 
performance of their duties, exercising their profession in full compliance with their 
obligations. PSRs accreditation is obtained when the marketing authorization holders register 
their PSRs in INFARMED. 
Combining the theoretical and regulation grounding, table 6.1 was developed highlighting its 
applicability in the selected perimeter of countries, whose goal is to analyze the extent to 
which each country has implemented restrictions in some or several promotion practices, to 




Table 6.1 – Restriction on promotion activities in a selected group of countries 
 
Source: own elaboration 
DTCA prohibition
Limits on global 
marketing / promotion 
efforts
Limits on the number of 
visits (detailing)
Limits on number of 
meetings organized
Limits on number of 
samples provided
Prohibition of gifts non-
relevant to the practice 
of medicine (of 
unreasonable value)
Compulsory licencing / 
obligation of accreditation / 
specific training of 
pharmaceutical sales reps1
                                Theoretical grounding
                                               of restriction
                                                  instrument
 Regulation grounding





(Brotzman & Mark, 1992; 
Brotzman & Mark, 1993; 
Stremersch & Lemmens, 
2009; Stremersch & Van 
Dyck, 2009; Liu, Gupta, 
Venkarataman & Liu, 2016; 
Larkin et al, 2017)
(Stremersch & 
Lemmens, 2009)
(Brennan et al, 2006; 
Stremersch & 
Lemmens, 2009)
(Brennan et al, 2006; 
Grande, 2009)
(Grande, 2009)




 April 2016 | Community 
Code of Medicinal products of human use | 
Farmindustria Ethics Code
Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes
Germany
Advertisement of Healthcare Products Act | Act 
Against Unfair Competition | Medicinal Products Act
Yes No No No Yes Yes N/A
Portugal
Legal Regime of Medicines for Human Use 
(Decree Law 176/2006, 30
th
 August | Order 
8213–B/2013
Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Spain
Law on Guarantees and Rational Use of Medicines 
and Medical Devices (Medicines Law) | Royal 
Decree 1416/1994
Yes Yes Yes4 No Yes Yes Yes
UK
Human Medicines Regulations 2012 (Regulations 
294 to 300)
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
US
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) | Office of 
Prescription Drug Promotion (OPDP) | Advertising 
and Promotional Labelling Branch (APLB) | PhRMA 
code with voluntary limits on detailing 
No No Yes5 No No No Yes
Notes: 1) By company or manufacturer association; 2) exception of campaigns for vaccination against human infectious diseases, subject to prior authorization;




Prevalence of restriction policies 
Brotzman & Mark (1992) developed research to determine the prevalence of policies 
restricting or regulating the interactions of PSRs with family medicine doctors, trying to 
assess to which extent certain restrictions were present in residency programs. The restrictions 
they evaluated were restrictions or limitations on: contact during working hours, on clinic 
drug samples, on personal samples for residents, on displays, on distribution of literature, on 
gifts and outings, and on group presentations. They found that, globally, residency programs 
permitted most of the activities, with the exception of informal guidelines concerning 
interactions with PSRs, concluding that the sample evidenced substantial variation regarding 
regulation of PSRs and doctors’ interactions. 
One year later, Brotzman & Mark (1993) studied the effect of regulatory policies regarding 
PSRs activities on residents’ attitudes. They found some very interesting results: residents 
working at healthcare institutions without restrictions on PSRs’ activities were four times 
more likely to view PSRs detailing activities as helpful, when compared to residents working 
at healthcare institutions where restrictions were into force. They also found that doctors from 
restricted programs declared a substantially lower number of contacts with PSRs, versus 
doctors from non-restricted programs, suggesting, as a possible explanation, that the absence 
of restrictions in some programs may be interpreted as a favorable disposition, from program 
directors, to PSRs activities. 
Brennan et al (2006) proposed a policy for Academic Medical Centers to eliminate conflicts 
of interest between physicians and the healthcare industry, by removing or modifying 
practices such as small gifts, drug samples, CME, funds for travel and accommodation, and 
consulting. Wazana (2000) had already questioned the lack of guidelines concerning resident 
and pharmaceutical industry representatives’ interactions or the efficacy of the existing 
guidelines. 
Disclosure of pharmaceutical manufacturers marketing interactions with physicians 
National legislations have been increasingly demanding pharmaceutical companies to disclose 
transfers of value to HCPs and HCOs. This has been seen in countries such as the USA with 
the Sunshine Act implementation in 2012, taking full effect in September 2013, as noted by 
Liu et al (2016). Pharmaceutical companies started reporting payments made to physicians, in 
a public database, as noted by Karas et al (2016), being 2014 the first full year where transfers 




implemented a similar program, in 2007, where the Australian Competition Tribunal placed 
disclosure requirements on Medicines Australia, the Australian pharmaceutical industry 
representative association. A Code of Conduct for industry–professional relationships was 
created, and details of every sponsored event, including the costs of any hospitality, were 
publicly posted on a website (Robertson, Moynihan, Walkom, Bero & Henry, 2009). 
In 2011, French Ministry of Health published its own Sunshine Act, Decree number 2013-
414, a law known as Bertrand Law, demanding disclosure of not only direct payments and 
grants, but also indirect payments (for instance, when a pharmaceutical company pays a hotel 
for the physicians’ accommodation). The French legislation goes also further by including 
additional eligible institutional recipients other than hospitals and teaching hospitals, such as 
Associations, Foundations, editors of prescription software, and also eligible individual 
recipients other than physicians, such as nurses, pharmacists, dentists, medical students and 
other). 
In Portugal, the Ministry of Health implemented new legislation in 2014 (Dispatch 
12284/2014, which defined the EUR60 threshold, précising Decree Law 176/2006 (30
th
 
August)’ concept of gift of insignificant value), demanding pharmaceutical companies to 
disclose transfers of value higher than EUR60 to healthcare professionals and healthcare 
organizations. The disclosure must be made using a specific INFARMED website called 
PLACOTRANS, with on-line available information for general public access. There seems to 
be nevertheless a delicate balance between the need for disclosure and transparency, and the 
need to guarantee recipients’ privacy. Vitry (2016) noted that Medicines Australia’s Code of 
Conduct includes an opt-out option, where healthcare professionals can choose not to have 
their name publicly reported in the disclosure of transfers of value such as advisory board 
fees, speaking fees, and other transfers of value. EFPIA code in Europe also includes an opt-
out option, where recipients must authorize the disclosure of transfers of value, or at a 
minimum must have the opportunity to opt-out of disclosures. 
Table 6.2 summarizes the codes and legislation backgrounds from seven countries, regarding 
disclosure of transfers of value to healthcare practitioners and organizations. It was built 
based on the International Comparative Legal Guides (ICLG, 2017), data compiled by Global 
Legal Group, an organization specialized in comparative legal analysis, and on previous 




Table 6.2 – Comparative analysis of codes and legal grounding on disclosure of transfers of 
value 
 
Source: own elaboration 
As highlighted by Liu et al (2016), the transparency requirements impelled «physician 
practices and hospitals to severely restrict pharmaceutical sales representatives’ direct 
access to their physicians» (p. 1). However, as noted by Loewenstein, Sah & Cain (2012), 
disclosure of conflicts of interests – both financial and non-financial -, despite positive and 
necessary, can lead physicians to provide biased advice to patients and is likely to increase 
pressure to take the physicians’ advice, despite a decrease in trust (due to patients’ fear of 
revealing lack of trust in the doctors). Loewenstein, Sah & Cain (2012) ended their article by 
suggesting policies to increase the effectiveness of the disclosure of physicians’ conflicts of 
interest. These include unconflicted second opinions (even covered by health insurers), and 
the creation of a unified internet-based universal online disclosure form. They ended by 
underlining that one of the greater limitations of disclosure is the moral licensing, which they 
define as «the rationalization that, with disclosure, the profession has dispensed with its 









Germany VFA (FSA Code)
Law on advertising in the field of 
healthcare
Portugal Apifarma Code
Dispatch 12284/2014 + Decree Law 






UK ABPI Code No specific legislation
USA  --- PhRMA Code Physician Payments Sunshine Act
Disclosure of transfers of value to health care practitioners (HCPs) and health care organizations (HCOs)
Industry Associations codes
National legislation / Procedures
Theoretical grounding (non-
exhaustive)
EFPIA Code (Karas, Bandari, Browning, 
Jacobs & Davies, 2016; Liu, 






Several scholars have been discussing the effectiveness of both self and government 
regulation in the scope of the pharmaceutical industry marketing initiatives. Grande (2009), in 
his discussion on self-regulation versus government intervention on pharmaceutical industry 
gifts and detailing to physicians, suggested that while the governmental regulation and actions 
are needed, the «medical profession needs to reclaim its independence from industry» (p. 82), 
and that «regulation alone can’t fully address the negative influences of marketing» (p. 82). 
Herxheimer & Collier (1990) noted that the Association of the British Pharmaceutical 
Industry (ABPI) developed its code of practice in order to auto regulate the promotion of 
prescription medicines. Their research concluded that the ABPI code did not reveal an 
obvious deterrent effect regarding non-compliant promotion activities. Herxheimer & Collier 
(1990) suggested that proper compulsory intervention from the health ministers would be 
necessary to regulate pharmaceutical manufacturers’ promotion activities. Despite the 
voluntary compliance of pharmaceutical manufacturer associations’ codes of conduct, 
research has demonstrated that some breaches might exist, when applying those codes. The 
main issue is that standards to observe by manufacturers are determined by the industry 
(Herxheimer & Collier, 1990), which might involve some tension between the commercial 
and ethical foundations of these codes and lead to weaknesses in their applications (Lexchin, 
1997).  
Norris, Herxheimer, Lexchin & Mansfield (2005) concluded, in their review on drug 
promotion by pharmaceutical companies, that there are effective and ineffective interventions 
to counter promotion activities. The effective initiatives are government regulation of 
promotion (more effective than industry self‐regulation), educating doctors about drug 
promotion (which influences attitudes and can improve skills), and publication of deceptive 
promotion. Ineffective initiatives are pharmaceutical industry self‐regulation, review by 
journal editors, guidelines/regulations for sales representatives or for advertisements, and 
government control of post‐marketing surveillance. Disclosure of marketing investments by 
manufacturers may not be as effective as tutelage compulsory bans in terms of prescription 
reduction, as noted by King & Bearman (2017). They also found that the uptake of new 
expensive medications was significantly lower in US states with government marketing 
regulation, when compared to states allowing unrestricted pharmaceutical marketing. Figure 






Figure 6.5 – Summary of main interventions to regulate pharmaceutical marketing 
Source: own elaboration 
Recognizing the scant literature on the impact of detailing restriction policies on prescription 
behavior, and given that manufacturers are increasingly facing difficulties in accessing 
physicians due to either government regulation, pharmaceutical manufacturers associations, 
or by physicians and their practices, Liu et al (2016) studied the effectiveness of several 
scenarios of simulated detailing restriction policies (detailing ceilings), to shed light on the 
implications for competing firms. They conducted research using data collected by a market 
research firm operating in the EUA, from a panel of physicians. Each physician reported the 
number of calls (visits received by PSRs) and the number of prescriptions for each drug 
included in the research perimeter (three drugs plus one non-drug treatment, in the statins 
class), and the time series included data from 24 months. Using a structural model, Liu et al 
(2016) simulated two different detailing restriction scenarios: one imposing a maximum of 
one visit per month, and one imposing a maximum of one visit per quarter. They reached very 
interesting conclusions: detailing restriction policies lead to reduced levels of detailing and 
expand prescription option that do not rely on detailing (in the case, detailing restriction 
policies would benefit the nondrug, non-detailed treatment-only option); with ceiling policies, 
the drug with the largest detailing stock effect and the highest detailing frequency suffer the 
most (market share and profit decreases), that is, firms that rely more on detailing would lose 
proportionally more market share; the stricter the detailing ceiling, the more the benefits to 




detailing competition between the firms, and increase their profits (since the reduction in 
market share would be more than compensated by a lower burden of PSRs costs); competitors 
raise their detailing levels and do not imitate individual firms in terms of limiting their own 
detailing levels, since the latter would lose profits, and the former would enjoy a profit gain, 
meaning that, to be effective, the detailing restriction policy must be imposed to all firms 
competing in the market.  
Larkin, Ang, Avorn & Kesselheim (2014) studied the impact of restriction of detailing 
activities in academic medical centers in the scope of antidepressants and antipsychotics in 
children, and found that, after the detailing restrictions, on-label prescriptions of promoted 
drugs dropped by 34 percentand on-label prescriptions of nonpromoted drugs rose by 14 
percent. Three years later, Larkin et al (2017), studied the effect of detailing restriction 
policies on physician prescription behavior on 11 academic medical centers (before and after 
the entry into force of detailing restriction), and reached conclusions that are similar to the 
ones obtained by Liu et al (2016): detailing restriction policies had a significant impact on 
physician prescription behavior in six of the eight drug classes of the drug classes studied, 
where on average there was a 1,67 percentage points drop in the market share of the detailed 
drugs, and a 0,84 percentage points increase in the market share of non-detailed drugs. To the 
best of our knowledge, these two articles are the first using real data on the effect of detailing 
restriction policies, and not counterfactual simulations. Figure 6.6 below demonstrates the 
effects of the detailing restrictions on drugs market share. The reduction in market share of 
detailed drugs is stronger in the case of drugs unaffected by generic entry. 
  
Figure 6.6 – Larkin et al (2017) mean market share of detailed drugs 





6.6.Chapter synthesis of main findings 
This chapter covered regulation on pharmaceutical manufacturers’ marketing practices 
(mainly promotion) on physicians and health care organizations. It started by addressing self-
regulation, exploring pharmaceutical manufacturers, pharmaceutical manufacturers 
associations, physician chambers, and healthcare organizations initiatives to auto-regulate the 
interactions between manufacturers and physicians. The literature has shown, however, that 
these types of initiatives have little to no effect as an instrument to regulate pharmaceutical 
promotion. 
The chapter also covered government regulation of pharmaceutical marketing, exploring 
manufacturer price regulation, regulation on physician prescription budgets, patient payment 
policies, regulation of direct-to-consumer advertising, and most importantly to the scope of 
this thesis, regulation of marketing efforts to physicians. Previous literature has shown that 
compulsory restrictions on pharmaceutical marketing are much more effective than self-
imposed ones, as interventions to counter promotion activities. Table 6.3 summarizes the 




Table 6.3 – Summary of the effects of government regulation of pharmaceutical marketing 
 
Source: own elaboration 
Scope Brief description Effect
Theoretical grounding 
of the effect




Government has direct control of the 
manufacturer drug price
Price control can cause 
launch delays | Drug sales 
tend to be higher in 
countries with manufacturer 
price control
(Danzon, Wang & Wang, 2005; Kyle, 2007; 




Government limits the total number of 
prescriptions a physician can write
Negative effect on drug 
sales (more effective for 
mature drugs than for new 
drugs)
(Granlund, Rudholmand & Wikstrom, 2006; 
Andersson, Petzold, Allebeck & Carlsten, 




Patients are requested to provide some form 
of co-payment for prescription drugs
Negative effect on drug 
sales




Government prohibition of direct-to-consumer 
advertising (set by all countries except USA 
and New Zealand)
Negative effect on new drug 
sales
(Stremersch & Lemmens, 2009)
Regulation on 
marketing efforts to 
physicians
Government restriction on the number of 
detailing visits a manufacturer can make, the 
number of meetings a manufacturer can 
organize, or the number of samples a 
manufacturer can dispense to physicians
Negative effect on drug 
sales (altough non-
significant for the countries 
analyzed)
(Brotzman & Mark, 1992; Brotzman & Mark, 
1993; Wazana, 2000; Brennan et al, 2006; 
Liu, Gupta, Venkataraman & Liu, 2016; 
Karas, Bandari, Browning, Jacobs & Davies, 






















Regulation of marketing efforts to physicians can take form of restrictions on gifts, on drug 
samples, on DTCA, on marketing expenditures, on the number of visits and meetings, and on 
PSR licensing / accreditation. The literature and legislation analysis of seven countries 
allowed to recognize that, despite some differences, the six European countries selected 
evidence reasonably similar restrictions regarding gifts and drug samples (the extent of which 
do however vary a little). The UK and Spain imposed limits on marketing / promotion 
expenditures as a percentage of the profits (in the first) or of the sales (in the second). Among 
these six European countries, Portugal seems to be the only with national legislation that 
limits PSRs’ access to physicians and institutions of the NHS. Spain does appear to have 
some restrictions in this scope, but only in some regions. 
The chapter ended by exploring very recent research on pharmaceutical promotion restrictions 
– specifically on detailing restrictions, developed by Liu et al (2016) with counterfactual 
simulations, after collecting data from a panel of physicians practicing in the USA 
(prescription and detailing data). Based on their simulations where detailing ceilings were 
tested, they obtained very interesting findings, here summarized below in table 6.4. 
Table 6.4 – Theorized effects of detailing restriction policies 
 
Source: own elaboration 
Theorized effects Theoretical grounding
Detailing restriction policies leads to reduced levels of detailing and expands 
prescription option that do not rely on detailing
(Larkin, Ang, Avorn & 
Kesselheim, 2014; Liu, Gupta, 
Venkataraman & Liu, 2016; 
Larkin et al, 2017)
With ceiling policies, the drug with the largest detailing stock effect and the 
highest detailing frequency suffers the most (market share and profit 
decreases)
(Liu, Gupta, Venkataraman & 
Liu, 2016)
The stricter the ceiling, the more the benefits to firms with weaker detailing 
effects | Detailing ceilings soften detailing competition
Competitors raise their detailing levels and do not imitate individual firms in 
terms of limiting its own detailing levels. The later loses profits and the 
former enjoy a profit gain
Implementation of policies at academic medical centers that restricted 
pharmaceutical detailing may be associated with modest but significant 
reductions in prescribing of detailed drugs
(Larkin, Ang, Avorn & 
Kesselheim, 2014; Larkin et 
al, 2017)
Detailing ceilings under combination therapies using generics can potentially 
hurt generics
Liu, Liu & Chintagunta (2017)
















7. Conceptual model  
In the scope of the current thesis, we developed a literature review on the lifesciences 
industry, pharmaceutlcal marketing, and regulation and policy of pharmaceutical marketing. 
The literature was then organized in order to address the effect of pharmaceutical industry 
promotion initiatives on physicians’ prescription behavior, moderated by policy regulation on 
pharmaceutical promotion initiatives (specifically detailing). This was performed to identify 
the conceptual framework (Creswell, 2014) of the proposed research. 
The literature review performed allowed the understanding that detailing – a form of personal 
selling (Fischer & Albers, 2010) and a form of relational marketing (Gronroos, 1994) - 
involves direct visits from PSRs to individual doctors, during which PSRs provide 
information about their company's drugs, free samples, scientific literature, trying to combat 
the efforts of PSRs from competing companies (Rao & Yamada, 1988; Steinman, Harper, 
Chren, Landefeld & Bero, 2007). It is not only the most used promotion tool (Yi, 
Anandalingamb & Sorrell, 2003; Gagnon & Lexchin, 2008; Datta & Dave, 2016), but also the 
tool with a higher effect on physicians’ prescribing behavior (Pitt & Nel, 1988; Berndt, Bui, 
Reiley & Urban, 1995; Narayanan et al, 2003; Narayanan, Desiraju & Chintagunta, 2004; 
Narayanan, Manchanda & Chintagunta, 2005; Kalyanaram, 2008; Kalyanaram, 2009; Dave & 
Saffer, 2012).  
Evidence from the theory suggests that detailing has a significant and positive effect on 
prescription behavior translated into an increase in the number of prescriptions of the 
promoted prescription drug (Stremersch & Van Dyck, 2009; Stremersch & Lemmens, 2009), 
in a causal relation. Despite the fact that several previous research articles have pointed to 
different elasticities (or effect magnitudes) of detailing (Kremer et al, 2008; Stremersch & 
Van Dyck, 2009), the great majority of articles (indluding reviews made by Kremer et al, 
2008, and by Spurling et al, 2010) point to a positive effect, with an average elasticity of 
0,326. This average was calculated by Kremer et al (2008) in their review, using 252 detailing 
elasticities.  
The theory also suggests that policy measures have been implemented by Governments to 
regulate pharmaceutical manufactuers’ marketing initiatives directed at physicians, which 
include regulation of marketing efforts to physicians (Stremersch & Lemmens, 2009; 
Stremersch & Van Dyck, 2009). Despite the scant literature on this specific field, existing 




can make can lead to a negative effect on the sales of the promoted drugs (Stremersch & 
Lemmens, 2009).  
This impact may be differentiated among drugs brands, as noted by Liu et al (2016). They 
estimated that, with a detailing ceiling, the drug with the largest detailing frequency suffers 
the most in terms of market share and profit decreases, while less detailed brand drugs appear 
to gain market share and profits. Larkin et al (2014) and Larkin et al (2017) also found that 
the detailed drugs tend to lose market share under a detailing restriction policy, and non-
detailed drugs tend to increase their market share under the detailing restriction policy.  
These findings suggest that a detailing ceiling may impact detailing elasticities differently 
among competing drug brands. The regulation of detailing regulation (in the form of a 
detailing ceiling) therefore may act as a moderating variable to the effect of detailing on 
physician prescription behavior. 
Consequently, this theoretical pavement allowed the identification of the main variables 
involved, forming a research hypothesis, which specifies the relationship among variables in 
terms of direction (Creswell, 2014).  
The model includes three sets of variables: the dependent variable is the number of drug 
prescriptions in DDDs (number of prescriptions written by physicians for the promoted drug, 
within a certain period of time, representing the promoted drug sales, to evaluate physicians’ 
prescription behavior, and measured as Ln Drug sales in DDD), the independent variable is 
the detailing intensity (measured as the number of calls (as an office visit with physician 
contact), in which the promoted drug is detailed, within a certain period of time, and 
measured as Ln Detailing flow), and the moderating variable is the policy measure consisting 
of the 2013 detailing ceiling (limitation placed on the number of detailing visits for a drug, 
that can be made to NHS infrastructure, within a certain period of time).  
A visual representation of the conceptual model is presented above, in figure 7.1, adapted 





Figure 7.1 – Conceptual model 
Source: adapted from Liu et al (2016) 
 
We will now present additional detail to substantiate this concept model, by presenting the 
descriptive tables of the conceptual model. We start with table 7.1, which evidences the 
components of the conceptual model. 
Table 7.1 – Components of the conceptual model 
 











detailing f low  
elasticities)
Number of calls (measured as an
office visit with physician contact), 
in which
the promoted drug is detailed, 
within a certain period of time
(Iizuka, 2004; 
Manchanda, Rossi & 
Chintagunta, 2004; Liu, 







drug sales, sell-in, in 
DDDs)
Sell-in sales (in DDDs) of 
prescription drugs written by 
physicians for the promoted drug, 
within a certain period of time
(Manchanda, Rossi & 
Chintagunta, 2004; Liu, 
Gupta, Venkataraman & 
Liu, 2016)
Drug sales sell-in




(also know  as 
detailing ceiling)
Limitation placed on the number 
of detailing visits for a drug, that 
can be made to a physician, 
within a certain period of time
(Liu, Gupta, 
Venkataraman & Liu, 
2016)
Existence of a 
detailing ceiling 
(Yes / No)
(Liu, Gupta, Venkataraman & Liu, 
2016)
(Gönül, Carter, Petrova & 
Srinivasan, 2001; Narayanan, 
Manchanda & Chintagunta, 2003; 
Manchanda & Chintagunta, 2004; 
Mizik & Jacobson, 2004; 
Manchanda, Rossi & Chintagunta, 
2004; Narayanan, Manchanda & 
Chintagunta, 2005; Kalyanaram; 
2009; Montoya, Netzer & Jedidi, 
2010; Datta & Dave, 2016; Liu, 




These concepts’ definitions were based on a compilation of previous research addressing 
these concepts, conducted by Iizuka (2004), Manchanda, Rossi & Chintagunta (2004), and 
Liu et al (2016). 
Table 7.2, shown below, evidences the relations between the components of the conceptual 
model. 
Table 7.2 – Relations between the components of the conceptual model 
 
Source: own elaboration 
Liu et al (2016) studied the effectiveness of several scenarios of simulated detailing restriction 
policies, to shed light on the implications for competing firms. They used a dynamic structural 
model of oligopoly competition in detailing, complemented with counterfactual simulations 
on the effect of several detailing ceilings, finding that detailing restriction policies lead to 
reduced levels of detailing and expand prescription option that do not rely on detailing; that 
with detailing ceiling policies, the drug with the largest detailing stock effect and the highest 
detailing frequency suffers the most (market share and profit decreases); that the stricter the 













Detailing has a 
positive effect on 
the sales of the 
promoted drug
(Gönül, Carter, Petrova & Srinivasan, 
2001; Narayanan, Manchanda & 
Chintagunta, 2003; Manchanda & 
Chintagunta, 2004; Mizik & 
Jacobson, 2004; Manchanda, Rossi 
& Chintagunta, 2004; Narayanan, 
Manchanda & Chintagunta, 2005; 
Kremer, Bijmolt, Leeflang & 
Wieringa, 2008; Kalyanaram; 2009; 
Stremersch & Van Dyck, 2009; 
Stremersch & Lemmens, 2009; 
Montoya, Netzer & Jedidi, 2010; 
Datta & Dave, 2016; Liu, Gupta, 
Venkataraman & Liu, 2016)
Quantitative analysis using 
time-series of drug sales and 
detailing intensity data
Average detailing elasticity = 0.326








Entry into force of 
a detailing ceiling 
has a differentiated 
effect on drugs 
sales, depending 
on their previous 
detailing intensity
Liu, Gupta, Venkataraman & Liu 
(2016)
Quantitative analysis using 
time-series of drug 
prescriptions and detailing 
intensity data. Dynamic 
structural model of oligopoly 
competition in detailing + 
Counterfactual simulations on 
the effect of several detailing 
ceilings
- With ceiling policies, the drug with the 
largest detailing intensity suffers the 
most in terms of market share, whereas 
competing drugs with lower detailing 
intensity may gain market share
- Detailing ceilings lead to reduced levels 
of detailing, and expand prescription 




These findings suggest that a detailing ceiling may impact drug brands detailing elasticities 
diffently. By other words, the ceiling effects may therefore moderate the detailing elasticities 
distincltly. Their research – using counterfactual simulations, and not actual data from 
regulation of detailing intensity - suggests that a detailing restriction policy may attenuate the 
positive effect of the detailing impact on prescription behavior for the drug with the highest 
detailing intensity, and the opposite for the drugs with lower detailing intensities, as 
illustrated in figure 7.2. 
 
Figure 7.2 – Expected impact of a detailing ceiling on detailing elasticity 













8. Health care in Portugal 
8.1.Content and logic of the chapter 
This chapter presents an overview of health care in Portugal. It starts with basic concepts, 
then presents base notes on health economics in Portugal, approaching the health care 
infrastructure and health care professionals. Following, the chapter addresses the 
pharmaceutical market in Portugal, including the pharmaceutical distribution channels, 
market value, medicines and medicines prices, NHS prescriptions and reimbursments, and 
generics. It then approaches covers the Portuguuse pharmaceutical legislative background, 
especially from the years 2000 to 2017, not only underlining legislative initiatives in the 
scope of prices, reimbursements, and medicines, but also on regulation of PSRs’ access to 
physicians and institutions in the scope of the NHS (detailing ceiling). The chapter then 
finalizes with a synthesis of the main findings. 
This chapter will be mostly a summary of Appendix 2 - Background of economics of health in 
Portugal, Appendix 3 - The pharmaceutical market in Portugal, and Appendix 4 - Portuguese 
pharmaceutical legislative framework overview – 2000 to 2017. Therefore, for a deeper 
analysis of the topics covered in this chapter, please consult these appendices. 
8.2.Concepts 
This topic will cover basic concepts in the Portuguese health care, with the goal of setting the 
pavement for the understanding of the specificities of the country in analysis. 
Primary, secondary and tertiary care 
From a type of care or specialization perspective, there is a distinction between primary, 
secondary and tertiary care. Primary care represents the first element of the health care 
process, as a first point of contact of a patient with the health care system. Patients who resort 
to these healthcare institutions typically are seen by general practitioners of family medicine 
physicians, seeking treatment for pathologies such as diabetes, respiratory problems (asthma 
and COPD), back pain, diabetes, and other. Santana & Costa (2008) referred the definition of 
primary care as «essential health care based on practical, scientifically sound and socially 
acceptable methods and technologies made universally accessible to individuals and families 
in the community through their full participation and at a cost that the community and the 
country can maintain at each stage development, in the spirit of self-confidence and self-
determination. They represent the first level of contact between individuals, the family and the 




possible to the places where people live and work and are the first element in a continuous 
process health care» (p. 32). 
Secondary care represents the health care services delivered by specialists such as internal 
medicine specialists, urologists, or cardiologists, who typically do not have first contact with 
patients (patients are often referred from the primary to the secondary care). Santana & Costa 
(2008) highlighted that secondary care represents a set of prevention, diagnostic and treatment 
actions, performed in the acute phase of illness, whose episodes need for specialized 
interventions, demanding the use of resources with differentiated technology, and are 
typically provided in hospital units and usually result in short-term episodes. The Portuguese 
health regulation entity (ERS, 2011) also classified secondary care as hospital care. 
Tertiary care represents the advanced or specialized medical treatment, treating diseases such 
as cancer, or providing health services such as cardiac or neurosurgery. ERS (2011) defined 
tertiary health care – also known as integrated continuous care – as «a set of sequential health 
and / or social support interventions, resulting from a joint evaluation, centered on the global 
recovery understood as the active and continuous therapeutic and social support process that 
aims to promote autonomy by improving the functionality of the person in a situation of 
dependency, through their rehabilitation, rehabilitation and family and social reintegration». 
ERS (2011) defines a fourth type of health care, known as home care, defined as «the set of 
activities for prevention, promotion, restoration or maintenance of health, as well as for 
diagnosis, treatment / therapy and rehabilitation, through a set of resources intended to 
provide health care to sick or in their homes, homes or institutions». Typically patients are 
referred from primary and secondary care to the tertiary care. 
Ambulatory and hospital market 
The medicines health market can also be classified as ambulatory and hospital. Barros (2014) 
noted that the main distinction between these two classifications resides in the way the 
demand is determined. While in the hospital market the patient does not have any 
participation in the decision making process of medicine choice and there is no patient 
financial reimbursement of the medicine cost, in the ambulatory market the patient may 
participate in the choice and may have to pay for part of the medicine retail selling price. 
Barros (2014) also noted that in the hospital market there is a stronger tradition of using 
generic medicines. The distinction between hospital and ambulatory can also be made from an 




ambulatory care includes all other health infrastructures such as health care centers usually 
located near residential areas, consisting of the market of medicines that are sold in 
community pharmacies and other authorized selling infrastructures. The ambulatory health 
infrastructure network is aimed at preventing and treating patient health issues with a higher 
proximity to the needed populations, minimizing the necessity for hospital admission. 
Infarmed (2014) defined, in its glossary, ambulatory market as the market consisting of 
medicines dispensed to outpatients (that is, patients that are not hospitalized), whose 
perimeter is given by the sum of prescription plus non-prescription medicines prescribed 
outside a hospital setting. 
 
Inpatients and outpatients 
From a patient type perspective, there are inpatients and outpatients. Inpatients are patients 
who are admitted at a health care infrastructure and stay there for more than 24 hours, 
occupying a bed. Conversely, outpatients are patients with health issues which do not require 
hospitalization. Outpatients can be admitted at a hospital and be subject of several health 
exams (X-rays, blood analysis, medical consultations), but are medically released in the same 
day. Andrade, Lima, Pereira, Fornara & Bonaiuto (2013) underlined the main differences 
between in and outpatients: while «outpatients are theoretically in a healthier condition, are 
less dependent on medical and nursing care, spend much less time in the health care setting, 
and have less contact with doctors, nurses and administrative staff than do inpatients», 
inpatients «stay for at least one night in the hospital, are supposedly in a more delicate 
condition, and are more dependent on nursing care» (p. 124). 
Prescription and non-prescription drugs 
As covered before in the medical prescription topic, the United States Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) classifies drugs as prescription and non-prescription (or over-the-
counter, or OTC), as underlined by Gabay (2013). Gabay (2013) also noted that a prescription 
medication, according to the FDA, must be «dispensed under a valid prescription if, because 
of its toxicity or other potentiality for harmful effect, or the method of its use, or the collateral 
measures necessary to its use, it is not safe for use except under the supervision of a 
practitioner licensed by law to administer such drug» (p. 198). On the opposite, non-
prescription, or OTC drugs, can be purchased directly at a retail pharmacy, where the term 




«medicine that you can buy without a prescription. They are safe and effective when you 
follow the directions on the label and as directed by your health care professional» (FDA, 
2017a). 
In the Portuguese market, only physicians are legally entitled to write a prescription for 
prescription drugs. OTC medicines can be purchased without a prescription (usually at 
pharmacies, para-pharmacies or other authorized OTC points of sale). Examples of OTCs 
include some vitamin supplements, some dermatological lotions and shampoos, some throat 
lozenges, and other products not demanding a prescription. In Portugal, there are however 
some specificities regarding OTC medicines. In 2013, a subcategory of OTC was introduced, 
namely OTC medicines dispensed exclusively in pharmacies (MNSRM-EF), by decree-law 
128/2013 (5
th
 September), as noted by Martins, Gonçalves, Marcelo, Vilão & Silva (2016). 
Examples of this subcategory include acetylsalicylic acid (to treat fever and / or mild to 
moderate pain in adults and adolescents) and picetoprofen (for cutaneous treatment of mild to 
moderate pain and inflammation of musculo-skeletal, rheumatic or post-traumatic problems), 
as stated in Infarmed website as of November 2017. Another specificity sets that there are 
some OTC medicines that require a prescription from a physician. 
Illustrative example of a Portuguese patient 
To understand the health care infrastructure and patient treatment process in the Portuguese 
health care system, an illustrative patient example will now be presented. A patient with a 
chest discomfort may seek medical advice with his family doctor at the local health center. 
She has a medical consultation and her doctor refers her to a cardiologist in the regional 
hospital, whom she visits a week later, and due to the severity of her pathology gets admitted 
and stays overnight for heart exams and observation. This patient was a primary care 
outpatient in the ambulatory network infrastructure, and later a secondary care inpatient in the 
hospital network infrastructure. This patient could then receive high blood pressure drugs 
prescription, and for instance a non-prescription natural supplement to reduce her stress levels 
(OTC product). 
8.3.Bases on health economics in Portugal 
In this sub-chapter, we will present some metrics about Health Economics indicators in 




8.3.1. Brief country overview 
According to Pordata (2017), Portugal had, in 2015, a resident population of 10,36 million, 
almost two thirds of which (65%) concentrated in the age group between 15 and 64 years old, 
proportion that has been relatively stable since 1981. The extremes of the age pyramid reveal, 
however, a switch in terms of proportion: while in 1981 there were 2,2 citizens with 15 or less 
years of age for each citizen with 65 or older, in 2015 this proportion was 0,7 (or 143,9 elders 
per 100 young people). 
The number of births per year has been steadily declining since the eighties, from 213.895 in 
1981 to 85.500 in 2015 (Pordata, 2017). In 2011 and 2015 Statistics Portugal data, the number 
of deaths were higher than the number of births, representing a negative natural population 
growth. 
Gross domestic product in 2016 reached €184.931,1 million, representing an estimated real 
growth of 1,4% from 2015 (Pordata, 2017). The economy has suffered, since 2005, two main 
negative impacts: the first one was the 2009 international crisis, provoking a decline of 3% in 
the GDP in that year; the second was the impact of budget austerity measures imposed by the 
Troika composed by the International Monetary Fund, European Commission and the Central 
European Bank, after Portugal’s request for budget assistance in April 2011. The austerity 
resulted in three consecutive years with negative GDP growth rates, reaching – 1,8% in 2011, 
-4,0% in 2012 and -1,1% in 2013. In 2014 the GDP started to recover, but modestly (+0,9%), 
and in 2015 and 2016 the growth rate was estimated at 1,6% and 1,4%, respectively (Pordata, 
2017).The average growth rate from 2005 to 2016 reached 0,1%, substantially lower than the 
1,0% verified in Spain, 3,6% in Ireland, 1,1% in the EU28, and 0,9% in the EU19 Euro zone. 
The current health expenditure in Portugal has been stable in the €15.000 million range, from 
2012 to 2015 (Pordata, 2017). Portugal has evidenced a relatively stable proportion of the 
GDP allocated to health expenditures, in the 8,9% (2015 estimate) to 9,9% (year 2009) range. 
Comparing Portugal against the southern European countries, the most similar 2015 
percentages are evidenced by Spain and Italy. Greece evidences a lower percentage (Troika 
austerity may have been more severe than in Portugal) and France evidences a higher 
proportion (in line with Germany’s). Portugal evidences a proportion of GDP allocated to 
health marginally lower than Ireland (another country which requested budget assistance to 
Troika, in 2010). Relatively to the EU28, Portugal evidences one percentage point less in this 




Public administrations have historically been the main contributor to the current health 
expenditures in Portugal, reaching a proportion of almost two thirds in 2015 (Pordata, 2017). 
Private financing has been growing its importance, reaching a 34% weight in 2015. Insurance 
societies contribution has been growing (from 1,5% in 2000 to 3,7% in 2015), while families’ 
contributions (or out-of-pocket costs, as the family health costs that are not reimbursed by 
public or private systems or insurance) have been relatively steady in the 27% range from 
2013 to 2015. 
Pharmaceutical spending per capita (on prescription medicines and self-medication (often 
referred to as OTC products)) evidenced a peak of $522 in 2009, in Portugal, then decreasing 
to $399 in 2014 (a reduction of 23,6%). Greece, another country that has requested budget 
assistance to Troika, also revealed a similar pattern, with a peak of $888 per capita, reaching 
2014 with a reduction of 29,1%) (OECD, 2015a). 
Analyzing Portugal related data in terms of evolution from 2010 to 2014 (Infarmed, 2015), it 
is evident a substantial reduction of drug consumption per capita in terms of retail price, 
especially regarding NHS expenditure (reduction of 39,4%). Despite the reduction in the 
average reimbursement in the NHS (from 69,9% to 62,5%), the average yearly cost borne by 
patients (out-of-pocket) also suffered an important reduction (-15,7%). 
In terms of health care expenditures allocation by type of provider, hospitals and ambulatory 
represent the highest weights. These two types of providers have been exhibiting a small, but 
evident increase in their intensity on the total current health expenditures (PORDATA, 2017). 
8.3.2. Health care infrastructure 
Portuguese National Health System 
The Portuguese National Health System (NHS), created in the year of 1979, is a structure 
through which the Portuguese State assures the right to health (promotion, prevention and 
surveillance) to all citizens of Portugal. In terms of infrastructure, the NHS has remained 
relatively stable since the early 2010’s, especially regarding the number of General Hospitals 
(85 in 2015, according to PORDATA (2017)). 
Private sector 
The number of private hospitals has been increasing in the last decade, reaching 111 units in 
2015, representing a growth of 22% from 2005 (INE, 2017). In 2015 there were four hospitals 




The number of community pharmacies has been stable since the year 2010, on the 2.880 to 
2.900 interval (INE, 2017). The reduction seen from 2012 to 2015 may be related to the 
economic crisis Portugal suffered, and to the regulatory changes implemented with respect to 
margins of the distribution channel operators (including pharmacies). The Portuguese 
National Association of Pharmacies (ANF) has issued a press release in August 2016, stating 
that there were 549 pharmacies in situation of attachment of assets or insolvency, representing 
a growth of 132% from December 2012 to July 2016. During this period, the insolvency 
numbers increased from 61 to 196 pharmacies, and the attachment of assets situations 
increased from 180 to 363 (ANF, 2016). 
8.3.3. Health care professionals 
According to Decree-Law 20/2013, number 3, point aaa, 14
th
 of February, a health 
professional is a person legally entitled to prescribe, dispense or administer medicines, 
namely physicians, dentists, veterinary doctors, odontologists, pharmacists or nurses. 
Physicians are the only professional category which is given the responsibility to prescribe 
medicines in Portugal (Decree-Law 20/2013, number 3, point fff, 14
th
 of February). Dentists 
and odontologists are also given to right to prescribe certain medicines. Pharmacists are given 
the responsibility to dispense medicines prescribed by physicians, and to dispense non-
prescription medicines. Nurses are given the responsibility to administer the medicines, 
especially vaccines (however, pharmacists can also legally administer vaccines, since 2008). 
The number of physicians in 2015 (48.487) was 34,2% higher than in 2005 (36.138), 
according to INE (2017). This grow has not been however similar between specialists 
(+28,4%, from 23.307 to 29.919) and non-specialists (+44,7%, from 13.220 to 18.568). In the 
same period, the number of nurses increased 40,6% (from 48.155 to 67.730) and the number 
of pharmacists increased 27,6% (from 9.494 to 12.119). Among the more than 70 specialties 
and subspecialties, the three most representative in terms of weight are General Practice, 
Internal Medicine and Pediatrics (INE, 2017). In terms of physician density per 100.000 
inhabitants, Portugal ranks second on the list with 443 physicians per 100.000 inhabitants, 
when considering the five biggest countries, and the countries assisted by Troika in the recent 
past (Portugal, Greece and Ireland) (OECD, 2016b). 
8.4.The pharmaceutical market in Portugal 
In this sub-chapter, we will summarize the organization and characterization of the 




8.4.1. Pharmaceutical distribution channels 
The distribution channels of the pharmaceutical industry in Portugal are shown below, in 
figure 8.1: 
 
Figure 8.1 - Pharmaceutical industry distribution channel in Portugal 
Source: own elaboration 
In terms of upstream distribution channel, medicines are either provided by pharmaceutical 
companies (which can produce the medicines in Portugal or in other country) or by importers 
of medicines. Wholesalers (called “Armazenistas”) by the medicines the pharmaceutical 
companies, or from importers. Considering the National Health System (NHS) institutions, 
medicines are bought by a buying center called SPMS (in Portuguese, “Serviços Partilhados 
do Ministério da Saúde”, or Shared services of the Ministry of Health). This buying center 
will negotiate tenders with wholesalers, or with pharmaceutical companies directly. At a NHS 
hospital setting, and for patients suffering from chronic diseases eligible for 100% state 
reimbursement (such as Crohn and ulcerative colitis diseases), patients can collect their 
medicines (at no cost) at a hospital pharmacy, upon presentation of a medical prescription. In 
terms of non-NHS hospital settings, pharmacies can buy their medicines from wholesalers 
(typical situation), or from the pharmaceutical companies directly (less frequent situation). 
Patients can buy or collect (depending on the reimbursement level) their prescription 
medicines at community pharmacies, and can buy non-prescription medicines at community 
pharmacies, parapharmacies and other authorized health spaces (ex: supermarkets such as 




The number of pharmaceutical companies operating in Portugal has increased from 311 in 
2010 to 419 in 419 (this number includes small companies). The number of pharmaceutical 
companies registered at APIFARMA (the association of the Portuguese pharmaceutical 
companies, mainly constituted by the large and medium-size companies) has been relatively 
stable, ranging from 130 in 2010, to 121 in 2015. The number of wholesalers has also been 
relatively stable, reaching 443 in 2014. As covered previously, the number of pharmacies has 
been stable too, reaching around 2.900 (the number of pharmacy extensions was slightly 
below 200 in 2015). The number of drugstores authorized to sell non-prescription (OTC) 
medicines (constituted by both parapharmacies and small health spaces at commercial areas) 
reached 1.015 in 2014. Table 8.1 explicits these metrics. 
Table 8.1 - Number of companies per distribution channel function in Portugal 
 
Sources: (1) and (3) INFARMED (2015) | (2) and (6) APIFARMA (2016) | (4) and (5) INE 
(2017) 
 
8.4.2. Pharmaceutical market value 
The total medicines market is divided in ambulatory market (prescription and non-
prescription medicines), and hospital market (NHS only). 
The medicines market evidenced a substantial negative growth from 2010 to 2015 (-16,9%), 
decreasing from €4.294 million to €3.570 million (APIFARMA, 2016). This decrease was 
especially evident from 2010 to 2011 (-7%) and from 2011 to 2012 (-9%), the two main years 
of austerity in Portugal. 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Pharmaceutical companies(1)   311   334   367   378   419  ---
Pharmaceutical companies 
associated to APIFARMA(2)
  130   130   122   121   123   121
Wholesalers(3)   402   406   409   409   443  ---
Community pharmacies(4)  2 879  2 900  2 910  2 881  2 889  2 892
Pharmacy extensions (Posts)(5)   176   174   186   184   196   192
Drug stores (authorized to sell 
non-prescription medicines)





In terms of importance (weight on total medicines market), the NHS hospital market has been 
gaining relevance, growing from 23,9% in 2010 to 29% in 2015 (Apifarma, 2016). This 
increase has been compensated by a decrease in the ambulatory market importance, especially 
on the prescription medicines market. 
The NHS is the main medicines financier in the Portuguese market. While NHS 
reimbursement costs decreased from €1.639 million in 2010 to 1.190 million in 2016, a 
reduction of 27,4%, the out-of-pocket patients’ costs remained relatively stable in the €683 
million to €799 million range. The non-NHS market comprises sub-systems and the 
remaining market. The subsystems included the health subsystem of Ministry of Justice, 
which, in 2011, was transferred to ADSE (Civil Servants Health Care Assistance, or 
“Assistência na Doença aos Servidores Civis do Estado”, in Portuguese. Then, in April 2013, 
ADSE and other health subsystems belonging to the Clinical and Drug Assistance to the 
Members of Military and Militarized Forces were incorporated in the NHS. The remaining 
market includes the market outside the NHS, such as private clinical practice (Apifarma, 
2016; Infarmed, 2015; Infarmed, 2017). Table 8.2 provides evidence about these topics. 
Table 8.2 - Detailed view of the medicines market – 2010 to 2015 – Portugal – retail price – 
NHS vs non-NHS 
 
Sources: APIFARMA (2016) | INFARMED (2015) | INFARMED (2017a) 
The total market, consisting of the sum of the ambulatory and NHS hospital market, suffered 
a loss of 16,9% in value from 2010 to 2015. The loss was not more pronounced due to the 
relative stability of the NHS hospital market expenditures with medicines (which were stable 
around €1.000 million. 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
 1 639  1 326  1 173  1 160  1 170  1 182  1 190
  707   799 683   689   703 710 697
 2 347  2 125  1 856  1 850  1 873  1 892  1 886
Sub-systems costs   292   166   132   69   21   20 N/A
Patients (out-of-pocket)   114   76   58   29   5   5 N/A
Total sub-systems   406   242   190   98   26   25 N/A
  513   607   600   498   540   619 N/A
 3 266  2 973  2 646  2 446  2 439  2 536 N/A
 1 028  1 022   989   975   990  1 034 N/A
 4 294  3 995  3 635  3 421  3 429  3 570 N/A
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The great majority of the NHS medicines prescriptions in 2014 were based on NHS health 
infrastructure, consisting of health centers and public hospitals. For instance, from a NHS 
expenditure point of view, the sum of these two health institution types was 74,2% (Infarmed, 
2015). 
The most impacting therapeutic groups in ambulatory market in terms of value in the year 
2016 were oral antidiabetics (medicines taken to reduce the glucose levels in the blood, in the 
scope of the treatment of diabetes mellitus), modifiers of the renin angiotensin (medicines to 
reduce the risk of cardiovascular events and overall mortality), and anticoagulants (but 
evidence a substantial growth when compared against 2015) (Infarmed, 2015; Infarmed, 
2017). This was mainly, as will be addressed later, due to the launch of two new oral 
anticoagulant drugs in the market: Pradaxa from Boehringer Ingelheim, and Xarelto from 
Bayer / Janssen. 
Considering the main international nonproprietary names (INN) in ambulatory market, the 
most impacting in terms of NHS expenditures in the year 2016 were Metformine + 
Vildagliptine, Metformine + Sitagliptine, and Rivaroxaban (Infarmed, 2017). The first two are 
medicines for the treatment of diabetes mellitus type 2, and the third is an anticoagulant (drug 
name: Xarelto). 
Considering the main commercial brands in ambulatory market, the most impacting in terms 
of NHS expenditures in the year 2016 were Janumet (an antidiabetic medicine from Sanofi), 
Eucreas (an antidiabetic medicine from Novartis) and Xarelto (an anticoagulant from Bayer), 
according to INFARMED (2017a). In fifth and eighth places are other anticoagulants, 
Pradaxa from Boehringer Ingelheim, and Eliquis from Bristol-Myers Squibb, which 
demonstrates the importance of this therapeutic group. 
As shown in INFARMED (2017a) publication, the main marketing holders (pharmaceutical 
companies) in terms of NHS expenditure in the year of 2016 were Merck Sharp & Dohme 
(with a market share of 8,2%), Novartis Europharm (market share of 7,5%) and AstraZeneca 
(market share of 6,5%). The weight of the top 10 marketing authorization holders 
(pharmaceutical companies) on the NHS medicines expenditure reached 44,5% in 2016. 
8.4.3. Medicines 
The number of medicines with marketing authorization (AIM, or “Autorização de Introdução 
no Mercado”, in Portuguese) reached 16.428 in 2014, 10,9% more than in 2010 (Infarmed, 




as for instance packages of 10 pills, 20 pills, syrup, tube, or other), increased more than the 
number of brand names (7,4% vs 3,7% respectively, from 2010 to 2014). In 2014, 93% of the 
medicines were prescription medicines, and 39% were reimbursed by the NHS (Infarmed, 
2015). 
The great majority of prescription medicines are of regular prescription type. Special and 
restricted types include medicines subject to special and restricted medical prescription, for 
hospital use only (Infarmed, 2015). 
8.4.4. NHS prescriptions 
The number of prescriptions on the NHS reached 72,9 million in 2015, an 8,8% increase 
when compared to 2010 (67 million). In the same five-year period, the number of packages 
increased 9,4%, from 139,9 million to 153 million units (Infarmed, 2015; SNS, 2016). 
In 2014, the average number of prescriptions per consultation was 1,8, the average number of 
packages per prescription was 2,1, and the average number of packages per consultation was 
3,77 (Infarmed, 2015; SNS, 2016). The average cost per prescription borne by the NHS 
evidenced, from 2010 to 2015, a reduction of 44,4% (Infarmed, 2017). The average 
percentage of medicine NHS reimbursement was 62,5% in 2014 (Infarmed, 2017). The 
average cost per package has suffered substantial reductions too, especially regarding the 
generics, where the NHS expenditures per package decreased 68,1%, with the retail price 
decreasing 53,5% in the period of 2010 to 2016, as seen below in table 8.3. 
Table 8.3 - NHS average cost per package in the NHS – 2010 to 2016 
 
Source: INFARMED (2017a) 
Scope 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
% variation 
2016 vs 2010
Retail price 16,77 15,19 13,25 12,41 12,24 12,21 12,10 -27,8%
NHS expenditure 11,72 9,48 8,38 7,78 7,65 7,63 7,63 -34,9%
Patient charge (out-of-pocket) 5,06 5,71 4,87 4,62 4,59 4,58 4,47 -11,7%
Retail price 17,23 16,79 16,19 15,72 15,70 15,74 15,55 -9,8%
NHS expenditure 11,46 10,73 10,44 10,07 10,12 10,19 10,20 -11,0%
Patient charge (out-of-pocket) 5,77 6,06 5,75 5,65 5,58 5,55 5,35 -7,3%
Retail price 15,48 11,5 7,87 7,24 7,23 7,19 7,20 -53,5%
NHS expenditure 12,46 6,6 4,60 4,21 4,07 4,00 3,98 -68,1%
Patient charge (out-of-pocket) 3,02 4,9 3,27 3,03 3,16 3,19 3,22 6,6%











8.4.5. NHS reimbursement 
The Portuguese National Health System foresaw four reimbursement categories, defined by 
Ordinance nr 195-D/2015, 30
th
 of June (table 8.4). 
Table 8.4 - Reimbursement categories and examples of eligible medicines 
 
The reimbursement categories vary according to: the therapeutic indications of the medicine; 
its use; the entities that prescribe it; and the increased consumption for patients suffering from 
certain pathologies. 
Concerning the medications dispensed through the NHS market, the average rate of 
reimbursement decreased from 69,9% in 2010 to 62,5% in 2014, a loss of 7,4 percentage 
points (Infarmed, 2015). This loss did not seem to affect the patients, as the patients’ out-of-
pocket costs did not increase substantially. 
8.4.6. Medicines price 
The average price of medicines in the ambulatory market was €12,09 in 2015, representing a 
reduction of 27,9% from the average price in 2010 (€16,77). The most intense reduction 
occurred in 2012, with a decrease of 12,8% in the average medicines price (Infarmed, 2017). 
Considering generics medicines only, this reduction was significantly more pronounced, 
reaching 53,5% in the same period of analysis. The loss on average price is even more 
extreme if we compare the year 2016 against the generics average retail price in January 2007 
(20,38€, according to Infarmed, 2017): 64,7% reduction. Table 8.5 provides quantitative 
evidence on these topics. 
 
 
Category Reimbursement Examples of eligible medicines / diseases
A 90%
Hormones and medicines used to treat endocrine diseases; Medications 
used in ocular affections; Antineoplastic and immunomodulatory drugs
B 69% Anti-infective drugs; Central nervous system; Cardiovascular system
C 37% Genitourinary system; Locomotor system; Antiallergic medications
D 15%
New medicines, medicines with adjusted co-payment or medicinal products 
which, for specific reasons and after a reasoned opinion issued in the 
framework of the evaluation process of the co-payment application, are 




Table 8.5 - Average price evolution in ambulatory market – Retail value – 2010 to 2016 
 
Source: INFARMED (2017a) 
Average medicines retail price in the scope of the NHS was 12,24€ in 2014, for a 
correspondent NHS average expenditure of 7,65€. By dividing 7,65€ by 12,24€, one obtain 
the average NHS reimbursement for medicines (62,5%, as addressed before). 
8.4.7. Generics 
Generics medicines are faithful copies of a mature drug, no longer protected by a patent, 
marketed with the chemical name of the active ingredient, according to Garattini & Tediosi 
(2010). 
The number of generic medicines with AIM increased 20,5% between 2010 and 2014, and the 
number of presentations increased 11,8% in the same period. The percentage of generics in 
the total drugs (brands and generics) gained five percentage points, from 2010 to 2014, and 
may have helped to contribute to the reduction of the average medicines price borne both by 
the NHS and by the patients (Infarmed, 2015). The generics penetration in units increased 
15,9 percentage points from 2010 (31,4%) to 2016 (47,3%). A similar increase was observed 
in market share in DDD and in packages (with 15,1 and 15,5 percentage points increases, 
respectively). Considering the generified market only, generics market share reached 64,4% 
in 2015 and 2016, representing an increase of 11,6 percentage points from 2010. 
8.5.Portuguese pharmaceutical legislative framework overview – 2000 to 2017 
This sub-chapter presents a summary of the main legislative changes implemented in Portugal 
between the years 2000 and 2017, in the scope of the pharmaceutical market, aiming the 
comprehension of the Portuguese reality. Since the year 2000, the successive governments 
implemented several measures in order to control the medicines expenditures, including the 
creation of reference prices in the scope of price formation, compulsory price reductions, 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2016 vs 2010
Average price (retail price) 16,77 15,19 13,25 12,41 12,24 12,21 12,09  ---
Variation vs previous year  --- -9,4% -12,8% -6,3% -1,4% -0,2% -1,0% -27,9%
Average price (retail price) 17,22 16,80 16,19 15,72 15,69 15,75 15,55  ---
Variation vs previous year  --- -2,4% -3,6% -2,9% -0,2% 0,4% -1,3% -9,7%
Average price (retail price) 15,48 11,50 7,87 7,23 7,24 7,19 7,20  ---
Variation vs previous year  --- -25,7% -31,6% -8,1% 0,1% -0,7% 0,1% -53,5%








development of protocols with the pharmaceutical industry to define maximum expenditures 
ceilings, and other measures. 
8.5.1. Number of legislative initiatives 
Leopold et al (2014), when comparing the effect of the economic recession on pharmaceutical 
policy and medicine sales in eight European countries, presented evidence of the number of 
measures implemented between 2008 and 2011 in the scope of pricing, reimbursement, and 
generics, underlining that Portugal reached 22 measures (10 for pricing, eight for 
reimbursement, and four for generics), information shown in figure 8.2. A complementary 
analysis was performed, with a specific focus on the Portuguese legislation background. This 
was aimed at, by the one hand, the understanding of the complexity of the granular legislative 
changes that occurred in Portugal not from 1986 to 2017 (and not only from 2008 to 2011), 
and the quantification, by the other, of all changes including laws, decree-laws, orders, 
ordinances, and other legislative instruments such as protocols. For a detailed explanation of 
the methodology observed in this legislation search, please consult appendix 4. 
 
Figure 8.2 – Number of health-related legislative diplomas identified in the period of 1986 to 
2017 





* The year of 2017 includes legislative diplomas up to August the 9
th
, 2017. 
More than to perform a systematic and detailed inventory of the legislative changes (which 
was not the objective of this endeavor), the process developed aimed at targeting several 
goals. The first one consisted of the identification of the main legislative initiatives that could 
have had an impact on the market development in terms of pricing, generics penetration and 
market growth, for a better understanding of its dynamics. These insights were expected to 
help identify the therapeutic class and drug perimeter, selected for the quantitative phase of 
the research design, which consisted of the second objective. A third objective consisted of 
the critical analysis of the impact of history when interpreting the results from the quantitative 
and qualitative steps of the research design, especially when analyzing the internal validity. 
8.5.2. Summary of the legislative initiatives 
A sumary of the appendix 4 is now presented. 
Prices, drug reimbursement and medicines (general) related 
Taking as a reference figure 8.2, it appears that the period between the years 2006 and 2012 
registered the highest numbers of legislative initiatives. Interestingly, during this period the 
CAGR of the NHS costs with medicines (Continental Portugal) suffered a dramatic reduction 
(figure 8.3). 
 
Figure 8.3 – CAGR evolution of costs incurred by the NHS with medicines (Continental 
Portugal) 




On the compulsory side, which had a mandatory effect - in the sense that they obliged an 
immediate change in stakeholders’ behavior, a series of measures was taken. These measures 
included successive changes in price formation methodology (including international 
reference pricing with selected countries for price comparison, and compulsory price 
reductions of newly launched generics medicines relative to the previous equivalent generic 
launched), with the goal of constraining the prices and having a better control on this variable; 
included mandatory price reductions in generics and non-generics prices, contributing to the 
control of the growth of NHS expenditures with medicines; included changes in 
reimbursement policy, relating reimbursement to a reference price of homogenous groups, 
further limiting the burden with medicines expenditures for both the NHS and to the patient. 
Other compulsory measures contributed also to a better control of prescriptions, better control 
of expenditures and behavioral changes of prescribers, and consisted of INN prescription, and 
electronic prescription. 
Other measures were taken, not positioned as compulsory, but rather as voluntary or optional, 
aimed at changing attitudes and behaviors. A positive discrimination measure to promote the 
penetration of generic medicines was established in 2000 (taking effects during five years), 
consisting of a temporary 10 percentage points increase in the reimbursement of generics in 
reimbursement categories B, C and D. It was aimed at providing a positive incentive to 
prescribers and patients to choose generics. Other measures included the training given to 
health care professionals on the benefits of generics (503 sessions involving 7195 participants 
from 2001 to 2002, according to Filipe (2008), and campaigns targeted at patients, health care 
professionals and press, stressing the benefits of generics in terms of quality and efficacy, and 
later in terms of cost savings to the patient and to the society. Also in the scope of voluntary 
behaviors inducement, incentives were established and given to pharmacies that increased the 
penetration of generic medicines in their practices. 
Protocols were developed with the pharmaceutical industry – through APIFARMA, which 
can be classified as having both a voluntary – in the sense that these protocols involved the 
pharmaceutical industry in the payment of part of the costs with NHS expenditures, should a 
certain threshold be exceeded) - and compulsory scope – in the sense that by the lack of 
participation could have led to a higher intensity of measures, possibly conducting to higher 
losses by the industry. Troika intervention led to an increase of the contribution solicited to 





Pharmaceutical sales representatives and access to physicians 
From a detailing restriction policy point of view, between 2001 and 2004, if restrictions ever 
existed, they must have been occasional and regional, coming from decisions of the Regional 
Administrations and not from the law. Between 2004 and 2006, Order 2837/2004 entered into 
force with restrictions that came to be declared unconstitutional with mandatory general force. 
As a consequence, between the declaration of unconstitutionality (December 5, 2006 or more 
precisely between January 4
th
 2007 - the date of publication of the Judgment of the 
Constitutional Court in Diário da República - and the Order 8213-B/2013, which entered into 
force in August the 1
st
 2013, there was a legal vacuum regarding restrictions to PSRs detailing 
activities. This means that regulation of marketing efforts to physicians (one of the forms of 
regulation noted by Stremersch & Lemmens, 2009) has taken effects from August the 1
st
 
2013, in the form of a detailing ceiling, with the following main characteristics: 
 Limit of two PSRs per day in each NHS Hospital service, or three PSRs per day in 
other NHS infrastructures (independently from the represented pharmaceutical 
companies) 
 Maximum of eight visits per day to doctors working at NHS institutions (reducing two 
days from Order 2837/2004), per PSR. This limit may be exceeded in the case of 
collective information sessions, but up to a maximum of two per year for each 
laboratory, and covering, simultaneously, at least five health professionals 
 Pharmaceutical companies can make a maximum of six visits per year to a NHS 
establishment or service, according to their size and the number of professionals of the 
different specialties that PSRs visit (in type B units integrated in the NHS - USFs, or 
family health units -, this number can exceptionally increase to eight visits per year, 










Table 8.6 below shows the summary of the main legislation related to PSRs access to NHS 
institutions and professionals (especially physicians). 
Table 8.6 – Summary of the most relevant legislation initiatives to regulate PSRs’ access to 
NHS institutions and professionals 
  
Source: own elaboration based on existing legislation 
Legislation Year Scope Main evidence






Advertising of medicinal 
products for human use
Articles 6 and 8 regulate the promotion to health professionals. No limit 









Access of PSRs to the 
NHS system for drug 
promotion purposes
Regulates PSRs' right to access NHS facilities. Regional health 
administrations should establish standards for PSR access to the 








Access to NHS 
establishments by 
PSRs
Sets limits on PSRs' access to NHS institutions and physicians (2 PSRs 
per day in hospital services, or 3 PSRs per day in other NHS settings; 10 
visits per day maximum per PSR; 6 visits per year (maximum) per 








Drugs statute (the legal, 
manufacturing, 
promotion, …)
Article 157 sets the global regulation of the PSRs' activities, including 
training and type of information they can provide to physicians
Revokes Decree-





Decision from the 
Constitutional Court
The Constitutional Court declares Order 2837/2004 inconstitutional, after 
APIFARMA asked the Public Prosecution to evaluate its 
constitutionality. Order 2837/2004 did not contain the express indication 











medicines and health 
products to NHS 
professionals, by PSRs
Defined limits on PSRs' access to NHS institutions and NHS 
professionals: 2 PSRs per day in hospital services, or 3 PSRs per day in 
other NHS settings (health centers, USFs); 8 visits per day (maximum) 
per PSR; 6 visits per year (maximum) per company to each NHS 






Figure 8.4 below evidences the same reality, with a visual representation of the legislation changes over time 
 
Figure 8.4 - Time frame of legislation regarding detailing restrictions in Portugal 





8.6.Pharmaceutical drugs sales and promotion investments data aggregation 
In the sales force effectiveness chapter, we explained that pharmaceutical companies use 
prescription information to qualify, segment and target physicians. This information can be 
disaggregated (such as in the USA, where HIOs provide pharmaceutical companies physician-
level data), or aggregated in regional territories typically called bricks (Fugh-Berman, 2008). 
In Portugal, Decree Law 176/2006 (30
th
 August), which constitutes the legal regime for 
medicines for human use, provides, in article 158, point 5, that it is prohibited to carry out, by 
any means, the collection, treatment and dissemination of information regarding the 
prescription of medicines by persons empowered to prescribe or dispense them. This refers to 
physician prescription data (those empowered to prescribe), and to pharmacies dispensing 
data (empowered to dispense). Therefore, HIOs are not able to sell disaggregated data 
(physician drug prescriptions or pharmacy sales data). The only institution with legal access 
to physician-level prescription behavior is Serviços Partilhados do Ministério da Saúde 
(SPMS), an institution created in 2010 by Decree-Law 19/2010 (March 22
nd
). 
According to SPMS (2017), its mission is to provide shared services - in the areas of 
purchasing and logistics, financial services, human resources and information and 
communication systems and technologies - to entities with specific activities in the health 
area, in order to "centralize, optimize and rationalize" the acquisition of goods and services in 
the National Health Service. SPMS develops several controls to detect fraud in prescriptions. 
According to the National Health System, the dematerialization of the prescriptions led to a 
reduction of 80% in the number of prescription-related frauds, since the year 2016 (NHS, 
2017). Dispatch 7979-P/2015 determined that prescription of dispensing medicines in 
community pharmacy, in NHS institutions, is carried out in the PEM (Prescrição Electrónica 
Médica) application, and also that SPMS provides NHS institutions with data on prescription 
standards necessary to control and improve medical prescription and fight against fraud and 
waste. It also provides that doctors with private practice can request the Physicians’ Chamber 
the PEM application. 
Pharmaceutical manufacturers have control of their medicines sales to wholesalers and 
pharmacies. However, they miss important information. First, they do not know their sales by 
territory (the higher the geographic granulatity, the lower the data availability and precision); 




know their relative success versus their competitors, by territory, which does not allow 
companies to effectively evaluate their PSRs’ teams. 
As highlighted in the Portuguese Competition’ Authority non-opposition decision 41/2012 
(Autoridade da Concorrência, 2013), the designation “brick” in the scope of the Portuguese 
pharmaceutical industry refers to a classification for a particular geographical grouping of 
customers, that is, a grouping made through the customer's postal codes which comprises 
groups of three or more pharmacies and does not allow an individual identification of the 
transactions. 
In Portugal, two HIOs provide regional drug sales, IQVIA and hMR: 
 IQVIA gathers sell-in data through agreements made with the majority of the 
wholesalers working in Portugal (which guarantee more than 95 per cent market 
representativeness). As covered before, sell-in represents the wholesalers’ sales to 
pharmacies. Sell-in data data is then compiled by brick (aggregation of at least three 
pharmacies) and sold to pharmaceutical manufacturers on a regular basis. IQVIA also 
provides sell-out data, whose data is collected from a panel of more than one thousand 
pharmacies, and then extrapolated to the entire universe of approximately 2.900 
community pharmacies 
 hmR gathers sell-out information through agreements made with the majority of the 
pharmacies associated with ANF (National Association of Pharmacies), which may 
provide better precision and reliability of data, compared to IQVIA sell-out service. 
Sell-out data is compiled by hmR in hmR territories, with a minimum of three 
pharmacies per territory 
In both cases (IQVIA and hmR), each brick or territory is usually defined using postal codes, 
and must contain at least three pharmacies, not allowing the identification of transactions by 
pharmacy, in consonance with European Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of personal 
data. Sales by brick or territory are then used by pharmaceutical companies to define sales 
territories allocated to each pharmaceutical sales representative, who are therefore evaluated 
by the results reached in terms of the promoted drugs’ market growth and market share in 






Two companies provide promotion investments data, IQVIA and 2Logical: 
 IQVIA gathers promotion data – extracted from a IQVIA database called Channel 
Dynamics – which contain a series of investment tools, including detailing, e–
detailing, mailing, e–mailing, meetings, events, congresses, webinars, clinical trials, 
journal advertising, websites, social media and samples. Promotion data is compiled 
by IQVIA through a representative panel of physicians that fill on–line questionnaires 
whenever exposed to a promotion tool (brand promoted, channel, messages, quality of 
the visit, and other variables). Promotion data from this panel is then extrapolated to 
the physician universes using a complex algorithm, regularly validated against real 
data. Therefore, pharmaceutical companies can have access to their relative position in 
terms of share of voice (given by their promotion investments divided by the global 
promotion investments in the eligible product market (therapeutic class) 
 2Logical provides a very similar service, based on an on-line data platform that which 
allows a panel of physicians to register every promotion tool impact they are impacted 
with (detailing, e-detailing, samples, and other promotion tools) 
Differences in the availability of physician-level prescription information between countries 
like the USA - where information can be bought and data-mined by pharmaceutical 
companies - and Portugal and European Union countries - where only regional, macro-level 
sales data is available – implies as covered previously different prescribers segmentation and 
targeting approaches, and relation between companies and prescribers. The understanding of 
the local reality will help adapt the methodology for the empirical study. 
 
8.7.Chapter synthesis of the main findings 
This chapter started by addressing base concepts in the Portuguese health care. A distinction 
between primary care (the first element of the health care process, as a first point of contact of 
a patient with the health care system), secondary care (represents the health care services 
delivered by specialists, who typically do not have first contact with patients), and tertiary 
care (advanced or specialized medical treatment). The chapter also addressed the distinction 
between hospital market (where the patient does not have any participation in the decision 
making process of medicine choice and there is no patient financial reimbursement of the 
medicine cost) and ambulatory market (the patient may participate in the choice and may have 




between inpatients (admitted at a health care infrastructure and staying there for more than 24 
hours, occupying a bed) and outpatients (with health issues which do not require 
hospitalization). 
The chapter then addressed brief bases of health economics in Portugal. The country suffered 
two negative impacts in the last decade (the international crisis in 2009, generating a decline 
of 3% in the GDP that year, and the budget austerity measures imposed by the Troika in 2011, 
with a profund negative impact on GDP growth rates (negative for the three years after the 
intervention). The country has evidenced a relatively stable proportion of the GDP allocated 
to health expenditures (between 8,9% and 9,9%, but the lower GDP in absolute value left to a 
lower investment in health expenditures. The Portuguese NHS medicines market evidenced a 
substantial negative growth from 2010 to 2015 (-16,9%). This reduction had impact on NHS 
costs with medicines, given that out-of-pocket costs remained relatively stable. The cost 
savings obtained by the NHS resulted in a reduction of 44,4% in the average cost per 
prescription (from 2010 to 2015), which allowed the NHS to reduce the average 
reimbursement rate. The average price of medicines in the ambulatory market dropped from 
€16,77 in 2010 to €12,09 in 2015 (-27,9%). The generics penetration increased from 31,4% in 
2010 to 47,3% in 2016 in units, and from 52,8% in 2010 to 64,4% in 2015 in the generified 
market. 
The chapter also analyzed the Portuguese pharmaceutical legislative framework, with a 
special focus on the period of the years 2000 to 2017. The substantial growth of medicines 
related expenditures observed during the first decade of the 21
st
 century, allied to the fact that 
a substantial proportion of the global health care costs are fixed (personnel, infrastructures), 
and given the marginal penetration of generics, may have contributed to the implementation, 
by successive governments, of a series of measures aimed at reducing the NHS and patients 
cost burden with medicines, whose effects were compulsory in some cases, while voluntary of 
optional in other cases. The period between the years 2006 and 2012 registered the highest 
numbers of legislative initiatives in the scope of price, reimbursement, and medicines in 
general, and included several measures to contrain the NHS expenditures with medicines such 
as changes in price formation methodology (international reference pricing and compulsory 
price reductions), changes in reimbursement policy (reference price of homogenous groups), 
INN prescription, and electronic prescription. Positive discrimination was implemented to 
help the penetration of generics, with temporary surcharge of the reimbursment. Protocols 




with NHS expenditures, should a certain threshold was exceeded. Specific legislation was 
implemented, in 2013, to regulate PSRs’ access to NHS doctors and institutions. This 
included detailing ceilings, below briefly characterized: 
 Limit of two PSRs per day in each NHS Hospital service, or three PSRs per day in 
other NHS infrastructures (independently from the represented pharmaceutical 
companies) 
 Maximum of eight visits per day to doctors working at NHS institutions, per PSR 
(exceptions may apply, in the scope of collective information sessions) 
 Pharmaceutical companies can make a maximum of six visits per year to a NHS 
establishment or service, according to their size and the number of professionals of the 
different specialties that PSRs visit (exception may apply, in the case of type B health 
family units 
Finally, the chapter approached the particular reality of the Portuguese pharmaceutical market 
in terms of access to drug sales and promotion tools data. It explained that the provision of 
disaggregated (individual-level) sales data is not legally allowed, and that HIOs provide 
pharmaceutical companies regional-level data, providing sales data per IQVIA brick or by 
hmR territory. Promotion tools investments data is provided by HIOs at a national level, 
without any regional aggregation. 
The characterization of the Portuguese situation – with all its specificities – will allow the 













This chapter describes the methodology observed throughout the development of this thesis, 
from literature review to data analysis procedures. 
9.1.Literature review 
The starting to conduct the literature review was the selection of the eligible key words. Given 
the scope of the thesis, several keywords were selected, which were the following: 
 Pharmaceutical marketing 
 Pharmaceutical promotion 
 Detailing and prescription 
 Pharmaceutical regulation 
 Detailing restriction policies 
The second decision was to select the scientific search engines for the articles. The options 
chosen were EBSCO-host (Business Source Complete) and b-on (on-line knowledge library, 
which gathers several international scientific libraries), and the search process started on 
October 2016. 
In a first moment, 123 articles were selected and abstracts were extracted and compiled into a 
single database in word processor format (DOC), with a balanced selection of less recent and 
more recent articles. The reading of these abstracts allowed a first understanding of the main 
concepts addressed by previous researchers in the pharmaceutical marketing and regulation 
and policy fields, and the most used methods for data analysis (quantitative using time series, 
quantitative using cross-sectional research, and qualitative using in-depth interviews and 
focus groups). A special attention was given to the future research suggestions given by the 
scholars. As the literature review was developed, other references were extracted, adding 
articles from journals with high impact factors; articles with a substantial amount of citations; 
and articles often referenced by the most active researchers in this field. A special attention 
was given to the time horizon of the publication date, including as far as possible articles from 
1980 to 2019, allowing the study of not only the historical references in this field, but also of 
more contemporaneous research. This process resulted in a final perimeter of 289 peer-
reviewed articles analyzed. In the literature review process, we also analyzed a selection of 
146 non-peer reviewed sources including pharmaceutical industry associations’ reports, 
pharmaceutical companies’ websites and reports, consulting companies’ reports, national 




many of which cited in peer-reviewed articles (for instance, IQVIA syndicated data regarding 
medicines sales, promotion investment magnitude, and other). 
 
9.2.Empirical study 
In this sub-chapter, the methodology observed to develop the empirical study is explained. 
9.2.1. Research method approach 
The empirical study observed a mixed research method, using a sequential explanatory 
design. The selection of this research approach was based on four main reasons. First, the 
search for comprehensiveness, as highlighted by O'Cathain, Murphy & Nicholl (2007), 
engaging with the «complexity of health, health care interventions, and the environment in 
which studies took place» (p. 85). Second, to obtain a better understanding of the research 
problem «by converging broad numeric trends from quantitative research, and the detail of 
qualitative research», as underlined by Creswell (2009, p. 121). Third, to allow a more 
detailed understanding of the data by «using qualitative follow–up data to help explain a 
quantitative database», as pointed by Creswell (2014, p. 177). Fourth, the fact that qualitative 
research can facilitate the interpretation of the relationship between the variables selected for 
analysis, as suggested by Bryman & Bell (2015). These last authors also underline the fact 
that «quantitative and the qualitative data deriving from mixed research methods research 
should be mutually illuminating» (p. 641), and that «triangulation involves using more than 
one method or source of data in the study of social phenomena» (p. 402). 
In terms of sequence, the research observed the following steps, here shown in figure 9.1: 
 
Figure 9.1 - Research method approach 





9.2.2. Epistemological and Ontological perspectives 
The research method can be positioned in terms of role of theory in relation to research, 
epistemological and ontological orientation, and other characteristics, summarized below in 
table 9.1. Using an adaptation of Bryman & Bell (2015) framework, the role of theory of the 
quantitative phase will be deductive, allowing the testing of theory, whereas the qualitative 
phase will be inductive, aimed at the possible generation of theory. In terms of 
epistemological orientation, the quantitative phase will use a natural science model 
(positivism), while the qualitative phase will use an interpretivist model. In what regards the 
ontological orientation, the quantitative phase (objective, and allowing generalization) will 
follow an objectivism approach, whereas the qualitative phase (subjective, aimed at studying 
the uniqueness) will observe a constructivist approach. 
Table 9.1 – Epistemological and ontological perspectives of the research model approach 
 
Source: adapted from Bryman & Bell (2015) 
 
9.2.3. Quantitative phase 
The research design that was observed to answer the research question comprised five 
dimensions: objective of the research, control used in the research, context of the research, 
time in terms of data availability, and data collection. Table 9.2 below summarizes the 





Table 9.2 - Research design scheme for the quantitative phase 
 
9.2.3.1.Research objective, control and context 
In terms of the research objective, the proposed research was explanatory in the first phase, 
studying the causal effect of the detailing activities on the prescription behavior through time, 
before and after the entry into force of a compulsory detailing ceiling. 
From a control point of view, the proposed research was correlational in the first phase 
(quantitative), using a posteriori control, since the database that was used in this phase had 
already been created. 
In terms of context, the quantitative phase is classified as field (natural). The research was 
conducted in the natural habitat, in the real world, and not confined to an artificial or 
laboratory setting. 
The selection of this research design (objective, control and context) for the quantitative phase 
was aligned with the designs used by the majority of the researchers in the pharmaceutical 
marketing community. These include (but not limited to) Gönül, Carter, Petrova & Srinivasan 
(2001), Narayanan, Manchanda & Chintagunta (2003), Mizik & Jacobson (2004), Manchanda 
& Chintagunta (2004), Manchanda & Chintagunta (2005), Manchanda & Honka (2005), 
Kalyanaram (2009), Fischer & Albers (2010), Montoya, Netzer & Jedidi (2010), Riese et al 





Concerning time, the research was longitudinal in the quantitative phase, as observed by 
researchers in the pharmaceutical marketing community for quantitative research. A time 
series of sales and marketing investments data was used. Some of the authors using time 
series data include (but not limited to) Narayanan, Manchanda & Chintagunta (2003), Mizik 
& Jacobson (2004), Fischer & Albers (2010), and Liu et al (2016). In order to analyze the 
impact of detailing on prescription behavior before and after the entry into force of the 
compulsory detailing ceiling in NHS infrastructure, a data series of six years was used (three 
years before the detailing ceiling, and three years after it went into force). 
9.2.3.3.Data collection 
Portugal is a very specific, highly restricted market, with absence of official published 
monthly data about individual medicines sales and promotion activities. By the one hand, 
prescription data is available to Infarmed only, but not available publicly. By the other hand, 
promotion data is only partially publicly available through Placotrans (Infarmed), but it is not 
organized and compiled properly, and misses the detailing activities (pharmaceutical 
manufacturers are not obliged to disclose detailing activities in Placotrans). 
Regarding data collection and research method, the quantitative phase used secondary data, 
collected by IQVIA, an American Health Information Organization and consulting company 
that resulted from the merger between IMS Health and Quintiles, and which provides services 
to the pharmaceutical industry. IQVIA (or companies acquired by former IMS Health, such as 
Verispan / Scott Levin, and SDI Health) has been the main data provider for research in the 
pharmaceutical marketing community, providing data for authors that studied detailing, 
including (but not limited to) Berndt et al (1995), Auvray, Hensgen & Sermet (2003), 
Rosenthal, Berndt, Donohue, Epstein & Frank (2003), Narayanan, Desiraju & Chintagunta 
(2004), Chintagunta & Desiraju (2005), Manchanda et al (2005), Windmeijer, de Laat, 
Douven & Mot (2006), Berndt, Danzon & Kruse (2007), Kalyanaram (2008), Kremer, 
Bijmolt, Leeflang & Wieringa (2008), Manchanda, Xie & Youn (2008), Vakratsas & 
Kolsarici (2008), Dong, Manchanda & Chintagunta (2009), Kalyanaram (2009), Ching & 
Ishihara (2012), Fischer & Albers (2010), Gönül & Carter (2010), Dong, Chintagunta & 
Manchanda (2011), Dave & Saffer (2012), Datta & Dave (2016), and Kappe & Stremersch 
(2016). 
The time series data IQVIA provided consisted, by the one hand, of sales of eligible 




price pharmacies pay to the wholesalers in the pharmaceutical marketing channels), and by 
the other hand of promotion investments made by pharmaceutical companies (including 
detailing). 
Sales data was gathered by IQVIA through agreements made with the majority of the 
wholesalers working in Portugal (>95% market representativeness, and therefore we consider 
it as populational data). Promotion data – extracted from an IQVIA database called Channel 
Dynamics – contains a series of investment tools, including detailing. Promotion data was 
compiled by IQVIA through a representative panel of physicians that fill on–line 
questionnaires whenever exposed to a promotion tool (identifying the brand promoted, the 
promotion tool used, writing the messages, qualifying the quality of the visit, and other 
variables). Promotion data from this panel was extrapolated to the physician universes using a 
complex algorithm, regularly validated against real data. We consider, for the purpose of this 
thesis, that promotion data is representative, allowing us to infer results from the sample to 
the whole population of doctors.  
9.2.3.4.Markets classes selection 
The markets included in the data extraction were defined using a three-fold procedure. 
First, we identified and quantified the most studied markets and therapeutic classes in the 
previous research perimeter presented before. For this, we built table 9.3, where in column we 








































Parsons & Abeele (1981) √
Mackowiak & Gagnon (1985) √ √




Gönül, Carter, Petrova & 
Srinivasan (2001)
√
Wittink (2002) √ √ √ √ √
Wosinska (2002) √
Narayanan, Manchanda & 
Chintagunta (2003)
√
Rosenthal, Berndt, Donohue, 
Epstein & Frank (2003)
√ √ √ √
Manchanda & Chintagunta (2004) √
Manchanda, Rossi & Chintagunta 
(2004)
√
Mizik & Jacobson (2004) √
Narayanan, Desiraju & 
Chintagunta (2004)
√
Chintagunta & Desiraju (2005) √










































Windmeijer, de Laat, Douven & 
Mot (2006)
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Berndt, Danzon & Kruse (2007) √ √ √
Venkataraman & Stremersch 
(2007)
√ √ √
Kalyanaram (2008) √ √ √
Manchanda, Xie & Youn (2008) √
Vakratsas & Kolsarici (2008) √
John (2008) √
Dong, Manchanda & Chintagunta 
(2009)
√
Kalyanaram (2009) √ √ √
Narayanan & Manchanda (2009) √
Fischer & Albers (2010) √
Fischer, Leeflang & Verhoef 
(2010)
√
Gönül & Carter (2010) √
Leeflang & Wieringa (2010) √








































Nair, Manchanda & Bhatia (2010) √
Dong, Chintagunta & Manchanda 
(2011)
√ √
Ching & Ishihara (2012) √
Dave & Saffer (2012) √ √ √ √
Wieringa & Leeflang (2013) √ √ √ √ √
Ruiz-Conde, Wieringa & Leeflang 
(2014)
√ √ √
Datta & Dave (2016) √
Kappe & Stremersch (2016) √
Liu, Gupta, Venkataraman & Liu 
(2016)
√
Mukherji, Jaimakiraman, Dutta & 
Rajiv (2016)
√
Chung, Kim & Park (2017) √
Kappe, Venkataraman & 
Stremersch (2017)
√





The above presented table can be further summarized, in order to allow the quantification of 
the most studied markets. By counting the number of areas, in each column, we obtained the 
following results, shown below in table 9.4: 
Table 9.4 – Markets counts on previous research 
 
Source: own elaboration 
Considering the article perimeter selected for analysis, the most studied therapeutic areas are 
tranquilizers / anti-depressants, anti-hyperlipidemics, anti-ulcers, anti-hystamines, and anti-
hypertension. Comparing these five areas against IMS Institute (2016) report on medicines 
use and spending in the US, we find that, except for anti-histamines, all the other areas are 
present in the top 20 therapeutic classes by spending in the USA, in the year 2015. 
We also looked at Kremer et al (2008) 252 detailing elasticities addressed in their review, 





Anonymous / vague 13





Respiratory (asthma / COPD) 4











Table 9.5 – Kremer et al (2008) number of elasticities by disease category 
 
Source: Adapted from Kremer et al (2008) 
Despite the different disease categorization, tables 9.4 and 9.5 suggest a reasonable alignment 
on the main therapeutic or disease areas previously studied in the scope of detailing. For 
instance, we can include anti-hyperlipidemic (cholesterol) and anti-hypertension in Kremer et 
al (2008) heart and vascular diseases group, or anti-histamines (allergies) and respiratory 
(asthma / COPD) in Kremer et al (2008) hypersensitivity group, or tranquilizers / anti-
depressants, anti-epileptics and anti-migraine in Kremer et al (2008) neurology and 
psychology group. The only group that is not represented in the articles we selected as 
perimeter is Kremer et al (2008) group skin diseases. 
Second, since the empirical study was targeting therapeutic classes in the Portuguese market, 
it was important to guarantee that the selected markets had an adequate representativeness in 
terms of health expenditure. Therefore, we analyzed the top 10 most important classes in 











Heart and vascular diseases 33
Hypersensitivity 35
Skin diseases 40






Table 9.6 – 2016 NHS expenditures with medicines, by pharmachoterapeutic classification 
 
Source: adapted from INFARMED (2016) 
Third, the insights gathered during a series of non–structured interviews with pharmaceutical 
industry specialists, which took place from April 2017 to January 2018, allowed the 
generation of additional insights. Based on the previous two steps, we compiled a list of 12 
classes, which were presented to specialists in pharmaceutical markets and therapeutic classes 















1 Other anti-diabetics Diabetes 15,3%









5 Insulines Diabetes 5,6%
6 Antidyslipidemic Cholesterol 5,1%
7





8 Antiepileptics and anticonvulsants Epilepsy 3,8%
9 Antidepression Depression 2,7%




Table 9.7 – Markets selected for discussion with specialists 
 
Source: own elaboration 
The two last non-structured interviews, which occurred between the 24
th
 and the 26
th
 of 
January 2018, were particularly insightful. These two specialists – both working at IQVIA, 
the company resulting from the merger between IMS Health and Quintiles – were asked to 
indicate, from the classes above, the ones with the most potential and interest to be studied, 
given: 
o Their importance in the Portuguese pharmaceutical market (in terms of market value and 
pathology prevalence) 
 
o The occurrence, in the last eight to 10 years, of generification (loss of patent of 
investigation brands, and entry of generics) 
 
o The occurrence, in the last eight to 10 years, of new entries of investigation drugs 
 
o The impact of generics in the class - the Portuguese pharmaceutical market has been 
subject to substantial new regulations in the last decade, so it was important to highlight 
that a selection criteria would be to consider at leasttwo classes more exposed to generics, 
and at least two less exposed 
















One of the specialists – project manager, age range >55, with 35+ years of professional 
experience, the last 13 of which in the pharmaceutical industry, in the classification of 
products in their correspondent therapeutic classes - indicated five classes, and another – 
account manager and solutions lead, age range 30-35, with ten years of experience in the 
Portuguese pharmaceutical market, therapeutic class dynamics and evolution through the 
years - indicated six classes. Of these, five are an exact match from the ones proposed by the 
first specialist. Both specialists were asked whether there were other classes – other than the 
12 shown – with interest in terms of analysis. No other classes were spontaneously suggested. 
The data provider of the time series requested that the classes should remain confidential, as 
well as the products in each class. Given this restriction, we present only the main area the 





Table 9.8 – Perimeter of markets selected for analysis in the empirical study 
 
 
Source: own elaboration 
The goal of this process was to obtain a list of markets which can contribute to both the theory, building on previous research, but also to the 
pharmaceutical practice, by selecting relevant, representative and current classes that make sense in the Portuguese market. The combined 
weight of these four markets accounted for more than three thirds of the NHS expenditures with medicines. 
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Yes Yes Yes Yes Low 3 100%
Market 2
- Pancreas -
Yes No Yes Yes Low 5 67%
Market 3
- Heart -
Yes Yes Yes Yes Moderate 5 43%
Market 4
- Liver -





As evidenced previously, all of the selected markets are important in terms of ATC global 
sales in Portugal. As explained by Olson & Singh (2017), the Anatomical Therapeutic 
Chemical (ATC) codes were created by the World Health Organization (WHO), assigning a 
code to drugs, based on their therapeutic and pharmacological characteristics. They explicated 
that «the ATC system has a tree-based hierarchy with five levels, each describing a new level 
of detail of a drug’s therapeutic profile as described in the following: first level: One letter 
signifying which of the 14 anatomical groups the drug acts on. Second level: two digits that 
represent the therapeutic group of the drug. Third and Fourth levels: one letter each 
specifying therapeutic and pharmacological subgroups. Fifth level: two digits that are used to 
identify the drug within its group» (p. 20). They presented an example regarding aspirin, 
shown below in figure 9.4. 
 
Figure 9.2 – ATC Codes for aspirin (in bold) 
Source: Olson & Singh (2017) 
9.2.3.5.Brands’ selection in each market 
After the definition of the markets, the next step consisted of the selection of the products to 
analyze, with a goal of five products per market. We observed the following general criteria 
for this selection, for each market (period of analysis from January 2012 to December 2015): 
- We started by selecting the three products with the highest sell-in sales in Euros; 
- Then we selected one brand that has entered the market during the period of analysis. 
When more than two brands existed in this situation, the one starting its sales closer to 
January 2012 was selected, in order to maximize the time series available for analysis; 
- Thereafter, we selected one brand that has lost patent protection during the period of 
analysis; When more than two brands existed in this situation, we selected the one that 
started facing competition from generics closer to January 2012, in order to maximize 




- In the situations where there were no new brands that started suffering from generics 
competition during the period of analysis, we selected another brand of interest (one 
promoted in co-marketing with one of the top three brands). There were other 
situations of co-marketing too, among products already in the top 3 of sell-in sales in 
Euros. 
With these criteria, we aimed to maximize the validity and generalization ability of the 
research performed, including not only the top three brands, but also new brands entering the 
market, mature brands losing their patent protection, and brands promoted in co-marketing 
with one or more of the top three brands in terms of sell-in sales. The effect of the detailing 
ceiling on a multitude of situations was then be possible (in some cases though the loss of 
patent protection or the start of commercialization were initiated after the entry into force of 
the detailing celing). 
9.2.3.6.Competitors’ selection for each brand 
Since one of the independent variables in our model is competitive promotion investments 
(especially competitive detailing), we then identified the main competitors of each brand in 
each market. This was performed in two ways: 
- First, we analyzed the drug sales ranking in each market and identified a first group of 
possible competitors for each brand 
- Second, we analyzed the indications of each brand using INFARMED’s INFOMED 
website, where we consulted the patient information leaflet, to understand whether the 
competitors were targeted at addressing the same pathologies. The weblink used for 
this selection was http://app7.infarmed.pt/infomed/ 
- Third, in order to validate the provisional list of the main competitors for each brand, 
we interviewed specialists working in the pharmaceutical industry, with direct 
experience in studying and managing brands in the selected markets. These interviews 




 of April 2018. The profile of the interviewed 
managers was the following: 
o Interviewed 1 - >50 years old, >10 years of experience in market research, in a 
company present in the top 3 in sell-in sales in one of the markets 
o Interviewed 2 – 35-40 years old, ≥10 years of experience in consultancy and 




The final list of competitors for each of the brands in each market was then completed. We 
selected up to five main competitors for each product. 
 
9.2.3.7.Data analysis model 
In terms of data analysis model, one could expect to use the model applied by Liu et al 
(2016). However, since we used aggregated data instead of disaggregated data, and given that 
we did not need to develop counterfactual simulations because we had access to real market 
data before and after the implementation of a detailing ceiling, we performed a specific search 
for a suitable data analysis model, focusing on previous research related to the detailing 
impact on prescription behavior. The research perimeter was set by analyzing – from all the 
global peer-reviewed references cited in this thesis – the articles exploring time-series data 
regarding detailing. 
Table 9.9 highlights the main findings gathered. This table characterizes each article in terms 
of data aggregation (nominatively at physician leel, or market level), level of analysis (brand 
or drug category), the quantitative model used, the dependent and independent variables used, 
and additional information about the model in terms of the use of non-linear detailing terms, 
detailing lagged terms, detailing stock (carryover), detailing stock discount (or wearout, or 





Table 9.9 – Data aggregation, level of analysis, and quantitative model used by previous researchers 
 


















Parsons & Abeele 
(1981)
√ √ OLS regression model
Sales 
(prescriptions)
Detailing; mailing; samples; 
handouts
Gender No No No  ---  ---
Mackowiak & Gagnon 
(1985)
√ √ ARIMA Time series analysis
Sales (new 
prescriptions)
Detailing; journal advertising  --- No Yes No  ---  ---
Berndt, Bui, Reiley & 
Urban (1996)
√ √
NL-2SLS (non-linear two stage least squares) 
regression model
Market share
Detailing; medical journal 
advertising; DTCA
Price; longevity in the 
market
No No Yes Yes 4.2%





Drug price; competitors 
price; drug age; other 
factors




Gönül, Carter, Petrova 
& Srinivasan (2001)
√ √
Multinomial logit model with na unknown 
number of latent classes and interactions
Sales 
(prescriptions)
Detailing; samples Retail price; insurance Yes No Yes Yes 0.1%
Wittink (2002) √ √ Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Regression
Sales 
(prescriptions)
Detailing; DTCA; Journal 
advertising; Physician 
meetings
Retail price No No No  ---  ---




Off formulary; other 
variables





Structural model of demand; random 
coefficients discrete choice model; Bayesian 
learning process; GMM-based methodology
Sales (new 
prescriptions)
Detailing; DTCA; meetings & 
events
Past experience; retail 
price
No Yes Yes Yes 30.0%
Rosenthal, Berndt, 
Donohue, Epstein & 
Frank (2003)




Drug price; order of 
entry; drug age (time 
remaining with patent)




Hierarchical Bayesian count data model and




Detailing; samples Specialty; gender Yes No No No  ---
Manchanda, Rossi & 
Chintagunta (2004)
√ √
Negative binomial distribution (NBD) 
regression (sales response function); Poisson 




Detailing; samples Specialty No Yes No No  ---
Mizik & Jacobson 
(2004)
√ √







No Yes No  ---  ---


























Linear sales model for category sales and a 
discrete choice model for brand share; 
standard Nerlove–Arrow (1962) exponential 
decay goodwill model (log-linear)
Sales 
(prescriptions)
Detailing; DTCA; meetings & 
events; interactions





Structural model of demand; random 




Detailing; DTCA; meetings & 
events
Retail price; time No Yes Yes Yes 30.0%
Windmeijer, de Laat, 
Douven & Mot (2006)
√ √ Modified Rizzo OLS regression model
Sales (Defined 
Daily Doses)
Drug promotion (detailing + 
advertising + direct mail); 
interactions; competitors 
promotion expenditures
Drug price; avg 
competitors' drug price, 
drug age; others
No No Yes Yes 4.6%
Berndt, Danzon & 
Kruse (2007)

















Patient requests; drug 
characteristics
No No No  ---  ---
Kalyanaram (2008) √ √ OLS regression model Market share
Detailing + journal 
advertising (DTPP); DTCA
Retail price; order of 
market entry
No No No  ---  ---
Manchanda, Xie & 
Youn (2008)
√ √
Binary choice model with duration dependence 
(equivalent to a discrete-time-hazard (survival) 






No No Yes Yes 30.0%
Vakratsas & Kolsarici 
(2008)
√ √
Switching regime dual-market diffusion model 




Detailing; journal advertising; 
DTCA
 --- No* Yes No  ---  ---
John (2008) √ √ Neural networks and non-linear programming
Sales 
(prescriptions)
Detailing  --- Yes No Yes No  ---
Dong, Manchanda & 
Chintagunta (2009)
√ √
Bayesian method with a prescription response 




Detailing  --- Yes Yes No  ---  ---
Kalyanaram (2009) √ √
2SLS (two stage least squares) regression 
model
Market share
Detailing + journal 
advertising (DTPP); DTCA
Retail price; competition 
intensity; avg cost per 
consumption
No No No  ---  ---
Independent variables Includes detailing…
Mixed logit model | Generalized method of 
moments (GMM) (log-log)
Market share  ---




Drug price; avg 
competitors price; 
seasonality



































Detailing Patient requests No No Yes No  ---
Fischer & Albers 
(2010)
√ √ √ Log-log model
Sales 
(prescriptions)
Detailing; journal advertising; 
DTCA
Drug price; order of 
entry; other variables
Yes No Yes No  ---
Fischer, Leeflang & 
Verhoef (2010)




Detailing; journal advertising; 
direct mailing; competitive 
marketing activities
Order of entry; quality; 
number of new entries; 
drug price
No Yes Yes Yes
54% 
(quarter)
Gönül & Carter (2010) √ √ Multiple regression model
Sales (new 
prescriptions)
Detailing; e-detailing Drug characteristics No No Yes Yes 0.4%
Leeflang & Wieringa 
(2010)
√ √
Modified Rizzo OLS regression model 
(Windmeijer, de Laat, Douven & Mot, 2006)
Sales 
(prescriptions)
Detailing; journal advertising; 
direct mail; competitive 
detailing
Drug price; competing 
drugs' avg price; drug 
age
No Yes Yes Yes N/A
Montoya, Netzer & 
Jedidi (2010)
√ √
Hierarchical Bayesian, nonhomogeneous 
hidden Markov model (1
st
) | Partially observable 





Detailing; samples  --- No No No  ---  ---
Nair, Manchanda & 
Bhatia (2010)
√ √




Detailing  --- Yes No No  ---  ---
Dong, Chintagunta & 
Manchanda (2011)
√ √
Poisson-lognormal simultaneous equation 





 --- Yes Yes Yes No  ---
Ching & Ishihara 
(2012)
√ √ Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Regression
Sales 
(prescriptions)
Detailing; samples; detailing 
made by partner (co-
marketing)
Price; clinical outcomes No No Yes Yes 4.1%




promotion (detailing + 
samples + journal 
advertising), DTCA
Price Yes No No  ---  ---
Wieringa & Leeflang 
(2013)
√ √




Detailing; medical journal 
advertising; direct mail; 
competitive promotion 
expenditures
Drug age; drug age 
squared;








Detailing; medical journal 
advertising; physician 
meetings; DTCA
 --- Yes Yes Yes No  ---






Source: own elaboration 
The analysis of the content of table 9.9 allows to conclude that a multitude of data models have been used by previous researchers. In the case of 
aggregated data (market aggregation), Rizzo (1999)’s model was adapted by Windmeijer, de Laat, Douven & Mot (2006), calibrating it to the Dutch 
pharmaceutical market. 

























Yes No Yes Yes 20.0%
Kappe & Stremersch 
(2016)
√ √




Detailing  --- No Yes Yes No  ---
Liu, Gupta, 
Venkataraman & Liu 
(2016)
√ √
Dynamic structural model of oligopoly 
competition in detailing (demand and supply), 
with 2-stage estimation + counterfactual 
simulations of detailing policy




√ √ Structural econometric model
Sales 
(prescriptions)
Detailing; DTCA  --- No Yes Yes Yes N/A
Chung, Kim & Park 
(2017)
√ √ OLS regression model
Sales 
(prescriptions)
Detailing; sampling  --- No Yes Yes Yes N/A
Kappe, Venkataraman 
& Stremersch (2017)





Trend; dummy (new 
product introduction)
No Yes Yes No  ---
Liu, Liu & Chintagunta 
(2017)
√ √
Hierarchical Bayesian logit model | 
Counterfactual policy simulations based on a 





 --- No Yes Yes Yes 1.0%






No No Yes Yes 40.0%




Table 9.10 below summarizes the main advantages and limitations of Rizzo (1999) and Windmeijer et al (2006)’ models. 
Table 9.10 – Advantages and limitations of Rizzo and Windmeijer’s models 
 















Data was pooled (category level), assuming that the marketing 
effects of all brands have the same effect on demand
First author to analyze the effects of marketing expenditures on 
the price elasticity of pharmaceutical demand
Aggregated marketing expenditures
Impactful work on public policy makers opinions about the wellfare 
of the pharmaceutical industry promotional activities
European reality different from the USA's in terms of pricing 
definition (pricing in Europe is predominantly set by policy makers 
from government, industry, and insurance companies, and not 
directly set by pharmaceutical companies themselves
Incorrect assumptions of homogeneous parameters across brands
Wieringa & 
Leeflang (2013)
Adapts Rizzo's model to the Dutch market, in an application to 
the European reality
Also uses aggregated marketing expenditures
More complete model than Rizzo's (included dummies for months 
and policy changes)
Data was pooled across 140 brands and 11 markets, which can 
lead to biased estimates
Windmeijer, de 

















For the purpose of the empirical component of our research, we will follow Leeflang & 
Wieringa (2010) since, such as Leeflang & Wieringa (2010)’s data, our time series data of 
drug sales and detailing expenditures is characterized by aggregated data, at drug brand level, 
with drug sales as dependent variable, and a series of promotion instruments expenditures as 
independent variables (detailing, journal advertising, and other). As noted by Leeflang & 
Wieringa (2010), Rizzo’s model, despite being well accepted, suffers from a few limitations 
listed in the table above. Such as in the Netherlands, in Portugal, prices are predominantely 
set by policy makers too (government), aspect which has been covered previously. 
Interestingly, Leeflang & Wieringa (2010) are one of the few authors studying European-level 
time series of data, in the research community studying detailing and pharmaceutical 
marketing in general, as can be concluded from the articles examined in table 9.11, which 






































Parsons & Abeele 
(1981)
Belgium N/A N/A






Mackowiak & Gagnon 
(1985)







Berndt, Bui, Reiley & 
Urban (1996)




Rizzo (1999) USA N/A N/A Antihypertension 46 drugs
72 
months
First Databank | The Physicians’ 
Desk Reference | IMS Health | 
IMSPACT
Gönül, Carter, Petrova 
& Srinivasan (2001)




Wittink (2002) USA N/A
Primary care and 
specialties
Hypertension, asthma, arthritis, 
erectile dysfuntion, other




Verispan (Scott-Levin Inc.) | 
ACNielsenHCI (PERQ/HCI)
Wosinska (2002) USA N/A N/A







IMS Health | Blue Shield of 





















Marketing research firms | 
Competitive Media Reporting | 





care, and other 
(anonymous)

















































Verispan Inc | Pharmaceutical 
firms
N/A





























Windmeijer, de Laat, 
Douven & Mot (2006)





Health Insurance Board | IMS 
Health













USA N/A Several (N/A)
Statins, gastrointestinal and 






Pharmaceutical marketing firm | 
FDA | National Institute for 
Health and Clinical Excellence
Kalyanaram (2008) USA N/A N/A
Anti-depressants, proton pump 




IMS Health | Competitive Media 
Reporting




care, and other 
(anonymous)
























Dong, Manchanda & 
Chintagunta (2009)
USA 330 Primary care








Kalyanaram (2009) USA N/A N/A
Anti-depressants, proton pump 




IMS Health | Competitive Media 













Fischer & Albers 
(2010)
USA N/A N/A N/A Several (2,831)
21 
quarters
IMS Health | FDA















Gönül & Carter (2010) USA N/A N/A 6 classes Several (21)
19 
months
SDI Health | IMS Health
Leeflang & Wieringa 
(2010)
Holland N/A
General practitioners + 
Psychiatrists
11 classes Several (140) N/A N/A
Montoya, Netzer & 
Jedidi (2010)
USA 300 N/A











Source: own elaboration 
Table 9.12 describes four of the models applied by Leeflang & Wieringa (2010). Models with 
pooled data are not present in the table, since in our dataset all data was organized at the 
individual brand level. All four models used logarithmized terms in both drug sales and 
independent variables (except for drug age and dummy variables). The models are described 














Nair, Manchanda & 
Bhatia (2010)
USA 1,500 N/A
Serious chronic disease that affects 




Pharmaceutical company | 
Market research firm
Dong, Chintagunta & 
Manchanda (2011)
USA 200 Primary care






Ching & Ishihara 
(2012)
Canada N/A N/A








Dave & Saffer (2012) USA N/A N/A
Analgesics / musculoskeletal, anti-





Physicians' desk reference | 
Competitive Media Reporting | 
IMS Health
Wieringa & Leeflang 
(2013)
Holland N/A N/A








USA N/A N/A Rhinitis, arthritis, asthma Several (34)
96 
months
Syndicated secondary data 
sources (anonymous)







IMS Health + pharmaceutical 
market research firm
Kappe & Stremersch 
(2016)
USA 4,622
General practitioners + 
Specialists









Venkataraman & Liu 
(2016)
USA 448 N/A



















Chung, Kim & Park 
(2017)







USA 1,585 General practitioners







Narket research firm 
(anonymous)
Liu, Liu & Chintagunta 
(2017)






Marketing research firm 
(anonymous)












Table 9.12 – Summary of the research models 
 
Source: own construction based on Leeflang & Wieringa (2010) 
Multiplicative model 
Following the great majority of the literature on the field of detailing and pharmaceutical 
marketing, and observing Leeflang & Wieringa (2010) option, we selected a multiplicative 
model, where we applied logarithms in both dependent variable (sales in DDDs) and 
independent variables (all promotion instruments, interactions, and other as later described in 



















Ln Lagged sales period t-1 No No No Yes
Ln Lagged sales period t-2 No No No Yes
Ln Detailing flow Yes Yes Yes No
Ln Detailing flow x Ln Detailing flow No No Yes No
Ln Journal advertising flow Yes Yes No No
Ln Direct marketing flow Yes Yes No No
Ln Global marketing expenditures flow No No No Yes
Ln Competitive detailing flow No Yes Yes No
Ln Competitive journal advertising flow No Yes No No
Ln Competitive direct marketing flow No Yes No No
Ln Competitive global marketing expenditures flow Yes No No Yes
Ln Detailing stock No No Yes No
Ln Detailing stock x Ln Detailing stock No No Yes No
Ln Global marketing expenditures stock No No No Yes
Competitive Ln Competitive global marketing expenditures stock No No No Yes
Own Ln Average drug price per DDD Yes No Yes Yes
Competitors Ln Average competitors drug price per DDD No No Yes Yes
Drug age Yes Yes Yes Yes
Drug age 2̂ Yes Yes Yes Yes
Drug age 3̂ No Yes No No
Average drug price per DDD x Ln Detailing flow No No Yes No
Ln Average drug price per DDD x Ln Detailing stock No No Yes No
Ln Average drug price per DDD x Drug age No No Yes No
Ln Journal advertising flow x Ln Detailing flow No Yes No No
Ln Journal advertising flow x Ln Mailing flow No Yes No No
Ln Mailing flow x Ln Detailing flow No Yes No No
Ln Global marketing expenditures stock x Ln Average drug price per DDD No No No Yes
Ln Global marketing expenditures stock x Ln Average competitors price per DDD No No No Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month dummies Yes Yes No Yes
Policy change dummies Yes Yes No Yes






































overcome the problem with logarithm of zero expenditures (which happened in several 
promotion instruments, with zero investment in some months, especially in the digital 
promotion expenditures), we substituted all zero values by 1€ (logarithm of one equals zero). 
Structural break models 
A structural break can be defined as «an instability or break in the parameters of the data» 
(Valentinyi-Endrész, 2004; p. 12), as «sudden events which change the structure of the 
econometric model under consideration» (Maurya, Singh & Khare, 2016; p. 195). 
As noted by Bai & Perron (2003), the literature on structural breaks includes both approaches 
to a single break, and to multiple breaks. Hansen (2001) explained several types of structural 
tests. One of these tests is a test for a structural break of unknown timing. Chow (1960), a 
pioneer in structural break models, developed a test for a structural break of known timing, by 
testing the equality of coefficients of two linear regressions splitting the sample in two 
periods. They then compared the sum of squares of the residuals assuming the equality versus 
inequality, using an F-test. The main limitation pointed to the Chow (1960) method is the fact 
that one must know, a priori, the timing of the break date, as noted by Hansen (2001), since 
otherwise the test may produce uninformative coefficients, and as a result the potentially true 
break data can be neglected. This limitation was addressed, as referred by Hansen (2001), 
when Quandt (1960) developed a test that foresaw the possibility of an unknown number of 
breaks, as an extension of Chow (1960)’s test. Quandt (1960)’s goal was to «indicate various 
approaches to testing the hypothesis that no switch occurred in the parameters of a linear 
regression system against the alternative that one switch took place» (p. 329). 
Other type of structural break estimation consists of an estimation of the timing of a structural 
break, by obtaining confidence intervals for the break date, as explained by Hansen (2001). 
He noted that this can be achieved by least squares, where «the least squares breakdate 
estimate is the date that minimizes the full-sample sum of squared errors» (p. 121). Bai & 
Perron (1998) developed an estimation strategy aimed at constructing tests to identify 
estimates of the break dates, and the number of breaks, in the scope of a model where some of 
the parameters were not exposed to changes. They method allowed them to estimate 
successive break points in the data series. As a null hypothesis, they propose the inexistence 
of any structural break, versus an alternative hypothesis which foresaw the existence of an 




Previous research using structural breaks has already been applied to time series of data 
involving the Portuguese pharmaceutical market. Pita Barros & Nunes (2010) studied 
structural breaks using a monthly time series of pharmaceutical expenditure growth in 
Portugal, from January 1995 to August 2008. The method they selected for data analysis – a 
structural time series approach - considered both the number of structural breaks and their 
timing endogenously (unknown, or not defined arbitrarily), where data would speak for itself, 
highlighting potential structural breaks which were not assumed by the researchers. They then 
checked the timings against health policies adopted by the Health Ministry. They found 
evidence of two structural breaks, approximately around October 2005 and January 2007, 
whose timing corresponded to two compulsory price reductions. Pita Barros & Nunes (2010) 
noted that the method they observed may be especially applicable in the scope of unexpected 
policy changes, such as the ones that consecutively happened in the Portuguese health sector, 
with a series of 10 major policy measures concentrated in the period between the years 2002 
and 2007. They reason that «unexpected policy measures may produce an effect with a lag 
with respect to official dates» (p. 441). 
Given the specific characteristics of our research – existence of one very well identified break 
regarding detailing activities, in the form of a detailing ceiling which entered into force in 
August 2013, we followed Chow (1960)’s approach to identify significant changes in 
regression coefficients before and after the structural break. Two equations were used for each 
product: one using data before the entry into force of the 2013 detailing ceiling, and one using 












9.2.4. Qualitative phase 
Table 9.13 below summarizes the research design applied in the qualiitative phase: 
 
Table 9.13 - Research design scheme for the qualiitative phase 
 
9.2.4.1.Research objective, control and context 
In terms of the research objective, the research was exploratory in the second phase, to help 
understand why specific results have arised. 
In this phase (qualitative), which had the goal of answering questions such as how or why, 
there was no control. 
In terms of context, the qualitative phase was classified as field (natural), since it was 
conducted in the natural habitat, in the real world. 
The selection of this research design (objective, control and context) for the qualitative – 
aimed at exploring insights on the behavior of healthcare professionals including physicians - 
was aligned with the designs used by authors like Prosser & Walley (2013a), Prosser & 
Walley (2013b), Grundy, Bero & Malone (2016), Skandrani & Sghaier (2016), and Saavedra, 







Concerning time, the research was cross–sectional (state) in the qualitative phase, since a 
single measurement in time was used. 
9.2.4.3.Data collection 
Primary research was generated in the qualitative phase, with the goal of probing quantitative 
results by exploring aspects of the central phenomenon (the moderating effect of a detailing 
ceiling on the relation between detailing intensity (measured through detailing flow) and 
prescription behavior (measured through sell-in sales in DDDs)), with a few participants from 
the pharmaceutical industry and policy regulators. The reason for following up with 
qualitative research in the second phase was to understand better and explain the quantitative 
results (Creswell, 2009).  
9.2.4.4.Investigation strategy 
Information from the quantitative phase was explored further using one case study consisting 
of the Portuguese pharmaceutical industry, with the goal of searching for converging 
evidence, making the outcomes as robust as possible. 
The data collection methods and tools selected observed a triangulation goal, comprising 
semi-structured in-depth personal interviews, researchers’ observations, documental analysis 
(pharmaceutical industry reports, regulator reports, pharmaceutical magazines, articles, 
legislation, other), and non-structured interviews with pharmaceutical marketing specialists. 
The actors, or elements that provided information about the cases, observed a goal of 
triangulation, and included prescribers (physicians), influencers (pharmaceutical sales 
representatives), regulators, and others that allowed a better understanding of eventual 
specificities of the research results. Table 9.14 evidences the actors we planned to interview in 
the qualitative phase of the research. During fieldwork, in order to overcome some 
limitations, and to reach a broader perspective, we made minor changes to the list, as 








Table 9.14 – Planned interviewed actors 
 
Source: own elaboration 
Data analysis technique consisted of content analysis, performed using the software NVivo 
11. A case study protocol was developed, defining the context and perimeter of questions for 
each case. A qualitative script was developed, subject to a pre-test and validation by the 
supervisor. In-depth interviews were made using sound recording (authorized by the 
interviewees), followed by interviews transcription to NVivo 11, finalizing with coding, 
analysis and interpretation. 
9.2.4.5.Case study protocol 
A case study protocol was designed, covering the general objectives of the research, the 
conceptual model and the type of paradigm used (pragmatism). The information of the 
interviewees was contextualized using a sociodemographic questionnaire, allowing the 
treatment and understanding of the information considered relevant, such as the personal, 
social, professional and academic context. The protocol also defined the requirements of 





Former Ministry of Health (2011-2015) 1
Former Ministry of Health (2015-2018) 1
NHS ACES Director 1
NHS Hospital Clinical Director 1
NHS exclusive General Practitioner (physician) 1
NHS + Private Practice General Practitioner (physician) 1
NHS exclusive Specialist (physician) 1
NHS + Private Practice Specialist (physician) 1
General Manager 1
Marketing / Sales Director 1
Pharmaceutical Sales Representative Market 1 - Blood 1
Pharmaceutical Sales Representative Market 2 - Pancreas 1
Pharmaceutical Sales Representative Market 3 - Heart 1
















process. It was stipulated the use of a portable voice recorder to record the interviews and the 
perceptions or observations of the interviewer after each of the interviews. 
Research goals 
The case study was aimed at answering to the following questions: 
- Which are the communication channels mostly used by the company to interact with 
physicians? 
- And which are the promotion tools? 
- What is the importance of detailing? 
- Which were the goals of implementing a detailing ceiling? 
- Was its implementation successful? 
- Was its application on the field controllable? Is the control of the PSRs calls effective? 
- Was there any structural change in the way PSRs contact with NHS institutions? 
Frequency, location of contact, booking new visits, … 
- Did the industry react to the detailing ceiling? How? 
- Were there any cases of misconducts / excess number of calls detected? Were there 
any consequences? Further measures taken? 
- Was the policy considered sufficient to reach the proposed goals? 
- Which changes would have to be made to make the ceiling more effective? 
 
Context information 
The context includes a series of relevant information that helped to understand each case. This 
information was collected in addition to the questions in the qualitative script, and included:  
- Market context – the importance, both in terms of sales magnitude and sales growth, 
of each of the case studies 
- Social context – the importance of the drugs (treatments), in the scope of public 
health, given the number of patients with pathologies treated by drugs in each of the 
cases 
- Economic context – the context of austerity initiated after the financial assistance by 






- Credentials and Access to the Case Study Sites 
This section describes the processes that were observed so that data could be accessed. 
 Selection of eligible interviewees – the first step consisted of the selection the roles, 
or positions, or responsibilities of the actors (before allocating names). The second 
step consisted of the identification of a series of candidates. Criteria defined for 
participants’ selections was: 
o Government / tutelage – current and ex-government officers which were 
important actors in the definition of the 2013 detailing ceiling, and officers 
from INFARMED (the health authority supervising the registry, credentiation 
and identification of the PSRs 
o Health care organizations – officers or directors of ACES (groups of 
healthcare centers) and hospitals, the ones in charge of informing ARS 
(regional health administration) of PSRs non-compliance, according to Order 
8213-B/2013, article 7 
o Health care providers - physicians working on the national health system 
(ACES, or groups of health centers, and hospitals). Two of the physicians with 
exclusivity to the NHS (one general practitioner and one specialist) and two 
with mixed practice (NHS and private) 
o Pharmaceutical industry officers – having an eligible function / occupation 
in the pharmaceutical manufacturer (PSR, or sales director / marketing director 
/ general manager), commercializing drugs in one or more of the selected 
ATCs, and also Consultants 
o Pharmaceutical sales representatives – PSRs promoting products from the 
four markets’ perimeters 
 Contact with eligible candidates – contact was made by mobile phone, e-mail, 
informal networks (personal and professional contacts), social networks (Linkedin, 





o The general objectives of the interview 
o The reason for being contacted 
o Probable duration of the interview (between 40 and 60 minutes) 
o The need to record the interview with a portable recorder 
o Confidentiality assurance 
o The fact that interview transcripts would be sent for review and adding up any 
forgotten information 
 Meeting schedule – whenever the invitations were accepted, a convenient location 
and date for the interview were set. Most of the interviews were set to Fridays 
 Interview – all interviews were conducted by the PhD candidate, using a portable 
sound recorder. In order to properly manage the interview dynamic in terms of 
sequence, content and homogeneity among all interviews, a previously developed 
qualitative script was used 
 Post-interview – after each interview, the PhD candidate recorded his perceptions, 
first ideas, and unanswered questions for each interview. These preliminary first 
insights about the dynamic conducted happened to be of substantial value during the 
content analysis phase, helping to understand the context and support both the hand-
written notes and the interviews transcriptions, for a holistic approach 
 Information sources 
o Non-structured interviews with pharmaceutical industry specialists 
o Semi-structured in-depth interviews with pharmaceutical industry stakeholders 
o Legislation 
o Other (including industry publications and articles) 
 Procedural reminders 
o Communication channel used for the interaction – whenever a face-to-face 




telephone interview was proposed, as an alternative. A third alternative as the 
last contingency plan was to request written answers to a set of questions sent 
by mail, by the researcher 
o Confidentiality issues – all interviewees were given confidentiality assurance 
that information (documents, photos, video, and sound) gathered during the 
interviews would be kept confidential. This assurance was given at the 
beginning of the interaction, before starting the interview. A non-disclosure 
agreement would be given to the interviewees, if requested 
o Usage of digital recorder – a smartphone was used to record all interviews 
o Procedures used for transcription and double-checking by interviewees – 
after the completion of the interviews phase, transcriptions were performed by 
the researcher, and sent to interviewees for validation 
o Content analysis software – NVivo 11 was used to record and monitor all 
research (content analysis). NVivo 11 was used as well to perform data 
analysis with increased accuracy, from the very beginning of the research 
o Documenting research steps – all research steps after the beginning of the 
qualitative phase were documented in a research diary, which included: 
 Entry dates of the note 
 Title of the note 
 Notes – these notes included insights written after the interviews, 
information found in different channels (such as videos, news, and 
other considered relevant) and researcher’s feelings and vents, and 
perceptions about the research 
 
Preliminary Guidelines for Case Study Data Collection  
- Specific issues to remember during data collection 
A specific interview script was built for each of the five types of interviewee. This script 




The script contains primary questions, and secondary or optional questions (one or two per 
dimension). These secondary questions were activated whenever the researcher needed more 
precision and clarity in the answer, namely in the following situations: 
o Interviewees only gave limited information; 
o Interviewees had some difficulties expressing themselves; 
o Non-verbal language did not match the expressed answers given. 
Examples of such secondary questions include “How did you feel about this situation?”, 
“Could you have decided differently?”, or “How exactly did you do it?”. 
A maximum of 6-7 questions was applied in each script dimension (sum of primary and 
secondary questions). 
In the semi-structured interviews, where only open-ended questions were used, the researcher 
was prepared to have included other questions adding value and insights to the formal 
questions present at the script. In this situation, the funnel technique was applied, where 
global, general questions were asked first, and specific, detailed questions were put later in 
the sequence. 
The researcher recorded the information collected in the interview by handwriting (general 
ideas) and complemented with digital voice recording, whever allowed by the interviewees. A 
transcript was done as soon as possible after the interview (after a maximum of up to two 
weeks), as well as a memo recording the personal comments of the researcher based on 
observation during the interview. As referred previously, the transcripts were sent to 
interviewees for review, adding up any forgotten information, and approval. 
Tables for data collection and possible information sources to answer each research 
question 
Data collection was separated as follows: 
 Contextual data – the topic included personal, professional and academic, and social 
data, helping the researcher to know each interviewee general profile 
 General data – in this topic, a definition for each dimension was created, as well as the 






Table 9.15 evidences the contextual data. 




Tables 9.16, 9.17 and 9.18 represent the general data table, where we list the macro 
dimensions, the units (or sub-dimensions), the concepts definition, the targets, and the 
questions themselves. It started with macro dimension 1 – Pharmaceutical communication 
channels and promotion tools.  
Context area Unit Questions Possible information sources









Table 9.16 – General Data – Dimension 1 
 













Means or vehicles through which the 
message moves from the sender to 
the receiver
All
1) Given your experience in the health sector, which are the most common communication channels used by 
pharmaceutical companies to vehiculate their messages to physicians? (face-to-face, on-line, telephone, mail, ...)
2) Considering the last five years, do you see any pattern change in terms of channels used? If so, why do you 
think that happened?
Promotion tools
Instruments used by companies to 
develop interactions with clients and 
reach promotion goals, using 
communication channels
All
3) And which are the most common promotion tools used by pharmaceutical companies to interact with 
physicians?
4) Do you see any pattern change in the utilization of promotion tools, in the last 5 years? If so, why do you think 
that happened?
All
5) In your opinion, what are the main goals of pharmaceutical companies when they decide to use promotion 
tools to interact with physicians?
6) Do you believe the promotion tools used by pharmaceutical companies can influence physicians' prescription 
choices? Why? How? To which extent? In which occasions / situations?
7) As you know, companies typically use a series of promotion tools including visits made by pharmaceutical 
sales representatives, activity also know by detailing, mailing, journal advertising, e-detailing, medical meetings, 
congresses, and other. How would you set the ranking of these instruments in their ability to influence doctors' 
prescribing decisions? (No. 1 = instrument with greater capacity of influence, No. 2 = instrument with second 
greater capacity of influence, etc). Why did you set the ranking this way?
8) In your view, what is the importance of detailing to pharmaceutical companies? And to the physicians? Is this 
importance equal for new vs older drugs? And is it equal for original drugs vs generics?
9) In your opinion, which are the main factors influencing physicians prescription decisions?
Physicians only
10) Do you consider that detailing influences your prescription decisions? To which extent? Why?
11) Do you consider yourself less or more easily influenced than your colleagues, concerning the effect of 
detailing on prescription decisions? Why?
Effect of promotion 
tools on prescription 
behavior









We then moved to dimension 2 – Implementation of the detailing ceiling in the National Health System 
Table 9.17 – General Data – Dimension 2 
 














goals of the 
detailing ceiling
Motivations and objectives of the 
tutelage for the detailing ceiling
All
12) In your view, what was the main goal the tutelage wanted to attain when it decided to limit the number of visits 
PSRs can make to NHS doctors and institutions?
13) Do you believe there other additional goals for imposing that limit?
Implementation of 
the detailing ceiling
Process of implementation, on the 
field, of the detailing ceiling
All
(adjust to "in your 
institution" in the 
case of NHS 
institution directors)
14) In your view, was the detailing ceiling to the NHS adequately implemented on the field? To which extent? Why 
do you think that?
15) Was the application of the ceiling to the NHS controlable, that is, was it simple to control whether the PSRs 
observed the maximum number of visits allowed? Why do you think that? How was the control made?
16) (Adjust in the case of NHS institution directors) To the extent of your knowledge, were there any cases of 
misconduct / excess number of visits detected? Were those eventual cases reported? Were there any 
consequences? Were there further measures taken?
Pharmaceutical 
companies reaction
Reaction of the pharmaceutical 
companies to face the entry into force 
of the detailing ceiling
All
17) Did pharmaceutical companies react to the detailing ceiling imposed to the number of visits to the NHS? 
How? When?
18) Did pharmaceutical companies use any "tricks" to circumvent the ceiling to the number of visits to the NHS? 
Which? Did it produce results? (ex: additional companies with different VATs, visiting doctors at their private 
practice, ...)
Implementation 
of the detailing 





Dimension 3 – Effect of the detailing ceiling to the NHS is shown below. 
Table 9.18 – General Data – Dimension 3 
 










Effect of the detailing ceiling on PSRs 
activity
All
19) In your view, was there any structural change in the way PSRs interacted with NHS institutions, as a 
consequence of the entry into force of the detailing ceiling, comparing with the previous reality? In the average 
number of visits made per day, in the frequency, location of contact, booking of new visits, ...? Any "trick" used 
by the PSRs? How did PSRs adjust to the detailing ceiling to the NHS?
On pharmaceutical 
companies
Effect of the detailing ceiling on 
pharmaceutical companies promotion 
decisions
All
20) In your view, did pharmaceutical companies reallocate its investments in promotion tools, due to the entry into 
force of the detailing ceiling to the visits made to the NHS? Ex: less investment in detailing and more investment 
in other promotion tools? Which ones?
On NHS institutions
Effect of the detailing ceiling on the 
activity of the NHS institutions
All
21) Do you think there was an impact on NHS institutions' daily activity as a result of the limitation of the number 
of visits made by the PSRs? Can you please elaborate?
All
(adjust to "you" / 
"your" in the case of 
physicians)
22) Was there any impact on NHS physicians as a result of the limitation of the number of visits made by the 
PSRs? If any, was it positive or negative? Why?
23) (Adjust in the case of Physicians) And was there any structural impact on physician prescription behavior due 
to the entry into force of the detailing ceiling to visits to the NHS? If so, which impact? Why?
All
24) Do you consider that the detailing ceiling impacted all pharmaceutical companies the same way? Why? Ex: 
companies with higher detailing intensity vs companies with lower detailing intensity
Goals attained
Ability of the detailing ceiling to reach 
the tutelage goals
All
25) Do you believe the detailing ceiling had a real impact on the field, translated into an effective reduction in the 
number of PSRs visits to NHS doctors and institutions? Why? To what extent?
26) Globally, do you consider that the ceiling to the number of PSRs visits to NHS reached the tutelage goals? 
Why?
Adjustments to the 
detailing ceiling 
Eventual adjustments to the detailing 
ceiling to make it more effective
All
(adjust in the case 
of the NHS officer in 
charge in 2013)
27) (Adjust in the case of the NHS officer in charge in 2013) Imagine you had the opportunity to design this 
detailing ceiling to the number of visits to the NHS, back in 2013. Would you have done something differently? 
Why? How? With different limits? With a different approach?
Final comments
Final comments the responder wants 
to make
All 28) Would you like to make any final comments?
On NHS physicians
Effect of the detailing ceiling on the 
activity of NHS physicians






Preliminary Outline for the Case Study Report 
The information included in the case study report was reviewed iteratively, in the sense that 
there was evolution and review until it was considered to have achieved a satisfactory level of 
quality to allow transmitting the desired messages with clarity and reasonable objectiveness. 
The case study report passed through the steps mentioned by Lincoln and Guba (1985): 
explain the problem under study, depict with clarity and rigor the applicable context, describe 
the activities and processes observed within that context, emphasize the aspects studied in 
detail on each site, and present the key insights of the research. 
 
9.2.5. Critical analysis of the chosen methodology 
The selected methodology incorporates several potential limitations and strengths, 
summarized below. 
Regarding promotion data, and depending on the therapeutic classes, drugs and medical 
specialties selected for analysis, statistical reliability may be lower than the global expected 
4,35% for a confidence interval of 95%. Nevertheless, sales data, collected from distributors 
in the Portuguese market, represents at least 95% of the market sales in Portugal. 
Concerning internal validity, there were several government policies (not related to 
restrictions to detailing activity) that took place. If some of them most likely did not have 
substantial effects during the time series period (January 2012 to December 2015), such as as 
compulsory price reductions in both brands and generics (especially between 2005 and 2010), 
others may have had non-insignificant impacts, such as the entry into force of compulsory 
writing of prescriptions by international nonproprietary name (INN, which took place in 2012, 
limiting the ability of physicians to prescribe using the brand names of medicines, given that 
generics are available), troika intervention causing severe budget constraints in health 
management (reducing market sales), economic crisis (which may have led to reductions in 
the number of PSRs, reducing the number of sales calls to physicians), and other. However, 
the quantitative analysis model tested some of the incorporation of qualitative variables in 
order to isolate their effects on the dependent variable (prescription behavior). Also, the fact 
that four therapeutic classes were selected (two less impacted by generics, and two more 
impacted) contributed to the increase in robustness of internal validity. Another relevant 




as the levels of expectations and the sales potential, which may have impacted the 
pharmaceutical companies’ decisions on the sales force sizing and number of visits to 
physicians. The qualitative phase of the research helped however to analyze and mitigate this 
possible impact on internal validity. 
Despite the limitations above, we believe the proposed research was adequate when assessed 
from additional perspectives. The first is external validity. Despite the fact that most of 
previous research was conducted using US–based data, the current research has relevant 
external validity, since data source, data, methods and strategy to answer to the research 
question are similar to the ones applied by previous researchers. The second is measurement 
validity. The proposed research is aligned with what experts in the pharmaceutical marketing 
and detailing have been studying (content validity), and addressed the same variables using 
longitudinal data and a case study (construct validity). The third is reliability (or replicability). 
Despite the fact that it was not possible to guarantee full reliability, since results in the 
literature reveal a certain extent of variability (especially in the magnitude of the relation), the 
proposed research used the same data source, the same variables and the same data 
aggregation as a substantial community of researchers in pharmaceutical marketing, and the 
analysis model will be inspired on previous research by other authors. Also, the proposed 
research applied the same analysis model to a long time series, testing whether the results are 
coherent over time (test and re–test). 
Focusing on the qualitative phase, the research benefited from construct validity (since 
several information sources were used, and the interview transcriptions were reviewed by the 
participants), external validity (since the research was linked to similar research already 
conducted) and reliability (since a case study protocol was developed, data was stored and 










10. Empirical study - quantitative 
This chapter starts by exploring the data procedures observed to prepare data for analysis. It 
then explores the application of several models used by Leeflang & Wieringa (2010). Finally, 
it explored adaptations of those models by including new variables. Conclusions were then 
addressed at the end of the chapter. 
Important decisions were taken regarding the analysis model application. These involved the 
inclusion of lagged analysis, non-linear terms, detailing stock (carryover), detailing stock 
discount, and the detailing stock discount monthly value, later explored in this chapter. 
10.1. Data preparation procedures 
Some procedures were performed regarding IQVIA data, which will be explored in the 
following sub-chapters. 
10.1.1. Data extraction 
Sell-in data was extracted using Dataview software, regarding the markets defined. Since 
Dataview only provides information of a maximum of three years, four CSV files were 
extracted: January 2006-December 2008, January 2009-December 2011, January 2012-
December 2014, and January 2015-December 2017. The four CSV files were then merged 
into one single file. Promotion data was extracted from Channel Dynamics into an EXCEL 
file. IQVIA Portugal only had monthly data regarding promotion investments from January 
2012, and as a consequence the analysis period was focused on the 19 months before the entry 
into force of the detailing ceiling (from January 2012 to July 2013), and the 29 months after 
(from August 2013 to December 2015). Promotion data was then incorporated into the sell-in 
merged dataset, mostly by automatic procedures (with a small number of drugs matched 
manually). 
10.1.2. Dataset configuration 
The received dataset had several megabytes of information, which was then compiled in order 
to feed the data analysis step. A new configuration was prepared, which had the structure 







Table 10.1 - Dataset adjusted configuration – Sell-in data 
 
Source: own elaboration 
Promotional data was also adjusted into a new configuration, here shown below in tables 10.2 
and 10.3. 












Jan 2012 Q € String Q € month/year month/year String String
Feb 2012 Q € String Q € month/year month/year String String
Mar 2012 Q € String Q € month/year month/year String String
… Q € String Q € month/year month/year String String
July 2013 Q € String Q € month/year month/year String String
Aug 2013 Q € String Q € month/year month/year String String
… Q € String Q € month/year month/year String String
Oct 2015 Q € String Q € month/year month/year String String
 Nov 2015 Q € String Q € month/year month/year String String
Dec 2015 Q € String Q € month/year month/year String String
Drug X




Table 10.2 - Dataset adjusted configuration – Promotion data 
 































Jan 2012 N N € € € € € € € € € € € €
Feb 2012 N N € € € € € € € € € € € €
Mar 2012 N N € € € € € € € € € € € €
… N N € € € € € € € € € € € €
July 2013 N N € € € € € € € € € € € €
Aug 2013 N N € € € € € € € € € € € €
… N N € € € € € € € € € € € €
Oct 2015 N N € € € € € € € € € € € €
 Nov 2015 N N € € € € € € € € € € € €
Dec 2015 N N € € € € € € € € € € € €
Promotion investments data





Table 10.3 evidences a series of additional variables contained in IQVIA’s database, related to 
detailing. 
Table 10.3 – Other promotion detailing-related data - Promotion data 
 











































































































10.1.3. Variables description 
We now characterize each of the available variables in the dataset provided by IQVIA, in 
tables 10.4 and 10.5. 
Table 10.4 – Sell-in variables description 
 











Sales in units Numeric Sell-in units
Sales in counting units Numeric
Number of pills or treatment units (tablets, capsules) in each pack (ex: 
30 pills)
Sales in Euros Numeric Sell-in sales in Euros
Pack String Description of the pack size (ex: 10mg)
Retail selling price Numeric Price the patient pays at the pharmacy, in Euros
Drug authorization 
date




Date on which the drug was first commercialized in the market (month 
and year) (can be different from the drug authorization date)
Molecule String Name of the corresponding molecule




Table 10.5 – Promotion variables description 
 




Amount spent with tele-detailing (telephone) calls promoting the 
drug (in Euros)
 ---
Face to face detailing 
(visits)
Numeric Number of detailing visits promoting the drug  ---
Face to face detailing 
(Euros)
Numeric Amount spent with the detailing visits promoting the drug (in Euros)  ---
Mailing Numeric Amount spent in mailing (regular mail) investments (in Euros)  ---
Drug Samples Numeric Amount spent in drug samples (in Euros)  ---
Meetings Numeric
Amount spent in meetings (assumes more than one physician 
impacted), face to face (in Euros)
 ---
Journal advertising Numeric Amount spent in ads posted in printed medical journals (in Euros)  ---


















Amount spent in meetings in digital channels, with personal 
interaction, remotely (in Euros)
 ---
Corporate Website Numeric
Amount spent in corporate websites (more applicable to OTC 
products) in Euros
 ---
E-mailing Numeric Amount spent in e-mailing (electronic mail) investments (in Euros)  ---
Number of products String Number of products promoted during the call 1, 2, 3, >3
Not at all useful nor of value to your practice
Somewhat useful and of value to your practice
Very useful and of value to your practice
DK/DA
 Never





 Decrease / stop
 Remain unchanged
 Increase / will begin to prescribe
DK/DA
No




Physician evaluation of the interest of the contact, considering its 
usefulness to his or her medical practice
Current prescription 
level

























































Interest of the contact
String
Future declared prescription intention of the promoted drug, based 
on the detailing visit




10.1.4. IQVIA variables subject to transformation 
Some of the variables provided by IQVIA had to be transformed as a preparation step for the 
data analysis. 
10.1.4.1. Drug sales 
IQVIA data contains, as seen above, drug sales in Euros, valued at the wholesaler price, also 
called sell-in price, consisting of the price wholesalers charge to pharmacies. Since the 
selected markets and products consist of prescription drugs, this variable represents 
physicians’ prescriptions of those drugs. IQVIA database also includes sales in units and in 
counting units. Counting units consist of the number of pills or treatment units (tablets, 
capsules) in each pack. For instance, one pack of Drug X 10mg 30 pills represents one Drug 
X 10mg units sold, but 30 counting units sold. However, there was the need to use a 
dependent variable that was immune to drug prices and to different pack sizes, which 
consisted of the defined daily doses (DDD), a unit of measure that represents the assumed 
average daily dose of maintenance therapy of a certain active substance in its main therapeutic 
indication in adults, and that does not necessarily reflect the dose the physician prescribed, 
acccording to the WHO Collaborating Centre for Drug Statistics (2018), option also followed 
by Windmeijer, de Laat, Douven & Mot (2006) and Leeflang & Wieringa (2010). Leeflang & 
Wieringa (2010) explained that DDD is a «standard measure to compare drug use across 
different drugs» (p. 124). The WHO Collaborating Centre for Drug Statistics (2018) also 
explained that «DDDs provide a fixed unit of measurement independent of price, currencies, 
package size and strength enabling the researcher to assess trends in drug consumption». 
According to the World Health Organization, the advantages of using DDD also include the 
evaluation of the effect of an intervention on drug use, and evaluate the regulatory impact and 
impacts of interventions on prescription patterns (WHO, 2018). 
The process that was observed to convert sales in units into sales in DDD was the following: 
 First, we consulted the WHO Collaborating Centre for Drug Statistics (2018) website 
https://www.whocc.no/atc_ddd_index/, where we could search for the DDD of the 
drug brands included in the analysis perimeter. By inserting the ATC3, we had access 






Figure 10.1 - Screenshot of ATC/DDD index 
 Second, we created an EXCEL spreadsheet where, using DDD values established by 
the World Health Organization, we converted IQVIA’s sell-in data (which consisted 
of the number of packs sold of each drug, and the number of dose units in each pack) 
into sell-in DDDs. We provide an illustrative example for an hypothetical product 
(here called product X), shown below in table 10.6: 
 
Table 10.6 – Product X DDDs 
 
 
Since product X has many presentations, we needed to calculate the DDDs for each of 
its presentations. 
 
Table 10.7 explicits the calculations made to compute both the DDDs and the average 









Table 10.7 – Calculation of DDD and average price for product X 
 
Source: own elaboration 
By multiplying the mg by the number of days of treatment and by the number of boxes 
sold in each presentation, we obtained the total dosage of the presentations sold. As an 
example, in the first row product X sold 150 boxes of 30 tablets, each one with 10mg. 
This is equivalent to 45 thousand mg, or 2.250 DDDs (45.000 / 20). By summing all 
the DDDs equivalents, we get the number of DDDs that should be put in the sales 
database (9.992,5 DDDs for Month 1), for product X. 
 
Some of the products consisted of a fixed combination of two active principles. In 
these cases, the WHO Collaborating Centre for Drug Statistics website did not set a 
DDD. To solve this, we looked at the DDDs for each of the active principles, and 
considered one of the two as the DDD for the combination therapy. Calculations were 
set relative to the selected principle (ex: Product A is a combination of 50mg active 
principle 1 and 5mg active principle 2. DDD for principle 1 is 50mg per day and DDD 
for principle 2 is 5mg per day. We guaranteed consistency between the selection of the 
unit magnitude (mg relative to one of the principles, and DDD relative to that specific 
principle). This option did not provoke any bias to the results, given that all applicable 
products were given the same DDD calculation method. Aplicable products where this 
treatment was performed were: 
o Market 2 – Pancreas – four products and two competitors 
o Market 3 – Heart – five products and one competitor 











Month 1 (nr 
of boxes)





Quocient to apply 





Avg price per 
DDD
Presentation 1 30 10 150 45.000 2.250,0 15,0 8.500 € 3,78 €
Presentation 2 28 20 20 11.200 560,0 28,0 1.950 € 3,48 €
Presentation 3 42 15 45 28.350 1.417,5 31,5 4.750 € 3,35 €
Presentation 4 10 10 250 25.000 1.250,0 5,0 9.000 € 7,20 €
Presentation 5 28 15 200 84.000 4.200,0 21,0 15.000 € 3,57 €
Presentation 6 14 15 30 6.300 315,0 10,5 2.000 € 6,35 €





10.1.4.2. Drug price 
Data provided by IQVIA included the wholesale and the retail selling price of the drugs. More 
than one approach could be observed in respect of the drug price. For instance, Leeflang & 
Wieringa (2010) divided the costs by the volume of sales, and obtained an average drug price 
in Euros, and Windmeijer et al (2006) calculated a price per DDD, by dividing the total cost 
by the total number of DDDs prescribed per month. We selected Windmeijer et al (2006)’s 
approach, which allowed us to have both sell-in sales and average drug price in DDDs. 
To calculate the average price per DDD for product X, we divided the sum of sales in Euros 
by the total DDDs, in the case 41.200€ / 9.992,5 DDDs = 4,12€ average price per DDD. This 
can be seen in table 10.7 above. 
10.1.4.3. Average competitors’ price 
Average price per DDD of competing drugs was calculated accordingly. We divided the sum 
of the sales in Euros by the sum of the sales in DDDs, obtaining the average competitor price 
per DDD. 
10.1.4.4. Competitive detailing 
IQVIA’s database includes, as seen before, detailing activities in units (number of calls 
detaiing a specific product) and Euros for all therapeutic classes selected for analysis. Since 
detailing activities were available for all brands in each therapeutic class, two variables could 
be prepared: 
 Detailing for each brand, also called detailing flow - given by the monthly investments 
in detailing, of each brand 
 Competitive detailing - given by the sum of the detailing activities performed by 
competitors of a specific drug (in each market, a perimeter of drug brands was selected 
as previously explained, and the competitive detailing is the sum of detailing activities 








Table 10.8 below illustrates a simplified example of detailing flow and competitive detailing. 
Table 10.8 – Illustration of detailing flow and competitive detailing 
 
Source: own elaboration 
For the calculation of the competitive detailing for each brand, we summed the detailing 
activities of the brands that were considered as main competitors, as described before in the 
topic Brands’ selection in each market. 
10.1.4.5. Stock variables 
Detailing stock was calculated following Narayanan, Manchanda & Chintagunta (2005) and 
Manchanda, Xie & Youn (2008) approaches, considering a montly discount rate of 30%, to 
represent the depreciation or decay of the detailing effectiveness over time. This means, as 
noted by Narayanan, Manchanda & Chintagunta (2005), that after six months, the impact of 
expenditures on detailing have diminished by almost 90%. This was calculated by computing 
(1-0,3)
6
 = 0,118. If we then calculate 1 – 0,118 we get 88,2%, which is close to the reported 
90%. After 12 months, the impact of detailing has diminished 98,6%. According to 
Narayanan, Manchanda & Chintagunta (2005), this carryover discount rate is consistent with 
belief of pharmaceutical industry practitioners. This is quite an “aggressive” carryover 
discount rate, since other authors have used lower percentages (such as Windmeijer, de Laat, 
Douven & Mot, 2006; Ching & Ishihara, 2012; Liu et al, 2016). 
Narayanan, Manchanda & Chintagunta (2005) also used a monthly discount rate for other 
marketing expenditures (OME) of 30%, which we also used in our analysis. 
Table 10.9 illustrates the impact of the carryover discount rate, for visualization purposes 




Nr of details in a given month
Drug A 100      Detailing flow for drug A
Drug B 50





Table 10.9 – Illustration of the calculation of own detailing stock 
 
Source: own elaboration 
In this example, the detailing stock of January 2013 was calculated as 500 x 1,4% + 600 x 
2,0% + 700 x 2,8% + 700 x 4,0% + 800 x 5,8% + 700 x 8,2% + 400 x 11,8% + 300 x 16,8% + 
500 x 24% + 600 x 34,3% + 700 x 49,0% + 400 x 70,0% = 1.216,9. 
Since our time series dataset started in January 2012 (19 months before the entry into force of 
the detailing ceiling), this implies that we would only have seven full monthly observations 
with stock variabels (January 2013 to July 2013, before the entry into force of the ceiling), 
which might have limited the robustness of the analysis. Therefore, we had two alternative 
options: 
30,0%










12 1,4% 98,6% January 2012 500  ---
11 2,0% 98,0% February 2012 600  ---
10 2,8% 97,2% March 2012 700  ---
9 4,0% 96,0% April 2012 700  ---
8 5,8% 94,2% May 2012 800  ---
7 8,2% 91,8% June 2012 700  ---
6 11,8% 88,2% July 2012 400  ---
5 16,8% 83,2% August 2012 300  ---
4 24,0% 76,0% September 2012 500  ---
3 34,3% 65,7% October 2012 600  ---
2 49,0% 51,0% November 2012 700  ---
1 70,0% 30,0% December 2012 400  ---
January 2013 350 1216,9
February 2013 450 1092,0
March 2013 500 1073,6
April 2013 500 1094,7
May 2013 600 1109,5
June 2013 600 1188,9
July 2013 350 1245,5
August 2013 250 1112,9
September 2013 300 951,2
October 2013 400 871,0
November 2013 500 883,9
December 2013 250 961,9





 The first was to follow Rizzo (1999)’s approach, by considering that detailing – and 
all the other promotion variables – investments in the previous 12 months (January 
2011 to December 2011) were the same as in the period of January 2012 to December 
2012. This approach has the advantage of simplicity, but has, according to 
Windmeijer et al (2006), a limitation, given the fact that typically the promotional 
investments tend to be higher in the initial periods of drug commercialization, and as 
a consequence the stock would be somewhat underestimated. But given the absence 
of real data from 12 months prior to the beginning of the dataset, this would be a 
possible solution to calculate the promotion stock 
 The second is to follow Windmeijer et al (2006)’s approach, by estimating the 
promotion flow using the following model (figure 10.2): 
 
Figure 10.2 – Windmeijer et al (2006) promotion flow estimation 
Source: Windmeijer et al (2006) 
Promfiy represents the promotion expenditure for drug i in year y; ageiy is the age of 
the drug in years. 
Compared to Rizzo (1999) and Windmeijer et al (2006)’s contributions, we are using much 
more promotion variables, which substantially increases the complexity of the model. We 
opted for using both approaches due to the following rationale. 
In the cases where promotion variables investments did not evidence series continuity in the 
dataset, in the sense that investments appear apparently arbitrarily concentrated in a few 
months without a clear pattern, we follow Rizzo’s approach. Most of the promotion tools 
using digital communication channels are included in this group, but also tools using 
traditional channels such as mailing, for some brands. Below is one example in figure 10.3, 





Figure 10.3 – Example of e-mailing investments for drug X 
Source: own elaboration 
In such cases, using Windmeijer et al (2006) promotion flow estimation for the previous 
periods based in time (drug age) might have produced unreliable flow estimates in these 
cases. Second, and related to the first, Windmeijer et al (2006)’s approach misses other 
independent variables than time itself, which are also not available in our dataset. In many 
cases, the products we analyzed had already been on the market for years prior to the initial 
observation provided by IQVIA, a situation similar to the one described by Rizzo (1999).  
In the impossibility of going back in time and / or have access to additional information from 
IQVIA (which had no monthly data available before January 2012 for promotion 
investments), we assume, following Rizzo’s approach, that the promotion investments in the 
prior 12 months were constant in real terms. This less complex approach, despite being 
discussable, appears to be reasonable in the perspective that the benefits of using a more 
parsimonious approach seem to be higher than the potential costs of using a smaller time 
series, and/or reaching unreliable estimates for most of the promotion tools in the dataset. To 
estimate the investment flows of the period of January 2011 to December 2011, we observed 
the following steps: 
- First, we obtained the monthly consumer price indexes from the National Statistics 






Figure 10.4 – INE Consumer price index 
Source: INE (2018) 
 
- Second, we calculated the discount factor, dividing 1 by the monthly price index 
- Third, we estimated the promotion investments flow by multiplying the 
investments flow by the monthly discount factors. Steps two and three are 
illustrated in table 10.10, as an example for detailing. 
Table 10.10 – Illustration of the calculation of own detailing stock 
 
Source: own elaboration 
In the cases where promotion variables investments evidence series continuity (all or most of 
the months with data), we applied an adaptation of Windmeijer et al (2006) approach, by 
using a regression model with 13 independent variables. The dependent variable is promotion 
investments (from January 2012 to December 2015). The independent variables are 12 
dummies for months, and one variable for time, for the same time period. We then computed 
Monthly consumer price 






2012 for drug A
Estimated e-
mailing flow 
2011 for drug A
January 2011 1,03525755741829 96,6% January 0 0
February 2011 1,03608576346423 96,5% February 500 483
March 2011 1,03159921946340 96,9% March 700 679
April 2011 1,03016102098974 97,1% April 1000 971
May 2011 1,02706899191223 97,4% May 0 0
June 2011 1,02717193558186 97,4% June 0 0
July 2011 1,02778867045762 97,3% July 0 0
August 2011 1,03088566323723 97,0% August 0 0
September 2011 1,02884066092967 97,2% September 200 194
October 2011 1,02130635030040 97,9% October 0 0
November 2011 1,01885325258150 98,1% November 0 0




the expected investments backwards for the period of January 2011 to December 2011. Below 
we present an example computed for one of the drugs in the data series (here called product 
X), for face to face detailing (figure 10.5): 
 
Figure 10.5 – Example of estimation of detailing flow – January 2011 to December 2011 
The chart below (figure 10.6) presents the number of detailing visits for the period of January 
2012 to December 2015 (lighter blue bars), and the estimated detailing investments for the 









Quadrado de R 76,5%




gl SQ MQ F F de significância
Regressão 13 47284357,3 3637258,26 9,48099483 7,3704E-08
Residual 35 14546227,6 415606,503
Total 48 61830584,9
Coeficientes Erro-padrão Stat t valor P 95% inferior95% superiorInferior 95,0%Superior 95,0%
Interceptar 422,3371875 387,463842 1,09000413 0,28315922 -364,25623 1208,9306 -364,2562 1208,9306
Time 66,7346875 6,93560412 9,62204392 2,3008E-11 52,6546626 80,8147124 52,654663 80,8147124
January 0 0 65535 #NUM! 0 0 0 0
February -249,2346875 455,907177 -0,5466786 #NUM! -1174,7755 676,306088 -1174,775 676,306088
March 749,905625 456,065414 1,644294 0,10906941 -175,95639 1675,76764 -175,9564 1675,76764
April 435,4209375 456,329021 0,954182 0,34653559 -490,97623 1361,8181 -490,9762 1361,8181
May 815,84875 456,697814 1,78640827 0,08269866 -111,2971 1742,9946 -111,2971 1742,9946
June 351,3015625 457,17154 0,76842395 0,44738948 -576,806 1279,40913 -576,806 1279,40913
July 128,216875 457,749872 0,28010248 0,78104778 -801,06477 1057,49852 -801,0648 1057,49852
August -660,7803125 458,432415 -1,4413909 0,15836228 -1591,4476 269,886968 -1591,448 269,886968
September 39,91 459,218704 0,08690848 0,93123958 -892,35353 972,173532 -892,3535 972,173532
October -78,3121875 460,108207 -0,1702038 0,86582989 -1012,3815 855,757132 -1012,382 855,757132
November 375,765625 461,100328 0,81493246 0,42062185 -560,31781 1311,84906 -560,3178 1311,84906





Figure 10.6 – Example of estimation of investments in the period of January 2011 to 
December 2011 
Source: own elaboration 
 
Negative estimated values were then manually converted into zeros (only a limited number of 
cases). 
In both approaches, as we get closer to January 2013, promotional investments stock will be 
progressively more reliable, since we are using more observations from which we had real 
investments (for instance, the detailing stock in July 2012 will have six observations from the 
year 2012, using a very conservative carryover discount factor (30%). Table 10.11 below lists 











Source: own elaboration 
10.1.4.6. Drug age 
Drug age in months was calculated using IQVIA’s variable “Commercialization launch date”, 
which consists of the date (month / year) when the drug was launched in the market, in 
Portugal. If for instance a drug was commercially launched in January 2012, then a numeric 
sequence would start with number 1 for January 2011, 2 for February 2012, and so on. Then 
we created another variable called Drug age squared (Drug age
2
), following Leeflang & 
Market Product
Detailing flow





BL1 Regression Regression Regression
BL2 Regression Regression Regression
BL3 Regression
PA1 Regression Regression Regression
PA2 Regression Regression Regression
PA3 Regression Regression Regression
PA4
N/A (consistent detailing 
activities started in 2013)
Rizzo (1999) Regression
PA5 Regression Regression Regression
HE1 Regression Rizzo (1999) Regression
HE2 Regression Regression Regression
HE3 Regression Rizzo (1999) Regression
HE4 Rizzo (1999)
N/A (no other marketing 
expenditures in 2012 and 2013)
Regression
HE5 Regression
LI1 Regression Rizzo (1999) Regression
LI2 Regression Rizzo (1999) Regression
LI3 Regression Rizzo (1999) Regression
LI4 Regression Rizzo (1999) Regression
LI5 Rizzo (1999) Rizzo (1999) Regression
Market 4 - 
Liver
Method applied for 2011 investments estimation
N/A (consistent promotion activities started in 2013)
Market 1 - 
Blood
Market 2 - 
Pancreas
Market 3 - 
Heart




Wieringa (2010)’s approach. Table 10.12 below illustrates an example of drug age 
calculation. 
Table 10.12 – Illustration of the calculation of drug age 
 
Source: own elaboration 
In cases where more than one presentation of the same product was being commercialized 
(ex: 10mg pills, 20mg pills, and so on), the commercialization launch date was set at the date 
where the first presentation was available in the market. Table 10.13 below exhibits an 
illustrative example. 
Table 10.13 – Example of multiple launch dates for the same product 
 
Source: own elaboration 
 
Drug age in 
months
Drug age in 
months squared
Launch date January 2012 1 1
February 2012 2 4
March 2012 3 9
April 2012 4 16
May 2012 5 25
June 2012 6 36
July 2012 7 49
August 2012 8 64
September 2012 9 81
October 2012 10 100
November 2012 11 121
December 2012 12 144
… … …
November 2015 47 2209















Therefore, for this product, the commercial launch date was set at December 2008. 
10.1.4.7. Other promotion variables 
In the case of the three variables shaded with a darker background in Table 10.5 – Promotion 
variables description -, we considered the options with the declared stronger impact which 
are: «Very useful and of value to your practice», «Frequently», and «Increase / will begin to 
prescribe». These independent variables percentages were calculated using a weighted 
average considering the number of calls in each of the rows of the database, for each of the 
products in our analysis. Regarding the number of products presented during the sales call, we 
updated the answers «>3» to 4 products, in order to have a numeric value. We believe this 
option will not impact robustness given two reasons: first, the percentage of «>3» answers is 
minimal (examples: average of 3,6% for product BL1, 1,8% for BL2, 1,6% for BL3); second, 
the literature has shown that a typical sales call includes up to three or four products, given its 
diminishing duration. 
 
10.1.5. Promotion investments aggregation 
As explained in topic 10.1.3. Variables description, we were given access to a substantially 
higher number of promotion tools expenditures than the ones used in previous research in the 
pharmaceutical marketing community. In order to test to maximize model comparison, we 
opted to aggregate the promotion investment expenditures so that we could use the same 
categories as Leeflang & Wieringa (2010). Therefore, we aggregated other promotion 
expenditures other than detailing, journal advertising, direct mail and meetings, using the 











Table 10.14 – Promotion aggregation investments 
 
Source: own elaboration 
 
10.1.5.1. Available independent variables 
Based on the provided variables, we prepared a database to allow maximum possibilities of 
applying previously developed models, and also allow the usage of new variables (to the best 

























Other traditional marketing 
expenditures




Table 10.15 – Final list of variables included for potential analysis 
 
Source: own elaboration 
Logarithmized? Variable name in SPSS Variable description in SPSS
Yes sales_ddd Ln Sales in DDDs
Yes sales_ddd_lag1 Ln Sales in DDDs lagged one period
Yes sales_ddd_lag2 Ln Sales in DDDs lagged two periods
Yes det_calls Ln Detailing flow (calls)
Yes det_calls_x_det_calls Ln Detailing flow (calls) x Ln Detailing flow (calls)
Yes det_euro Ln Detailing flow (€)
Yes det_euro_x_det_euro Ln Detailing flow (€) x Ln Detailing flow (€)
Yes journal Ln Journal advertising flow
Yes mailing Ln Mailing flow
Yes meetings Ln Meetings (live) flow
Yes other_trad Ln Other traditional marketing expenditures flow
Yes digital Ln Digital marketing expenditures flow
Yes ome Ln Other marketing expenditures flow
Yes global_mkt_expend Ln Global marketing expenditures flow
Yes comp_det Ln Competitive detailing flow (calls)
Yes comp_journal Ln Competitive Journal advertising flow
Yes comp_mail Ln Competitive mailing flow
Yes comp_meet Ln Competitive meetings (live) flow
Yes compet_other_trad Ln Competitive other traditional marketing expenditures flow
Yes compet_digit Ln Competitive digital marketing expenditures flow
Yes compet_global Ln Competitive global marketing expenditures flow
Yes det_stock Ln Detailing stock (calls)
Yes det_stock_x_det_stock Ln Detailing stock (calls) x Ln Detailing stock (calls)
Yes ome_stock Ln Other marketing expenditures stock
Yes glob_mkt_stock Ln Global marketing expenditures stock
Competitive Yes comp_mark_expend_stock Ln Competitive global marketing expenditures stock
Own Yes avg_price_ddd Ln Average drug price per DDD
Competitors Yes avg_comp_price_ddd Ln Average competitors price per DDD
No drug_age Drug age
No drug_age_sq Drug age 2̂
No drug_age_cube Drug age 3̂
Yes price_x_det Ln Average drug price per DDD x Ln Detailing flow
Yes price_x_det_stock Ln Average drug price per DDD x Ln Detailing stock
Yes price_x_age Ln Average drug price per DDD x Drug age
Yes journal_x_det Ln Journal advertising flow x Ln Detailing flow
Yes journal_x_mail Ln Journal advertising flow x Ln Mailing flow
Yes mail_x_det Ln Mailing flow x Ln Detailing flow
Yes global_mkt_stock_x_drug_price Ln Global marketing expenditures stock x Ln Average drug price per DDD
Yes global_mkt_stock_x_comp_price Ln Global marketing expenditures stock x Ln Average competitors price per DDD
No reimbursem Public reimbursement (dummy)
No loss_exclusivity Loss of exclusivity (dummy)
No det_ceiling Detailing ceiling entry into force (dummy)
No electronic_rx Compulsory electronic prescription (dummy)
No y2013 to y2015 Year 2013 (dummy) to Year 2015 (dummy)
No m2 to m12 Month 2 (dummy) to Month 12 (dummy)
No ipad_tablet Ipad / Tablet (% of times used in calls)
No laptop Laptop based materials (% of times used in calls)
No printed Printed material (% of times used in calls)
No very_useful Very useful (% of calls)
No incr_or_begin Increase / Will begin to prescribe (% of calls)
Yes nr_products Ln Avg number of products presented during the calls
Year and month dummies
Visual Aid Type
Interest of the contact
Prescription - future (intention)
Number of products presented
Current period sales 
(dependent)
Policy change dummies
















In some of the variables where no variation was present (that is, the variable had the same 
values for the whole time series), we opted to remove them from the respective model, 
following Leeflang, Wieringa, Bijmolt & Pauwels (2015)’s approach («If price (or another 
variable for that matter) is relatively stable over the period of observation, then it cannot 
have much explanatory power in the sample» (p. 244). 
10.2. Expected signals of the coefficients 
We proceeded to a theory analysis of the expected signals of the coefficients of all variables 
used by authors addressed by Leeflang & Wieringa (2010), summarizing the gathered 
information on table 10.16 below. 
Table 10.16 – Expected signals of coefficients 
 




Ln Lagged sales period t-1 Positive Windmeijer et al (2006) | Leeflang & Wieringa (2010)
Ln Lagged sales period t-2 Positive Windmeijer et al (2006) | Leeflang & Wieringa (2010)
Ln Detailing flow Positive Kremer et al (2008) | Stremersch & Van Dyck (2009)
Ln Detailing flow x Ln Detailing flow Negative Gönül et al (2001) | Manchanda & Chintagunta (2004)
Ln Journal advertising flow Positive Pitt & Nel (1988) | Williams & Hensel (1991)
Ln Direct marketing flow Positive Parsons & Abeele (1981) | Williams & Hensel (1991)
Ln Marketing expenditures flow Positive Leeflang & Wieringa (2010)
Ln Competitive detailing flow Negative Leeflang & Wieringa (2010)
Ln Competitive journal advertising flow Negative Leeflang & Wieringa (2010)
Ln Competitive direct marketing flow Negative Leeflang & Wieringa (2010)
Ln Competitive marketing expenditures flow Negative Leeflang & Wieringa (2010)
Ln Detailing stock Positive Narayanan et al (2004) | Leeflang & Wieringa (2010)
Ln Detailing stock x Ln Detailing stock Positive Rizzo (1999)
Ln Marketing expenditures stock Positive Inferred from Leeflang & Wieringa (2010)
Competitive Ln Competitive global marketing expenditures stock Negative Leeflang & Wieringa (2010)
Own Ln Average drug price per DDD Negative Leeflang & Wieringa (2010)
Competitors Ln Average competitors drug price per DDD Positive Leeflang & Wieringa (2010)
Drug age Positive Wittink (2002) | Leeflang & Wieringa (2010)
Drug age x Drug age Negative Wittink (2002) | Leeflang & Wieringa (2010)
Drug age x Drug age x Drug age  --- Not explicitly shown in Wittink (2002)
Average drug price per DDD x Ln Detailing flow Positive Rizzo (1999) | Leeflang & Wieringa (2010)
Ln Average drug price per DDD x Ln Detailing stock Positive Rizzo (1999) | Leeflang & Wieringa (2010)
Ln Average drug price per DDD x Drug age Negative Rizzo (1999)
Ln Journal advertising flow x Ln Detailing flow  ---
Ln Journal advertising flow x Ln Mailing flow  ---
Ln Mailing flow x Ln Detailing flow  ---
Ln Global marketing expenditures stock x Ln 
Average drug price per DDD
Positive Windmeijer et al (2006) | Leeflang & Wieringa (2010)
Ln Global marketing expenditures stock x Ln 
Average competitors price per DDD
Negative Windmeijer et al (2006) | Leeflang & Wieringa (2010)
Detailing ceiling (restriction policy) Negative Liu, Gupta, Venkataraman & Liu (2016) | Larkin et al (2017)
Drug public reimbursement Positive Scherer (1993)





































10.3. Descriptive analysis 
This sub-chapter will briefly describe each of the products selected for analysis, in terms of sales, detailing, and global promotion expenditures 
evolution. Specific issues such as policy changes will be highlighted (ex: start of public reimbursement). 
10.3.1. Market 1 - Blood 
Market 1 comprises a subset of a larger market that treats blood-related health issues, and includes, in a specific type of treatments, three competitors. 
These competitors are very expensive drugs, comparing their price against the traditional therapies used before the appearance of this new class of 
treatments. Table 10.17 provides a general characterization of each of the selected products in Market 1. 
Table 10.17 – Products characterization in Market 1 – Blood 
 













Was promoted in 
co-marketing?
If promoted in co-
marketing, with 
which brand?
Rank 1 in sales
(sell-in, ∑2012-2015)
BL1 2 No No No No N/A
Rank 2 in sales
(sell-in, ∑2012-2015)
BL2 2 No No No No N/A





No No No N/A
In the period of January 2012 to December 2015…





Figure 10.7 below explores additional insights regarding Market 1. Product BL2 was the first one of this class to be launched, representing a 
significant burden to the NHS. Product BL1 followed (received public reimbursement in August 2014, moment after which sales grew substantially. 
Product BL3 was the third entering this new class, investing heavily in detailing and in meetings (live). 
 
Figure 10.7 – Sales in DDDs, and detailing and other marketing expenditures (OME) flow for Products BL1, BL2 and BL3 
Source: own elaboration 
Please note: 
 Two vertical axis were set: the one on the left represents Sales in DDDs, and the one on the right represent marketing expenditures in Euros 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 In Market 1, as well as in all other three markets, both vertical axis were forced to a fixed scale, in order to allow a better visual perception of 
the relative magnitude of both sales and marketing expenditures across all the products in each market 
 The vertical dashed line represents the entry into force of the detailing restriction policy (detailing ceiling), on August 2013 
Figure 10.8 below represents the boxplots of sales in DDDs, number of calls, and OME for each of the three products of Market 1. It provides 
additional description, complementary to the time series approach followed by providing the charts presented above. 
 
Figure 10.8 – Market 1 boxplots (sales in DDDs, number of calls, and OME) 
Source: own elaboration 
BL1 BL2 BL3
Sales in DDD boxplot - Market 1 - Blood
BL1 BL2 BL3
Detailing flow (# calls) boxplot - Market 1 - Blood
BL1 BL2 BL3





Interestingly, product BL1 has a very long “whisker” represented by the difference between 
the maximum and quartile 3, explained by the rapid acceleration of sales in the last 
observations of the time series (this can be seen in the previously presented chart, in figure 
10.7). The lower “whisker” is represented by the difference between quartile 1 and the 
minimum. The first line in each box represents quartile 1, the second line represents the 
median, and the third line represents quartile 3. The dark blue shade therefore represents the 
difference between quartile 3 and the median, and the light blue shade represents the 
difference between the median and quartile 1. In order to search for outliers, we proceeded to 
the following calculations: 
 Left inner fence = Q1 – 1,5 x IQR (quartile 1 minus 1,5 x interquartile range) 
 Left outer fence = Q1 – 3,0 x IQR 
 Mean minus 3 stdv = x̅ - 3σ 
 Right inner fence = Q3 + 1,5 x IQR, represented by an orange shaded square 
 Right outer fence = Q3 + 3,0 x IQR, represented by a red shaded square 
 Mean plus 3 stdv = x̅ + 3σ, represented by a blue shaded circle 
 






Table 10.18 – Summary of the boxplots results – Market 1 (Blood) 
 
Source: own elaboration 
We concentrate our attention on the situations where the maximum is higher than the right outer fence (first row of the table). In this market, the 
apparent outliers are all explained by marketing decisions regarding the intensity of promotion investments. For instance, product BL1 evidenced a 
huge increment in face-to-face meetings two months before the approval of its public reimbursement. Product BL3 registered higher promotion 
expenditures in face-to-face meetings too, associated with planned initiatives. 
As a conclusion of this analysis, we did not proceed to any outlier treatment, given that the ones detected were explained by the marketing activities 
of the pharmaceutical companies. Therefore, data modelling used the full time series of data. 
 
BL1 BL2 BL3 BL1 BL2 BL3 BL1 BL2 BL3
Higher than right outer fence? No No No No No No Yes No Yes
Higher than right inner fence? No No No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Higher than x̅ + 3σ? No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
BL1 BL2 BL3 BL1 BL2 BL3 BL1 BL2 BL3
Lower than left outer fence? No No No No No No No No No
Lower than left inner fence? No No No No No No No No No
Lower than x̅ - 3σ? No No No No No No No No No
Is 
minimum…
Sales in DDDs Detailing flow (calls) OME flow (€)
Is 
maximum…




10.3.2. Market 2 - Pancreas 
Market 2 comprises five products that treat a health issue provoked by a pancreas non-optimal functioning. It includes five products, four of which 
promoted in co-marketing (same active principle, but a different commercial brand). One of the products started its commercialization four months 
before the entry into force of the detailing ceiling. Table 10.19 provides general characterization of the products selected for analysis in this market. 
Table 10.19 – Products characterization in Market 2 – Pancreas 
 
Source: own elaboration 
The behavior in terms of the evolution of sales in DDDs, detailing flow and other marketing expenditures is shown below in figure 10.9. Products 














Was promoted in 
co-marketing?
If promoted in co-
marketing, with 
which brand?
Rank 1 in sales
(sell-in, ∑2012-2015)
PA1 5 No No No Yes
2 brands not in the 
brand selection
Rank 2 in sales
(sell-in, ∑2012-2015)
PA2 5 No No No Yes PA3 and PA5
Rank 3 in sales
(sell-in, ∑2012-2015)
PA3 5 No No No Yes PA2 and PA5





No No No N/A
Another one of interest PA5 5 No No No Yes PA2 and PA3
Market 2 - 
Pancreas









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: own elaboration 
The boxplots regarding market 2 are shown below, in figure 10.10. 
 
Figure 10.10 – Market 2 boxplots (sales in DDDs, number of calls, and OME) 
Source: own elaboration 
Based on the interpretation of the sales in DDDs boxplots, we can confirm the insights gathered by interpreting the time series chart: these products 
(except product PA4) are mature products, with very little variation in their time series. Product PA4 was the one with the higher investments in other 
marketing expenditures (OME), in the period of analysis, mainly explained by big investments in clinical trials. 
Just as performed regarding market 1, we searched for the existence of outliers, which data is summarized below in table 10.20: 
PA1 PA2 PA3 PA4 PA5
Sales in DDD boxplot - Market 2 - Pancreas
PA1 PA2 PA3 PA4 PA5
Detailing flow (# calls) boxplot - Market 2 -
Pancreas
PA1 PA2 PA3 PA4 PA5





Table 10.20 – Summary of the boxplots results – Market 2 (Pancreas) 
 
Source: own elaboration 
Again, we concentrate our focus on the first row. Products PA1, PA2 and PA3 apparently have outliers in OME. A closer analysis reveals that 
product PA1 substantially increased its face-to-face meetings expenditures two months before product PA4 start of commercialization. Products PA2 
and PA3 are promoted in co-marketing with product PA5, and the peak in OME was justified by higher than average investments in face-to-face 





PA1 PA2 PA3 PA4 PA5 PA1 PA2 PA3 PA4 PA5 PA1 PA2 PA3 PA4 PA5
Higher than right outer fence? No No No No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes No No
Higher than right inner fence? No No No No No No No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Higher than x̅ + 3σ? No No No No No No No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
PA1 PA2 PA3 PA4 PA5 PA1 PA2 PA3 PA4 PA5 PA1 PA2 PA3 PA4 PA5
Lower than left outer fence? No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No
Lower than left inner fence? Yes No No No No No No No No No No No No No No




Sales in DDDs Detailing flow (calls) OME flow (€)







10.3.3. Market 3 - Heart 
Market 3 handles a heart-related pathology affecting a subtantial proportion of the Portuguese population. Four of the brands are co-marketed. 
General characterization of the selected products in Market 3 is shown below in table 10.21. 
Table 10.21 – Products characterization in Market 3 – Heart 
 
Source: own elaboration 
Figure 10.11 evidences the substantial sales loss of products HE3 and HE4. Product HE3, after having approaved a patent extension, lost its 
exclusivity in October 2013, but competitors only initiated their sales six months after, and therefore the dummy variable “Loss of exclusivity” will 
receive the value “1” from March 2014 to December 2015. Product HE4 lost its exclusivity in September 2012, and generics started their sales in that 












Was promoted in 
co-marketing?
If promoted in co-
marketing, with 
which brand?
Rank 1 in sales
(sell-in, ∑2012-2015)
HE1 5 No No No Yes
1 brand not in the 
brand selection
Rank 2 in sales
(sell-in, ∑2012-2015)
HE2 5 No No No Yes
1 brand not in the 
brand selection






1 brand not in the 
brand selection






1 brand not in the 
brand selection





No No No N/A
Market 3 - 
Heart














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: own elaboration 
The boxplots regarding market 3 are shown below, in figure 10.12. 
 
Figure 10.12 - Market 3 boxplots (sales in DDDs, number of calls, and OME) 
Source: own elaboration 
As seen above, products HE3 and HE4 lost their patent in 2012, and product HE5 was launched at the beginning of 2013. Products HE1 and HE2 are 
mature products, with very stabilized sales. 
 
 
HE1 HE2 HE3 HE4 HE5
Sales in DDD boxplot - Market 3 - Heart
HE1 HE2 HE3 HE4 HE5
Detailing flow (# calls) boxplot - Market 3 - Heart
HE1 HE2 HE3 HE4 HE5




Table 10.22 below helped us identify potential outlier observations. 
Table 10.22 – Summary of the boxplots results – Market 3 (Heart) 
 
Source: own elaboration 
HE1 HE2 HE3 HE4 HE5 HE1 HE2 HE3 HE4 HE5 HE1 HE2 HE3 HE4 HE5
Higher than right outer fence? No No No No No No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Higher than right inner fence? No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Higher than x̅ + 3σ? No No No No No No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HE1 HE2 HE3 HE4 HE5 HE1 HE2 HE3 HE4 HE5 HE1 HE2 HE3 HE4 HE5
Lower than left outer fence? No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No
Lower than left inner fence? No No No No No No No No No Yes No No No No No
Lower than x̅ - 3σ? No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No
Is 
minimum…
Sales in DDDs Detailing flow (calls) OME flow (€)
Is 
maximum…




Concentrating our attention on the first row, we can see that there are several products with 
potential outliers in detailing flow and OME. In the case of detailing flow, products HE3 and 
HE4 substantially decreased their detailing expenditures, ending the period of analysis with 
zero calls. Therefore, given that this was a planned strategy after losing their patents (on 
March 2012 and September 2012, respectively), we will not eliminate any outlier 
observations. Regarding OME, we noticed that all five products appear to evidence strong 
outliers. We followed two approaches: 
 Eliminated this variable in the case of product HE4 – this product had expenditures on 
OME in only one of the 48 months of the time series. Therefore, the regression model 
of product HE4 did not include this variable 
 Did not eliminate any observation in the case of products HE1, HE2, HE3 and HE5, 
given that the investments in OME resulted from the normal business activity and 
planning. For example, product HE1 had a major mailing initiative in the summer of 
2013, product HE2 launched a very strong face-to-face meeting initiave around the 
period when product HE5 was launched, product HE3 launched a face-to-face 
meetings initiative at the beginning of 2012 to resist the eminent loss of exclusivity, 
and product HE5 launched a face-to-face meetings initiative in the middle of quarter 2 
2014 to help increase the slope of the sales growth (which had started to reduce its 
pace) 
Products HE3 and HE4 were the only ones – in the markets and products perimeter selected 






10.3.4. Market 4 - Liver 
Market 4 comprises five products that treat a health issue involving a non-optimal functioning of the liver. All five products are marketed in co-
marketing, and are characterized in table 10.23 below. 
Table 10.23 – Products characterization in Market 4 – Liver 
 
Source: own elaboration 
Product LI1 – co-marketed with product LI3 - is, by far, the leader in this market, but is not the strongest invester in detailing activities. Figure 10.13 












Was promoted in 
co-marketing?
If promoted in co-
marketing, with 
which brand?
Rank 1 in sales
(sell-in, ∑2012-2015)
LI1 5 No No No Yes LI3
Rank 2 in sales
(sell-in, ∑2012-2015)
LI2 5 No No No Yes LI5
Rank 3 in sales
(sell-in, ∑2012-2015)
LI3 5 No No No Yes LI1




(started 7 montths before)
No No Yes
Another one not in the 
brand selection
Another one of interest LI5 5 No No No Yes LI2
In the period of January 2012 to December 2015…



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: own elaboration 
The boxplots regarding market 4 are shown below, in figure 10.14. 
 
Figure 10.14 – Market 4 boxplots (sales in DDDs, number of calls, and OME) 
Source: own elaboration 
Market 4 products are also mature, with the exception of product LI4, launched in 2011. The OME boxplot evidences a great variation of the 
maximum montly investments among the five products. The high top whiskers of product LI4 in OME is mainly explained by higher investments in 
live meetings, while in product LI5 it is mainly explained by higher investments in face to face meetings and journal advertising. 
 
LI1 LI2 LI3 LI4 LI5
Sales in DDD boxplot - Market 4 - Liver
LI1 LI2 LI3 LI4 LI5
Detailing flow (# calls) boxplot - Market 4 - Liver
LI1 LI2 LI3 LI4 LI5




Table 10.24 below helped us identify potential outlier observations. 
Table 10.24 – Summary of the boxplots results – Market 4 (Liver) 
 
 
Source: own elaboration 
Concentrating our attention on the first row, we first analyzed product LI5 detailing flow. This product evidenced a higher than average number of 
calls during the first semester of 2012, with four very close values. We did not eliminate any observation for this reason (regular business operations 
and planning). We then looked at OME, starting with product LI1, which evidenced a strong investment in face-to-face meetings in a period where 
sales were starting to evidence some saturation in terms of growth rate. Product LI4 invested heavily in face-to-face meetings approximately after one 
year after product launch in order to re-ignite sales growth, and product LI5 invested substantially higher than average on face-to-face meetings at the 
end of 2014, in a moment where sales growth appeared to stagnate. Given these plausible reasons, we decided to keep all observations. 
LI1 LI2 LI3 LI4 LI5 LI1 LI2 LI3 LI4 LI5 LI1 LI2 LI3 LI4 LI5
Higher than right outer fence? No No No No No No No No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Higher than right inner fence? No Yes No No No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Higher than x̅ + 3σ? No No No No No No No No No No No Yes No Yes Yes
LI1 LI2 LI3 LI4 LI5 LI1 LI2 LI3 LI4 LI5 LI1 LI2 LI3 LI4 LI5
Lower than left outer fence? No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No
Lower than left inner fence? No No No No Yes No Yes No No No No No No No No
Lower than x̅ - 3σ? No No No No Yes No No No No No No No No No No
Is 
minimum…
Sales in DDDs Detailing flow (calls) OME flow (€)
Is 
maximum…





10.4. Application of four previous models 
This chapter describes the data analysis performed with our data. We started by applying four 
different models, previously developed by Rizzo (1999), Wittink (2002), and Windemeijer et 
al (2006). We applied the models directly as they were used by their authors, to assess the 
extent to which they appear to fit to the Portuguese market reality. SPSS and Eviews complete 
set of outputs can be consulted at Appendix 6. 
10.4.1. Necessary model adaptation 
We have seen that all four models used in this chapter use temporal dummies (Rizzo 1999 
used only year dummies, instead of year and month dummies). By applying the models 
directly using three dummies for the years (2013, 2014, and 2015) and 11 dummies for 
months (from February to December) we noticed some problems occurred: many variables 
were excluded by SPSS, situation which did not happen when the variable drug age in months 
was removed. There was therefore a mathematical problem, consisting of a perfect linear 
relationship between drug age in months and the year and month dummies. We exemplify 







Figure 10.15 – Regression of drug age in months on year and month dummies for product 
BL1 
By using the coefficients shown in the table above, we computed the predicted drug age based 
on the real drug age (table 10.25). Naturally, we reached the exact real drug age, as shown 
below in regarding product BL1: 





Y2013 Y2014 Y2015 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9 M10 M11 M12
Drug age 
(predicted)
37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 37
38 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 38
39 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 39
40 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 40
41 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 41
42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 42
43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 43
44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 44
45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 45
46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 46
47 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 47




In order to solve this mathematical problem, we replaced the monthly dummies by quarter 
dummies, therefore avoiding perfect collinearity. This option is consistent with the 
pharmaceutical industry practice, where the typical cycle is composed of three months. Table 
10.26 below demonstrates how the month dummies were converted into quarter dummies. 
Table 10.26 – Month to quarter dummies conversion 
 
Therefore, all models using monthly temporal dummies were adapted to incorporate quarter 
dummies instead. 
 
10.4.2. Wittink (2002) simplified (Model 1) 
10.4.2.1. Procedures and outputs 
An adaptation of the model was made regarding product L14, which evidenced a very low 
variation in its price. One can see in figure 10.16 below that Ln average drug price for LI4 is 
almost a constant, with only a slight reduction of 0,5% in the drug price from January 2012 to 
December 2015. The decision to exclude this variable was based on its extremely high 
coefficient in the regression, with a price elasticity of -43,206, which manifestly appears to 
have very little relation with the reality in this market (descriptive statistics in figure 10.16). 
 
Figure 10.16 – Descriptive statistics of variable Ln average drug price for product LI4 
In order to allow a global view of the coefficients and significance, four tables – one for each 
market – were built, adapted from Leeflang & Wieringa (2010). Table 10.27 represents 
Market 1, table 10.28 represents Market 2, table 10.29 represents Market 3, and table 10.30 
represents Market 4. 
 
M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9 M10 M11 M12

















7,415  --- Yes Yes 8,989  --- Yes Yes -26,503  --- Yes Yes
Ln Detailing flow -0,074 No No No 0,036 Yes No No -0,192 No Yes Yes
Ln Journal advertising flow 0,013 Yes Yes Yes 0,001 Yes No No -0,027 No Yes Yes
Ln Direct marketing flow 0,002 Yes No No -0,001 No No No 0,018 Yes No Yes
Competitive Ln Competitive expend. flow -0,009 Yes No No 0,060 No No No 0,418 No Yes Yes
Price Own Ln average drug price -0,488 Yes No Yes -0,805 Yes No Yes 1,712 No No No
Drug age 0,100 Yes Yes Yes 0,111 Yes Yes Yes 1,246 Yes Yes Yes
Drug age squared -0,0003 Yes No Yes -0,001 Yes Yes Yes -0,014 Yes Yes Yes
Public reimbursement 0,491 Yes Yes Yes -0,099 No No No 5,594 Yes Yes Yes
Quarter 2 0,113  --- No No 0,056  --- No No -0,054  --- No No
Quarter 3 0,126  --- No No 0,182  --- No Yes 0,068  --- No No
Quarter 4 0,256  --- No No 0,290  --- Yes Yes 0,526  --- Yes Yes
Year 2013 0,157  --- No No 0,266  --- No No
Year 2014 0,257  --- No No 0,553  --- No No
Year 2015 0,728  --- No No 0,890  --- No No 0,573  --- Yes Yes










































13,402  --- Yes Yes 14,720  --- Yes Yes 11,243  --- Yes Yes 1,972  --- No No 13,275  --- Yes Yes
Ln Detailing flow -0,001 No No No 0,075 Yes No No -0,072 No No Yes -0,003 No No No 0,036 Yes No No
Ln Journal advertising flow 0,00002 Yes No No 0,003 Yes No No 0,001 Yes No No 0,001 Yes No No 0,001 Yes No No
Ln Direct marketing flow -0,005 No No No 0,001 Yes No No -0,002 No No No 0,033 Yes No No -0,004 No No No
Competitive Ln Competitive expend. flow 0,046 No No No 0,010 No No No 0,140 No Yes Yes 0,400 No No Yes 0,048 No No No
Price Own Ln average drug price 0,434 No No No -2,798 Yes No No 2,637 No No No -3,078 Yes No No
Drug age 0,005 Yes No No -0,010 No No No 0,006 Yes No No 0,282 Yes Yes Yes -0,005 No No No
Drug age squared -0,0002 Yes No Yes -0,0001 Yes No No -0,0002 Yes Yes Yes -0,003 Yes Yes Yes ####### Yes No No
Quarter 2 0,125  --- Yes Yes 0,069  --- No Yes 0,111  --- Yes Yes -0,250  --- No No 0,045  --- No No
Quarter 3 0,199  --- Yes Yes 0,165  --- Yes Yes 0,183  --- Yes Yes 0,093  --- No No 0,087  --- No No
Quarter 4 0,286  --- Yes Yes 0,234  --- Yes Yes 0,256  --- Yes Yes 0,068  --- No No 0,128  --- No No
Year 2013 0,250  --- Yes Yes 0,184  --- No No 0,264  --- Yes Yes 0,081  --- No No
Year 2014 0,507  --- Yes Yes 0,352  --- No No 0,629  --- Yes Yes 0,059  --- No No 0,045  --- No No






Adjusted R2 0,617 0,556 0,776
Temporal dummies








Product PA1 Product PA2 Product PA3
Constant (no variation)
Product PA5



























14,735  --- Yes Yes 14,560  --- Yes Yes 10,504  --- No No 39,118  --- Yes Yes 6,263  --- Yes Yes
Ln Detailing flow 0,023 Yes No No 0,062 Yes Yes Yes 0,006 Yes No No 0,012 Yes No No -0,043 No No No
Ln Journal advertising flow -0,002 No No No 0,007 Yes Yes Yes -0,006 No No No
Ln Direct marketing flow -0,011 No Yes Yes -0,008 No Yes Yes 0,011 Yes No No 0,010 Yes No No
Competitive
Ln Competitive marketing 
expenditures flow
0,013 No No No -0,038 Yes No No 0,120 No No No -0,090 Yes No No 0,277 No No No
Price Own Ln average drug price 0,981 No No No -0,039 Yes No No -0,290 Yes No No -0,882 Yes Yes Yes -0,746 Yes No No
Drug age 0,012 Yes No No 0,004 Yes No No 0,065 No No No -0,251 No Yes Yes 0,171 Yes Yes Yes
Drug age squared -0,0001 Yes No No -0,0003 Yes Yes Yes -0,0003 Yes No No 0,001 No Yes Yes -0,002 Yes Yes Yes
Loss of exclusivity -0,158 Yes No No 0,034 No No No
Quarter 2 0,074  --- Yes Yes 0,110  --- Yes Yes 0,103  --- No No 0,003  --- No No 0,222  --- No No
Quarter 3 0,141  --- Yes Yes 0,200  --- Yes Yes 0,181  --- No No 0,034  --- No No 0,234  --- No No
Quarter 4 0,206  --- Yes Yes 0,321  --- Yes Yes 0,224  --- No No 0,081  --- No No 0,299  --- No No
Year 2013 0,207  --- No Yes 0,336  --- Yes Yes 0,261  --- No No -0,165  --- No No
Year 2014 0,481  --- Yes Yes 0,740  --- Yes Yes 0,607  --- No No -0,037  --- No No 0,272  --- No No














No investments in time series
No investments in time series
No investments in time series
Product HE4 Product HE5
0,893
N/A (product launched in 2013)
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
Product HE1 Product HE2 Product HE3

























17,824  --- Yes Yes 17,955  --- Yes Yes 12,972  --- Yes Yes 12,705  --- Yes Yes 7,190  --- Yes Yes
Ln Detailing flow -0,056 No No No 0,008 Yes No No -0,008 No No No 0,081 Yes No No 0,063 Yes No No
Ln Journal advertising flow 0,002 Yes No No 0,002 Yes No No 0,007 Yes Yes Yes -0,0040 No No No 0,006 Yes No No
Ln Direct marketing flow -0,005 No No No 0,016 Yes No No 0,003 Yes No No -0,006 No No No -0,015 No Yes Yes
Competitive
Ln Competitive marketing 
expenditures flow
0,118 No No No -0,020 Yes No No 0,069 No No No -0,012 Yes No No -0,033 Yes No No
Price Own Ln average drug price -0,962 Yes No No -2,247 Yes No No -0,965 Yes No No 4,782 No Yes Yes
Drug age -0,058 No No No -0,036 No No No 0,011 Yes No No 0,012 Yes No No 0,033 Yes No Yes
Drug age squared 0,0002 No No No 0,00001 No No No -0,0001 Yes No No -0,0003 Yes Yes Yes -0,0006 Yes Yes Yes
Quarter 2 0,067  --- No No 0,096  --- Yes Yes 0,065  --- No No 0,119  --- Yes Yes 0,177  --- Yes Yes
Quarter 3 0,197  --- No No 0,166  --- Yes Yes 0,154  --- No No 0,147  --- Yes Yes 0,242  --- Yes Yes
Quarter 4 0,230  --- No No 0,296  --- Yes Yes 0,186  --- No Yes 0,232  --- Yes Yes 0,349  --- Yes Yes
Year 2013 0,244  --- No No 0,313  --- Yes Yes 0,141  --- No No 0,233  --- No Yes 0,566  --- Yes Yes
Year 2014 0,541  --- No No 0,645  --- Yes Yes 0,415  --- No Yes 0,467  --- No Yes 0,785  --- Yes Yes











Product LI1 Product LI2 Product LI3 Product LI4 Product LI5
ANOVA Sig. 0,135 0,008 0,001








Based on the four tables shown above, we prepared a summary of results for a better interpretation, with table 10.31. 
Table 10.31 – Summary of Wittink (2002) simplified (Model 1) results 
 
In this table, we added, in the last two columns, the results obtained by Leeflang & Wieringa (2010) using Model 1 with a 49 products in Dutch 






































































Ln Detailing flow 33,3% 0,0% -0,077 0,036 40,0% 0,0% 0,007 0,056 80,0% 20,0% 0,012 0,026 60,0% 0,0% 0,018 0,051 55,6% 5,6% -0,003 0,040 10,0% 0,014
Ln Journal advertising flow 66,7% 33,3% -0,004 0,007 100,0% 0,0% 0,001 0,001 33,3% 33,3% 0,000 0,007 80,0% 20,0% 0,003 0,004 75,0% 18,8% 0,000 0,004 6,0% 0,027
Ln Direct marketing flow 66,7% 0,0% 0,006 0,010 40,0% 0,0% 0,005 0,017 50,0% 0,0% 0,000 0,010 40,0% 0,0% -0,001 0,009 47,1% 0,0% 0,002 0,012 4,0% 0,007
Ln Competitive marketing 
expenditures flow
33,3% 0,0% 0,156 -0,009 0,0% 0,0% 0,129 N/A 40,0% 0,0% 0,056 -0,064 60,0% 0,0% 0,024 0,093 33,3% 0,0% 0,084 0,010 0,0% 0,053
Ln average drug price 66,7% 0,0% 0,140 -0,647 50,0% 0,0% -0,701 -2,938 80,0% 20,0% -0,195 -0,489 75,0% 0,0% 0,152 -1,391 68,8% 6,3% -0,172 -1,209  ---  ---
Drug age 100,0% 100,0% 0,486 0,486 60,0% 20,0% 0,056 0,098 60,0% 20,0% -0,251 0,063 60,0% 0,0% -0,008 0,019 66,7% 27,8% 0,094 0,158 100,0% 0,170
Drug age squared 100,0% 66,7% -0,005 -0,005 100,0% 40,0% -0,001 -0,001 80,0% 40,0% -0,001 -0,001 60,0% 40,0% -0,0002 -0,0003 83,3% 44,4% -0,001 -0,002 65,0% -0,001
Public reimbursement 66,7% 66,7% 1,995 3,042  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  --- 66,7% 66,7% 1,995 3,042  ---  ---














Market 1 - Blood
(3 products)
% cases with…















10.4.3. Wittink (2002) complete (Model 2) 
10.4.3.1. Procedures and outputs 
We started running the first regressions and noted an issue with Model 2, where SPSS would 
exclude the variable Drug_age^2. To investigate this, we manually ran some regressions and 
found that, for the data set consisting of the temporal observations on our database, the 
variable Drug age^3 can be perfectly obtained from a linear combination of the variables 
Drug age and Drug age^2. Below we present the outputs of this regression for product BL1, 
in figure 10.17. 
 
Figure 10.17 – Linear regression of Dru age^3 on Drug age and Drug age^2 for product BL1 
in model 2 





Figure 10.18 – Linear regression of Dru age^3 on Drug age and Drug age^2 for product BL1 
in model 2 
Therefore, to solve the multicollinearity provoked by the inclusion of Drug age^3, we decided 
to remove this variable from the list of variables in Model 2. 
In addition to this global adaptation for all products, there was also the need to adjust Model 2 
for some products. Regarding product BL3, we had to make a small adjustment corresponding 
to the complete version of Wittink (2002) explored by Leeflang & Wieringa (2010). SPSS 






Figure 10.19 – Rejected variables for product BL3 in model 2 
We manually investigated the reason for the exclusion, and found that the variable Ln Journal 
advertising is dramatically correlated with Ln Journal advertising x Ln detailing flow, as seen 







Figure 10.20 – Linear regression of Ln Journal advertising flow on its interaction with Ln 
detailing flow for product BL3 in model 2. 
The fact that we are working with a limited number of observations for product BL3 (18 
months only, given that it started its sales in July 2014), associated with the reality that a 
number of months has zero investments in journal advertising originated this almost perfect 
collinearity, rejected by SPSS. For visualization purposes, we show the observations for Ln 
Journal advertising flow and its interaction with Ln detailing flow, here seen in table 10.32. 
Table 10.32 – Observations involved in variable rejection for product BL3 in model 2 
 
We then looked at variable Drug age, which was also rejected by SPSS. We ran some manual 
regressions and found that it is highly correlated with the dummy variable year 2015, as 




























Figure 10.21 – Linear regression of Drug age on Year 2015 dummy for product BL3 in model 
2 
It is demonstrated then that drug age is almost a linear perfect combination of the Year 2015 
dummy. Again, the reduced number of observations and the fact that we are working with 
one-year dummy only (sales started in 2014) provoked this variable rejection. 
In order to solve this problem, we decided to adapt model 2 for product BL3 by: 
 Removing the interaction variable (Ln Journal advertising flow x Ln Detailing flow) 
 Removing the year 2015 dummy 
As a result, SPSS did not exclude any variable with this adapted model. Tables 10.33, 10.34, 



















3,511  --- No Yes 8,003  --- Yes Yes -25,224  --- Yes Yes
Ln Detailing flow 0,287 Yes No Yes -0,017 No No No -0,017 No No No
Ln Journal advertising 
flow
0,279 Yes No Yes 0,086 Yes No No -0,028 No Yes Yes
Ln Direct marketing 
flow
0,135 Yes No No -0,099 No No No -0,274 No No No
Ln Competitive 
detailing flow
-0,050 Yes No No 0,033 No No No -0,091 Yes No No
Ln Competitive journal 
advertising flow
-0,004 Yes No No 0,012 No Yes Yes -0,011 Yes No No
Ln Competitive direct 
marketing flow
0,003 No No No 0,003 No No No 0,030 No Yes Yes
Drug age 0,115 Yes Yes Yes 0,135 Yes Yes Yes 1,535 Yes Yes Yes
Drug age squared -0,0005 Yes Yes Yes -0,001 Yes Yes Yes -0,017 Yes Yes Yes
Ln Journal advertising 
flow x Ln Detailing flow
-0,033  --- No Yes -0,012  --- No No  ---  ---  ---  ---
Ln Journal advertising 
flow x Ln Mailing flow
0,000  --- No No 0,000  --- No No 0,003  --- No No
Ln Mailing flow x Ln 
Detailing flow
-0,017  --- No No 0,013  --- No No 0,039  --- No No
Public reimbursement 0,631 Yes Yes Yes -0,188 No Yes Yes 4,882 Yes Yes Yes
Quarter 2 0,178  --- Yes Yes 0,081  --- No No -0,203  --- Yes Yes
Quarter 3 0,223  --- No No 0,171  --- No Yes -0,077  --- No No
Quarter 4 0,328  --- No No 0,261  --- No Yes 0,251  --- No Yes
Year 2013 0,289  --- No No 0,230  --- No No
Year 2014 0,428  --- No No 0,411  --- No No
Year 2015 1,008  --- No No 0,688  --- No No  ---  ---  ---  ---
Adjusted R2 0,995 0,983 1,000
ANOVA Sig. 0,000 0,000 0,000
Temporal dummies




































14,011  --- Yes Yes 14,446  --- Yes Yes 13,126  --- Yes Yes 2,132  --- No No 12,615  --- Yes Yes
Ln Detailing flow -0,029 No No No 0,076 Yes No No -0,175 No No Yes 0,079 Yes No No 0,018 Yes No No
Ln Journal advertising 
flow
-0,078 No No No 0,037 Yes No No -0,040 No No Yes -0,243 No No No -0,019 No No No
Ln Direct marketing 
flow
0,100 Yes No No -0,097 No No No -0,125 No No No 1,495 Yes No No 0,061 Yes No No
Ln Competitive 
detailing flow
0,054 No No No -0,074 Yes No No 0,180 No Yes Yes 0,512 No No No 0,026 No No No
Ln Competitive journal 
advertising flow
-0,004 Yes No No 0,003 No No No 0,004 No No No 0,0002 No No No 0,005 No No No
Ln Competitive direct 
marketing flow
-0,004 Yes No No -0,005 Yes No Yes -0,003 Yes No No 0,032 No No No -0,001 Yes No No
Drug age 0,002 Yes No No -0,005 No No No 0,004 Yes No No 0,272 Yes No No 0,002 Yes No No
Drug age squared -0,0002 Yes No Yes -0,0001 Yes No No -0,0002 Yes No Yes -0,003 Yes No No -0,0001 Yes No No
Ln Journal advertising 
flow x Ln Detailing flow
0,010  --- No No -0,004  --- No No 0,005  --- No No 0,029  --- No No 0,003  --- No No
Ln Journal advertising 
flow x Ln Mailing flow
0,002  --- No Yes 0,000  --- No No -0,001  --- No No 0,001  --- No No
Ln Mailing flow x Ln 
Detailing flow
-0,016  --- No No 0,013  --- No No 0,017  --- No No -0,200  --- No No -0,010  --- No No
Quarter 2 0,109  --- Yes Yes 0,076  --- Yes Yes 0,098  --- Yes Yes -0,199  --- Yes Yes 0,044  --- No No
Quarter 3 0,184  --- Yes Yes 0,165  --- Yes Yes 0,169  --- Yes Yes 0,274  --- No No 0,077  --- No No
Quarter 4 0,268  --- Yes Yes 0,222  --- Yes Yes 0,220  --- Yes Yes 0,394  --- No No 0,118  --- No No
Year 2013 0,262  --- No Yes 0,175  --- No No 0,223  --- No Yes 0,070  --- No No
Year 2014 0,505  --- No Yes 0,407  --- No Yes 0,464  --- Yes Yes 0,565  --- No No 0,107  --- No No
Year 2015 0,837  --- No Yes 0,668  --- No Yes 0,719  --- Yes Yes 0,851  --- No No 0,240  --- No No
No interaction in time series
0,845 0,171
ANOVA Sig. 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,136
0,765
Wittink (2002) complete
Product PA1 Product PA2 Product PA3 Product PA4
N/A (product launched in 2013)
Constant
Model specification
































13,817  --- Yes Yes 14,387  --- Yes Yes 7,498  --- No No 33,494  --- Yes Yes 6,585  --- Yes Yes
Ln Detailing flow 0,033 Yes No No 0,024 Yes No No 0,004 Yes No No 0,007 Yes No No 0,024 Yes No No
Ln Journal advertising 
flow
0,074 Yes No No -0,051 No No No 0,498 Yes No No
Ln Direct marketing 
flow
-0,048 No No No -0,082 No No No 0,009 Yes No No -0,711 No No No
Ln Competitive 
detailing flow
0,003 No No No -0,022 Yes No No 0,122 No No No -0,095 Yes No No 0,350 No No No
Ln Competitive journal 
advertising flow
0,006 No Yes Yes -0,002 Yes No No 0,002 No No No 0,009 No Yes Yes -0,005 Yes No No
Ln Competitive direct 
marketing flow
-0,0019 Yes No No -0,001 Yes No No -0,016 Yes Yes Yes -0,004 Yes No No 0,013 No No No
Drug age 0,020 Yes No No 0,009 Yes No No 0,122 Yes No Yes -0,170 No Yes Yes 0,202 Yes Yes Yes
Drug age squared -0,0002 Yes Yes Yes -0,0002 Yes Yes Yes -0,001 Yes Yes Yes 0,0003 No Yes Yes -0,002 Yes Yes Yes
Ln Journal advertising 
flow x Ln Detailing flow
-0,011  --- No No 0,007  --- No No -0,068  --- No No
Ln Journal advertising 
flow x Ln Mailing flow
0,002  --- Yes Yes 0,002  --- No No
Ln Mailing flow x Ln 
Detailing flow
0,006  --- No No 0,009  --- No No 0,003  --- No No 0,096  --- No No
Loss of exclusivity -0,133 Yes No No 0,057 No No No
Quarter 2 0,079  --- Yes Yes 0,088  --- Yes Yes 0,170  --- Yes Yes 0,083  --- No Yes 0,132  --- No No
Quarter 3 0,152  --- Yes Yes 0,172  --- Yes Yes 0,318  --- Yes Yes 0,154  --- No Yes -0,043  --- No No
Quarter 4 0,219  --- Yes Yes 0,263  --- Yes Yes 0,409  --- Yes Yes 0,206  --- No Yes -0,149  --- No No
Year 2013 0,229  --- No Yes 0,265  --- Yes Yes 0,434  --- No Yes -0,058  --- No No
Year 2014 0,565  --- Yes Yes 0,609  --- Yes Yes 0,929  --- No Yes 0,243  --- No No -0,414  --- No No
Year 2015 0,898  --- Yes Yes 1,030  --- Yes Yes 1,408  --- No Yes 0,575  --- No No -0,859  --- No No
Not applicable
No interactions in time series No interactions in time series
No interactions in time series
No investments in time series
No interactions in time series
No interactions in time series
0,000 0,0000,000 0,000 0,000
Adjusted R2 0,823 0,693 0,924 0,979 0,869
Not applicable Not applicablePolicy change
No interactions in time series
No investments in time series No investments in time series
Wittink (2002) complete




Product HE3 Product HE4 Product HE5
Temporal dummies





























16,392  --- Yes Yes 15,916  --- Yes Yes 13,202  --- Yes Yes 12,679  --- Yes Yes 11,454  --- Yes Yes
Ln Detailing flow -0,118 No No Yes 0,005 Yes No No -0,021 No No No 0,083 Yes No No 0,091 Yes No No
Ln Journal advertising 
flow
-0,118 No Yes Yes 0,060 Yes No No 0,004 Yes No No 0,042 Yes No No -0,004 No No No
Ln Direct marketing 
flow
-0,050 No No No -0,199 No No No 0,102 Yes No No
Ln Competitive 
detailing flow
0,118 No No Yes -0,036 Yes No No 0,096 No No No -0,011 Yes No No -0,051 Yes No No
Ln Competitive journal 
advertising flow
0,007 No No Yes 0,003 No No No -0,002 Yes No No 0,0004 No No No -0,0001 Yes No No
Ln Competitive direct 
marketing flow
-0,009 Yes No Yes -0,008 Yes Yes Yes -0,002 Yes No No -0,003 Yes No No 0,004 No No No
Drug age -0,005 No No No -0,020 No No No 0,018 Yes No No 0,008 Yes No No -0,004 No No No
Drug age squared -0,0001 Yes No No -0,0001 Yes No No -0,0002 Yes No Yes -0,0003 Yes Yes Yes -0,0005 Yes Yes Yes
Ln Journal advertising 
flow x Ln Detailing flow
0,016  --- Yes Yes -0,009  --- No No 0,000  --- No No -0,006  --- No No 0,002  --- No No
Ln Journal advertising 
flow x Ln Mailing flow
-0,001  --- No No -0,0004  --- No No 0,000  --- No No -0,0019  --- No No
Ln Mailing flow x Ln 
Detailing flow
0,007  --- No No 0,002  --- No No 0,032  --- No No -0,001  --- No No -0,015  --- No No
Quarter 2 0,056  --- No No 0,139  --- Yes Yes 0,072  --- No Yes 0,114  --- Yes Yes 0,153  --- Yes Yes
Quarter 3 0,214  --- Yes Yes 0,226  --- Yes Yes 0,163  --- Yes Yes 0,150  --- Yes Yes 0,266  --- Yes Yes
Quarter 4 0,239  --- No Yes 0,361  --- Yes Yes 0,204  --- Yes Yes 0,236  --- Yes Yes 0,414  --- Yes Yes
Year 2013 0,217  --- No No 0,386  --- Yes Yes 0,143  --- No No 0,247  --- No Yes 0,517  --- Yes Yes
Year 2014 0,537  --- No No 0,801  --- Yes Yes 0,440  --- No No 0,498  --- No Yes 0,876  --- Yes Yes
Year 2015 0,969  --- No Yes 1,309  --- Yes Yes 0,723  --- No Yes 0,887  --- Yes Yes 1,514  --- Yes Yes
Removed (two non-zero 
observations only)
Removed (one non-zero 
observation only)
No interactions in time series
ANOVA Sig. 0,022 0,003 0,005 0,000 0,000

















Based on the four tables shown above, we prepared a summary of results for a better interpretation, with table 10.37. 






























































Ln Detailing flow 33,3% 0,0% 0,084 0,287 60,0% 0,0% -0,006 0,058 100,0% 0,0% 0,018 0,018 60,0% 0,0% 0,008 0,060 66,7% 0,0% 0,020 0,061
Ln Journal advertising flow 66,7% 0,0% 0,112 0,183 20,0% 0,0% -0,069 0,037 66,7% 0,0% 0,174 0,286 60,0% 0,0% -0,003 0,035 50,0% 0,0% 0,031 0,135
Ln Direct marketing flow 33,3% 0,0% -0,079 0,135 60,0% 0,0% 0,287 0,552 25,0% 0,0% -0,208 0,009 33,3% 0,0% -0,049 0,102 40,0% 0,0% 0,015 0,317
Ln Competitive detailing 
flow
66,7% 0,0% -0,036 -0,071 20,0% 0,0% 0,140 -0,074 40,0% 0,0% 0,072 -0,058 60,0% 0,0% 0,023 -0,033 44,4% 0,0% 0,059 -0,054
Ln Competitive journal 
advertising flow
66,7% 0,0% -0,001 -0,008 20,0% 0,0% 0,002 -0,004 40,0% 0,0% 0,002 -0,003 40,0% 0,0% 0,001 -0,001 38,9% 0,0% 0,001 -0,004
Ln Competitive direct 
marketing flow
0,0% 0,0% 0,012 N/A 80,0% 0,0% 0,004 -0,004 80,0% 20,0% -0,002 -0,006 80,0% 20,0% -0,004 -0,006 66,7% 11,1% 0,001 -0,005
Drug age 100,0% 100,0% 0,595 0,595 80,0% 0,0% 0,055 0,070 80,0% 20,0% 0,037 0,088 40,0% 0,0% -0,001 0,013 72,2% 22,2% 0,125 0,188
Drug age squared 100,0% 100,0% -0,006 -0,006 100,0% 0,0% -0,001 -0,001 80,0% 80,0% -0,001 -0,001 100,0% 40,0% 0,000 0,000 94,4% 50,0% -0,001 -0,002
Ln Journal advertising 
flow x Ln Detailing flow
 ---  --- -0,022  ---  ---  --- 0,009  ---  ---  --- -0,024  ---  ---  --- 0,001  ---  ---  --- -0,005  ---
Ln Journal advertising 
flow x Ln Mailing flow
 ---  --- 0,001  ---  ---  --- 0,001  ---  ---  --- 0,002  ---  ---  --- -0,001  ---  ---  --- 0,0005  ---
Ln Mailing flow x Ln 
Detailing flow
 ---  --- 0,011  ---  ---  --- -0,039  ---  ---  --- 0,028  ---  ---  --- 0,005  ---  ---  --- -0,001  ---
Public reimbursement 66,7% 66,7% 1,775 2,756  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  --- 66,7% 66,7% 1,775 2,756
Loss of exclusivity  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  --- 50,0% 0,0% -0,038 -0,133  ---  ---  ---  --- 50,0% 0,0% -0,038 -0,133
Market 1 - Blood
(3 products)
Market 2 - Pancreas
(5 products)
Market 3 - Heart
(5 products)






















10.4.4. Rizzo (1999) (Model 3) 
10.4.4.1. Procedures and outputs 
By directly applying model 3 (Rizzo, 1999) to our data, we noted several multicollinearity 
problems. To exemplify, we show the outputs of products BL1, shown below in figure 10.22. 
 
Figure 10.22 – Excluded variables for product BL1 in model 3 
 
Rizzo (1999) had noted, regarding his data, that some forms of the regressions (46 products) 
had evidenced multicollinearity problems (p. 97). We developed some additional regressions 
using the excluded variables, to investigate the potential reasons by which SPSS was rejecting 
some variables. We started by regressing Ln Detailing flow x Ln detailing flow on Ln 





Figure 10.23 – Linear regression of Ln Detailing flow x Ln Detailing flow on Ln Detailing 
flow for product BL1 in model 3 
The output variable can be calculated almost perfectly using the original variable itself (Ln 
Detailing flow). 
We performed a similar analysis regarding another pair of variables: Ln Detailing stock x Ln 





Figure 10.24 – Linear regression of Ln Detailing stock x Ln Detailing stock on Ln Detailing 
stock 
 
Likewise, the output variable can be calculated almost perfectly using the original variable 
itself (Ln Detailing stock). 
Finally, we regressed Drug age x Drug age on Drug age, and found, again, a very strong 





Figure 10.25 – Linear regression of Drug age x Drug age on Drug age for product BL1 in 
model 3 
Our interpretation of these results is the following: there is a very high level of 
multicollinearity explained by the fact that the variables exhibit values in a very limited range, 
for which SPSS calculates a very close relation between the original values and the values 
multiplied by themselves. Given this multicollinearity problem, and in order to avoid multiple 
sets of excluded variables, we opted to use a slightly adapted Rizzo (1999) model, removing 
from the list of independent variables three variables: 
 Ln Detailing flow x Ln Detailing flow 
 Ln Detailing stock x Ln Detailing stock 
 Drug age squared 
Then testing this adapted model for product BL1, SPSS did not exclude any variable. 
However, running the regressions for the other products, we noticed that another variable was 
consistently being excluded: Ln Drug price x Ln Detailing stock. An example of product BL2 





Figure 10.26 – Additional excluded variable for product BL2 in adjusted model 3 
By regressing Ln Drug price x Ln Detailing stock on Ln Drug price, we obtained an almost 
linear combination which explains a very high amount of the variation of the dependent 
variable (here shown in figure 10.27). 
 
Figure 10.27 – Linear regression of Ln Drug price x Ln Detailing stock on Ln Drug price for 




Again, to avoid exclusion of variables due to this multicollinearity issues, we decided to 
remove this interaction variable from the original Rizzo (1999) model for product BL2. 
Running the regressions again, no variables were excluded. 
Regarding product BL3, we had to further adapt the model, again due to multicollinearity. We 
removed the interaction variables Ln average drug price x Ln Detailing flow and Ln average 
drug price x Drug age, given their very high correlation with the variables Ln average drug 
price and Drug age. By memory, product BL3 only has 18 observations (from July 2014 to 
December 2015). 
In relation to product PA4, whose sales started in April 2013, we had to make some 
adjustment to the Rizzo (1999) model too. The first one was the removal of the variable Ln 
average drug price, given that, during the period of analysis, the drug did not experience any 
price change (constant). Therefore, the interaction variables Ln Drug price x Ln Detailing 
flow and Ln Drug price x Drug age had to be removed too. 
Concerning product HE1, SPSS excluded the variable Ln average drug price x Drug age, 
given that there is an almost perfect correlation (-0,962) between the individual variables, as 
seen below in figure 10.28. Therefore, we removed this interaction variable from the 
regression model. 
 
Figure 10.28 – Correlation between Ln average drug price and Drug age for product HE1 in 
adjusted model 3 
The same was done regarding products HE3, HE4, LI1 and LI2 which evidenced the same 
correlation problem between the same two variables, as seen below in figures 10.29, 10.30, 





Figure 10.29 – Correlation between Ln average drug price and Drug age for product HE3 
 
 
Figure 10.30 – Correlation between Ln average drug price and Drug age for product HE4 in 
adjusted model 3 
 
Figure 10.31 – Correlation between Ln average drug price and Drug age for product LI1 in 





Figure 10.32 – Correlation between Ln average drug price and Drug age for product LI2 in 
adjusted model 3 
Product LI4 also evidenced some multicollinearity issues in the regressions, where we had to 
exclude Ln average drug price, given that it is almost a constant, with only a slight reduction 
of 0,5% in the drug price from January 2012 to December 2015. Therefore, the interaction 
variables Ln Drug price x Ln Detailing flow and Ln Drug price x Drug age also had to be 
removed. Figure 10.33 evidences the descriptive statistics for product LI4. 
 
Figure 10.33 – Descriptive statistics of variable Ln average drug price for product LI4 
 
After all these adptations to the Rizzo (1999) model, we show the summary tables such as 





Table 10.38 – Summary of Rizzo (1999) (Model 3) regression outputs – Market 1 - Blood 
 











6,606  --- Yes Yes 14,433  --- Yes Yes 12,964  --- No No
Own Ln Detailing flow 0,028 Yes No No 0,435 Yes No No 0,239 Yes No Yes
Competitive Ln Competitive detailing flow 0,091 No No No 0,047 No No No -0,097 No No No
Ln Detailing stock 0,174 Yes No No -0,004 No No No 0,639 Yes Yes Yes
Own Ln average drug price 0,004 No No No -3,660 Yes No No 0,047 No No No
Competitors
Ln Average competitors drug 
price
-1,542 No No No -0,178 No No No -14,437 No Yes Yes
Drug age 0,070 Yes Yes Yes -0,110 No Yes Yes 0,031 Yes No No
Ln Drug price x Ln Detailing 
flow
-0,007 No No No -0,376 No No No
Ln Drug price x Drug age -0,002 Yes No No 0,140 No Yes Yes
Public reimbursement 0,519 Yes Yes Yes -0,104 No No No 4,263 Yes Yes Yes
Year 2013 -0,102  --- No No 0,030  --- No No
Year 2014 -0,298  --- No Yes 0,225  --- No Yes
Year 2015 -0,119  --- No No 0,137  --- No No 0,147  --- No No





N/A (product launched in 2014)

















Table 10.39 – Summary of Rizzo (1999) (Model 3) regression outputs – Market 2 – Pancreas 
 



















15,779  --- Yes Yes 21,110  --- Yes Yes 7,376  --- No Yes 55,771  --- No No 11,223  --- Yes Yes
Own Ln Detailing flow 0,206 Yes No No -0,316 No No No 0,608 Yes No No 0,057 Yes No No 0,143 Yes No No
Competitive Ln Competitive detailing flow 0,050 No No No 0,056 No No No 0,128 No Yes Yes 0,224 No No No 0,059 No No No
Ln Detailing stock 0,073 Yes No No -0,088 No No No 0,154 Yes No No 0,830 Yes Yes Yes 0,027 Yes No No
Own Ln average drug price 2,651 No No No -25,749 Yes No No 13,104 No No No 4,354 No No No
Competitors
Ln Average competitors drug 
price
-12,689 No No No 1,679 Yes No No -0,518 No No No -285,5 No No No -1,915 No No No
Drug age -0,027 No No Yes -0,026 No No No -0,020 No No No 0,124 Yes Yes Yes 0,020 Yes No No
Ln Drug price x Ln Detailing 
flow
-0,642 No No No 1,211 Yes No No -2,191 No No No -0,344 No No No
Ln Drug price x Drug age 0,125 No Yes Yes 0,107 No No No 0,096 No No No -0,057 Yes No No
Year 2013 -0,088  --- No No -0,103  --- No Yes -0,010  --- No No -0,070  --- No No
Year 2014 -0,441  --- No No -0,427  --- No No 0,013  --- No No -0,292  --- No No -0,210  --- No No
Year 2015 -0,501  --- No No -0,503  --- No No -0,014  --- No No -0,539  --- No No -0,259  --- No No
Constant (no variation)











Adjusted R2 0,583 0,453 0,738















Table 10.40 – Summary of Rizzo (1999) (Model 3) regression outputs – Market 3 – Heart 
 



















12,252  --- No Yes 9,916  --- Yes Yes 15,594  --- Yes Yes 18,411  --- Yes Yes -3,347  --- No No
Own Ln Detailing flow 0,049 Yes No No 0,180 Yes No No -0,027 No No No -0,055 No No No 0,806 Yes No No
Competitive Ln Competitive detailing flow 0,021 No No No -0,019 No No No 0,136 No No Yes -0,057 Yes No No 0,150 No No No
Ln Detailing stock 0,054 Yes No No 0,155 Yes No No 0,052 Yes No No 0,015 Yes No No 0,218 Yes Yes Yes
Own Ln average drug price -1,002 Yes No No -1,704 No No No -0,556 Yes No No 1,268 No No Yes -8,919 Yes No No
Competitors
Ln Average competitors drug 
price
-0,402 No No Yes -0,507 No No No 0,274 Yes No No -1,307 No No Yes -3,187 No Yes Yes
Drug age 0,009 Yes No No 0,045 Yes No No -0,014 No No Yes -0,018 No Yes Yes 0,114 Yes Yes Yes
Ln Drug price x Ln Detailing 
flow
0,073 Yes No No 0,120 Yes No No -0,026 No No No -0,053 No No No 0,850 Yes No No
Ln Drug price x Drug age 0,035 No No No 0,065 No No No
Loss of exclusivity -0,194 Yes Yes Yes -0,112 Yes No Yes
Year 2013 -0,048  --- No No -0,022  --- No Yes 0,042  --- No Yes -0,353  --- Yes Yes
Year 2014 -0,067  --- No No -0,015  --- No No 0,103  --- No No -0,431  --- Yes Yes 0,115  --- No No
Year 2015 -0,100  --- No No 0,383  --- No No -0,093  --- No No -0,334  --- Yes Yes -0,123  --- No No
N/A (product launched in 2013)
0,975 0,980
0,000
Adjusted R2 0,768 0,423 0,913
0,000 0,001
Policy change Not applicable Not applicable
Constant
ANOVA Sig. 0,000 0,000
Removed due to multicollinearity Removed due to multicollinearity
Temporal dummies
Removed due to multicollinearity
Rizzo (1999) (adapted)
Model specification















Table 10.41 – Summary of Rizzo (1999) (Model 3) regression outputs – Market 4 – Liver 
 



















14,952  --- No No 13,473  --- No Yes 17,462  --- No Yes 11,781  --- Yes Yes 16,936  --- Yes Yes
Own Ln Detailing flow -0,035 No No No 0,006 Yes No No -0,578 No No No 0,074 Yes No No -0,251 No No No
Competitive Ln Competitive detailing flow 0,110 No No No 0,022 No No No 0,143 No No Yes -0,006 Yes No No 0,032 No No No
Ln Detailing stock -0,133 No No No 0,012 Yes No No 0,092 Yes No No 0,075 Yes No No 0,277 Yes Yes Yes
Own Ln average drug price 0,043 No No No -1,319 Yes No No 9,332 No No No -12,897 Yes No Yes
Competitors
Ln Average competitors drug 
price
0,772 Yes No Yes 0,185 Yes No No -0,628 No No No -0,743 No No No 0,752 Yes Yes Yes
Drug age 0,005 Yes No No 0,003 Yes No No -0,028 No No No 0,017 Yes Yes Yes -0,108 No Yes Yes
Ln Drug price x Ln Detailing 
flow
-0,106 No No No 0,013 Yes No No -1,078 No No No 0,452 Yes No No
Ln Drug price x Drug age -0,045 Yes No No 0,193 No Yes Yes
Year 2013 -0,122  --- Yes Yes -0,023  --- No No -0,011  --- No No 0,054  --- No No -0,057  --- No No
Year 2014 -0,099  --- No No -0,031  --- No No 0,058  --- No No -0,031  --- No No -0,169  --- No No
Year 2015 -0,135  --- No No -0,071  --- No No 0,059  --- No No -0,038  --- No No -0,207  --- No No
ANOVA Sig. 0,195 0,017 0,014 0,000 0,000






















Based on the four tables shown above, we prepared a summary of results for a better interpretation, in table 10.42. 
Table 10.42 – Summary of Rizzo (1999) (Model 3) results 
 





























































Ln Detailing flow 100,0% 0,0% 0,234 0,234 80,0% 0,0% 0,140 0,254 60,0% 0,0% 0,191 0,345 40,0% 0,0% -0,157 0,040 66,7% 0,0% 0,087 0,236
Ln Competitive 
detailing flow
0,0% 0,0% 0,014 -0,097 0,0% 0,0% 0,103 N/A 20,0% 0,0% 0,046 -0,038 20,0% 0,0% 0,060 -0,006 11,1% 0,0% 0,061 -0,045
Ln Detailing stock 66,7% 33,3% 0,270 0,407 80,0% 20,0% 0,199 0,271 100,0% 20,0% 0,099 0,099 80,0% 20,0% 0,065 0,114 83,3% 22,2% 0,146 0,190
Ln average drug price 33,3% 0,0% -1,203 -3,660 25,0% 0,0% -1,410 -25,749 60,0% 0,0% -2,183 -3,045 50,0% 0,0% -1,210 4,688 43,8% 0,0% -1,563 -4,027
Ln average 
competitors drug price
0,0% 0,0% -5,385 N/A 20,0% 0,0% -59,795 1,679 20,0% 0,0% -1,026 0,274 60,0% 20,0% 0,067 0,570 27,8% 5,6% -17,773 0,732
Drug age 66,7% 33,3% -0,003 0,051 40,0% 20,0% 0,014 0,072 60,0% 20,0% 0,027 0,056 60,0% 20,0% -0,022 0,008 55,6% 22,2% 0,005 0,044
Ln average drug price 
x Ln Detailing flow
0,0% 0,0% -0,191 N/A 25,0% 0,0% -0,492 1,211 60,0% 0,0% 0,193 0,348 50,0% 0,0% -0,180 0,233 40,0% 0,0% -0,140 0,453
Ln average drug price 
x Drug age
50,0% 0,0% 0,069 -0,002 25,0% 0,0% 0,068 -0,057 0,0% 0,0% 0,050 N/A 50,0% 0,0% 0,074 -0,045 30,0% 0,0% 0,066 -0,035
Public reimbursement 66,7% 66,7% 1,559 2,391  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  --- 66,7% 66,7% 1,559 2,391













Market 3 - Heart
(5 products)




Market 1 - Blood
(3 products)








10.4.5. Windmeijer et al (2006) (Model 4) 
10.4.5.1. Procedures and outputs 
Starting with product BL1, SPSS outputs excluded the variable Ln Average drug price (here 
shown in figure 10.34). We performed manual investigation to try to understand the reason 
for the exclusion. 
 
Figure 10.34 – Excluded variables for product BL1 in model 4 
We noted that Ln Average drug price can be calculated, to a very good extent, through a 
linear combination of product BL1 competitors’ average drug price and a dummy variable, as 







Figure 10.35 – Linear regression of Ln Average competitors price on Ln Average drug price 
and policy change dummy, for product BL1 in model 4 
This is likely the reason for variable exclusion in the SPSS outputs. Therefore, in the presence 
of this multicollinearity, we removed the variable Ln Average competitors’ price from the 
model. Running the regression again without this variable resulted in no variables exclusion. 
Running the full model 4 regression for product BL2, SPSS excluded the two interaction 
variables (figure 10.36). 
 
Figure 10.36 – Excluded variables for product BL2 in model 4 
This is due to the multicollinearity, where the interaction variables are almost a perfect linear 
combination of the two individual variables. Below we can see this situation for the variable 





Figure 10.37 – Linear regression of Ln Global marketing expenditures stock x Ln Average 
drug price on Ln Global marketing expenditures stock and Ln Average drug price, for product 
BL2 in model 4 
Given this multicollinearity problem, we decided to remove the two interaction variables from 
the equation for product BL2. The updated regression outputs for BL2 did not exclude any 
variable. 





Figure 10.38 – Excluded variables for product BL3 in model 4 – iteration 1 
In an attempt to find the reasons for this exlusion, we mannualy investigated some regression 
models, starting with Drug age dependent on Drug age squared (figure 10.39). 
 





In this time series, which as seen before includes 18 observations (months), drug age can be 
almost perfectly calculated with drug age squared. We decided, therefore, to remove drug age 
squared from the regression. However, SPSS continued excluding two variables, as seen 
below in figure 10.40. 
 
Figure 10.40 – Excluded variables for product BL3 in model 4 – iteration 2 
Based on our experience with the two previous products, the regression for product BL3 must 
be experiencing multicollinearity between the interaction variables and the individual 






Figure 10.41 – Linear regression of Ln Global marketing expenditures stock x Ln Average 
drug price on Ln Global marketing expenditures stock and Ln Average drug price, for product 
BL3 in model 4 
As expected, the interaction variable is substantially dependent on its two individual 
variables. We decided to remove both interaction variables, and as a consequence no 
additional variable was excluded by SPSS. 





Figure 10.42 – Excluded variables for product PA1 in model 4 
We decided to remove these two variables from the regression, given that, as seen before, the 
interaction variables can be calculated almosted perfectly through a linear combination of the 
individual variables on their basis. 
In the case of product PA2, two variables were excluded by SPSS, as seen in figure 10.43. 
 
Figure 10.43 – Excluded variables for product PA2 in model 4 
Given the reasons presented before, we decided to remove these two variables from the 




In the case of product PA3, SPSS excluded, once again, the two interaction variables (figure 
10.44). 
 
Figure 10.44 – Excluded variables for product PA3 in model 4 
The reason for that is due to the almost perfect ability of obtaining the interaction variables 
based on their decomposition of the two separate variables, as covered before. 
In the case of product PA4, we removed the variable Ln Average drug price since it is a 
constant (zero variation through the months). Then two variables were excluded by SPSS, as 
displayed below in figure 10.45. 
 




Such as seen in previous examples, this is explained by the almost perfect linear explanation 
of the interaction variable based on its two base, original variables. Therefore we decided to 
remove the interaction variable. SPSS then kept excluding the variable Ln Global marketing 
expenditures stock (figure 10.46). 
 
Figure 10.46 – Excluded variable for product PA4 in model 4 – iteration 2 
After a further investigation, we noticed that the likely reason for this exclusion is very high 
multicollinearity between the interaction variable Ln Marketing expenditures stock x Ln 






Figure 10.47 – Linear regression of Ln Global marketing expenditures stock x Ln Average 
competitors’ price on Ln Global marketing expenditures stock and Ln Average competitors 
price, for product PA4 in model 4 
Therefore, by removing this interaction variable from the equation, SPSS outputs did not 
evidence any additional excluded variables. 
Moving to product PA5, two variables were excluded by SPSS: Ln Average drug price and 





Figure 10.48 – Excluded variables for product PA5 in model 4 – iteration 1 
The reason for this was, once more, the multicollinearity between the interaction variables 
and their individual variables. In the case of the first interaction variable, the outputs below 





Figure 10.49 – Linear regression of Ln Global marketing expenditures stock x Ln Average 
competitors’ price on Ln Global marketing expenditures stock and Ln Average competitors’ 
price, for product PA5 in model 4 
We started by removing this interaction variable and ran the regression again. SPSS excluded 





Figure 10.50 – Excluded variables for product PA5 in model 4 – iteration 2 
Then we decided to remove the other interaction variable (Ln Global marketing expenditures 
stock x Ln Average Drug price), and no issues with multicollinearity were detected. 
Moving to product HE1, SPSS excluded the variable Ln Global marketing expenditures stock 
(figure 10.51). 
 
Figure 10.51 – Excluded variable for product HE1 in model 4 
Our suspicion is that, by removing the interaction variable Ln Marketing expenditures stock x 
Ln Average drug price, collinearity problems will subside and no additional variable may be 
excluded, which turn out a right option. 





Figure 10.52 – Excluded variable for product HE2 in model 4 – iteration 1 
We first removed the interaction variable and ran the regression again. However, the other 
variable was still excluded by SPSS (figure 10.53). 
 
Figure 10.53 – Excluded variable for product HE2 in model 4 – iteration 2 
Therefore, we decided to remove the other interaction variable (Ln Global marketing 
expenditures stock x Ln Average Drug price), which solved the multicollinearity issue. 
Regarding product HE3, SPSS excluded the variable Drug age (figure 10.54). 
 
Figure 10.54 – Excluded variable for product HE3 in model 4 
Given our previous experience on the likely issues of collinearity between Drug age and Drug 
age squared, we removed the latter from the regression and the issue subsided, with no further 




In the case of product HE4, two variables were excluded by SPSS (figure 10.55): 
 
Figure 10.55 – Excluded variable for product HE4 in model 4 
By removing the variables Drug age squared and Ln Global marketing expenditures stock x 
Ln Average competitors’ price from the regression, SPSS did not exclude any additional 
variable. 
In the case of product HE5, SPSS excluded two variables, shown below (figure 10.56). 
 




As performed in similar cases using Model 4, we decided to remove the two interaction 
variables, highly correlated with the variables they are based at. 
 
Moving to Market Liver, SPSS excluded, in the case of product LI1, two variables (figure 
10.57). 
 
Figure 10.57 – Excluded variable for product LI1 in model 4 
By manually removing the interaction variables in Model 4 for product LI1, no additional 
variables were excluded by SPSS. 
Regarding product LI2, SPSS excluded the following two variables (figure 10.58): 
 




Given our experience using model 4, the multicollinearity is likely due to the almost perfect 
linear relation between the interaction variables and the two variables on their bases. We 
decided to remove both the interaction variables from the regression, which solved the 
multicollinearity issue. 
Product LI3 also evidenced multicollinearity between the interaction variables and their base 
variables. SPSS rejected these two variables (figure 10.59): 
 
Figure 10.59 – Excluded variable for product LI3 in model 4 
By removing the two interaction variables from the regression, the issue was solved. 
In relation to product LI4, SPSS excluded the variable Ln Global marketing expenditures 
stock (figure 10.60). 
 




Once again, given our experience with previous similar situations in model 4, we removed the 
interaction variable Ln Global marketing expenditures stock x Ln Average drug price, which 
solved the multicollinearity issue. 
Finally, in the case of product LI5, SPSS excluded the two interaction variables (figure 
10.61). 
 
Figure 10.61 – Excluded variables for product LI5 in model 4 
As in previous similar situations using Model 4, we decided to remove the two interaction 
variables from the regression, in order to solve the multicollinearity issue. Tables 10.43, 
















4,148  --- No No 5,338  --- No Yes -8,945  --- No No
0,208 Yes No No -0,126 No No No -0,048 No No No
0,104 Yes No No 0,255 Yes No Yes 0,093 Yes No Yes
Own
Ln Global marketing 
expenditures flow 
0,020 Yes No No 0,067 Yes 0,221 No 0,136 Yes No No
Competitive
Ln Competitive marketing 
expenditures flow
0,066 No No No 0,037 No No No 0,068 No No No
Own
Ln Global marketing 
expenditures stock
-0,148 No No No 0,166 Yes No No 0,171 Yes No No
Competitive
Ln Competitive global 
marketing expenditures stock
0,324 No Yes Yes 0,037 No No No 0,974 No No No
Own
Ln Average drug price per 
DDD
-2,506 Yes No No -0,346 Yes No No -0,003 No No No
Competitors
Ln Average competitors drug 
price per DDD
-0,195 No No No -7,656 No No No
Drug age 0,026 Yes No No 0,076 Yes No No 0,089 Yes No Yes
Drug age squared -0,0001 Yes No No -0,001 Yes Yes Yes
0,189 Yes No No
-0,113 Yes Yes Yes
Public reimbursement 0,367 Yes Yes Yes -0,211 No Yes Yes 5,069 Yes Yes Yes
Quarter 2 0,061  --- No No 0,067  --- No No -0,013  --- No No
Quarter 3 0,156  --- No No 0,225  --- Yes Yes 0,075  --- No No
Quarter 4 0,278  --- No Yes 0,354  --- Yes Yes -0,014  --- No No
Year 2013 0,263  --- No No 0,363  --- No
Year 2014 0,547  --- No No 0,818  --- Yes Yes
Year 2015 0,970  --- No No 1,253  --- Yes Yes 0,188  --- No No
Removed due to multicollinearity
Removed due to multicollinearity
Removed due to multicollinearity
Windmeijer et al (2006)
Model specification







Ln Sales in DDDs lagged one period
ANOVA Sig. 0,000 0,000 0,000








Ln Global marketing expenditures stock x 
Ln Average drug price per DDD
Removed due to multicollinearity
Removed due to multicollinearity
Removed due to multicollinearity
Policy change
N/A (product launched in 2014)
Adjusted R2 0,997 0,983 0,999
Temporal dummies
Ln Global marketing expenditures stock x 























19,260  --- Yes Yes 27,719  --- Yes Yes 16,276  --- Yes Yes 12,687  --- No No 16,833  --- Yes Yes
-0,463 No Yes Yes -0,512 No Yes Yes -0,496 No Yes Yes 0,020 Yes No No -0,425 No Yes Yes
0,193 Yes No No -0,084 No No No 0,041 No No No -0,017 No No No -0,111 No No No
Own
Ln Global marketing 
expenditures flow 
0,032 Yes No No 0,021 Yes No No -0,075 No Yes Yes 0,180 Yes No No 0,047 Yes No No
Competitive
Ln Competitive marketing 
expenditures flow
-0,032 Yes No No -0,006 Yes No No 0,131 No Yes Yes 0,148 No No No 0,033 No No No
Own
Ln Global marketing 
expenditures stock
0,132 Yes No No -0,210 No No Yes 0,103 Yes No No 0,548 Yes No No 0,050 Yes No No
Competitive
Ln Competitive global 
marketing expenditures stock
0,010 No No No 0,145 No No No -0,00001 Yes No No 0,656 No No No 0,239 No No No
Own
Ln Average drug price per 
DDD
6,519 No No No -17,215 Yes No Yes 3,299 No No No -5,274 Yes No No
Competitors
Ln Average competitors drug 
price per DDD
-15,643 No No No 3,977 Yes No No -0,373 No No No -128,38 No No No 0,212 Yes No No
Drug age 0,005 Yes No No -0,003 No No No 0,013 Yes No No 0,191 Yes Yes Yes -0,010 No No No
Drug age squared -0,0003 Yes Yes Yes -0,0002 Yes Yes Yes -0,0003 Yes Yes Yes -0,002 Yes No No 0,00002 No No No
Quarter 2 0,189  --- Yes Yes 0,103  --- Yes Yes 0,125  --- Yes Yes 0,146  --- No No 0,033  --- No No
Quarter 3 0,290  --- Yes Yes 0,233  --- Yes Yes 0,209  --- Yes Yes 0,550  --- Yes Yes 0,099  --- No No
Quarter 4 0,422  --- Yes Yes 0,328  --- Yes Yes 0,303  --- Yes Yes 0,581  --- No No 0,132  --- No No
Year 2013 0,437  --- Yes Yes 0,337  --- Yes Yes 0,337  --- Yes Yes 0,089  --- No No
Year 2014 0,451  --- No No 0,165  --- No No 0,764  --- Yes Yes 0,600  --- No No 0,021  --- No No
Year 2015 0,921  --- No Yes 0,470  --- No No 1,130  --- Yes Yes 1,133  --- No No 0,150  --- No No
Removed due to multicollinearity Removed due to multicollinearity
Removed due to multicollinearity
Constant (no variation)
Product PA5
Windmeijer et al (2006)
Model specification











Ln Sales in DDDs lagged one period




Removed due to multicollinearity Removed due to multicollinearity
Removed due to multicollinearity
Removed due to multicollinearity
Removed due to multicollinearity
Ln Global marketing expenditures stock x 
Ln Average drug price per DDD
Ln Global marketing expenditures stock x 




N/A (product launched in 2013)




Removed due to multicollinearity























22,962  --- Yes Yes 20,740  --- Yes Yes 0,972  --- No Yes 21,106  --- Yes Yes 3,727  --- No No
-0,764 No Yes Yes -0,554 No Yes Yes -0,073 No No No -0,087 No No No 0,045 Yes No No
-0,163 No No No 0,089 Yes No No 0,412 Yes No No 0,069 Yes No No 0,017 Yes No No
Own
Ln Global marketing 
expenditures flow 
0,003 Yes No No 0,002 Yes No No 0,007 Yes No No 0,006 Yes No No 0,049 Yes No No
Competitive
Ln Competitive marketing 
expenditures flow
-0,053 Yes No Yes -0,046 Yes No No 0,069 No No No -0,044 Yes No No 0,019 No No No
Own
Ln Global marketing 
expenditures stock
0,418 Yes No Yes 0,159 Yes No No 1,614 Yes No Yes 0,819 Yes Yes Yes 0,046 Yes No No
Competitive
Ln Competitive global 
marketing expenditures stock
-0,015 Yes No No -0,056 Yes No No 0,146 No No No -0,394 Yes Yes Yes 0,281 No No No
Own
Ln Average drug price per 
DDD
0,068 No No No 0,445 No No No 4,153 No No Yes -4,130 Yes No Yes -0,127 Yes No No
Competitors
Ln Average competitors drug 
price per DDD
-3,451 No No Yes -0,287 No No No -21,224 No Yes Yes -1,132 No No Yes -1,438 No No No
Drug age 0,021 Yes No No -0,003 No No No -0,056 No Yes Yes -0,042 No Yes Yes 0,083 Yes Yes Yes
Drug age squared 0,000 N/A Yes Yes -0,0002 Yes No Yes -0,001 Yes Yes Yes
-0,552 No No Yes 0,634 Yes Yes Yes
0,268 No No No 2,454 No Yes Yes
Loss of exclusivity -0,091 Yes No No -0,161 Yes Yes Yes
Quarter 2 0,107  --- Yes Yes 0,121  --- Yes Yes 0,128  --- No No 0,063  --- No No 0,057  --- No No
Quarter 3 0,170  --- Yes Yes 0,183  --- Yes Yes 0,258  --- Yes Yes 0,102  --- No No 0,059  --- No No
Quarter 4 0,264  --- Yes Yes 0,330  --- Yes Yes 0,382  --- Yes Yes 0,190  --- No No 0,152  --- No No
Year 2013 0,285  --- Yes Yes 0,435  --- Yes Yes 0,453  --- No Yes 0,037  --- No No
Year 2014 0,624  --- Yes Yes 0,859  --- Yes Yes 0,980  --- No Yes 0,228  --- No No 0,188  --- No No
Year 2015 0,937  --- Yes Yes 1,371  --- Yes Yes 1,452  --- No Yes 0,449  --- No No 0,340  --- No No
Removed due to multicollinearity
Removed due to multicollinearity Removed due to multicollinearity





Ln Sales in DDDs lagged one period







Removed due to multicollinearity




Ln Global marketing expenditures stock x 
Ln Average drug price per DDD
Ln Global marketing expenditures stock x 
Ln Average competitors price per DDD
Removed due to multicollinearity Removed due to multicollinearity
Not applicable
N/A (product launched in 2013)
Removed due to multicollinearity
0,950 0,984 0,987
0,000 0,000 0,000
































28,366  --- Yes Yes 16,228  --- Yes No 18,508  --- Yes Yes -2,592  --- No No 1,649  --- No No
-0,507 No Yes Yes -0,529 No Yes Yes -0,411 No Yes Yes -0,365 No Yes Yes -0,090 No No No
0,031 Yes No No 0,013 Yes No No 0,008 Yes No No 0,127 Yes No No 0,336 Yes Yes Yes
Own
Ln Global marketing 
expenditures flow 
-0,003 No No No 0,0004 Yes No No -0,029 No No No 0,085 Yes No No 0,075 Yes No Yes
Competitive
Ln Competitive marketing 
expenditures flow
0,029 No No No 0,020 No No No 0,088 No No No -0,029 Yes No No 0,088 No No Yes
Own
Ln Global marketing 
expenditures stock
-0,104 No No No 0,025 Yes No No 0,071 Yes No No 0,324 Yes No No 0,267 Yes Yes Yes
Competitive
Ln Competitive global 
marketing expenditures stock
-0,053 Yes No No 0,172 No No No 0,029 No No No 0,031 No No No 0,168 No No No
Own
Ln Average drug price per 
DDD
-0,273 Yes No No 1,131 No No No -1,055 Yes No No -20,768 Yes No No -1,888 Yes No No
Competitors
Ln Average competitors drug 
price per DDD
0,567 Yes No No 0,588 Yes Yes Yes -0,205 No No No -10,242 No No No 0,964 Yes Yes Yes
Drug age -0,051 No No No 0,011 Yes No No -0,002 No No No 0,002 Yes No No 0,011 Yes No No
Drug age squared 0,0001 No No No -0,0002 Yes No No -0,0001 Yes No No -0,0003 Yes No No -0,0003 Yes No Yes
0,782 No No No
Quarter 2 0,121  --- No Yes 0,146  --- Yes Yes 0,108  --- Yes Yes 0,129  --- Yes Yes 0,213  --- Yes Yes
Quarter 3 0,241  --- Yes Yes 0,229  --- Yes Yes 0,213  --- Yes Yes 0,186  --- Yes Yes 0,304  --- Yes Yes
Quarter 4 0,324  --- Yes Yes 0,354  --- Yes Yes 0,278  --- Yes Yes 0,308  --- Yes Yes 0,464  --- Yes Yes
Year 2013 0,250  --- No No 0,471  --- Yes Yes 0,280  --- No Yes 0,379  --- Yes Yes 0,627  --- Yes Yes
Year 2014 0,706  --- No Yes 0,917  --- Yes Yes 0,722  --- Yes Yes 0,696  --- Yes Yes 1,150  --- Yes Yes
Year 2015 1,077  --- No Yes 1,317  --- Yes Yes 1,117  --- Yes Yes 1,166  --- Yes Yes 1,621  --- Yes Yes
0,000 0,000




Ln Global marketing expenditures stock x 
Ln Average drug price per DDD
Ln Global marketing expenditures stock x 
Ln Average competitors price per DDD
Removed due to multicollinearity
Removed due to multicollinearity Removed due to multicollinearity Removed due to multicollinearity
Removed due to multicollinearity




Removed due to multicollinearity






Ln Sales in DDDs lagged one period







Removed due to multicollinearity
Removed due to multicollinearity






Based on the four tables shown above, we prepared a summary of results for a better interpretation, here shown in table 10.47. 






































































Ln Sales in DDDs lagged one 
period
33,3% 0,0% 0,011 0,208 20,0% 0,0% -0,375 0,020 20,0% 0,0% -0,287 0,045 -0,0003 0,0% 0,0% -0,381 N/A 0,020 16,7% 0,0% -0,288 0,091 16,0% 0,020
Ln Sales in DDDs lagged two 
periods
100,0% 0,0% 0,151 0,151 20,0% 0,0% 0,005 0,193 80,0% 0,0% 0,085 0,147 0,030 100,0% 20,0% 0,103 0,103 0,050 72,2% 5,6% 0,079 0,134 24,0% 0,050
Ln Global marketing 
expenditures flow 
100,0% 0,0% 0,074 0,074 80,0% 0,0% 0,041 0,041 100,0% 0,0% 0,013 0,013 0,010 60,0% 0,0% 0,026 0,054 0,002 83,3% 0,0% 0,035 0,041 10,0% 0,010
Ln Competitive marketing 
expenditures flow
0,0% 0,0% 0,057 N/A 40,0% 0,0% 0,055 -0,019 60,0% 0,0% -0,011 -0,048 0,060 20,0% 0,0% 0,039 -0,029 0,080 33,3% 0,0% 0,033 -0,035 0,0% 0,070
Ln Global marketing 
expenditures stock
66,7% 0,0% 0,063 0,169 80,0% 0,0% 0,125 0,209 100,0% 20,0% 0,611 0,611 0,100 80,0% 20,0% 0,117 0,172 -0,080 83,3% 11,1% 0,247 0,328 2,0% -0,070
Ln Competitive global 
marketing expenditures stock
0,0% 0,0% 0,445 N/A 20,0% 0,0% 0,210 N/A 60,0% 20,0% -0,008 -0,155 -0,030 20,0% 0,0% 0,069 -0,053 -0,180 27,8% 5,6% 0,150 -0,130 6,0% -0,050
Ln Average drug price per DDD 66,7% 0,0% -0,951 -0,951 50,0% 0,0% 4,909 -17,215 40,0% 0,0% 0,082 -2,128 -0,150 80,0% 0,0% -4,571 -5,996 -0,540 58,8% 0,0% -2,234 -4,831 10,0% -0,100
Ln Average competitors drug 
price per DDD
0,0% 0,0% -3,925 N/A 40,0% 0,0% -28,04 -2,957 0,0% 0,0% -5,506 N/A -1,150 60,0% 40,0% -1,666 0,707 1,110 29,4% 11,8% -10,82 -1,387 10,0% 0,500
Drug age 100,0% 0,0% 0,063 0,063 60,0% 20,0% 0,039 0,070 40,0% 20,0% 0,000 0,052  --- 60,0% 0,0% -0,006 0,008  --- 61,1% 11,1% 0,020 0,048  ---  ---
Drug age squared 100,0% 50,0% -0,0004 -0,0004 80,0% 60,0% -0,001 -0,001 66,7% 33,3% -0,001 -0,0005  --- 80,0% 0,0% -0,0002 -0,0002  --- 80,0% 33,3% -0,0004 -0,0005  ---  ---
Ln Global marketing 
expenditures flow x Ln Average 
drug price per DDD
100,0% 0,0% 0,189 0,189 N/A N/A N/A N/A 50,0% 50,0% 0,041 0,634 -0,080 N/A N/A N/A N/A -0,270 66,7% 33,3% 0,090 0,411 0,0% -0,050
Ln Global marketing 
expenditures flow x Ln Average 
competitors price per DDD
100,0% 33,3% -0,113 -0,113 N/A N/A N/A N/A 0,0% 0,0% 0,680 N/A 0,090 0,0% 0,0% N/A N/A -0,130 25,0% 16,7% 0,848 -0,113 8,0% -0,050
Public reimbursement 66,7% 66,7% 1,742 2,718  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  --- 66,7% 66,7% 1,742 2,718  ---  ---









































Market 1 - Blood
(3 products)







Such as performed in the summary table in Model 1, we added comparative data resulting 
from Leeflang & Wieringa (2010) research using Dutch data. Their data was added to the 
(comparable) Market 3 – Heart, to the (comparable) Market 4 (Liver), and global results (two 
last columns). 
 
10.4.6. Comparative analysis of Models 1 to 4 
In order to compare the several models fit we calculated, such as performed by Leeflang & 
Wieringa (2010), the Akaike information criterion (AIC), and the Bayesian information 
criterion (BIC). 
The AIC was proposed by Akaike (1974) and the BIC was proposed by Schwarz (1978), both 
aiming to help minimize subjective choice of the best model, by quantifying a parameter that 
can help researchers select the most optimal from multiple alternative models. 
The AIC is given by n * Ln(SSR/n) + 2 * k, where: 
n = sample size 
SSR = sum of squared residuals 
k = p + 1 
p = number of parameters in the regression 
 
And the BIC is given by n * Ln(SSR/n) + k * Ln(n) 
 
Both criterions penalize models with a higher number of variables, and both are interpreted 
the same way: the lower the result, the better the model. 
The next tables (10.48, 10.49. 10.50, and 10.51) evidence the AICs and BICs for all the 




Table 10.48 - AICs and BICs for model 1 (Wittink 2002 simplified) 
 
Table 10.49 – AICs and BICs for model 2 (Wittink 2002 complete) 
 
BL1 BL2 BL3 PA1 PA2 PA3 PA4 PA5 HE1 HE2 HE3 HE4 HE5 LI1 LI2 LI3 LI4 LI5
n 48 48 18 48 48 48 33 48 48 48 48 35 48 48 48 48 48 48
SSR 0,35 0,19 0,01 0,10 0,08 0,07 1,21 0,09 0,09 0,07 0,37 0,18 0,66 0,22 0,12 0,10 0,11 0,18
k 15 15 13 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 13 13 14 14 14 13 14
AIC -206,6 -235,6 -107,0 -270,7 -278,1 -286,1 -81,2 -274,1 -271,9 -287,5 -205,8 -159,0 -179,6 -229,6 -259,2 -269,4 -266,3 -238,9 All products
AIC mean -228,1
AIC SD 61,3
BIC -178,5 -207,5 -95,4 -244,5 -251,9 -259,9 -60,2 -247,9 -245,7 -261,3 -179,6 -138,8 -155,2 -203,4 -233,0 -243,2 -242,0 -212,7 All products
BIC mean -203,4






Market 3 - Heart
Model 1 (Wittink 2002 simplified)









BL1 BL2 BL3 PA1 PA2 PA3 PA4 PA5 HE1 HE2 HE3 HE4 HE5 LI1 LI2 LI3 LI4 LI5
n 48 48 18 48 48 48 33 48 48 48 48 35 48 48 48 48 48 48
SSR 0,33 0,16 0,003 0,08 0,07 0,06 0,94 0,09 0,07 0,05 0,31 0,16 0,66 0,16 0,10 0,09 0,10 0,18
k 19 19 15 18 18 18 16 18 17 18 16 14 17 18 16 18 17 18
AIC -201,2 -236,3 -129,8 -269,2 -275,7 -281,7 -85,6 -267,2 -278,8 -290,6 -210,3 -159,6 -171,5 -238,8 -263,9 -264,2 -260,6 -232,0 All products
AIC mean -228,7
AIC SD 58,2
BIC -165,6 -200,8 -116,4 -235,5 -242,0 -248,0 -61,6 -233,5 -247,0 -256,9 -180,4 -137,8 -139,7 -205,1 -233,9 -230,5 -228,8 -198,4 All products
BIC mean -197,9
BIC SD 54,2
Model 2 (Wittink 2002 complete)
Market 1 - Blood Market 2 - Pancreas Market 3 - Heart Market 4 - Liver
AIC -189,1 -235,9 -222,2 -251,9
54,3 84,2 60,2 15,3
BIC -160,9 -204,1 -192,4 -219,3




Table 10.50 – AICs and BICs for model 3 (Rizzo 1999) 
 
Table 10.51 – AICs and BICs for model 4 (Windmeijer et al 2006) 
BL1 BL2 BL3 PA1 PA2 PA3 PA4 PA5 HE1 HE2 HE3 HE4 HE5 LI1 LI2 LI3 LI4 LI5
n 48 48 18 48 48 48 33 48 48 48 48 35 48 48 48 48 48 48
SSR 0,39 0,20 0,085 0,11 0,11 0,09 0,71 0,10 0,11 0,12 0,40 0,21 0,16 0,26 0,15 0,14 0,18 0,16
k 13 13 9 12 12 12 8 12 11 12 12 12 11 11 11 12 9 12
AIC -205,6 -237,4 -78,5 -267,9 -269,4 -279,8 -110,7 -274,1 -269,5 -263,6 -206,3 -155,1 -250,5 -228,6 -255,7 -257,9 -250,6 -248,9 All products
AIC mean -228,3
AIC SD 57,8
BIC -181,3 -213,1 -70,4 -245,4 -247,0 -257,4 -98,7 -251,6 -248,9 -241,1 -183,9 -136,4 -229,9 -208,1 -235,1 -235,4 -233,8 -226,5 All products
BIC mean -208,0
BIC SD 54,4
Model 3 (Rizzo 1999)
Market 1 - Blood Market 2 - Pancreas Market 3 - Heart Market 4 - Liver
AIC -173,8 -240,4 -229,0 -248,4
84,1 72,7 48,2 11,6
BIC -154,9 -220,0 -208,1 -227,8
74,9 68,0 47,3 11,6
BL1 BL2 BL3 PA1 PA2 PA3 PA4 PA5 HE1 HE2 HE3 HE4 HE5 LI1 LI2 LI3 LI4 LI5
n 48 48 18 48 48 48 33 48 48 48 48 35 48 48 48 48 48 48
SSR 0,19 0,16 0,01 0,07 0,05 0,05 0,51 0,07 0,05 0,06 0,18 0,11 0,07 0,17 0,07 0,10 0,07 0,11
k 19 18 15 17 17 16 15 17 18 17 19 18 16 17 17 17 18 16
AIC -227,3 -237,4 -98,9 -277,8 -291,5 -298,1 -107,3 -279,3 -297,1 -285,2 -228,9 -164,6 -283,0 -236,8 -278,9 -262,2 -274,9 -259,5 All products
AIC mean -243,8
AIC SD 60,9
BIC -191,7 -203,7 -85,6 -246,0 -259,6 -268,1 -84,9 -247,5 -263,4 -253,4 -193,4 -136,6 -253,0 -204,9 -247,1 -230,4 -241,2 -229,5 All products
BIC mean -213,3
BIC SD 57,0
77,2 80,7 55,4 16,5
Model 4 (Windmeijer et al 2006)
Market 1 - Blood Market 2 - Pancreas Market 3 - Heart Market 4 - Liver
BIC -160,3 -221,2 -220,0 -230,6
65,0 76,8 54,2 16,2




Table 10.52 below summarizes the average AICs and BICs per market. 
Table 10.52 – Summary of average AICs and BICs per market and model 
 
Source: own elaboration 
Figure 10.62 below presents the same information in a chart format. 
 
Figure 10.62 – Average AIC and average BIC per Market and Model – graphic 
Source: own elaboration 
 
Market 1 - 
Blood
Market 2 - 
Pancreas
Market 3 - 
Heart




Model 1 (Wittink 2002 simplified) -183,0 -238,0 -220,8 -252,7 -228,1
Model 2 (Wittink 2002 complete) -189,1 -235,9 -222,2 -251,9 -228,7
Model 3 (Rizzo 1999) -173,8 -240,4 -229,0 -248,4 -228,3
Model 4 (Winmeijer et al 2006) -187,9 -250,8 -251,8 -262,5 -243,8
Market 1 - 
Blood
Market 2 - 
Pancreas
Market 3 - 
Heart




Model 1 (Wittink 2002 simplified) -160,5 -212,9 -196,1 -226,8 -203,4
Model 2 (Wittink 2002 complete) -160,9 -204,1 -192,4 -219,3 -197,9
Model 3 (Rizzo 1999) -154,9 -220,0 -208,1 -227,8 -208,0










Model 4 – Windmeijer et al (2006) seems to evidence the lower average AICs and BICs. In 
order to allow additional insights, we calculated the relative likelihood (Burnham & 
Anderson, 2003) of each model compared with the model with the lower AIC. The formula 
used was: 
exp((AICmin − AICi)/2). As an example, let us compare model 1 against model 4 (the one 
evidencing the lower average AICs). We get exp ((-228,1 – -243,8)/2) = 0,0004. This means 
model 1 is 0,0004 times as probable as model 4 to minimize information loss. 
 
Table 10.53 below summarizes these calculations for all markets and models. 
Table 10.53 – AIC relative likelihood among markets and models 
 
Source: own elaboration  
Model 4 stands out as the one with the higher fit. We can also interpret AIC values in light of 
a rule of thumb (Burnham & Anderson, 2004): 
 Variation in AIC < 2 → there is substantial evidence for the model, that is, it is not 
distant to the reference model 
 Variation in AIC comprehended between 3 and 7 → there is less support for the model 






Market 1 - 
Blood
Market 2 - 
Pancreas
Market 3 - Heart Market 4 - Liver All products
Model 1 (Wittink 2002 simplified) 0,0889 0,0017 0,0000 0,0075 0,0004
Model 2 (Wittink 2002 complete) 1,8395 0,0006 0,0000 0,0051 0,0005
Model 3 (Rizzo 1999) 0,0009 0,0055 0,0000 0,0009 0,0004




Table 10.54 below presents the AIC variation of models 1 to 3 versus model 4. 
Table 10.54 – Variation of AIC of models 1 to 3 against model 4 
 
Source: own elaboration 
Again, model 4 appears to be the one with the highest fit. The only exception is seen in its the 
comparison against model 2 in Market 1 (which has a marginally lower average BIC). 
Finally, we used a rule of thumb to compare between BICs, using the magnitude of the delta 
between two BICs, as proposed by Kass & Raftery (1995). 
 Variation in BIC less than 2 → the models are not distant (not worth more than a bare 
mention) 
 
 Variation of BIC comprehended between 2 and 6 → positive evidence against the 
candidate model 
 
 Variation of BIC comprehended between 6 and 10 → strong evidence against the 
candidate model 
 







Market 1 - 
Blood
Market 2 - 
Pancreas
Market 3 - Heart Market 4 - Liver All products
Model 1 (Wittink 2002 simplified) 4,8 12,7 31,0 9,8 15,7
Model 2 (Wittink 2002 complete) -1,2 14,9 29,6 10,6 15,1
Model 3 (Rizzo 1999) 14,0 10,4 22,8 14,1 15,5




Table 10.55 highlights the delta of models 1 to 3 BICs against model 4 BICs. 
Table 10.55 – Variation of BIC of models 1 to 3 against model 4 
 
Source: own elaboration 
As a conclusion, there is sufficient evidence to consider Model 4 as globally the most suited 
for the type of data we used. The next step consists of an attempt to build an even better 
model, based on Model 4, which can better adjust to our data. 
10.5. Calibration of Model 4 into three additional models 
This chapter describes the procedures and results of the adaptation of Model 4 – Windmeijer 
et al (2006) to our data, testing three additional models. At the end of this subchapter, we will 
chose the final model to later assess whether the entry into force of a detailing restriction 
policy did in fact produce any change in the model parameters, when comparing the before 
and after of the restriction policy. 
10.5.1. Introduction 
This sub-chapter describes the main differential characteristics in models 5 to 7, in relation to 
Model 4. 
In Model 5, given that our data series has total granularity (non-aggregated comprising a 
series of promotion investments categories), we adapted Model 4 in the following way: 
 Instead of using Ln Global marketing expenditures flow, we used the three variables 
that more commonly appear in the literature, and one for all other marketing 
investments (traditional and digital) 
o Ln Detailing flow 
o Ln Mailing flow 
o Ln Journal advertising flow 
o Ln Other marketing expenditures flow 
 
Market 1 - 
Blood
Market 2 - 
Pancreas
Market 3 - Heart Market 4 - Liver All products
Model 1 (Wittink 2002 simplified) -0,1 8,3 23,8 3,8 10,0
Model 2 (Wittink 2002 complete) -0,6 17,1 27,6 11,3 15,5
Model 3 (Rizzo 1999) 5,4 1,2 11,9 2,9 5,3




 Instead of using Ln Global marketing expenditures stock, we used: 
o Ln Detailing stock 
o Ln Other marketing expenditures stock 
 
 Instead of the interaction variable Ln Global marketing expenditures flow x Ln 
Average drug price per DDD, we used (“borrowed” from model 3 - Rizzo, 1999): 
o Average drug price per DDD x Ln Detailing flow 
o Ln Average drug price per DDD x Ln Detailing stock 
o Ln Average drug price per DDD x Drug age 
In Model 6, we used the original Model 4 and added a series of new variables that, to the 
extent of our knowledge and except detailing call duration, have not previously been used by 
the research community studying pharmaceutical marketing. By memory, these variables are 
shown below in table 10.56. 
Table 10.56 – List of additional variables used in Models 6 and 7 
 
Source: own elaboration 
Finally, in Model 7, we used Model 4 with expenditures disaggregation and added the new 
variables shown above in table 10.56 (by other words, we added the new variables to Model 
5). The goal of using these three different models was to use the total combinations of 
possibilities regarding Model 4, disaggregated expenditures, and new variables, allowing us to 








Variable description in SPSS
No ipad_tablet % of calls the reps used Ipad / Tablet
No laptop % of calls where the reps used laptop based materials
No printed % of calls where the doctor received printed material
No very_useful % of calls where doctors considered the information received as very useful
No incr_or_begin % of calls where doctors declared they would increase or start prescribing the product
Yes nr_products Ln Avg number of products presented during the calls
Visual Aid Type
Interest of the contact
Prescription - future (intention)




Table 10.57 – Summary of variables used in models 4 to 7 
 
Source: own elaboration 









Ln Lagged sales period t-1 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ln Lagged sales period t-2 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ln Detailing flow No Yes No Yes
Ln Detailing flow x Ln Detailing flow No No No No
Ln Journal advertising flow No Yes No Yes
Ln Direct marketing flow No Yes No Yes
Ln Global marketing expenditures flow Yes No Yes No
Ln Competitive detailing flow No No No No
Ln Competitive journal advertising flow No No No No
Ln Competitive direct marketing flow No No No No
Ln Competitive global marketing expenditures flow Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ln Detailing stock No Yes No Yes
Ln Detailing stock x Ln Detailing stock No No No No
Ln Global marketing expenditures stock Yes No Yes No
Ln Other marketing expenditures stock (except detailing) No Yes No Yes
Competitive Ln Competitive global marketing expenditures stock Yes Yes Yes Yes
Own Ln Average drug price per DDD Yes Yes Yes Yes
Competitors Ln Average competitors drug price per DDD Yes Yes Yes Yes
Drug age Yes Yes Yes Yes
Drug age 2̂ Yes Yes Yes Yes
Drug age 3̂ No No No No
Average drug price per DDD x Ln Detailing flow No Yes No Yes
Ln Average drug price per DDD x Ln Detailing stock No Yes No Yes
Ln Average drug price per DDD x Drug age No Yes No Yes
Ln Journal advertising flow x Ln Detailing flow No No No No
Ln Journal advertising flow x Ln Mailing flow No No No No
Ln Mailing flow x Ln Detailing flow No No No No
Ln Global marketing expenditures stock x Ln Average drug price per DDD Yes No Yes No
Ln Global marketing expenditures stock x Ln Average competitors price per DDD Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Policy change dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ipad / Tablet (% of times used in calls) No No Yes Yes
Laptop based materials (% of times used in calls) No No Yes Yes
Printed material (% of times used in calls) No No Yes Yes
Very useful (% of calls) No No Yes Yes
Increase / Will begin to prescribe (% of calls) No No Yes Yes
Ln Avg number of products presented during the calls No No Yes Yes
New models based on Mode 4










































10.5.2. Model 5 (Model 4 with expenditures disaggregation) 
10.5.2.1. Procedures and outputs 
Starting with product BL1, SPSS excluded two variables, as seen below (figure 10.63). 
 
Figure 10.63 – Excluded variables for product BL1 in model 5 – iteration 1 
Given the experience with Model 4 (very similar to model 5), we removed the interaction 
variable Ln Global marketing expenditures stock x Ln Average competitors price per DDD 
(highly correlated with Ln Average competitors price per DDD) and Drug age squared. A 
second iteration of the regression evidenced another excluded variable: Ln Drug price x Ln 
Detailing stock (figure 10.64). 
 




The reason for this exclusion was the almost perfect linear combination between the 
interaction variable and the two individual variables on its basis, which was demonstrated by 
the outputs below (figure 10.65). 
 
Figure 10.65 – Linear regression of Ln Drug price x Ln Detailing stock on Ln Average drug 
price per DDD and Ln Detailing stock, for product BL1 in model 5 
We opted to remove the excluded interaction variable, and no additional issues of 
multicollinearity appeared in product BL1. 





Figure 10.66 – Excluded variables for product BL2 in model 5 
Given our previous experience with Model 4, we removed these two variables from the 
independent variables, due to the multicollinearity with the individual base variables. No 
additional excluded variables resulted after this action. 
Regarding product Bl3, we obtained, in a first model iteration, several excluded variables 
from SPSS (figure 10.67): 
 




We started by two variables: removing Ln Drug price x Ln Detailing flow, and Drug age 
squared. SPSS then excluded the following variables (figure 10.68): 
 
Figure 10.68 – Excluded variables for product BL3 in model 5 – iteration 2 
We suspected of the negative effect of the interaction variable Ln Average drug price per 
DDD x Ln Detailing stock, and removed it. SPSS continued to exclude three variables (figure 
10.69): 
 
Figure 10.69 – Excluded variables for product BL3 in model 5 – iteration 3 
We then removed the interaction variable Ln Global marketing expenditures stock x Ln 





Figure 10.70 – Excluded variables for product BL3 in model 5 – iteration 4 
We finally removed the variables Ln Drug price per DDD x Drug age, and Ln Detailing stock, 
in order to eliminate multicollinearity. With this fourth iteration, SPSS did not exclude any 
more variables. 
Moving to product PA1, SPSS excluded two variables (figure 10.71): 
 
Figure 10.71 – Excluded variables for product PA1 in model 5 
By removing these interaction variables, no additional multicollinearity issues were found for 
product PA1. 





Figure 10.72 – Excluded variables for product PA2 in model 5 
We decided to remove the two interaction variables and, given our experience with the data, 
also Drug age squared (highly correlated with Drug age). After this procedure, no further 
multicollinearity were detected in the case of product PA2. 
In the case of product PA3, SPSS excluded three variables (figure 10.73): 
 




Given the experience gathered in the previous products using models 4 and 5, we removed the 
variables Ln Global marketing expenditures stock x Ln Average competitors’ price, Drug age 
squared, and Ln Drug price x Ln Detailing stock, which resulted in no additional excluded 
variables in SPSS outputs. 
In the case of product PA4, we had to remove Ln Average drug price per DDD given that this 
variable is a constant. We then had to remove all interaction variables involving Ln Average 
drug price per DDD, to avoid multicollinearity problems. After this procedure, SPSS did not 
exclude any of the independent variables. 
As of product PA5, SPSS excluded two variables (figure 10.74): 
 
Figure 10.74 – Excluded variables for product PA5 in model 5 – iteration 1 
We decided to remove the variable Drug age squared, and the interaction variable Ln Global 
marketing expenditures stock x Ln Average competitors price per DDD, decision which 





Figure 10.75 – Excluded variables for product PA5 in model 5 – iteration 2 
We suspected that by removing the interaction variable Ln Drug price x Drug age the issue 
would be solved, which proved to be a right decision. 
Moving to product HE1, SPSS excluded three variables (figure 10.76): 
 
Figure 10.76 – Excluded variables for product HE1 in model 5 
We decided to remove the interaction variables Ln Average drug price per DDD x Ln 
Detailing flow, Ln Average drug price per DDD x Ln Detailing stock, and Ln Drug price x 
Drug age, sources of multicollinearity (almost perfect linear relation between the interaction 
variables and the independent separate variables at their base. No additional excluded 
variables were excluded by SPSS. 





Figure 10.77 – Excluded variables for product HE2 in model 5 
We removed the interaction variables Ln Drug price x Drug age, and Ln Average drug price 
per DDD x Ln Detailing stock, resulting in no additional excluded variable. 
In the case of product HE3, two variables were removed by SPSS (figure 10.78): 
 
Figure 10.78 – Excluded variables for product HE3 in model 5 
Given our experience with this model and our data, we decided to remove the interaction 
variable Ln Drug price x Drug age, and the variable Drug age squared, which resulted in no 
additional excluded variables. 






Figure 10.79 – Excluded variables for product HE4 in model 5 
We removed the same two variables: the interaction variable Ln Drug price x Drug age, and 
the variable Drug age squared, resulting in no additional excluded variables due to the issue of 
multicollinearity. 
Regarding product HE5, two variables were excluded due to multicollinearity (figure 10.80): 
 
Figure 10.80 – Excluded variables for product HE5 in model 5 
To solve this issue, we decided to remove these two variables from the regression. 





Figure 10.81 – Excluded variables for product LI1 in model 5 
Based in our previous experience with this model, we removed the interaction variables Ln 
Average drug price per DDD x Ln Detailing flow, Ln Average drug price per DDD x Ln 
Detailing stock, Ln Global marketing expenditures stock x Ln Average competitors price per 
DDD, and Ln Average drug price per DDD x Drug age, which resulted in no additional 
problems of multicollinearity. 
In the case of product LI2, SPSS excluded three variables (figure 10.82): 
 




By running again the regression without the variables Ln Drug price x Ln Detailing stock, Ln 
Global marketing expenditures stock x Ln Average competitors price per DDD, and Ln 
Average drug price per DDD x Drug age, no more multicollinearity issues were detected. 
Regarding product LI3, SPSS excluded two variables (figure 10.83): 
 
Figure 10.83 – Excluded variables for product LI3 in model 5 
By removing the interaction variables Ln Average drug price per DDD x Drug age and Ln 
Global marketing expenditures stock x Ln Average competitors’ price per DDD, no more 
issues with multicollinearity were detected. 
In the case of product LI4, SPSS excluded three variables (figure 10.84): 
 




By removing the interaction variables Ln Average drug price per DDD x Ln Detailing flow, 
Ln Average drug price per DDD x Ln Detailing stock, and Ln Average drug price per DDD x 
Drug age, we solved the multicollinearity issues. 
Finally, in the case of product LI5, SPSS excluded three variables (figure 10.85): 
 
Figure 10.85 – Excluded variables for product LI5 in model 5 
By removing the variables Ln Average drug price per DDD x Ln Detailing stock, Ln Global 
marketing expenditures stock x Ln Average competitors’ price per DDD, and Drug age 
squared, no mode multicollinearity was detected. 
















3,303  --- No No 20,599  --- Yes Yes -20,173  --- No No
0,255 Yes No No -0,549 No Yes Yes -0,023 No No No
0,100 Yes No No -0,216 No No No 0,166 Yes No Yes
Ln Detailing flow -0,070 No No No 0,616 Yes No Yes 0,022 Yes No No
Ln Journal advertising flow 0,005 Yes No No -0,0002 No No No -0,026 No No No
Ln Direct marketing flow 0,005 Yes No No -0,006 No No Yes 0,019 Yes No No
Competitive
Ln Competitive marketing 
expenditures flow
0,050 No No No 0,077 No No No 0,334 No No No
Ln Detailing stock 0,231 Yes No No 0,092 Yes No No
Ln Other marketing 
expenditures stock
-0,028 No No No -0,014 No No No -0,303 No No No
Competitive
Ln Competitive global 
marketing expenditures stock
0,125 No No No 0,038 No No No 1,653 No No No
Own
Ln Average drug price per 
DDD
-0,290 Yes No No -4,136 Yes No No 2,132 No No No
Competitors
Ln Average competitors drug 
price per DDD
-1,378 No No No -0,246 No No No -4,970 No No No
Drug age 0,025 Yes No No -0,091 No No No 0,048 Yes No No
Drug age squared -0,001 Yes Yes Yes
0,095 Yes No No -0,570 No No Yes
-0,007 Yes No No 0,193 No Yes Yes
Public reimbursement 0,419 Yes Yes Yes -0,182 No Yes Yes 6,173 Yes Yes Yes
Quarter 2 0,039  --- No No 0,071  --- No No -0,029  --- No No
Quarter 3 0,111  --- No No 0,253  --- Yes Yes 0,091  --- No No
Quarter 4 0,226  --- No No 0,404  --- Yes Yes 0,196  --- No No
Year 2013 0,236  --- No No 0,463  --- Yes Yes
Year 2014 0,374  --- No No 1,228  --- Yes Yes
Year 2015 0,669 No No 1,617  --- Yes Yes 0,563  --- No No
Removed due to multicollinearity
Removed due to multicollinearity
Removed due to multicollinearity
Removed due to multicollinearity
Removed due to multicollinearity Removed due to multicollinearity
Removed due to multicollinearity
Removed due to multicollinearityLn Average drug price per DDD x Drug age
Ln Global marketing expenditures stock x 




ANOVA Sig. 0,000 0,000 0,007
Policy change
Temporal dummies
N/A (product launched in 2014)
Adjusted R2 0,997 0,990 1,000
Ln Average drug price per DDD x Ln 
Detailing flow
Removed due to multicollinearity
Ln Average drug price per DDD x Ln 
Detailing stock












Ln Sales in DDDs lagged one period


























30,490  --- Yes Yes 32,694  --- Yes Yes 24,767  --- Yes Yes 59,086  --- No No 22,091  --- Yes Yes
-0,577 No Yes Yes -0,554 No Yes Yes -0,588 No Yes Yes -0,127 No No No -0,399 No Yes Yes
-0,061 No No No 0,129 Yes No No -0,049 No No No -0,096 No No Yes -0,081 No No No
Ln Detailing flow 0,087 Yes No No -0,435 No No No 0,107 Yes No No 0,557 Yes Yes Yes 0,115 Yes No No
Ln Journal advertising flow -0,001 No No No 0,006 Yes Yes Yes 0,004 Yes No No -0,013 No No No 0,001 Yes No No
Ln Direct marketing flow -0,004 No No No 0,002 Yes No No -0,001 No No No 0,015 Yes No No -0,002 No No No
Competitive
Ln Competitive marketing 
expenditures flow
-0,003 Yes No No -0,016 Yes No No 0,068 No No No 0,034 No No No 0,051 No No No
Ln Detailing stock 0,039 Yes No No -0,240 No Yes Yes 0,153 Yes No No 3,465 Yes No No -1,054 No No No
Ln Other marketing 
expenditures stock
0,004 Yes No No 0,034 Yes No No 0,004 Yes No No 0,176 Yes No No -0,019 No No No
Competitive
Ln Competitive global 
marketing expenditures stock
0,083 No No No 0,203 No No No -0,089 Yes No No 0,200 No No No 0,378 No No No
Own
Ln Average drug price per 
DDD
1,532 No No No -45,601 Yes Yes Yes -8,993 Yes No No -31,802 Yes No No
Competitors
Ln Average competitors drug 
price per DDD
-27,826 No Yes Yes 4,479 Yes No Yes 1,172 Yes No No -352,29 No No No 0,253 Yes No No
Drug age -0,081 No Yes Yes -0,098 No Yes Yes -0,121 No Yes Yes 0,133 Yes No No -0,006 No No No
Drug age squared 0,0000 Yes No No 0,001 No No No
-0,275 No No No 1,661 Yes No No -0,725 No No No -0,282 No No No
3,828 Yes No No
0,217 No Yes Yes 0,213 No Yes Yes 0,350 No Yes Yes
-7,236 Yes No No
Quarter 2 0,128  --- Yes Yes 0,121  --- Yes Yes 0,148  --- Yes Yes -0,041  --- No No 0,032  --- No No
Quarter 3 0,233  --- Yes Yes 0,288  --- Yes Yes 0,236  --- Yes Yes 0,353  --- No No 0,101  --- No No
Quarter 4 0,352  --- Yes Yes 0,414  --- Yes Yes 0,328  --- Yes Yes 0,240  --- No No 0,138  --- No No
Year 2013 0,310  --- Yes Yes 0,404  --- Yes Yes 0,366  --- Yes Yes 0,087  --- No No
Year 2014 -0,014  --- No No 0,299  --- No No 0,848  --- Yes Yes -0,140  --- No No 0,065  --- No No
Year 2015 0,310  --- No No 0,727  --- No Yes 1,283  --- Yes Yes 0,061  --- No No 0,235  --- No No
Removed due to multicollinearity
Removed due to multicollinearity
Removed due to multicollinearity
Removed due to multicollinearity
Removed due to multicollinearity
Removed due to multicollinearity
Constant (no variation)
N/A (product launched in 2013)
Removed due to multicollinearity
Removed due to multicollinearity
Removed due to multicollinearity
Removed due to multicollinearity
Removed due to multicollinearity
0,964 0,335
0,000 0,030
Adjusted R2 0,760 0,752 0,837










Ln Average drug price per DDD x Ln 
Detailing flow
Ln Average drug price per DDD x Ln 
Detailing stock
Ln Average drug price per DDD x Drug age
Ln Global marketing expenditures stock x 
Ln Average competitors price per DDD
Temporal dummies
Removed due to multicollinearity
Removed due to multicollinearity
Removed due to multicollinearity
Constant
Lagged sales
Ln Sales in DDDs lagged one period






























26,793  --- Yes Yes 23,036  --- Yes Yes 5,066  --- No No 22,341  --- Yes Yes -2,654  --- No No
-0,801 No Yes Yes -0,470 No Yes Yes -0,080 No No No -0,065 No No No -0,004 No No No
-0,245 No No No 0,151 Yes No No 0,806 Yes Yes Yes 0,187 Yes No No 0,013 Yes No No
Ln Detailing flow 0,027 Yes No No 0,054 Yes No No -0,071 No No No 0,202 Yes No Yes 0,456 Yes No No
Ln Journal advertising flow -0,002 No No No 0,006 Yes Yes Yes 0,001 Yes No No
Ln Direct marketing flow -0,008 No No Yes -0,007 No Yes Yes 0,002 Yes No No -0,001 No No No
Competitive
Ln Competitive marketing 
expenditures flow
-0,070 Yes Yes Yes -0,047 Yes No No 0,063 No No No -0,041 Yes No No 0,019 No No No
Ln Detailing stock 0,424 Yes No No -0,294 No No No 0,548 Yes No No 0,745 Yes No Yes 0,183 Yes No No
Ln Other marketing 
expenditures stock
0,015 Yes No No 0,022 Yes No No 0,028 Yes Yes Yes 0,004 Yes No No 0,006 Yes No No
Competitive
Ln Competitive global 
marketing expenditures stock
0,023 No No No -0,049 Yes No No 0,142 No No No -0,384 Yes Yes Yes 0,305 No No No
Own
Ln Average drug price per 
DDD
1,266 No No No 0,562 No No No 1,330 No No No -1,595 Yes No No -5,833 Yes No No
Competitors
Ln Average competitors drug 
price per DDD
-3,716 No No No 3,290 Yes No No -12,219 No Yes Yes -1,931 No No Yes -1,713 No No No
Drug age 0,025 Yes No No -0,003 No No No -0,064 No Yes Yes -0,048 No Yes Yes 0,146 Yes Yes Yes
Drug age squared -0,0002 Yes No Yes 0,000 Yes Yes Yes -0,001 Yes No No
0,038 Yes No No -0,047 No No No 0,153 Yes No Yes 0,409 Yes No No
-0,067 No No No 0,523 Yes No Yes
0,064 No No No
0,301 No No No -0,271 Yes No No 0,781 No Yes Yes 0,063 No No No
Loss of exclusivity -0,120 Yes No No -0,166 Yes Yes Yes
Quarter 2 0,088  --- Yes Yes 0,155  --- Yes Yes 0,154  --- Yes Yes 0,082  --- No No 0,037  --- No No
Quarter 3 0,160  --- Yes Yes 0,233  --- Yes Yes 0,200  --- Yes Yes 0,138  --- No No 0,033  --- No No
Quarter 4 0,239  --- Yes Yes 0,391  --- Yes Yes 0,462  --- Yes Yes 0,266  --- Yes Yes 0,129  --- No No
Year 2013 0,264  --- Yes Yes 0,465  --- Yes Yes 0,827  --- Yes Yes 0,152  --- No No
Year 2014 0,618  --- Yes Yes 1,025  --- Yes Yes 1,551  --- Yes Yes 0,433  --- No No 0,161  --- No No
Year 2015 0,927  --- Yes Yes 1,717  --- Yes Yes 2,093  --- Yes Yes 0,728  --- No No 0,266  --- No No
Removed due to multicollinearity
Removed due to multicollinearity
Removed due to multicollinearity
Removed due to multicollinearity
No investments in time series
Removed due to multicollinearity
No investments in time series
No investments in time series
N/A N/A
Removed due to multicollinearity
Removed due to multicollinearity
Removed due to multicollinearity
Removed due to multicollinearity
0,987
0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Adjusted R2
ANOVA Sig.





Ln Average drug price per DDD x Ln 
Detailing flow
Ln Average drug price per DDD x Ln 
Detailing stock
Ln Average drug price per DDD x Drug age
Ln Global marketing expenditures stock x 





N/A (product launched in 2013)
Temporal dummies
N/APolicy change
Removed due to multicollinearity








Ln Sales in DDDs lagged one period
Ln Sales in DDDs lagged two periods
Model 5
Model specification






















30,790  --- Yes Yes 13,538  --- No Yes 12,034  --- No No -1,424  --- No No 9,203  --- No No
-0,540 No Yes Yes -0,581 No Yes Yes -0,449 No Yes Yes -0,442 No Yes Yes -0,102 No No No
-0,020 No No No -0,059 No No No 0,035 No No No 0,060 Yes No No 0,294 Yes No No
Ln Detailing flow -0,029 No No No 0,576 Yes No No 0,761 Yes No No 0,030 Yes No No -0,328 No No No
Ln Journal advertising flow 0,003 Yes No No -0,001 No No No 0,007 Yes Yes Yes -0,002 No No No 0,001 Yes No No
Ln Direct marketing flow -0,002 No No No -0,002 Yes No No 0,004 Yes No No 0,001 Yes No No -0,008 No No Yes
Competitive
Ln Competitive marketing 
expenditures flow
0,027 No No No 0,029 No No No 0,076 No No No -0,032 Yes No No 0,082 No No Yes
Ln Detailing stock -0,125 No No No 0,048 Yes No No 0,256 Yes No No -0,121 No No No 0,257 Yes No Yes
Ln Other marketing 
expenditures stock
0,018 Yes No No -0,013 No No No 0,037 Yes No Yes 0,027 Yes No No 0,009 Yes No No
Competitive
Ln Competitive global 
marketing expenditures stock
-0,059 Yes No No 0,154 No No No -0,083 Yes No No 0,044 No No No 0,188 No No No
Own
Ln Average drug price per 
DDD
-1,031 Yes No No 8,206 No No No -12,130 Yes No No -30,522 Yes No No -9,496 Yes No No
Competitors
Ln Average competitors drug 
price per DDD
0,762 Yes No No 0,622 Yes Yes Yes -0,445 No No No 6,519 Yes No No 0,985 Yes Yes Yes
Drug age -0,080 No No No 0,007 Yes No No 0,038 Yes No No 0,002 Yes No No -0,083 No No Yes
Drug age squared 0,0002 No No No -0,0001 Yes No No -0,0003 Yes Yes Yes -0,0002 Yes No No
-0,893 No No No 1,534 Yes No No 0,594 Yes No No
0,262 Yes No No
0,106 No No Yes
-0,516 Yes No No
Quarter 2 0,107  --- No No 0,143  --- Yes Yes 0,102  --- Yes Yes 0,133  --- Yes Yes 0,174  --- Yes Yes
Quarter 3 0,235  --- Yes Yes 0,219  --- Yes Yes 0,215  --- Yes Yes 0,169  --- Yes Yes 0,262  --- Yes Yes
Quarter 4 0,314  --- No Yes 0,334  --- Yes Yes 0,295  --- Yes Yes 0,298  --- Yes Yes 0,403  --- Yes Yes
Year 2013 0,246  --- No No 0,458  --- Yes Yes 0,274  --- No Yes 0,382  --- Yes Yes 0,499  --- Yes Yes
Year 2014 0,686  --- No No 0,873  --- Yes Yes 0,704  --- Yes Yes 0,717  --- Yes Yes 0,948  --- Yes Yes
Year 2015 1,022  --- No No 1,243  --- Yes Yes 1,143  --- Yes Yes 1,141  --- Yes Yes 1,351  --- Yes Yes
Removed due to multicollinearity
Removed due to multicollinearity
Removed due to multicollinearity
Removed due to multicollinearity
Removed due to multicollinearity
Removed due to multicollinearity
Removed due to multicollinearity
Removed due to multicollinearity
Removed due to multicollinearity
Removed due to multicollinearity
Removed due to multicollinearity
Removed due to multicollinearity
Removed due to multicollinearity
Removed due to multicollinearity
0,241 0,534 0,523 0,942 0,766
0,080 0,001 0,002 0,000 0,000
Ln Average drug price per DDD x Drug age
Ln Global marketing expenditures stock x 








Ln Average drug price per DDD x Ln 
Detailing flow
Ln Average drug price per DDD x Ln 
Detailing stock








Ln Sales in DDDs lagged one period












Based on the four tables shown above, we prepared a summary of results for a better interpretation, shown in table 10.62. 






























































Ln Sales in DDDs lagged one 
period
33,3% 0,0% -0,106 0,255 0,0% 0,0% -0,449 N/A 0,0% 0,0% -0,284 N/A 0,0% 0,0% -0,423 N/A 5,6% 0,0% -0,339 0,255
Ln Sales in DDDs lagged two 
periods
66,7% 0,0% 0,017 0,133 20,0% 0,0% -0,032 0,129 80,0% 20,0% 0,182 0,289 40,0% 0,0% 0,062 0,130 50,0% 5,6% 0,062 0,194
Ln Detailing flow 66,7% 0,0% 0,189 0,319 80,0% 20,0% 0,086 0,216 80,0% 0,0% 0,134 0,185 60,0% 0,0% 0,202 0,456 72,2% 5,6% 0,149 0,278
Ln Journal advertising flow 33,3% 0,0% -0,007 0,005 60,0% 20,0% -0,001 0,004 66,7% 33,3% 0,002 0,003 60,0% 20,0% 0,002 0,004 56,3% 18,8% -0,001 0,004
Ln Direct marketing flow 66,7% 0,0% 0,006 0,012 40,0% 0,0% 0,002 0,008 25,0% 0,0% -0,004 0,002 60,0% 0,0% -0,002 0,002 47,1% 0,0% 0,0003 0,007
Ln Competitive marketing 
expenditures flow
0,0% 0,0% 0,153 N/A 40,0% 0,0% 0,027 -0,010 60,0% 20,0% -0,015 -0,053 20,0% 0,0% 0,037 -0,032 33,3% 5,6% 0,039 -0,035
Ln Detailing stock 100,0% 0,0% 0,162 0,162 60,0% 0,0% 0,473 1,219 80,0% 0,0% 0,321 0,475 60,0% 0,0% 0,063 0,187 70,6% 0,0% 0,271 0,537
Ln Other marketing 
expenditures stock
0,0% 0,0% -0,115 N/A 80,0% 0,0% 0,040 0,055 100,0% 20,0% 0,015 0,015 80,0% 0,0% 0,016 0,023 72,2% 5,6% 0,0004 0,030
Ln Competitive global 
marketing expenditures stock
0,0% 0,0% 0,605 N/A 20,0% 0,0% 0,155 -0,089 40,0% 20,0% 0,007 -0,217 40,0% 0,0% 0,049 -0,071 27,8% 5,6% 0,160 -0,133
Ln Average drug price per DDD 66,7% 0,0% -0,765 -2,213 75,0% 25,0% -21,22 -28,799 40,0% 0,0% -0,854 -3,714 80,0% 0,0% -8,994 -13,295 64,7% 5,9% -8,024 -13,766
Ln Average competitors drug 
price per DDD
0,0% 0,0% -2,198 N/A 60,0% 0,0% -74,84 1,97 20,0% 0,0% -3,257 3,290 80,0% 40,0% 1,689 2,222 44,4% 11,1% -21,59 2,202
Drug age 66,7% 0,0% -0,006 0,036 20,0% 0,0% -0,035 0,133 40,0% 20,0% 0,011 0,085 60,0% 0,0% -0,023 0,016 44,4% 5,6% -0,014 0,053
Drug age squared 100,0% 100,0% -0,0007 -0,0007 50,0% 0,0% 0,0004 -0,00002 100,0% 33,3% -0,0004 -0,0004 75,0% 25,0% -0,0001 -0,0002 80,0% 30,0% -0,0002 -0,0003
Ln Average drug price per DDD 
x Ln Detailing flow
50,0% 0,0% -0,238 0,095 25,0% 0,0% 0,076 1,661 75,0% 0,0% 0,138 0,200 66,7% 0,0% 0,412 1,064 53,8% 0,0% 0,130 0,640
Ln Average drug price per DDD 
x Ln Detailing stock
N/A N/A N/A N/A 100,0% 0,0% 3,828 3,828 50,0% 0,0% 0,228 0,523 100,0% 0,0% 0,262 0,262 75,0% 0,0% 1,137 1,538
Ln Average drug price per DDD 
x Drug age
50,0% 0,0% 0,093 -0,007 0,0% 0,0% 0,260 N/A 0,0% 0,0% 0,064 N/A 0,0% 0,0% 0,106 N/A 14,3% 0,0% 0,162 -0,007
Ln Global marketing 
expenditures stock x Ln 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 100,0% 0,0% -7,236 -7,236 25,0% 0,0% 0,218 -0,271 100,0% 0,0% -0,516 -0,516 50,0% 0,0% -1,147 -2,674
Public reimbursement 66,7% 66,7% 2,137 3,296  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  --- 66,7% 66,7% 2,137 3,296




















Market 1 - Blood
(3 products)
Market 2 - Pancreas
(5 products)





10.5.3. Model 6 (original Model 4 + new variables) 
10.5.3.1. Procedures and outputs 
Starting with product BL1, SPSS excluded two variables, as seen below (figure 10.86). 
 
Figure 10.86 – Excluded variables for product BL1 in model 6 
Given the experience with Model 4, we removed the interaction variables Ln Global 
marketing expenditures stock x Ln Average drug price per DDD and Ln Global marketing 
expenditures stock x Ln Average competitors’ price per DDD, which solved the 
multicollinearity issues. 
In the case of product BL2, also two variables were removed by SPSS, as shown below 
(figure 10.87). 
 




We removed these two variables from the regression (the same two removed in the case of 
product BL1). 
A more delicate case was noticed with product BL3. SPSS excluded several variables (figure 
10.88): 
 
Figure 10.88 – Excluded variables for product BL3 in model 6 – iteration 1 
 
As with products BL1 and BL2, we removed the two interaction variables Ln Global 
marketing expenditures stock x Ln Average drug price per DDD and Ln Global marketing 
expenditures stock x Ln Average competitors’ price per DDD). We also removed the variable 






Figure 10.89 – Excluded variables for product BL3 in model 6 – iteration 2 
We then decided to remove the variable Ln Global marketing expenditures stock, given that it 
an almost perfect combination of the two lagged sales variables (figure 10.90). 
 
Figure 10.90 – Regression of Ln Global marketing expenditures stock on Ln Sales in DDD 




This new iteration provoked two excluded variables in SPSS outputs (figure 10.91): 
 
Figure 10.91 – Excluded variables for product BL3 in model 6 – iteration 3 
We then removed the variable Ln Average competitors price per DDD, which is highly 
correlated with Drug age (adjusted R
2
 = 0,825), which resulted in no additional 
multicollinearity issues. However, the resulting R
2
 is equal to one, and the p-values (sig. 
columns in the coefficients output) has missing values.  
Moving to product PA1, SPSS excluded two variables (figure 10.92), which we removed to 





Figure 10.92 – Excluded variables for product PA1 in model 6 
With product PA2, we applied the same procedure as with products BL1, BL2 and PA1, in 
order to remove the multicollinearity provoked by the interaction variables below (figure 
10.93): 
 
Figure 10.93 – Excluded variables for product PA2 in model 6 
The same with product PA3 (figure 10.94): 
 





In the case of product PA4, SPSS excluded two variables (figure 10.95): 
 
Figure 10.95 – Excluded variables for product PA4 in model 6 
By removing the two interaction variables that had shown before to provoke problems (Ln 
Global marketing expenditures stock x Ln Average drug price per DDD and Ln Global 
marketing expenditures stock x Ln Average competitors price per DDD), we solved the 
multicollinearity issues. 
Moving to product PA4, SPSS removed two variables (figure 10.96): 
 




By applying the same treatment as the previous product (revoving the interaction variables), 
we solved the multicollinearity issues. 
With product HE1, SPSS excluded one variable only (figure 10.97): 
 
Figure 10.97 – Excluded variables for product HE1 in model 6 
We applied the same “treatment” as in all other products analyzed so far, removing the two 
interaction variables provoking the multicollinearity issues. 
In the case of product HE2, SPSS excluded two variables (figure 10.98): 
 




We suspected that the origin of the multicollinearity was the inclusion of the two interaction 
variables. By removing them from the list of independent variables, no more issues were 
detected. 
Moving to product HE3, SPSS excluded two variables (figure 10.99): 
 
Figure 10.99 – Excluded variables for product HE3 in model 6 
We removed these two variables from the regression, in order to solve the multicollinearity 
issues. 
In the case of product HE4, we noted that the dataset has very limited information available 
regarding the new variables. Therefore, we removed those variables, and as a consequence 
product HE4 in Model 6 will have the same outputs as in Model 4. 





Figure 10.100 – Excluded variables for product HE5 in model 6 
By removing these two interaction variables, no more multicollinearity issues were detected. 
Moving to product LI1, SPSS excluded two variables due to multicollinearity (figure 10.101): 
 
Figure 10.101 – Excluded variables for product LI1 in model 6 






A similar situation occurred with product LI2 (figure 10.102): 
 
Figure 10.102 – Excluded variables for product LI2 in model 6 
After removing the interaction variables, the multicollinearity issues were solved. 
In the case of product LI3, SPSS excluded two variables due to the multicollinearity with the 
two interaction variables (figure 10.103): 
 
Figure 10.103 – Excluded variables for product LI3 in model 6 




Such as with product LI3, SPSS excluded the same two variables in product LI4 (figure 
10.104): 
 
Figure 10.104 – Excluded variables for product LI4 in model 6 
The multicollinearity issue was solved, once more time, by removing the two interaction 
variables from the list of independent variables. 
Finally, in the case of product LI5, SPSS excluded the two interaction variables (figure 
10.105). 
 
Figure 10.105 – Excluded variables for product LI4 in model 6 
















5,697  --- No No 9,642  --- Yes Yes 1,605  ---  ---  ---
0,244 Yes No No -0,251 No No No 0,016 Yes  ---  ---
0,057 Yes No No 0,085 Yes No No 0,123 Yes  ---  ---
Own Ln Global marketing expenditures flow 0,009 Yes No No 0,001 Yes No No 0,141 Yes  ---  ---
Competitive
Ln Competitive marketing 
expenditures flow
0,038 No No No 0,047 No No No -0,243 Yes  ---  ---
Own
Ln Global marketing expenditures 
stock
-0,039 No No No 0,089 Yes No No
Competitive
Ln Competitive global marketing 
expenditures stock
0,208 No No No 0,025 No No No
Own Ln Average drug price per DDD 0,180 No No No -0,568 Yes No No 2,439 No  ---  ---
Competitors
Ln Average competitors drug price per 
DDD
-2,234 No Yes Yes 0,058 Yes No No
Drug age 0,012 Yes No No 0,098 Yes No No 0,046 Yes  ---  ---
Drug age squared 0,0001 No No No -0,001 Yes Yes Yes
Public reimbursement 0,452 Yes Yes Yes -0,104 No No No 5,588 Yes  ---  ---
0,016  --- No No 0,649  --- No No -0,883  ---  ---  ---
0,400  --- No No -0,537  --- No No -3,694  ---  ---  ---
0,220  --- No No 0,336  --- Yes Yes -0,853  ---  ---  ---
-0,146  --- No No 0,031  --- No No 0,526  ---  ---  ---
0,095  --- No No -0,0001  --- No No 0,239  ---  ---  ---
-0,262  --- No No -0,049  --- No No 0,404  ---  ---  ---
Quarter 2 0,049  --- No No 0,074  --- No No 0,230  ---  ---  ---
Quarter 3 0,101  --- No No 0,206  --- Yes Yes 0,234  ---  ---  ---
Quarter 4 0,216  --- No No 0,376  --- Yes Yes 0,372  ---  ---  ---
Year 2013 0,223  --- No No 0,457  --- Yes Yes
Year 2014 0,386  --- No No 0,892  --- Yes Yes
Year 2015 0,740  --- No No 1,217  --- Yes Yes 0,827  ---  ---  ---
Removed due to multicollinearity
Removed due to multicollinearity
Removed due to multicollinearity
Removed due to multicollinearity
Removed due to multicollinearity
Removed due to multicollinearity
Removed due to multicollinearity
Very useful (% of calls)
Increase / Will begin to prescribe (% of calls)
Ln Avg number of products presented during the calls
Additional 
variables
Removed due to multicollinearity
Removed due to multicollinearity
ANOVA Sig. 0,000 0,000  ---
Policy change
Temporal dummies
N/A (product launched in 2014)
Adjusted R2 0,997 0,986 0,999
Ipad / Tablet (% of times used in calls)
Laptop based materials (% of times used in calls)




Ln Global marketing expenditures stock x Ln 
Average drug price per DDD
Ln Global marketing expenditures stock x Ln 









Removed due to multicollinearity
Lagged sales
Ln Sales in DDDs lagged one period


























22,921  --- Yes Yes 26,755  --- Yes Yes 21,201  --- Yes Yes 17,666  --- No No 16,048  --- Yes Yes
-0,474 No Yes Yes -0,459 No Yes Yes -0,612 No Yes Yes 0,009 Yes No No -0,432 No Yes Yes
0,109 Yes No No -0,055 No No No -0,175 No No No 0,000 Yes No No -0,105 No No No
Own Ln Global marketing expenditures flow 0,021 Yes No No 0,036 Yes No No -0,099 No Yes Yes 0,099 Yes No No 0,059 Yes No No
Competitive
Ln Competitive marketing 
expenditures flow
-0,027 Yes No No 0,016 No No No 0,120 Yes Yes Yes 0,115 No No No 0,018 No No No
Own
Ln Global marketing expenditures 
stock
0,194 Yes No No -0,138 No No No 0,121 Yes No No 0,594 Yes No No 0,039 Yes No No
Competitive
Ln Competitive global marketing 
expenditures stock
-0,028 Yes No No 0,132 No No No -0,022 Yes No No 0,783 No No No 0,317 No No No
Own Ln Average drug price per DDD 9,171 No No No -19,519 Yes No Yes 2,598 No No No -6,123 Yes No No
Competitors
Ln Average competitors drug price per 
DDD
-23,990 No No No 4,207 Yes No No -0,435 No No No -161,32 No No No 0,692 Yes No No
Drug age -0,017 No No No -0,026 No No No 0,026 Yes No No 0,170 Yes No No -0,012 No No No
Drug age squared -0,0002 Yes No No -0,00005 Yes No No -0,0003 Yes Yes Yes -0,002 Yes No No 0,0001 No No No
0,186  --- No No 0,187  --- No No -0,305  --- No No 0,099  --- No No -0,010  --- No No
0,397  --- No No -0,151  --- No No -0,280  --- No No 0,114  --- No No 0,033  --- No No
0,149  --- Yes Yes 0,136  --- No No 0,059  --- No No 0,350  --- No No 0,038  --- No No
-0,002  --- No No -0,095  --- No No 0,154  --- No No 1,179  --- No Yes 0,069  --- No No
-0,056  --- No No -0,058  --- No No -0,044  --- No No 0,387  --- No No -0,004  --- No No
-0,060  --- No No -0,133  --- No No -0,131  --- No No -0,756  --- No No -0,008  --- No No
Quarter 2 0,171  --- Yes Yes 0,102  --- Yes Yes 0,078  --- No Yes 0,247  --- No No 0,027  --- No No
Quarter 3 0,300  --- Yes Yes 0,235  --- Yes Yes 0,122  --- No Yes 0,832  --- Yes Yes 0,093  --- No No
Quarter 4 0,435  --- Yes Yes 0,344  --- Yes Yes 0,191  --- No Yes 0,936  --- Yes Yes 0,119  --- No No
Year 2013 0,504  --- Yes Yes 0,379  --- Yes Yes 0,213  --- No No 0,093  --- No No
Year 2014 0,356  --- No No 0,184  --- No No 0,469  --- No No 1,078  --- No No 0,000  --- No No
Year 2015 0,823  --- No No 0,483  --- No No 0,666  --- No No 2,117  --- No No 0,099  --- No No
Additional 
variables
Ipad / Tablet (% of times used in calls)
Laptop based materials (% of times used in calls)
Printed material (% of times used in calls)
Very useful (% of calls)
Increase / Will begin to prescribe (% of calls)
Ln Avg number of products presented during the calls
0,218
ANOVA Sig. 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,129
Temporal dummies
N/A (product launched in 2013)
Adjusted R2 0,674 0,643 0,828 0,961
Removed due to multicollinearity
Ln Global marketing expenditures stock x Ln 
Average competitors price per DDD










Ln Global marketing expenditures stock x Ln 
Average drug price per DDD
Removed due to multicollinearity Removed due to multicollinearity Removed due to multicollinearity Removed due to multicollinearity
Constant
Lagged sales
Ln Sales in DDDs lagged one period





























28,336  --- Yes Yes 21,002  --- Yes Yes 10,563  --- No No 21,106  --- Yes Yes 3,976  --- No No
-0,733 No Yes Yes -0,494 No Yes Yes -0,565 No No No -0,087 No No No 0,057 Yes No No
-0,314 No No No 0,095 Yes No No 0,799 Yes No No 0,069 Yes No No 0,009 Yes No No
Own Ln Global marketing expenditures flow 0,019 Yes No No 0,002 Yes No No -0,061 No No No 0,006 Yes No No 0,026 Yes No No
Competitive
Ln Competitive marketing 
expenditures flow
-0,061 Yes No Yes -0,045 Yes No No -0,022 Yes No No -0,044 Yes No No -0,024 Yes No No
Own
Ln Global marketing expenditures 
stock
0,108 Yes Yes Yes 0,064 Yes No No 0,386 Yes No No 0,819 Yes Yes Yes 0,026 Yes No No
Competitive
Ln Competitive global marketing 
expenditures stock
0,013 No No No -0,028 Yes No No 0,230 No No No -0,394 Yes Yes Yes 0,174 No No No
Own Ln Average drug price per DDD 1,065 No No No 0,442 No No No -2,671 Yes No No -4,130 Yes No Yes -0,249 Yes No No
Competitors
Ln Average competitors drug price per 
DDD
0,015 Yes No No -0,075 No No No -6,700 No No No -1,132 No No Yes -2,748 No No No
Drug age 0,034 Yes No No -0,009 No No No -0,063 No No No -0,042 No Yes Yes 0,107 Yes Yes Yes
Drug age squared -0,0002 Yes No Yes -0,0002 Yes No No -0,001 Yes Yes Yes
0,410 Yes No No 0,634 Yes Yes Yes
Loss of exclusivity -0,198 Yes No No -0,161 Yes Yes Yes
0,096  --- No No 0,170  --- No No 0,086  --- No No -0,250  --- No No
0,177  --- No No -1,155  --- No No -0,548  --- No No
0,013  --- No No 0,114  --- No No 0,009  --- No No 0,166  --- No No
-0,118  --- No No -0,029  --- No No 0,034  --- No No 0,416  --- No Yes
-0,002  --- No No 0,064  --- No No 0,040  --- No No -0,106  --- No No
0,104  --- No No 0,038  --- No No -0,014  --- No No 0,315  --- No No
Quarter 2 0,104  --- Yes Yes 0,144  --- Yes Yes 0,192  --- No No 0,063  --- No No 0,042  --- 0,491 No
Quarter 3 0,161  --- Yes Yes 0,203  --- Yes Yes 0,094  --- No No 0,102  --- No No 0,044  --- 0,609 No
Quarter 4 0,240  --- Yes Yes 0,349  --- Yes Yes 0,380  --- No No 0,190  --- No No 0,161  --- 0,195 No
Year 2013 0,233  --- No Yes 0,458  --- Yes Yes 0,684  --- No No 0,037  --- No No
Year 2014 0,533  --- Yes Yes 0,888  --- Yes Yes 1,376  --- No No 0,228  --- No No 0,100  --- No No





Ipad / Tablet (% of times used in calls)
Laptop based materials (% of times used in calls)
Printed material (% of times used in calls)
Very useful (% of calls)
Increase / Will begin to prescribe (% of calls)
Ln Avg number of products presented during the calls
ANOVA Sig. 0,000 0,000 0,013 0,000 0,000
Temporal dummies
N/A (product launched in 2013)
Adjusted R2 0,872 0,623 0,815 0,984 0,991
Removed due to multicollinearity
Ln Global marketing expenditures stock x Ln 
Average competitors price per DDD
Removed due to multicollinearity Removed due to multicollinearity Removed due to multicollinearity
Policy change Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
Removed due to multicollinearity
Price
Drug age




Ln Global marketing expenditures stock x Ln 
Average drug price per DDD
Removed due to multicollinearity Removed due to multicollinearity
Removed due to multicollinearity
Constant
Lagged sales
Ln Sales in DDDs lagged one period































27,974  --- Yes Yes 16,858  --- Yes Yes 19,204  --- Yes Yes 7,336  --- No No 3,473  --- No No
-0,482 No Yes Yes -0,470 No Yes Yes -0,359 No Yes Yes -0,283 No No No -0,063 No No No
0,094 Yes No No 0,077 Yes No No -0,141 No No No 0,092 Yes No No 0,309 Yes No Yes
Own Ln Global marketing expenditures flow -0,009 No No No -0,003 No No No 0,030 Yes No No 0,153 Yes Yes Yes 0,093 Yes No Yes
Competitive
Ln Competitive marketing 
expenditures flow
0,049 No No No -0,018 Yes No No 0,035 No No No -0,098 Yes No No 0,088 No No Yes
Own
Ln Global marketing expenditures 
stock
-0,121 No No No 0,013 Yes No No 0,141 Yes No No 0,126 Yes No No 0,184 Yes No No
Competitive
Ln Competitive global marketing 
expenditures stock
-0,133 Yes No No 0,159 No No No -0,040 Yes No No 0,109 No No No 0,187 No No No
Own Ln Average drug price per DDD 0,091 No No No 1,260 No No No -1,385 Yes No No -6,919 Yes No No -3,412 Yes No No
Competitors
Ln Average competitors drug price per 
DDD
0,784 Yes No No 0,449 Yes No No -0,222 No No No 0,370 Yes No No 1,107 Yes Yes Yes
Drug age -0,045 No No No -0,010 No No No 0,006 Yes No No 0,010 Yes No No 0,010 Yes No No
Drug age squared 0,0001 No No No -0,0001 Yes No No -0,0001 Yes No No -0,0003 Yes No Yes -0,0003 Yes No Yes
0,041  --- No No 0,274  --- No No 0,002  --- No No 0,012  --- No No 0,058  --- No No
0,510  --- No No 0,057  --- No No -0,031  --- No No -0,633  --- No No -0,368  --- No No
-0,055  --- No No 0,073  --- No No -0,058  --- No No 0,061  --- No No 0,115  --- No No
0,018  --- No No 0,020  --- No No -0,128  --- No No -0,318  --- No No -0,273  --- No No
0,196  --- No No -0,060  --- No No 0,242  --- Yes Yes 0,086  --- No No 0,091  --- No No
0,085  --- No No -0,053  --- No No 0,112  --- No No 0,233  --- No No -0,065  --- No No
Quarter 2 0,122  --- No No 0,152  --- Yes Yes 0,057  --- No No 0,096  --- Yes Yes 0,188  --- Yes Yes
Quarter 3 0,250  --- No No 0,254  --- Yes Yes 0,169  --- No Yes 0,167  --- Yes Yes 0,258  --- Yes Yes
Quarter 4 0,316  --- No No 0,410  --- Yes Yes 0,194  --- No No 0,257  --- Yes Yes 0,385  --- Yes Yes
Year 2013 0,239  --- Yes Yes 0,538  --- Yes Yes 0,192  --- No No 0,343  --- Yes Yes 0,456  --- Yes Yes
Year 2014 0,714  --- No Yes 1,041  --- Yes Yes 0,557  --- No Yes 0,603  --- Yes Yes 0,938  --- Yes Yes
Year 2015 1,097  --- No No 1,535  --- Yes Yes 0,844  --- No Yes 1,021  --- Yes Yes 1,280  --- Yes Yes
Ln Avg number of products presented during the calls
Removed due to multicollinearity
Additional 
variables
Ipad / Tablet (% of times used in calls)
Laptop based materials (% of times used in calls)
Printed material (% of times used in calls)
Very useful (% of calls)
Increase / Will begin to prescribe (% of calls)
0,743
ANOVA Sig. 0,158 0,002 0,013 0,000 0,000
Temporal dummies
Adjusted R2 0,194 0,534 0,421 0,953
Removed due to multicollinearity Removed due to multicollinearity Removed due to multicollinearity
Ln Global marketing expenditures stock x Ln 
Average competitors price per DDD






Ln Global marketing expenditures stock x Ln 
Average drug price per DDD
Removed due to multicollinearity Removed due to multicollinearity
Constant
Lagged sales
Ln Sales in DDDs lagged one period














Based on the four tables shown above, we prepared a summary of results for a better interpretation, shown below in table 10.67. 






























































Ln Sales in DDDs lagged one 
period
66,7% 0,0% 0,003 0,130 20,0% 0,0% -0,394 0,009 20,0% 0,0% -0,364 0,057 0,0% 0,0% -0,332 N/A 22,2% 0,0% -0,302 0,081
Ln Sales in DDDs lagged two 
periods
100,0% 0,0% 0,088 0,088 40,0% 0,0% -0,045 0,109 80,0% 0,0% 0,131 0,243 80,0% 0,0% 0,086 0,086 72,2% 0,0% 0,063 0,137
Ln Global marketing 
expenditures flow 
100,0% 0,0% 0,050 0,050 80,0% 0,0% 0,023 0,023 80,0% 0,0% -0,002 -0,002 60,0% 20,0% 0,053 0,081 77,8% 5,6% 0,029 0,031
Ln Competitive marketing 
expenditures flow
33,3% 0,0% -0,053 -0,243 40,0% 20,0% 0,048 -0,006 100,0% 0,0% -0,039 -0,050 40,0% 0,0% 0,011 -0,098 55,6% 5,6% -0,003 -0,072
Ln Global marketing 
expenditures stock
50,0% 0,0% 0,025 0,089 80,0% 0,0% 0,162 0,237 100,0% 40,0% 0,281 0,281 80,0% 0,0% 0,069 0,116 82,4% 11,8% 0,153 0,207
Ln Competitive global 
marketing expenditures stock
0,0% 0,0% 0,116 N/A 40,0% 0,0% 0,236 N/A 40,0% 20,0% -0,001 -0,136 40,0% 0,0% 0,056 -0,133 35,3% 5,9% 0,099 -0,136
Ln Average drug price per DDD 33,3% 0,0% 0,684 -0,568 50,0% 0,0% -3,468 -19,519 60,0% 0,0% -1,109 -2,190 60,0% 0,0% -2,073 -2,906 52,9% 0,0% -1,631 -4,512
Ln Average competitors drug 
price per DDD
50,0% 0,0% -1,088 0,058 40,0% 0,0% -36,17 -4,882 20,0% 0,0% -2,128 N/A 80,0% 20,0% 0,498 0,780 47,1% 5,9% -11,25 -2,141
Drug age 100,0% 0,0% 0,052 0,052 40,0% 0,0% 0,028 0,060 40,0% 20,0% 0,005 0,071 60,0% 0,0% -0,006 0,003 55,6% 5,6% 0,016 0,044
Drug age squared 50,0% 50,0% 0,000 -0,001 80,0% 20,0% -0,001 -0,001 100,0% 33,3% -0,001 -0,001 80,0% 0,0% 0,000 0,000 80,0% 20,0% 0,000 -0,001
Ln Global marketing 
expenditures flow x Ln Average 
drug price per DDD
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 100,0% 50,0% 0,522 0,522 N/A N/A N/A N/A 100,0% 50,0% 0,522 0,522
Ln Global marketing 
expenditures flow x Ln Average 
competitors price per DDD
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Public reimbursement 66,7% 33,3% 1,979 3,020  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  --- 66,7% 33,3% 1,979 3,020
Loss of exclusivity  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  --- 100,0% 50,0% -0,180 -0,180  ---  ---  ---  --- 100,0% 50,0% -0,180 -0,180
Ipad / Tablet (% of times used 
in calls)
 ---  --- -0,072  ---  ---  --- 0,031  ---  ---  --- 0,026  ---  ---  --- 0,077  ---  ---  --- 0,025  ---
Laptop based materials (% of 
times used in calls)
 ---  --- -1,277  ---  ---  --- 0,023  ---  ---  --- -0,509  ---  ---  --- -0,093  ---  ---  --- -0,357  ---
Printed material (% of times 
used in calls)
 ---  --- -0,099  ---  ---  --- 0,147  ---  ---  --- 0,076  ---  ---  --- 0,027  ---  ---  --- 0,051  ---
Very useful (% of calls)  ---  --- 0,137  ---  ---  --- 0,261  ---  ---  --- 0,076  ---  ---  --- -0,136  ---  ---  --- 0,079  ---
Increase / Will begin to 
prescribe (% of calls)
 ---  --- 0,111  ---  ---  --- 0,045  ---  ---  --- -0,001  ---  ---  --- 0,111  ---  ---  --- 0,065  ---
Ln Avg number of products 
presented during the calls




















Market 1 - Blood
(3 products)
Market 2 - Pancreas
(5 products)





10.5.4. Model 7 (Model 4 with expenditures disaggregation + new variables) 
10.5.4.1. Procedures and outputs 
Starting with product BL1, SPSS excluded three variables (figure 10.106): 
 
Figure 10.106 – Excluded variables for product BL1 in model 7 – iteration 1 
We started by removing the variables Drug age squared and Ln Global marketing 
expenditures stock x Ln Average competitors price per DDD, as sources of multicollinearity 
in many previous models. SPSS then excluded one variable (figure 10.107): 
 




We suspected that the source of this exclusion was the interaction variable Ln Average drug 
price per DDD x Ln Detailing stock. After removing this variable, no additional excluded 
variables were detected. 
In the case of product BL2, the excluded variables were the following (figure 10.108): 
 
Figure 10.108 – Excluded variables for product BL2 in model 7 – iteration 1 
Given our experience with Model 4 and Model 5 (similar to Model 7), we removed the 
variables Drug age squared, Ln Drug price x Ln Detailing stock, and Ln Global marketing 
expenditures stock x Ln Average competitors price. SPSS then excluded another variable 
(figure 10.109): 
 




By removing the interaction variable Ln Average drug price per DDD x Drug age, no more 
issues of multicollinearity were detected. 
In the case of product BL3, SPSS excluded a substantial number of variables, a similar 
situation as in Models 4 and 5 (figure 10.110). 
 
Figure 10.110 – Excluded variables for product BL3 in model 7 – iteration 1 
We started by removing the variables that previously had demonstrated to be a source of 
multicollinearity in the previous products and similar models: Drug age squared, Ln Average 
drug price per DDD x Ln Detailing stock, Ln Average drug price per DDD x Drug age, and 
Ln Global marketing expenditures stock x Ln Average competitors price per DDD. SPSS kept 





Figure 10.111 – Excluded variables for product BL3 in model 7 – iteration 2 
We then removed the variables Ln Average drug price per DDD x Ln Detailing flow, and Ln 
Sales in DDDs lagged two periods. SPSS kept excluding the following variables (figure 
10.112): 
 




We then removed the variables Quarter 3 (dummy) and Ln Competitive global marketing 
expenditures stock, which reduced the excluded variables to three (figure 10.113): 
 
Figure 10.113 – Excluded variables for product BL3 in model 7 – iteration 4 
Finally, we removed the variables Quarter 2 (dummy) and Quarter 4 (dummy) (which were 
allowing an almost perfect linear combination to calculate drug age), and Ln Average 
competitors price per DDD, and no more issues of multicollinearity were found. 
Moving to product PA1, SPSS excluded two variables (figure 10.114): 
 




By removing these two variables from the list of independent variables, no additional 
multicollinearity was detected. 
In the case of product PA2, SPSS excluded three variables (figure 10.115): 
 
Figure 10.115 – Excluded variables for product PA2 in model 7 
By removing the two interaction variables in additional to the interaction variable Average 
Drug price x Drug age, no more multicollinearity issues were detected. 
Moving to product PA3, SPSS excluded three variables (figure 10.116): 
 




Given our experience with this model, we removed the interaction variables Ln Global 
marketing expenditures stock x Ln Average competitors’ price, Ln Average drug price per 
DDD x Drug age, and Ln Average drug price per DDD x Ln Detailing stock, which resulted 
in no additional variables excluded. 
In relation to product PA4, SPSS excluded three variables (figure 10.117): 
 
Figure 10.117 – Excluded variables for product PA4 in model 7 – iteration 1 
Leeflang & Wieringa (2010) noted that interactions between variables may be a source of 
multicollinearity, and therefore some should be removed. Following this principle, and using 
our experience with the data and intuition, we decided to remove the following variables, in 
order to solve the multicollinearity issues: Ln Global marketing expenditures stock x Ln 
Average competitors’ price per DDD, Ln Average drug price per DDD x Ln Detailing stock, 
and Ln Average drug price per DDD x Drug age. One additional interaction variable was 





Figure 10.118 – Excluded variables for product PA4 in model 7 – iteration 2 
Moving to product PA5, SPSS removed three variables (figure 10.119): 
 
Figure 10.119 – Excluded variables for product PA5 in model 7 
We started by removing the variables that previously provoked more sources of 
multicollinearity: Ln Average drug price per DDD x Ln Detailing stock, Ln Average drug 
price per DDD x Drug age, and Ln Global marketing expenditures stock x Ln Average 






In the case of product HE1, SPSS excluded three variables (figure 10.120): 
 
Figure 10.120 – Excluded variables for product HE1 in model 7 – iteration 1 
By removing the interaction variables Ln Average drug price per DDD x Ln Detailing stock, 
Ln Average drug price per DDD x Drug age, and Ln Global marketing expenditures stock x 
Ln Average competitors price per DDD, we almoved solved the multicollinearity issues. Then 
SPSS excluded the remaining interaction variable Ln Average drug price per DDD x Ln 
Detailing flow which, after removal from the list of independent variables, solved the 
multicollinearity problems (figure 10.121). 
 
Figure 10.121 – Excluded variables for product HE1 in model 7 – iteration 2 





Figure 10.122 – Excluded variables for product HE2 in model 7 
We removed the interaction variables Ln Average drug price per DDD x Drug age, Ln Global 
marketing expenditures stock x Ln Average competitors’ price per DDD, and Ln Average 
drug price per DDD x Ln Detailing stock, which solved the multicollinearity issues. 
In the case of product HE3, SPSS removed three variables (figure 10.123): 
 
Figure 10.123 – Excluded variables for product HE3 in model 7 – iteration 1 
We removed the interaction variables Ln Average drug price per DDD x Ln Detailing stock, 




Ln Average competitors’ price per DDD. We ran the regression again and SPSS still removed 
the variables Drug age squared (figure 10.124). 
 
Figure 10.124 – Excluded variables for product HE3 in model 7 – iteration 2 
After removing this variable, no more issues were detected. 
In the case of product HE4, we noted that the dataset has very limited information available 
regarding the new variables. Therefore, we removed those variables, and as a consequence 
product HE4 in Model 7 will have the same outputs as in Model 5. 
Moving to product HE5, SPSS removed two variables (figure 10.125): 
 
Figure 10.125 – Excluded variables for product HE5 in model 7 
By removing these two interaction variables, we solved the multicollinearity issues. 





Figure 10.126 – Excluded variables for product LI1 in model 7 
Given our experience with this model, we decided to remove the interaction variables Ln 
Average drug price per DDD x Ln Detailing stock, Ln Average drug price per DDD x Drug 
age, Ln Global marketing expenditures stock x Ln Average competitors’ price per DDD, and 
Ln Average drug price per DDD x Ln Detailing flow, which solved the multicollinearity 
issues. In the case of product LI2, SPSS excluded four variables (figure 10.127): 
 
Figure 10.127 – Excluded variables for product LI2 in model 7 
By removing the four interaction variables, we solved the multicollinearity problems. 





Figure 10.128 – Excluded variables for product LI3 in model 7 
To solve this multicollinearity problem, we removed two interaction variables: Ln Global 
marketing expenditures stock x Ln Average competitors’ price per DDD, and Ln Average 
drug price per DDD x Drug age, which resulted in no additional variables excluded. 
In the case of product LI4, SPSS excluded three variables (figure 10.129): 
 
Figure 10.129 – Excluded variables for product LI4 in model 7 
By removing these three interaction variables from the regression model, no additional issues 
of multicollinearity were detected. 





Figure 10.130 – Excluded variables for product LI5 in model 7 
We decided to remove three interaction variables: Ln Average drug price per DDD x Ln 
Detailing stock, Ln Average drug price per DDD x Drug age, and Ln Global marketing 
expenditures stock x Ln Average competitors’ price per DDD, which solved the 
multicollinearity issues. Tables 10.68, 10.69, 10.70 and 10.71 summarize the coefficients 

















4,139  --- No No 5,967  --- No No -1,683  ---  ---  ---
0,297 Yes No No -0,139 No No No 0,028 Yes  ---  ---
-0,005 No No No 0,440 Yes Yes Yes
Ln Detailing flow 0,012 Yes No No 0,214 Yes No No 0,127 Yes  ---  ---
Ln Journal advertising flow 0,007 Yes No No 0,005 Yes No No 0,008 Yes  ---  ---
Ln Direct marketing flow 0,008 Yes No No -0,002 No No No -0,009 No  ---  ---
Competitive
Ln Competitive marketing 
expenditures flow
0,012 No No No 0,088 No No No -0,158 Yes  ---  ---
Ln Detailing stock 0,334 Yes No No 0,139 Yes No No 0,353 Yes  ---  ---
Ln Other marketing expenditures 
stock
-0,044 No No No -0,106 No No Yes 0,249 Yes  ---  ---
Competitive
Ln Competitive global marketing 
expenditures stock
-0,022 Yes No No 0,078 No No No
Own Ln Average drug price per DDD 0,986 No No No 1,675 No No No -0,743 Yes  ---  ---
Competitors
Ln Average competitors drug price 
per DDD
-1,537 No No No -0,140 No No No
Drug age 0,044 Yes No No -0,020 No No No 0,129 Yes  ---  ---
Drug age squared
-0,008 No No No -0,244 No No No
-0,014 Yes No No
Public reimbursement 0,463 Yes Yes Yes -0,208 No No Yes 4,354 Yes  ---  ---
-0,031  --- No No 0,345  --- No No 0,153  ---  ---  ---
0,727  --- No No -1,548  --- Yes Yes -1,403  ---  ---  ---
0,289  --- No No 0,205  --- No No -0,345  ---  ---  ---
-0,091  --- No No -0,147  --- No No -0,308  ---  ---  ---
-0,031  --- No No 0,0357  --- No No 0,117  ---  ---  ---
-0,362  --- No No -0,146  --- No No 0,698  ---  ---  ---
Quarter 2 0,024  --- No No 0,062  --- No No
Quarter 3 0,040  --- No No 0,163  --- No No
Quarter 4 0,137  --- No No 0,389  --- Yes Yes
Year 2013 0,199  --- No No 0,545  --- Yes Yes
Year 2014 0,192  --- No No 1,105  --- Yes Yes
Year 2015 0,386  --- No No 1,373  --- Yes Yes 0,043  ---  ---  ---
Very useful (% of calls)
Increase / Will begin to prescribe (% of calls)
Ln Avg number of products presented during the calls
Removed due to multicollinearity
Removed due to multicollinearity
Removed due to multicollinearity
Adjusted R2 0,997 0,986 1,000
ANOVA Sig. 0,000 0,000  ---
Removed due to multicollinearity Removed due to multicollinearity Removed due to multicollinearity
Policy change
Temporal dummies
N/A (product launched in 2014)
Additional 
variables
Ipad / Tablet (% of times used in calls)
Laptop based materials (% of times used in calls)




Ln Average drug price per DDD x Ln Detailing flow Removed due to multicollinearity
Ln Average drug price per DDD x Ln Detailing stock Excluded due to multicollinearity Removed due to multicollinearity Removed due to multicollinearity
Ln Average drug price per DDD x Drug age Removed due to multicollinearity
Ln Global marketing expenditures stock x Ln 







Removed due to multicollinearity Removed due to multicollinearity
Removed due to multicollinearity
Removed due to multicollinearity





Removed due to multicollinearity
Lagged sales


























31,267  --- Yes Yes 24,512  --- Yes Yes 25,818  --- Yes Yes 11,758  --- No No 14,986  --- No Yes
-0,603 No Yes Yes -0,486 No Yes Yes -0,757 No Yes Yes -0,072 No No No -0,474 No Yes Yes
0,027 No No No 0,184 Yes No No -0,275 No No No -0,070 No No No -0,080 No No
Ln Detailing flow 0,061 Yes No No -0,125 No No No -0,049 No No No 0,597 Yes No No 0,344 Yes No No
Ln Journal advertising flow -0,006 No No No 0,006 Yes Yes Yes 0,004 Yes No No -0,006 No No No 0,003 Yes No No
Ln Direct marketing flow -0,005 No No No 0,001 Yes No No 0,0004 Yes No No 0,015 Yes No No -0,002 No No No
Competitive
Ln Competitive marketing 
expenditures flow
0,004 No No No 0,020 No No No 0,075 No No No -0,124 Yes No No 0,022 No No No
Ln Detailing stock 0,037 Yes No No -0,203 No No No 0,049 Yes No No 1,728 Yes No No 0,099 Yes No No
Ln Other marketing expenditures 
stock
0,013 Yes No No 0,043 Yes No No 0,030 Yes No No -0,039 No No No -0,027 No No No
Competitive
Ln Competitive global marketing 
expenditures stock
-0,088 Yes No No 0,164 No No No -0,107 Yes No No 0,946 No No No 0,275 No No No
Own Ln Average drug price per DDD -0,089 Yes No No -24,286 Yes No No 6,096 No No No -1,487 Yes No No
Competitors
Ln Average competitors drug price 
per DDD
-22,866 No No No 3,912 Yes No No -0,279 No No No -163,61 No No No 2,608 Yes No No
Drug age -0,088 No Yes Yes -0,023 No No No 0,031 Yes No No 0,142 Yes No No -0,002 No No No
Drug age squared 0,0000 Yes No No -0,0001 Yes No No -0,0004 Yes Yes Yes -0,0004 Yes No No -0,0001 Yes No No
-0,332 No No No 0,495 Yes No No -0,301 No No No -0,986 No No No
0,228 No Yes Yes
0,285  --- No No 0,043  --- No No -0,394  --- No No 0,295  --- No No 0,004  --- No No
0,040  --- No No -0,002  --- No No -0,130  --- No No 0,998  --- No No 0,182  --- No No
0,002  --- No No 0,064  --- No No 0,044  --- No No -0,021  --- No No -0,011  --- No No
-0,196  --- No No -0,140  --- No No 0,147  --- No No 0,338  --- No No 0,027  --- No No
0,156  --- No No 0,050  --- No No -0,055  --- No No -0,636  --- No No -0,012  --- No No
0,076  --- No No -0,101  --- No No -0,120  --- No No -1,084  --- No No -0,050  --- No No
Quarter 2 0,143  --- Yes Yes 0,120  --- Yes Yes 0,100  --- No Yes 0,042  --- No No 0,070  --- No No
Quarter 3 0,241  --- Yes Yes 0,296  --- Yes Yes 0,158  --- Yes Yes 0,587  --- No No 0,163  --- No No
Quarter 4 0,351  --- Yes Yes 0,434  --- Yes Yes 0,224  --- Yes Yes 0,494  --- No No 0,191  --- No No
Year 2013 0,299  --- No No 0,448  --- Yes Yes 0,247  --- No Yes 0,149  --- No No
Year 2014 0,097  --- No No 0,308  --- No No 0,561  --- No No 0,615  --- No No 0,107  --- No No
Year 2015 0,428  --- No No 0,739  --- No No 0,812  --- No No 1,385  --- No No 0,299  --- No No
Removed due to multicollinearity
Additional 
variables
Ipad / Tablet (% of times used in calls)
Laptop based materials (% of times used in calls)
Printed material (% of times used in calls)
Very useful (% of calls)
Increase / Will begin to prescribe (% of calls)
Ln Avg number of products presented during the calls
0,136
ANOVA Sig. 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,281
Temporal dummies
N/A (product launched in 2013)
Adjusted R2 0,744 0,699 0,836 0,961
Removed due to multicollinearity Removed due to multicollinearity
Ln Global marketing expenditures stock x Ln 
Average competitors price per DDD
Removed due to multicollinearity Removed due to multicollinearity Removed due to multicollinearity Removed due to multicollinearity
Removed due to multicollinearity Removed due to multicollinearity




Ln Average drug price per DDD x Ln Detailing flow Removed due to multicollinearity
Ln Average drug price per DDD x Ln Detailing stock Removed due to multicollinearity Removed due to multicollinearity Removed due to multicollinearity Removed due to multicollinearity










Ln Sales in DDDs lagged one period





























30,257  --- Yes Yes 18,052  --- Yes Yes 19,092  --- No No 22,341  --- Yes Yes 0,318  --- No No
-0,720 No Yes Yes -0,322 No Yes Yes -0,976 No No No -0,065 No No No 0,030 Yes No No
-0,297 No No No 0,173 Yes No No 0,876 Yes No No 0,187 Yes No No 0,011 Yes No No
Ln Detailing flow 0,039 Yes No No 0,201 Yes No No -0,719 No No No 0,202 Yes No Yes 0,302 Yes No No
Ln Journal advertising flow -0,003 No No No 0,005 Yes Yes Yes 0,007 Yes No No
Ln Direct marketing flow -0,006 No No No -0,010 No Yes Yes -0,002 No No No 0,003 Yes No No
Competitive
Ln Competitive marketing 
expenditures flow
-0,073 Yes No Yes -0,044 Yes No No -0,086 Yes No No -0,041 Yes No No -0,039 Yes No No
Ln Detailing stock 0,087 Yes No Yes -0,117 No No No -0,219 No No No 0,745 Yes No Yes 0,119 Yes No No
Ln Other marketing expenditures 
stock
0,011 Yes No No 0,064 Yes Yes Yes 0,023 Yes No No 0,004 Yes No No -0,010 No No No
Competitive
Ln Competitive global marketing 
expenditures stock
0,041 No No No -0,059 Yes No No 0,427 No No No -0,384 Yes Yes Yes 0,234 No No No
Own Ln Average drug price per DDD 3,074 No No No -0,058 Yes No No 5,711 No No No -1,595 Yes No No -3,529 Yes No No
Competitors
Ln Average competitors drug price 
per DDD
0,152 Yes No No -0,264 No No No -9,885 No No No -1,931 No No Yes -2,393 No No No
Drug age 0,024 Yes No No -0,009 No No No -0,048 No No No -0,048 No Yes Yes 0,135 Yes Yes Yes
Drug age squared -0,0002 Yes No No -0,0002 Yes No Yes -0,001 Yes Yes Yes
0,168 Yes No No -0,456 No No No 0,153 Yes No Yes 0,280 Yes No No
0,523 Yes No Yes
0,027 No No No
0,063 No No No
Loss of exclusivity -0,388 Yes No No -0,166 Yes Yes Yes
0,097  --- No No 0,362  --- No Yes 0,027  --- No No -0,520  --- No No
0,175  --- No No -1,032  --- No No -1,157  --- No No
0,047  --- No No 0,098  --- No No 0,057  --- No No 0,090  --- No No
-0,071  --- No No 0,110  --- No No 0,091  --- No No 0,315  --- No No
0,001  --- No No 0,028  --- No No -0,029  --- No No 0,119  --- No No
0,090  --- No No -0,023  --- No No -0,032  --- No No 0,280  --- No No
Quarter 2 0,095  --- Yes Yes 0,189  --- Yes Yes 0,252  --- No No 0,082  --- No No 0,025  --- No No
Quarter 3 0,162  --- Yes Yes 0,259  --- Yes Yes 0,117  --- No No 0,138  --- No No 0,027  --- No No
Quarter 4 0,236  --- Yes Yes 0,428  --- Yes Yes 0,408  --- No No 0,266  --- Yes Yes 0,166  --- No No
Year 2013 0,246  --- No Yes 0,506  --- Yes Yes 0,898  --- No No 0,152  --- No No
Year 2014 0,595  --- Yes Yes 1,099  --- Yes Yes 1,786  --- No Yes 0,433  --- No No 0,136  --- No No




Ipad / Tablet (% of times used in calls)
Laptop based materials (% of times used in calls)
Printed material (% of times used in calls)
Very useful (% of calls)
Increase / Will begin to prescribe (% of calls)
Ln Avg number of products presented during the calls
Removed due to multicollinearity Removed due to multicollinearity
ANOVA Sig. 0,000 0,000 0,021 0,000 0,000
Adjusted R2 0,873 0,757 0,877 0,984 0,988
Removed due to multicollinearity
Policy change N/A N/A N/A
Temporal dummies
N/A (product launched in 2013)
Missing information
Removed due to multicollinearity
Removed due to multicollinearity
Ln Average drug price per DDD x Drug age Removed due to multicollinearity Removed due to multicollinearity Removed due to multicollinearity Removed due to multicollinearity
Removed due to multicollinearity
Drug age




Ln Average drug price per DDD x Ln Detailing flow Removed due to multicollinearity
Ln Average drug price per DDD x Ln Detailing stock Removed due to multicollinearity Removed due to multicollinearity
Ln Global marketing expenditures stock x Ln 
Average competitors price per DDD
No investments in time series No investments in time series








Ln Sales in DDDs lagged one period





























28,565  --- Yes Yes 17,810  --- Yes Yes 14,178  --- No No 6,373  --- No No 7,793  --- No No
-0,499 No Yes Yes -0,507 No Yes Yes -0,547 No Yes Yes -0,409 No No Yes -0,089 No No No
0,074 Yes No No 0,005 Yes No No -0,138 No No No 0,113 Yes No No 0,278 Yes No No
Ln Detailing flow -0,018 No No No -0,001 No No No 0,832 Yes No No 0,062 Yes No No -0,218 No No No
Ln Journal advertising flow 0,001 Yes No No 0,001 Yes No No 0,008 Yes Yes Yes -0,002 No No No 0,002 Yes No No
Ln Direct marketing flow -0,005 No No No -0,004 No No No 0,006 Yes No No -0,0001 No No No -0,010 No Yes Yes
Competitive
Ln Competitive marketing 
expenditures flow
0,075 No No No -0,016 Yes No No 0,038 No No No -0,076 Yes No No 0,071 No No No
Ln Detailing stock -0,133 No No No 0,049 Yes No No 0,407 Yes No No 0,062 Yes No No 0,142 Yes No No
Ln Other marketing expenditures 
stock
0,037 Yes No No -0,014 No No No 0,066 Yes Yes Yes 0,023 Yes No No -0,001 No No No
Competitive
Ln Competitive global marketing 
expenditures stock
-0,185 Yes No No 0,161 No No No -0,147 Yes No No 0,111 No No No 0,151 No No No
Own Ln Average drug price per DDD -0,320 Yes No No 1,890 No No No -13,774 Yes No No -13,448 Yes No No -5,500 Yes No No
Competitors
Ln Average competitors drug price 
per DDD
1,777 Yes No No 0,486 Yes No No -0,204 No No No 2,900 Yes No No 0,906 Yes Yes Yes
Drug age -0,058 No No No -0,015 No No No 0,050 Yes No No 0,006 Yes No No 0,010 Yes No No
Drug age squared 0,0001 No No No -0,0001 Yes No No -0,0003 Yes Yes Yes -0,0002 Yes No No -0,0004 Yes No No
1,578 Yes No No 0,460 Yes 0,551
0,355 Yes No No
-0,213 Yes No No
0,003  --- No No 0,276  --- No No 0,134  --- No No 0,065  --- No No 0,016  --- No No
0,882  --- No No 0,127  --- No No 0,064  --- No No -0,402  --- No No -0,389  --- No No
-0,068  --- No No 0,084  --- No No -0,175  --- Yes Yes 0,124  --- No No 0,154  --- No No
0,088  --- No No 0,010  --- No No -0,177  --- No Yes -0,208  --- No No -0,271  --- No No
0,184  --- No No -0,054  --- No No 0,216  --- Yes Yes -0,011  --- No No 0,135  --- No No
0,053  --- No No -0,072  --- No No 0,176  --- Yes Yes 0,172  --- No No -0,127  --- No No
Quarter 2 0,111  --- No No 0,142  --- Yes Yes 0,047  --- No No 0,125  --- Yes Yes 0,189  --- Yes Yes
Quarter 3 0,250  --- No Yes 0,240  --- Yes Yes 0,173  --- Yes Yes 0,169  --- Yes Yes 0,268  --- Yes Yes
Quarter 4 0,298  --- No No 0,380  --- Yes Yes 0,207  --- Yes Yes 0,290  --- Yes Yes 0,425  --- Yes Yes
Year 2013 0,233  --- No No 0,528  --- Yes Yes 0,207  --- No No 0,385  --- Yes Yes 0,533  --- Yes Yes
Year 2014 0,703  --- No No 0,983  --- Yes Yes 0,545  --- Yes Yes 0,700  --- Yes Yes 1,033  --- Yes Yes
Year 2015 1,105  --- No No 1,443  --- Yes Yes 0,887  --- Yes Yes 1,123  --- Yes Yes 1,499  --- Yes Yes
Removed due to multicollinearity
Removed due to multicollinearity
Additional 
variables
Ipad / Tablet (% of times used in calls)
Laptop based materials (% of times used in calls)
Printed material (% of times used in calls)
Very useful (% of calls)
Increase / Will begin to prescribe (% of calls)
ANOVA Sig. 0,253 0,001 0,001 0,000 0,000
Adjusted R2 0,148 0,483 0,667 0,941 0,779
Ln Global marketing expenditures stock x Ln 
Average competitors price per DDD
Removed due to multicollinearity Removed due to multicollinearity Removed due to multicollinearity Removed due to multicollinearity
Temporal dummies
Ln Avg number of products presented during the calls
Removed due to multicollinearity Removed due to multicollinearity Removed due to multicollinearity Removed due to multicollinearity










Ln Average drug price per DDD x Ln Detailing flow Removed due to multicollinearity Removed due to multicollinearity
Ln Average drug price per DDD x Ln Detailing stock
Constant
Lagged sales
Ln Sales in DDDs lagged one period












Based on the four tables shown above, we prepared a summary of results for a better interpretation (table 10.72). 






























































Ln Sales in DDDs lagged one period 66,7% 0,0% 0,062 0,297 0,0% 0,0% -0,478 N/A 20,0% 0,0% -0,411 0,030 0,0% 0,0% -0,410 N/A 16,7% 0,0% -0,351 0,163
Ln Sales in DDDs lagged two periods 50,0% 50,0% 0,217 0,440 20,0% 0,0% -0,043 0,105 80,0% 0,0% 0,190 0,312 80,0% 0,0% 0,066 0,117 58,8% 5,9% 0,088 0,215
Ln Detailing flow 100,0% 0,0% 0,118 0,118 60,0% 0,0% 0,166 0,334 80,0% 0,0% 0,005 0,186 40,0% 0,0% 0,131 0,447 66,7% 0,0% 0,103 0,249
Ln Journal advertising flow 100,0% 0,0% 0,007 0,007 60,0% 20,0% 0,000 0,004 66,7% 33,3% 0,003 0,006 80,0% 20,0% 0,002 0,003 75,0% 18,8% 0,002 0,005
Ln Direct marketing flow 33,3% 0,0% -0,001 0,008 60,0% 0,0% 0,002 0,006 25,0% 0,0% -0,004 0,003 20,0% 0,0% -0,003 0,006 35,3% 0,0% -0,001 0,006
Ln Competitive marketing expenditures flow 33,3% 0,0% -0,020 -0,158 20,0% 0,0% -0,001 -0,124 100,0% 0,0% -0,056 -0,056 40,0% 0,0% 0,019 -0,046 50,0% 0,0% -0,014 -0,073
Ln Detailing stock 100,0% 0,0% 0,275 0,275 80,0% 0,0% 0,342 0,478 60,0% 0,0% 0,123 0,317 80,0% 0,0% 0,106 0,165 77,8% 0,0% 0,204 0,311
Ln Other marketing expenditures stock 33,3% 0,0% 0,033 0,249 60,0% 0,0% 0,004 0,029 80,0% 20,0% 0,018 0,026 60,0% 20,0% 0,022 0,042 61,1% 11,1% 0,018 0,051
Ln Competitive global marketing expenditures stock 50,0% 0,0% 0,028 -0,022 40,0% 0,0% 0,238 -0,098 40,0% 20,0% 0,052 -0,222 40,0% 0,0% 0,018 -0,166 41,2% 5,9% 0,094 -0,142
Ln Average drug price per DDD 33,3% 0,0% 0,639 -0,743 75,0% 0,0% -4,941 -8,621 60,0% 0,0% 0,721 -1,727 80,0% 0,0% -6,230 -8,260 64,7% 0,0% -2,670 -5,893
Ln Average competitors drug price per DDD 0,0% 0,0% -0,84 N/A 40,0% 0,0% -36,05 3,260 20,0% 0,0% -2,864 0,152 80,0% 20,0% 1,173 1,517 41,2% 5,9% -11,20 1,820
Drug age 66,7% 0,0% 0,051 0,087 40,0% 0,0% 0,012 0,087 40,0% 20,0% 0,011 0,080 60,0% 0,0% -0,001 0,022 50,0% 5,6% 0,015 0,064
Drug age squared N/A N/A N/A N/A 100,0% 20,0% -0,0002 -0,0002 100,0% 33,3% -0,0005 -0,0005 80,0% 20,0% -0,0002 -0,0003 92,3% 23,1% -0,0003 -0,0003
Ln Average drug price per DDD x Ln Detailing flow 0,0% 0,0% -0,126 N/A 25,0% 0,0% -0,281 0,495 75,0% 0,0% 0,036 0,200 100,0% 0,0% 1,019 1,019 50,0% 0,0% 0,067 0,522
Ln Average drug price per DDD x Ln Detailing stock N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 100,0% 0,0% 0,523 0,523 100,0% 0,0% 0,355 0,355 100,0% 0,0% 0,439 0,439
Ln Average drug price per DDD x Drug age 100,0% 0,0% -0,014 -0,014 0,0% 0,0% 0,228 N/A 0,0% 0,0% 0,027 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 33,3% 0,0% 0,080 -0,014
Ln Global marketing expenditures stock x Ln 
Average competitors price per DDD
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0,0% 0,0% 0,063 N/A 100,0% 0,0% -0,213 -0,213 50,0% 0,0% -0,075 -0,213
Public reimbursement 66,7% 33,3% 1,537 2,409  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  --- 66,7% 33,3% 1,537 2,409
Loss of exclusivity  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  --- 100,0% 50,0% -0,277 -0,277  ---  ---  ---  --- 100,0% 50,0% -0,277 -0,277
Ipad / Tablet (% of times used in calls)  ---  --- 0,156  ---  ---  --- 0,046  ---  ---  --- -0,009  ---  ---  --- 0,099  ---  ---  --- 0,068  ---
Laptop based materials (% of times used in calls)  ---  --- -0,741  ---  ---  --- 0,218  ---  ---  --- -0,671  ---  ---  --- 0,056  ---  ---  --- -0,179  ---
Printed material (% of times used in calls)  ---  --- 0,050  ---  ---  --- 0,016  ---  ---  --- 0,073  ---  ---  --- 0,024  ---  ---  --- 0,038  ---
Very useful (% of calls)  ---  --- -0,182  ---  ---  --- 0,035  ---  ---  --- 0,111  ---  ---  --- -0,112  ---  ---  --- -0,028  ---
Increase / Will begin to prescribe (% of calls)  ---  --- 0,041  ---  ---  --- -0,099  ---  ---  --- 0,030  ---  ---  --- 0,094  ---  ---  --- 0,013  ---




















Market 1 - Blood
(3 products)
Market 2 - Pancreas
(5 products)





10.5.5. Comparative analysis of Models 5 to 7 
In order to compare the additional models (5 to 7) fit we calculated AIC and BIC. 
The next tables (10.73, 10.74 and 10.75) evidence the AICs and BICs for all the products, for each of the three additional models (5 to 7). 
Table 10.73 – AICs and BICs for model 5 
 




BL1 BL2 BL3 PA1 PA2 PA3 PA4 PA5 HE1 HE2 HE3 HE4 HE5 LI1 LI2 LI3 LI4 LI5
n 48 48 18 48 48 48 33 48 48 48 48 35 48 48 48 48 48 48
SSR 0,17 0,08 0,00 0,05 0,04 0,04 0,34 0,06 0,04 0,04 0,12 0,10 0,05 0,16 0,07 0,06 0,07 0,09
k 22 23 17 22 21 21 19 21 21 22 22 21 21 20 21 22 21 21
AIC -227,7 -263,0 -161,7 -290,0 -303,1 -298,3 -113,4 -276,8 -299,3 -300,8 -242,3 -163,6 -285,1 -232,8 -273,5 -273,4 -271,3 -258,3 All products
AIC mean -251,9
AIC SD 54,3
BIC -186,5 -220,0 -146,6 -248,8 -263,8 -259,0 -84,9 -237,5 -260,0 -259,6 -201,1 -131,0 -245,8 -195,4 -234,2 -232,2 -232,0 -219,0 All products
BIC mean -214,3
BIC SD 49,7
BIC -184,4 -218,8 -219,5 -222,6
36,7 75,5 55,0 16,4
AIC -217,5 -256,3 -258,2 -261,9
51,4 80,5 57,9 17,4
Model 5




Table 10.74 – AICs and BICs for model 6 
 
Table 10.75 – AICs and BICs for model 7 
 
BL1 BL2 BL3 PA1 PA2 PA3 PA4 PA5 HE1 HE2 HE3 HE4 HE5 LI1 LI2 LI3 LI4 LI5
n 48 48 18 48 48 48 33 48 48 48 48 35 48 48 48 48 48 48
SSR 0,17 0,10 0,00 0,06 0,05 0,04 0,30 0,07 0,04 0,05 0,06 0,11 0,03 0,15 0,06 0,08 0,05 0,09
k 24 24 18 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 18 22 23 23 23 23 23
AIC -223,7 -246,5 -601,0 -275,2 -285,4 -295,6 -108,6 -268,8 -292,7 -279,6 -277,0 -164,6 -303,8 -229,3 -273,1 -264,0 -281,3 -253,6 All products
AIC mean -273,5
AIC SD 95,2
BIC -178,8 -201,6 -585,0 -232,1 -242,4 -252,6 -74,2 -225,7 -249,6 -236,5 -234,0 -136,6 -262,6 -186,3 -230,1 -221,0 -238,3 -210,5 All products
BIC mean -233,2
BIC SD 99,1
BIC -321,8 -205,4 -223,9 -217,2
228,2 74,1 50,1 20,2
AIC -357,1 -246,7 -263,5 -260,3
211,6 77,9 56,4 20,2
Model 6
Market 1 - Blood Market 2 - Pancreas Market 3 - Heart Market 4 - Liver
BL1 BL2 BL3 PA1 PA2 PA3 PA4 PA5 HE1 HE2 HE3 HE4 HE5 LI1 LI2 LI3 LI4 LI5
n 48 48 18 48 48 48 33 48 48 48 48 35 48 48 48 48 48 48
SSR 0,14 0,10 0,00 0,04 0,03 0,03 0,23 0,06 0,04 0,03 0,03 0,10 0,03 0,14 0,06 0,03 0,06 0,07
k 28 27 17 28 27 27 24 27 26 27 25 21 27 26 26 28 27 27
AIC -225,7 -244,8 N/A -287,6 -293,9 -298,2 -116,0 -264,3 -293,5 -308,2 -312,1 -163,6 -303,6 -226,8 -268,3 -291,2 -270,8 -261,2 All products
AIC mean -260,6
AIC SD 53,1
BIC -173,3 -194,2 N/A -235,2 -243,4 -247,6 -80,1 -213,8 -244,8 -257,7 -265,3 -131,0 -253,1 -178,2 -219,6 -238,8 -220,3 -210,6 All products
BIC mean -212,2
BIC SD 48,9
BIC -183,8 -204,0 -230,4 -213,5
14,8 70,5 56,1 22,2
AIC -235,2 -252,0 -276,2 -263,6
13,5 77,2 63,3 23,4
Model 7




Table 10.76 below summarizes the average AICs and BICs per market. 
Table 10.76 – Summary of average AICs and BICs per market and model (1 to 7) 
 
Source: own elaboration 
Figure 10.131 below presents the same information in a chart format. 
 
Figure 10.131 – Average AIC and average BIC per Market and Model (1 to 7) 
Market 1 - 
Blood
Market 2 - 
Pancreas
Market 3 - 
Heart




Model 1 (Wittink 2002 simplified) -183,0 -238,0 -220,8 -252,7 -228,1
Model 2 (Wittink 2002 complete) -189,1 -235,9 -222,2 -251,9 -228,7
Model 3 (Rizzo 1999) -173,8 -240,4 -229,0 -248,4 -228,3
Model 4 (Winmeijer et al 2006) -187,9 -250,8 -251,8 -262,5 -243,8
Model 5 -217,5 -256,3 -258,2 -261,9 -251,9
Model 6 -357,1 -246,7 -263,5 -260,3 -273,5
Model 7 -235,2 -252,0 -276,2 -263,6 -260,6
Market 1 - 
Blood
Market 2 - 
Pancreas
Market 3 - 
Heart




Model 1 (Wittink 2002 simplified) -160,5 -212,9 -196,1 -226,8 -203,4
Model 2 (Wittink 2002 complete) -160,9 -204,1 -192,4 -219,3 -197,9
Model 3 (Rizzo 1999) -154,9 -220,0 -208,1 -227,8 -208,0
Model 4 (Winmeijer et al 2006) -160,3 -221,2 -220,0 -230,6 -213,3
Model 5 -184,4 -218,8 -219,5 -222,6 -214,3
Model 6 -321,8 -205,4 -223,9 -217,2 -233,2









Source: own elaboration 
Model 6 evidences the lower average AICs and BICs. In order to allow additional insights, we 
calculated the relative likelihood (Burnham & Anderson, 2003) of Models 5 and 7 against 
Model 6. 
Table 10.77 shows the AIC relative likelihood among markets, in Models 5 and 7 versus 
Model 6. 
Table 10.77 – AIC relative likelihood among markets – Models 5 and 7 versus Model 6 
 
Model 6 stands out as the one with the global higher fit. However, Model 7 has a better fit 
than Model 6 in three of the four markets. 
Table 10.78 below presents the AIC variation of Models 5 and 7 versus Model 6. 
Table 10.78 – Variation of AIC of Models 5 and 7 against Model 6 
 
Again, model 6 evidences the highest global fit, but loses to Model 7 in three out of four 
markets. 






Market 1 - 
Blood
Market 2 - 
Pancreas
Market 3 - Heart Market 4 - Liver All products
Model 5 0,0000 123,0044 0,0707 2,2247 0,0000
Model 7 0,0000 14,0270 571,8052 5,4255 0,0015
Times as probable as model 6 to minimize information loss
Market 1 - 
Blood
Market 2 - 
Pancreas
Market 3 - Heart Market 4 - Liver All products
Model 5 139,6 -9,6 5,3 -1,6 21,6
Model 7 121,8 -5,3 -12,7 -3,4 13,0




Table 10.79 – Variation of BIC of Models 5 and 7 against Model 6 
 
As a conclusion, there is sufficient evidence to consider Model 6 as globally the most suited 
for the type of data we used. However, there are two main important aspects to address, which 
will impact the final choice of the model to use: 
 Model 6 AIC is only better than Model 7 AIC due to the fact that the SSR in product 
BL3 in Model 7 equals zero (0,000). This way, the AIC calculation was not possible, 
provoking an “artificial” increase (in the positive direction) on the AIC average for 
market 1 – Blood. Should SSR be marginally higher than zero and Model 7 would be 
the one with the lowest AIC 
 
 Our thesis is directed at studying the effect, on detailing elasticities, of the entry into 
force of a detailing ceiling. This means that Model 6 must not be the one selected, as it 
does not include the variable Ln Detailing flow (it only includes Ln Global marketing 
expenditures flow) 
 









Market 1 - 
Blood
Market 2 - 
Pancreas
Market 3 - Heart Market 4 - Liver All products
Model 5 137,4 -13,4 4,4 -5,3 18,9
Model 7 138,0 1,4 -6,5 3,7 21,0




Before moving to the analysis of structural breaks in our data (with future model 8.4), we 
performed additional analysis with Model 7. In order to allow deeper insights and discussion 
of its results against the theory, and also having the goal of finding patterns for younger or 
older drugs, we performed a very simple analysis: instead of defining an arbitrary threshold 
above which a drug would be considered as older (in opposition to younger), we: 
 Calculated drug age for each of the 18 products (number of months that have passed 
since product started its commercialization in the market). The reference month was 
the last observation (December 2015), so if a drug was launched on January 2015 its 
age would be 12 months on December 2015; 
 
 Calculated the median of drug age, which resulted in a value of 84 
 
 Classified all products as Younger or Older, using the reference value of 84 




Table 10.80 – Classification of products as Younger or Older – Model 7 
 
Source: own elaboration 
Table 10.80 also evidences the average results of the variable coefficients. 
 
BL1 BL2 BL3 PA1 PA2 PA3 PA4 PA5 HE1 HE2 HE3 HE4 HE5 LI1 LI2 LI3 LI4 LI5
Older Younger Younger Older Older Younger Younger Younger Older Older Older Older Younger Older Older Older Younger Younger
Drug age at the end of the time series 84 81 47 84 88 75 47 75 102 87 197 193 47 141 128 139 54 61
Detailing flow elasticity 0,012 0,214 0,127 0,061 -0,125 -0,049 0,597 0,344 0,039 0,201 -0,719 0,202 0,302 -0,018 -0,001 0,832 0,062 -0,218
Journal advertising flow elasticity 0,007 0,005 0,008 -0,006 0,006 0,004 -0,006 0,003 -0,003 0,005  ---  --- 0,007 0,001 0,001 0,008 -0,002 0,002
Direct marketing (mailing) flow elasticity 0,008 -0,002 -0,009 -0,005 0,001 0,000 0,015 -0,002 -0,006 -0,010 -0,002  --- 0,003 -0,005 -0,004 0,006 0,000 -0,010
Detailing stock elasticity 0,334 0,139 0,353 0,037 -0,203 0,049 1,728 0,099 0,087 -0,117 -0,219 0,745 0,119 -0,133 0,049 0,407 0,062 0,142
Average drug price per DDD x Ln Detailing flow elasticity -0,008 -0,244  --- -0,332 0,495 -0,301  --- -0,986  --- 0,168 -0,456 0,153 0,280  ---  --- 1,578  --- 0,460
Ipad / Tablet (% of times used in calls) -0,031 0,345 0,153 0,285 0,043 -0,394 0,295 0,004 0,097 0,362 0,027  --- -0,520 0,003 0,276 0,134 0,065 0,016
Laptop based materials (% of times used in calls) 0,727 -1,548 -1,403 0,040 -0,002 -0,130 0,998 0,182 0,175 -1,032  ---  --- -1,157 0,882 0,127 0,064 -0,402 -0,389
Printed material (% of times used in calls) 0,289 0,205 -0,345 0,002 0,064 0,044 -0,021 -0,011 0,047 0,098 0,057  --- 0,090 -0,068 0,084 -0,175 0,124 0,154
Very useful (% of calls) -0,091 -0,147 -0,308 -0,196 -0,140 0,147 0,338 0,027 -0,071 0,110 0,091  --- 0,315 0,088 0,010 -0,177 -0,208 -0,271
Increase / Will begin to prescribe (% of calls) -0,031 0,036 0,117 0,156 0,050 -0,055 -0,636 -0,012 0,001 0,028 -0,029  --- 0,119 0,184 -0,054 0,216 -0,011 0,135





We then calculated the averages of some of these variables, here shown below in table 10.81, 
in columns 3 and 4. 
Table 10.81 – Average coefficient results for drugs – Model 7 
 
Source: own elaboration 
Some very interesting patterns started to appear. But in order to allow even higher evidence, 
we performed the exact same analysis using quartile 1 (percentiles ≤ 25%, cut point at 64,5 
months) and quartile 3 (percentile ≥ 75%, cut point at 121,5 months) as references. The 
results are shown above, in columns 4 and 5 of table 10.81. 
 
10.6. Additional models 
After applying seven models to our data, we chose, as addressed before, Model 7 as globally 
the most appropriate. As discussed previously, Model 7 does evidence most of the 
coefficients as non-significant, such as seen in Windmeijer et al (2006) and Leeflang & 
Wieringa (2010). In order to try to find additional patterns in our data, we decided to test 
other models: 
 Model 8.1 – consists of the full Model 7, but this time manually removing, step by 
step, all the non-significant variables (removing the ones with the highest p-values 
first) 
Younger Older Much Younger Much Older
(n=8) (n=10) (n=5) (n=5)
Detailing flow elasticity 0,172 0,048 0,174 0,059
Journal advertising flow elasticity 0,003 0,002 0,002 0,003
Direct marketing (mailing) flow elasticity 0,000 -0,002 0,000 -0,002
Detailing stock elasticity 0,336 0,099 0,481 0,170
Average drug price per DDD x Ln Detailing flow elasticity -0,158 0,228 0,370 0,425
Ipad / Tablet (% of times used in calls) -0,005 0,133 0,002 0,110
Laptop based materials (% of times used in calls) -0,481 0,123 -0,471 0,358
Printed material (% of times used in calls) 0,030 0,044 0,001 -0,025
Very useful (% of calls) -0,013 -0,042 -0,027 0,003
Increase / Will begin to prescribe (% of calls) -0,038 0,058 -0,055 0,079
Avg number of products presented during the calls -0,047 -0,022 -0,012 0,032




 Model 8.2 – consists of the full Model 7, but with stepwise regression, leaving SPSS 
to select the significant variables 
 Model 8.3 - A first attempt to build a final model, with a limited number of selected 
independent variables 
Our goal was to see which significant variables would remain, and which patterns would 
appear, to help us generalize. 
 
10.6.1. Model 8.1 - Model 7 with manual non-significant variables removal 
10.6.1.1. Procedures and outputs 
We started by selecting pairs of products, chosing product BL3 from Market 1 (younger 
product, launched in the market in July 2014, and product HE3, an older product (launched in 
the early years of the 21
st
 century). In each iteration, in SPSS, we used a second block with all 













If the variable removed in each iteration generates a R
2
 change higher than 0,05, therefore we 
do not reject the hypothesis that the R
2
 are considered equal. 
We present an example of the first two iterations, for product HE3, using exactly the same 
initial variables as in Model 7 (also excluding the variables that were provoking 





Figure 10.132 – Outputs of product HE3 in Model 8.1 – first iteration 
The variable Ln Mailing flow has the highest sig (last column of the table above, 0,944, in 





Figure 10.133 – R
2
 change in the first iteration of product HE3 in Model 8.1 
With an R
2 
change of 0,944, we do not reject the hypothesis that the two R
2 
are equal, and 
therefore we continued our analysis, removing variable after variable, with the following 
sequence: 
 Increase / Will begin to prescribe (% of calls) 
 Ipad / Tablet (% of times used in calls) 
 Ln Avg number of products presented during the calls 
 Ln Competitive global marketing expenditures flow 
 Printed material (% of times used in calls) 
 Very useful (% of calls) 
 Ln Competitive global marketing expenditures stock 
 Ln Detailing stock (calls) 
 Ln Sales in DDDs lagged one period 
 Ln Drug price x Ln Detailing flow 
 Ln Detailing flow (calls) 
 Ln Average drug price per DDD 
 Ln Average competitors price per DDD 
 Ln Other marketing expenditures stock 







 Figure 10.134– Significant variables for product HE3 in Model 8.1 
Interestingly, with the exception of the lagged variable (two periods) and Drug age (which has 
a negative coefficient, given that product HE3 has been declining its sales, very slowly 
though), all the significant variables are dummy (temporal dummies mostly, and loss of 
exclusivity). 
We then moved to product BL3. After many iterations, we reached the final model, shown 





Figure 10.135 – Significant variables for product BL3 in Model 8.1 
Only four variables were significant. In this case, given that product BL3 is very recent and is 
experiencing the initial stage of the product life cycle, Drug age coefficient expectedly has a 
positive signal. This product was clearly benefited by the public reimbursement. 
In order to search for patterns, we extended our analysis to another pair of products: BL1 (at 
the end of the faster initial sales growth) and PA4 (substantially more recent), whose outputs 
are shown below in figure 10.136. 
 







Contrarily to the first pair of products, product BL1 has mainly non-dummy significant 
variables. The most intriguing one is Ln Average competitors’ price per DDD, which has a 
negative signal, contrarily to what would be expected. 
 
The significant variables in the case of product PA4 were the following (figure 10.137): 
 
Figure 10.137 – Significant variables for product PA4 in Model 8.1 
 
Detailing flow was not significant by a small value. The significant variables include two 
temporal dummies, drug age, average competitors price (whose coefficient is justified by the 
fast that prices in this market almost had no change at all, during the 48 months of our time 
series), and detailing stock. 
In these two pairs of products we were not able, yet, to gain additional insights to help us 










Figure 10.138 – Significant variables for product BL2 in Model 8.1 
 
In the case of product BL2, 13 independent variables (approaximately half of the total) were 
significant, including the six dummy temporal variables. A very interesting conclusion in this 
product is that the use of printed materials and tablets during the calls appears to positively 










Moving to product PA1, the significant independent variables were the following (figure 
10.139): 
 
Figure 10.139 – Significant variables for product PA1 in Model 8.1 
Nine independent variables coefficients were significant, including five dummy temporal 
variables. 





Figure 10.140 – Significant variables for product PA2 in Model 8.1 
Twelve independent variables coefficients were significant, including five dummy temporal 
variables. Product PA2 is extremely sensitive to both changes in its own price, and changes in 
average competitors’ price. Journal advertising has a marginal effect on drug sales (for each 
1% change in journal advertising, drug sales in DDDs increase 0,005%. 





Figure 10.141 – Significant variables for product PA3 in Model 8.1 
Eleven independent variables coefficients were significant, including six dummy temporal 
variables. Product PA3 non-dummy variable coefficients the opposite signal as would be 
expected. 





Figure 10.142 – Significant variables for product PA5 in Model 8.1 
Product PA5 has eight independent variables with significant coefficients, including four 
temporal dummy variables. Detailing flow appears with an elasticity of 0,174. 
Moving to product HE1, the variables with significant coefficients were (figure 10.143): 
 




Product HE1 has ten independent variables with significant coefficients, including six 
temporal dummy variables. Detailing stock appears with an elasticity of 0,1. It is very 
interesting to see the negative effect of competitive global marketing expenditures on drug 
sales of product HE1. 
10.6.1.2. Results 
It was now time to conclude whether the ten products analyzed so far evidence some type of 
pattern in terms of significant independent variables. Table 10.82 below summarizes the 
significant variables (p-values < 0,05) and correspondent coefficients. 
Table 10.82 – Summary of ten products significant variables using Model 8.1 
 
Source: own elaboration 
Older Younger Younger Older Older Younger Younger Younger Older Older
BL1 BL2 BL3 PA1 PA2 PA3 PA4 PA5 HE1 HE3
Constant 6,775 6,057 -3,778 32,040 28,880 17,612 47,558 11,664 24,935 12,144
Ln Sales in DDDs lagged one period 0,373  ---  --- -0,582 -0,506 -0,512  --- -0,410 -0,699  ---
Ln Sales in DDDs lagged two periods  --- 0,485  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  --- 0,717
Ln Detailing flow (calls)  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  --- 0,174  ---  ---
Ln Journal advertising flow  ---  ---  ---  --- 0,005  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---
Ln Competitive global marketing expenditures flow  --- 0,094  ---  ---  --- 0,149  ---  --- -0,054  ---
Ln Detailing stock  ---  ---  ---  --- -0,262  --- 0,827  --- 0,100  ---
Ln Other marketing expenditures stock  ---  --- 0,413  --- 0,056  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---
Ln Competitive global marketing expenditures stock  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  --- 0,443  ---  ---
Ln Average drug price per DDD  ---  ---  ---  --- -21,953 6,123  ---  ---  ---  ---
Ln Average competitors price per DDD -1,659  ---  --- -28,340 4,493  --- -229,16  ---  ---  ---
Drug age 0,031 -0,031 0,154 -0,084  ---  --- 0,092  ---  --- -0,052
Drug age 2̂  ---  ---  ---  --- 0,000 0,000  ---  --- 0,000  ---
Ln Drug price x Ln Detailing flow  ---  ---  ---  ---  --- -0,432  --- -0,432  ---  ---
Ln Drug price x drug age  ---  ---  --- 0,208  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---
Public reimbursement 0,501 -0,107 4,762  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---
Loss of exclusivity (dummy)  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  --- -0,221
Ipad / Tablet (% of times used in calls)  --- 0,624  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---
Laptop based materials (% of times used in calls)  --- -1,241  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---
Printed material (% of times used in calls) 0,213 0,276  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---
Quarter 2 (dummy)  --- 0,114  --- 0,135 0,090 0,161  ---  --- 0,146 0,238
Quarter 3 (dummy)  --- 0,256  --- 0,241 0,242 0,264 0,175 0,048 0,229 0,301
Quarter 4 (dummy) 0,071 0,475  --- 0,364 0,357 0,370 0,176 0,068 0,355 0,538
Year 2013 (dummy)  --- 0,646  --- 0,325 0,308 0,426  --- 0,049 0,425 0,630
Year 2014 (dummy)  --- 1,252  ---  ---  --- 0,938  ---  --- .667 1,311




Analyzing the table above, we realize that – excluding the dummy variables and drug age - no 
apparent pattern is evident, neither considering the 10 products, nor considering subgroups 
such as younger versus older products. Due to this finding, we decided to stop at this point, 
leaving products HE2, HE4, HE5, LI1, LI2, LI2, LI3, LI4 and LI5 without analysis.  
 
10.6.2. Model 8.2 - Model 7 with stepwise regression 
10.6.2.1. Procedures and outputs 
As methodological and intellectual curiosity, we then decided to test full Model 7 with a 
stepwise regression, to see to which extent our manual removal of non-significant variables 
was close to an automatic variable removal by SPSS. We fully applied Model 7, excluding the 
already omitted variables (the ones previously removed due to multicollinearity). 
We analyzed the 18 products, starting with product BL1 (figures 10.144 and 10.145). 
 





Figure 10.145 – Coefficients – Product BL1 in Model 8.2 





We then computed the other stepwise regressions, and built table 10.83 as a summary. 
Table 10.83 – Summary of significant variables using Model 8.2 (stepwise) 
 
Older Younger Younger Older Older Younger Younger Younger Older Older Older Older Younger Older Older Older Younger Younger
BL1 BL2 BL3 PA1 PA2 PA3 PA4 PA5 HE1 HE2 HE3 HE4 HE5 LI1 LI2 LI3 LI4 LI5
Constant 3,023 5,270 -5,457 13,981 18,683 14,352 1,949 12,706 18,481 18,599 16,853 0,234 5,132 21,749 24,406 11,063 -40,41 7,266
Ln Sales in DDDs lagged one period 0,555 0,297  ---  --- -0,279  ---  ---  --- -0,361 -0,331 -0,463  ---  --- -0,418 -0,498  ---  --- 0,372
Ln Sales in DDDs lagged two periods  --- 0,389  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  --- 0,362 0,983  ---  --- -0,338  --- 0,477  ---
Ln Detailing flow (calls)  ---  --- 0,093  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---
Ln Journal advertising flow  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  --- 0,005  ---  ---  ---  ---  --- 0,007  ---  ---
Ln Mailing flow  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  --- -0,009
Ln Competitive global marketing expenditures flow 0,068  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  --- 0,158  ---  ---
Ln Detailing stock  ---  --- 0,598  ---  ---  --- 0,889  --- 0,071  ---  ---  --- 0,195  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---
Ln Other marketing expenditures stock  ---  --- 0,189  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---
Ln Average drug price per DDD -0,373 -1,108  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  --- -72,32  ---
Ln Average competitors price per DDD  ---  ---  ---  --- -1,889 -2,507  ---  ---  --- -0,346  ---  --- -3,726  --- 0,199  ---  ---  ---
Drug age 0,028  --- 0,128 0,004  ---  --- 0,089  --- 0,012 0,005  ---  --- 0,095  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---
Drug age 2̂  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  --- 0,0000  ---  ---  ---  --- -0,001  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---
Ln Drug price x Ln Detailing flow  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  --- 0,144  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---
Ln Drug price x Ln Detailing stock  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  --- -0,237  ---  ---
Public reimbursement 0,248  --- 4,666  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---
Loss of exclusivity (dummy)  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  --- -0,278  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---
Ipad / Tablet (% of times used in calls)  ---  --- 0,482  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  --- -0,352  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---
Printed material (% of times used in calls)  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  --- 0,116  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  --- 0,298
Very useful (% of calls)  ---  --- -0,572  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  --- 0,324  ---  ---  --- -0,363  ---
Increase / Will begin to prescribe (% of calls)  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  --- 0,153  ---  ---
Ln Avg number of products presented during the calls  ---  --- 0,651  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  --- 0,479  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---
Quarter 3 (dummy)  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  --- 0,046 -0,052  ---
Quarter 4 (dummy)  ---  ---  ---  --- 0,046 0,040  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  --- 0,128  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---
Year 2013 (dummy)  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  --- -0,132  ---  ---  ---  ---
Year 2014 (dummy)  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  --- 0,219  ---  ---  ---  ---  --- 0,089 -0,057  ---  ---  ---  ---
Year 2015 (dummy)  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  --- -0,576  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---




Tabel 10.83 demonstrates the strong heterogeneity among products, in terms of their variables 
with significant coefficients. Again, and such as seen using Model 8.1, we did not find 
evident patterns, which confirms our dissatisfaction. 
10.6.3. Model 8.3 – First attempt to build a final model 
10.6.3.1. Procedures and outputs 
Consequently, we decided to choose a theoretically robust regression model, resulting from 
the theory on pharmaceutical marketing. We started with model 8.1, keeping however, in each 
non-significant variable removal, a fixed group of variables, which have vastly been 
demonstrated to impact prescription behavior (measured as drug sales): 
 Detailing flow 
 Journal advertising flow 
 Mailing (direct marketing) flow 
 Detailing stock 
 Average drug price per DDD 
 Drug age 
 Drug price x Detailing flow 
 Public reimbursement (when applicable) 
 Loss of exclusivity (when applicable) 
Therefore, these variables were kept in the regression outputs, even if they evidenced non-
significant coefficients. 
Below, we present the regression output for product BL1, with the fixed applicable variables 





Figure 10.146 – Chosen variables for product BL1 in Model 8.3 (final model) 
 
10.6.3.2. Results 
We then proceeded with the other 17 products. Table 10.84 below evidences the fixed 
variables, in addition to the variables with significant coefficients. The light blue shade 
highlights the coefficients with sig. < 0,05, whereas the dark blue shaded ones highlight the 
coefficients with sig. < 0,10. The fixed variables are highlithed with a darker blue shade (first 
column from the left – these are the variables that were not removed, even not having, in most 




Table 10.84 – Coefficients in Model 8.3 
 
Older Younger Younger Older Older Younger Younger Younger Older Older Older Older Younger Older Older Older Younger Younger
BL1 BL2 BL3 PA1 PA2 PA3 PA4 PA5 HE1 HE2 HE3 HE4 HE5 LI1 LI2 LI3 LI4 LI5
2,372 11,278 -9,522 31,324 31,539 18,349 24,980 11,202 23,426 24,877 27,742 22,085 4,086 25,067 23,805 11,721 -1,525 10,460
0,359 -0,551 -0,517 -0,603 -0,126 -0,608 -0,526 -0,533 -0,453 -0,536 -0,504 -0,427
-0,098 0,338
Ln Detailing flow 0,023 0,155 0,212 0,021 -0,429 0,160 0,443 0,154 0,024 -0,116 -0,010 0,137 0,120 0,004 0,011 0,927 0,036 -0,561
Ln Journal advertising flow 0,006 0,006 0,001 -0,001 0,005 0,005 -0,014 0,001 -0,004 0,006 0,002 0,001 -0,001 0,008 -0,006 0,002
Ln Direct marketing flow 0,010 0,001 0,009 -0,004 0,001 -0,002 -0,017 -0,004 -0,006 -0,006 0,025 0,001 -0,005 0,005 0,007 -0,002 -0,007
Competitive Ln Competitive marketing expenditures flow -0,062
Ln Detailing stock 0,251 0,033 1,250 0,027 -0,181 0,104 2,247 0,012 0,085 -0,093 0,048 1,252 0,192 -0,190 0,039 0,188 0,018 0,128
Ln Other marketing expenditures stock 0,054
Competitive Ln Competitive global marketing expenditures stock -0,568
Own Ln Average drug price per DDD 1,409 -0,719 0,887 -0,435 -31,20 9,380 4,436 1,595 0,795 -0,432 -2,739 -0,983 -0,805 -1,679 -12,62 -30,14 -7,527
Competitors Ln Average competitors drug price per DDD -1,550 -27,72 3,566 -191,8 -1,521 -3,683 0,219 0,408
0,063 0,027 0,101 -0,087 -0,001 0,015 0,168 0,004 0,015 -0,003 -0,033 -0,029 0,102 -0,016 -0,033 0,037 0,015 0,013
-0,0002 -0,0003 -0,0002 -0,0003 -0,001 -0,0003 -0,0003 -0,001











0,132 0,095 0,137 0,123 0,135 0,125 0,069 0,138 0,199
0,233 0,216 0,222 0,214 0,205 0,213 0,087 0,197 0,200 0,153 0,290
0,068 0,097 0,356 0,308 0,325 0,297 0,358 0,214 0,068 0,123 0,132 0,335 0,248 0,246 0,455
0,102 0,181 0,313 0,258 0,370 0,300 0,417 0,289 0,406 0,277 0,272 0,641
0,217 0,339 0,808 0,701 0,894 0,382 0,077 0,232 0,818 0,656 0,538 1,108
0,330 0,297 1,219 1,098 1,385 0,388 1,198 1,033 0,924 1,684
Adjusted R2 0,997 0,986 1,000 0,757 0,704 0,841 0,957 0,136 0,873 0,791 0,877 0,984 0,988 0,148 0,483 0,667 0,941 0,779















Ipad / Tablet (% of times used in calls)
Laptop based materials (% of times used in calls)
Printed material (% of times used in calls)
Very useful (% of calls)





Ln Drug price x Ln Detailing flow
Ln Drug price x Ln Detailing stock







Ln Sales in DDDs lagged one period












We then further summarized the outputs from Model 8.3, in table 10.85 below. 
















































Ln Detailing flow 0,130 100,0% 0,0% 0,070 80,0% 20,0% 0,031 60,0% 0,0% 0,084 80,0% 0,0% 0,073 77,8% 5,6%
Ln Journal advertising flow 0,004 100,0% 33,3% -0,001 60,0% 40,0% 0,001 40,0% 20,0% 0,001 60,0% 20,0% 0,001 61,1% 27,8%
Ln Direct marketing flow 0,007 100,0% 33,3% -0,005 20,0% 0,0% 0,004 40,0% 20,0% -0,001 40,0% 0,0% 0,000 44,4% 11,1%
Competitive
Ln Competitive marketing 
expenditures flow
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A -0,062 20,0% 20,0% N/A N/A N/A -0,062 5,6% 5,6%
Ln Detailing stock 0,511 100,0% 66,7% 0,442 80,0% 20,0% 0,297 80,0% 60,0% 0,037 80,0% 20,0% 0,301 83,3% 38,9%
Ln Other marketing 
expenditures stock
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0,054 20,0% 20,0% 0,054 5,6% 5,6%
Competitive
Ln Competitive global 
marketing expenditures stock
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A -0,568 20,0% 20,0% N/A N/A N/A -0,568 5,6% 5,6%
Own
Ln Average drug price per 
DDD
0,526 33,3% 0,0% -4,455 40,0% 20,0% -0,353 60,0% 20,0% -10,554 100,0% 0,0% -4,163 61,1% 11,1%
Competitors
Ln Average competitors drug 
price per DDD
-1,550 0,0% 0,0% -71,981 20,0% 20,0% -2,602 0,0% 0,0% 0,314 40,0% 20,0% -27,759 16,7% 11,1%
0,064 100,0% 100,0% 0,020 60,0% 40,0% 0,010 40,0% 0,0% 0,003 60,0% 0,0% 0,020 61,1% 27,8%
N/A N/A N/A -0,0003 40,0% 40,0% -0,0005 60,0% 60,0% -0,0004 60,0% 60,0% -0,0004 44,4% 44,4%
-0,063 0,0% 0,0% 0,075 20,0% 0,0% 0,026 60,0% 20,0% 1,352 40,0% 0,0% 0,248 33,3% 5,6%
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0,967 20,0% 20,0% N/A N/A N/A 0,967 5,6% 5,6%
-0,023 33,3% 33,3% 0,219 0,0% 0,0% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0,098 5,6% 5,6%
1,677 66,7% 66,7% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1,677 66,7% 66,7%






Ln Drug price x Ln Detailing flow
Ln Drug price x Ln Detailing stock




















10.6.3.3. Comparison of Model 8.3 against Model 7 
It was now time to compare Model 7 against Model 8.3 coefficients and overall metrics (table 
10.86). 
Table 10.86 – Comparison of the fixed variables in Models 7 and 8.3 
 
Source: own elaboration 
Despite the fact that Model 7 apparently produced a higher percentage of coefficients with 
signals as expected based on the theory, Model 8.3 has a substantially higher percentage of 
coefficients with both the correctal signal and sig. < 0,05. Also, Model 8.3 detailing 
coefficients (flow and stock) have also a substantially higher percentage of products with 
signal as suggested by the theory. Model 8.3 seems, therefore, our best model so far. 
However, model 8.3 includes temporal dummies which will not allow the correct application 
of the Chow (1960) test. The number of independent variables is dependent of the year 
dummies, where for the first 19 months of the time series (Period 1, before the entry into 
force of the detailing restriction policy) we would use the dummy Year 2013 only, and for the 
second 29 months (Period 2, after the entry into force of the detailing restriction policy) we 
Model 7 Model 8.3 Model 7 Model 8.3 Model 7 Model 8.3
Ln Detailing flow 0,103 0,073 66,7% 77,8% 0,0% 5,6%
Ln Journal advertising flow 0,002 0,001 75,0% 61,1% 18,8% 22,2%
Ln Direct marketing flow -0,001 0,0003 35,3% 44,4% 0,0% 11,1%
Ln Detailing stock 0,204 0,301 77,8% 83,3% 0,0% 33,3%
Ln Average drug price per DDD -2,670 -4,163 64,7% 61,1% 0,0% 11,1%
Drug age 0,015 0,020 50,0% 61,1% 5,6% 22,2%
Ln Drug price x Ln Detailing flow 0,067 0,248 50,0% 33,3% 0,0% 5,6%
Public reimbursement 1,537 1,677 66,7% 66,7% 33,3% 66,7%
Loss of exclusivity (dummy) -0,277 -0,221 100,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0%
65,1% 59,9% 12,0% 25,3%
% signal as expectedAverage elasticities





would use the dummies Year 2014 and Year 2015. To avoid this issue, we decided to run 
Model 8.3 again but without temporal dummies. We named this model as Model 8.4. 
10.6.4. Model 8.4 – Final model 
10.6.4.1. Procedures and outputs 
As our final model, we performed some analyses and controls to the full model (that is, the 
whole dataset of 48 observations), in order to guarantee the model is adequate. This consisted 
of: 
 Collinearity diagnostic – we analyzed the variable inflation factor (VIF) for each 
variable 
 
VIF = 1 / (1-R
2
j) is the R
2
 of the regression when we have the variable j as dependent 
and as independent all the other variables. If this R
2
 is high, then the VIF ratio will 
also be very high and will mean that the variable j will be highly correlated with the 




In relation to VIF, the rule of thumb is to accept VIF up to 10 (meaning that we can 
accept R
2
j up to values of 0,9). VIFs close to 3 are considered excellent. 
 
 Normality of residuals – it is important to guarantee that the residuals follow a 
normal distribution. At SPSS, we activated the options Save → Residuals → 
Unstandardized. We then explored this variable (Analyze → Descriptives → Explore, 
with the options Histogram and Normality plots with tests, and looking especially for 
the Shapiro-Wilk test. 
 
Given that normal distributions have a skewness and a Kurtosis (flatness measure) 
equal to zero, and as a rule of thumb, that: 
- If | Skewness | > 0,5 → we get a significant difference 
- If | Kurtosis | > 0,5 → we get a significant difference 
In other words, if in absolute value these results are not lower than 0,5, then there is 







The hypotheses are the following: 
H0: U ~ N 
Ha: U ~ N 
 
 Homocedasticity analysis – a homocedastic model is one whose variation of Y does 
not increase with the variation (increase) of X, that is, the variance of U given X is 
constant (this dispersion must be constant). We saved the unstandardized residuals and 
calculated their square 
 
The hypotheses are the following: 
 
H0: V (U | x1, x2, ..., xn) = σ
2
 
Ha: V (U | x1, x2, ..., xn) = σ
2
 (x1, x2, ..., xn) 
 
The appropriate test is Breush-Pagan, where Û
2
 = B0 + B1X1 + ... + BkXk + E 
In order to check the homocedasticity, we performed a regression with the squared 
unstandardized residuals as dependent variable and the other variables as independent. 
Whenever the sig. output in the ANOVA was lower than 0,05, we rejected the 
hypothesis of homocedasticity. 
 
 Reset test – we saved the unstandardized predicted values, squared them, and ran the 
regression again including them as an independent variable. In the cases where this 
variable is significant, the model appears not correctly specified. This can be called a 
“trick” to avoid including all squared coefficients, thus synthetizing all the coefficients 
of degree 2 into one variable. We also performed this for cubic coefficient. 
 
The hypotheses are the following: 
H0: βi = 0 





Such as performed with Model 8.3, we included all variables but left a selected group of 




We started with Market 1 – Blood. We had to drop the dummy variable Public reimbursement 
too, given that it occurred during Period 2 (after the entry into force of the detailing ceiling), 
and would not be applicable to apply to Period 1. We did this to keep the number of variables 
the same in the model using 48 observations and the models using 19 and 29 observations 
(Periods 1 and 2, respectively). We performed the same procedures such as in previous 




The next pages summarize the procedures observed regarding product BL1 (figures 10.147, 
10.148, 10.149, 10.150, 10.151 and 10.152). 
 




We kept the R
2
 change option activated. We can detect very high VIFs, which we find 
expectable given the use of a lagged variable and an interaction variable. We started by 
removing the interaction variable Ln Drug price x Ln Detailing flow, which provoked a 
substantial reduction in overall VIFs. 
 
Figure 10.148 – Regression outputs of product BL1 in Model 8.4 – iteration 2 
We then removed the lagged variable (Ln Sales in DDDs lagged one period), which allowed a 





Figure 10.149 – Regression outputs of product BL1 in Model 8.4 – iteration 3 
 
This decision had no significant impact on R
2
, as seen below. 
 
Figure 10.150 – R
2
 change of product BL1 in Model 8.4 (iteration 3) 
The next decision was to remove the variable Ln Average drug price per DDD, which had the 





Figure 10.151 – Regression outputs of product BL1 in Model 8.4 – iteration 4 




Figure 10.152 – R
2
 change of product BL1 in Model 8.4 (iteration 3) 
 
Therefore, we reintroduced this last removed variable again in the regression. We accept 
relatively high VIFs in the cases where the removal of certain variables provoke significant 
reductions in the R
2
. By other words, we accept having a lower precision of the parameter 




We then faced a difficult situation. By the one hand, there are sources of multicollinearity, 
evident in three of the variables, which would suggest us to remove at least Detailing stock 
(created having at its base the variable Detailing flow). By the other hand, if we remove these 
core variables from our model our ability to interpret the results in light of the theory would 
be substantially limited. Therefore, taking into account the pros and cons, we decided to keep 
those fixed variables in our model, assuming, in conscience, it is not the most correct or 
scientific one. This was the same assumption we observed regarding the other products 
analyzed. As a general rule, we tried to keep, in the regressions, the fixed set of variables 
discussed before, with the exception of the lagged sales terms and the interaction variable Ln 
Drug price x Ln Detailing flow. 
 
Normality of residuals 
We then moved to the analysis of the normality of the residuals, still regarding product BL1 
(figures 10.153, 10.154, 10.155 and 10.156). 
 





Figure 10.154 – Test of normality of residuals of product BL1 in Model 8.4 
  
 





Figure 10.156 – Histogram of unstandardized residuals of product BL1 in Model 8.4 
Both kurtosis and skweness are lower than 0,5 (in absolute terms), and we did not reject the 
hypothesis that the residuals follow a normal distribution, based on the outputs of the Shapiro-
Wilk test (sig. = 0,931), so we assume the normality of the residuals. 
Homocedasticity analysis 
We then moved to the analysis of homodedasticity (figure 10.157). Using the squared 
residuals as the dependent variable, we looked at the ANOVA output. 
 





Given that the sig. is higher than 0,05, we do not reject the null hypothesis, that is, the R
2
 of 
this regression is not significantly different from zero. 
Reset test 
Finally we performed the reset test. We started with a quadratic term (figure 10.158). 
 
Figure 10.158 – Quadratic RESET test for product BL1 in Model 8.4 





Figure 10.159 – Cubic RESET test for product BL1 in Model 8.4 
In both cases, the variables coefficients are non-significant, and therefore we can conclude the 
model is well specified in relation to eventual quadratic and cubed terms. 
We then replicated the analysis for the rests of the products. Some products were not analyzed 
due to an insufficient number of observations (or inexistence of observations at all) before the 
entry into force of the detailing ceiling: 
 Product BL3 - was launched 12 months after the entry into force of the detailing 
ceiling 
 Product PA4 - was launched four months before the entry into force of the detailing 
ceiling 







Also, in some of the products we were not able to use some independent variables, so that we 
could have the same number of variables in Period 1 and Period, a condition to apply the 
Chow (1960) test: 
 Products HE1 and HE4 - the variables Ln Journal advertising flow and Ln Direct 
marketing flow were not included due to the fact that in Period 1 there were no 
investments 
 
 Product HE3 – the variable Ln Journal advertising flow was not included due to the 
fact that in Period 1 there were no investments 
 
 Products LI2, LI3 and LI4 - the variable Ln Direct marketing flow was not included 




Table 10.87 below summarizes the coefficients obtained in all regressions, using the whole dataset for all products, using SPSS. An updated table 
with products LI4 and LI5 coefficients obtained with the statistical software Eviews will be shown later (heterocedasticity). 
Table 10.87 – Summary of coefficients in Model 8.4 
 
Coefficient cells highlighted in light blue have sig. < 0,05, and cells with darker blue have sig. < 0,10.
BL1 BL2 PA1 PA2 PA3 PA5 HE1 HE2 HE3 HE4 LI1 LI2 LI3 LI4 LI5
-2,507 6,454 12,529 18,402 15,835 6,294 19,188 14,336 22,192 -0,817 16,977 26,458 12,752 -0,508 8,599
-0,360 -0,402 -0,377 0,518 -0,564
0,585 0,487 -0,350
Ln Detailing flow -0,205 0,063 0,032 0,002 -0,027 0,058 -0,001 0,024 -0,011 0,025 -0,023 0,010 0,019 0,092 -0,028
Ln Journal advertising flow 0,005 0,005 0,000 0,003 0,002 0,001 0,006 0,001 -0,001 0,008 -0,004 -0,001
Ln Direct marketing flow 0,001 0,002 -0,004 -0,001 -0,004 -0,006 -0,002 0,014 -0,005 -0,013
Competitive
Ln Competitive marketing 
expenditures flow
0,136 0,121
Ln Detailing stock 0,165 -0,011 0,195 0,076 0,214 -0,049 0,099 -0,082 0,053 0,018 -0,112 0,031 0,093 -0,012 0,150
Competitive
Ln Competitive global marketing 
expenditures stock
0,631 0,406
Own Ln Average drug price per DDD -0,642 -1,471 -0,897 -0,637 1,475 1,675 1,048 -0,279 -1,769 -0,268 0,672 -1,903 -1,826 -19,76
Competitors
Ln Average competitors drug price 
per DDD
-0,348 5,078 0,232 0,282




Adjusted R2 0,995 0,975 0,528 0,527 0,774 0,270 0,802 0,483 0,842 0,975 -0,064 0,492 0,357 0,923 0,611
Ln Sales in DDDs lagged two periods
Constant
Lagged sales















Ipad / Tablet (% of times used in calls)




Table 10.88 below summarizes the conclusions on the good specification of the models using 
SPSS. This table will be later updated after running products LI4 and LI5 regressions with 
Eviews. 
Table 10.88 – Summary of the good specification analysis – Model 8.4 before the use of 
Eviews in products LI4 and LI5 
 
Source: own elaboration 
In some of the regressions, we had to accept high or very high VIFs. This was especially 
evident in products: 
 PA3 - when we removed, independently, the variables Drug age and Drug age 
squared, the R
2
 Sig. F change produced a value lower than 5%, and therefore we 
decided to keep both variables in the final model, despite their very high VIFs 
 
 HE1 - when we removed the variable Drug age, the R2 Sig. F change produced a value 
lower than 5%, and therefore we decided to keep tje variable in the final model, 
despite its high VIF 
 
 HE2 - when we removed the variable Drug age, the R2 Sig. F change produced a value 
lower than 5%. However, since the variable was automatically excluded by SPSS due 
to its high VIF when using Period 1 regression, we decided to remove the variable 
BL1 BL2 PA1 PA2 PA3 PA5 HE1 HE2 HE3 HE4 LI1 LI2 LI3 LI4 LI5
Collinearity 
diagnostics
All VIFs < 10? No No Yes No No No No Yes No No Yes No Yes No No
| Skewness | < 0.5? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
| Kurtosis | < 0.5? Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No No No No
Shapiro-Wilk Sig. > 0.05? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Homocedasticity 
 diagnostics
ANOVA Sig. > 0.05? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Quadratic coeff. Sig. > 0.05? Yes Yes No No No No No Yes No No Yes No No No No








(and be able to proceed to the Chow (1960) test, having the same number of variables 
in the three models - Global, Period 1 and Period 2) 
 
 HE4 - when we removed, independently, the variables Ln Sales in DDDs lagged one 
and two periods, the R
2
 Sig. F change produced a value lower than 5%, and therefore 
we decided to keep both variables in the final model, despite their very high VIFs 
 
 LI4 - when we removed, independently, the variable Drug age, the R2 Sig. F change 
produced a value lower than 5%, and therefore we decided to keep it in the final 
model, despite its high VIF 
 
 LI5 - when we removed, independently, the variables Drug age and Ln Average 
competitors price per DDD, the R
2
 Sig. F change produced a value lower than 5%, and 
therefore we decided to keep both variables in the final model, despite their high VIFs 
 
Only one product, HE4, evidenced a Sig. < 0,05 in the Shapiro-Wilk test (0,033, to be 
precise), which does not dramatically impact the quality of the model. 
We detected a problem of heterocedasticity in the case of products LI4 and LI5. To solve this 
issue, we ran the regressions for these two products using the statistical software Eviews 
version 10+ University Edition. 
We started by preparing two Excel files, one with product LI4 time series, and other with 
product LI5 time series. We then imported each of these files to eviews, using one at the time. 
We followed exactly the same procedures as the ones observed in SPSS with the other 











Our list of variables is shown below, for product 4 (figure 10.160): 
 
Figure 10.160 – List of variables used in Eviews for products LI4 
In this equation, we removed the variable Ln Direct Marketing flow, given that it does not 
have observations in period 1. We used the method Huber-White for covariance method. 
We ran the regressions for product LI4 first, taking into consideration the VIF and R
2
 change. 





Figure 10.161 – Coefficients obtained in Eviews – first iteration - product LI4 
These outputs represent our first iteration. We then started to remove variables, one by one. 
The main candidate would be Drug age squared (Sig. = 0,9705). The next candidate to be 
removed was Ln Journal Advertising flow (Probability = 0,9638), but given that this is one of 
the fixed variables, we did not remove it. We then continued the analysis by removing the 
non-significant variables, until we reached a final equation. The sequence of variables 
removed was the following: 
 Drug age squared 
 Ln Sales in DDDs lagged two periods 
 Ln Average drug price per DDD x Drug age 




 % of calls where doctors declared they would increase or start prescribing the product 
 Ln Competitive global marketing expenditures stock 
 Ln Average competitors price per DDD 
 % of calls the reps used Ipad / Tablet 
 Ln Competitive global marketing expenditures flow 
 % of calls where the doctor received printed material 
 Ln Sales in DDDs lagged one period 
 Ln Average drug price per DDD x Ln Detailing stock 
 % of calls where doctors considered the information received as very useful 
Figure 10.162 shows our model (with the significant variables and the ones that are fixed, 
even non-significant): 
 
Figure 10.162 – Coefficients obtained in Eviews – after manual removal of variables - 
product LI4 
We then had to look at the VIFs of these variables, to decide whether we needed to proceed 
with the removal of additional variables. We went to View → Coefficient Diagnostics → 





Figure 10.163 – Error message when calculating the product LI4 VIFs with Eviews 
We tested the model with Ordinary Covariance Method (instead of Huber-White) and there 
was no invertibility problems. By other words, with non-robust estimation (Ordinary) we do 
not have invertibility problems, although obtaining a matrix of covariances with a determinant 
very close to zero, ie, it does not reach the threshould to be considered approximately 
singular. In the case of robust estimation (Huber-White) we obtained an indication of non-
invertibility of the covariance matrix, although having a higher determinant than the previous 
one (with non-robust estimation). Unable to understand the source of this error, we believe 
this may potentially represent a bug in Eviews. 
Despite this limitation, we suspect from multicollinearity in some of the significant variables, 
especially in Ln Drug price x Ln Detailing flow, due to abnormal coefficients of the separate 
variables (Ln Detailing flow, and Ln Average Drug price per DDD). To test our suspicion, we 
ran a non-robust (Ordinary) regression with the same independent variables and obtained the 
respective VIFs, here show below (figure 10.164). 
 




Indeed the interaction variable Ln Drug price x Ln Detailing flow evidences an extremely 
high VIF and needs to be removed from our equation. We now got back to the Huber-White 
method. With the removal of the interaction, the overall model became more intuitive to 
interpret, with variable signals much more in line with the theory on pharmaceutical 
marketing and detailing (figure 10.165): 
 
Figure 10.165 – Coefficients obtained in Eviews – removal of interaction variable - product 
LI4 
Despite the fact that the interaction variable was signicant, its maintenance would provoke 
illogical coefficient signals in the individual variables it is made of (Ln Detailing flow, and Ln 
Average drug price per DDD), and resulting in abnormal coefficient magnitudes. We will 
later confirm this variable was not relevant. 
Now that we have non-significant variables again, we continued the removal of the variables: 
 Ln Other marketing expenditures stock 




The final iteration of the model produced the output below (figure 10.166): 
 
Figure 10.166 – Coefficients obtained in Eviews – final interaction – product LI4 
We then tried to obtain the VIFs again, and this time it did not produce an error, which 
increases our suspicion of some bug in Eviews when dealing with likely very strong 
multicollinearity. 
The output below shows the VIFs (figure 10.167): 
 




Despite the relatively high VIFs in two of the variables, we opted to keep them in the model. 
We had to guarantee, however, that all the removed variables were redundant for R
2
 change 
purposes. To do this, we used the option Redundant variables test, in View → Coefficient 
diagnosis. We compared the initial equation against the initial equation without all the 
discarded variables. The output we obtained is shown below (figure 10.168): 
 
Figure 10.168 – Redundant Variables Test in Eviews – all removed variables - Product LI4 
The variables are redundant (probability of 0,0834). This way, although the removed 
interaction variable Ln Average price per DDD x Ln Detailing flow was significant by itself 
as described above, it was not when jointly removed with all other discarded variables, which 





We then analyzed the normality of residuals of our final model regarding product LI4. We 
selected the option Histogram – Normality Test in the menu option View → Residual 
Diagnostics, and obtained the output below (figure 10.169): 
 
 
Figure 10.169 – Residuals Normality Test in Eviews – Product LI4 
 
The Jarque-Bera output of 0,573388 means we can not reject the hypothesis of the normality 
of the residuals (p > 0,05). 
Finally, we ran the Reset test, by selecting the option Ramsey Reset Test in View → Stability 






Figure 10.170 – Quadratic Reset Test in Eviews for Product LI4 
Since the p-value of the quadratic term is lower than 0,05, the model lacks quadratic terms. 
We will further address this issue after the analysis of product LI5 in Eviews. We also added a 
cubic term to the reset test, however obtaining an error (“Near singular matrix error. 
Regressors may be perfectly collinear”). 
We then performed the exact same analysis for product LI5. Below we find the first 





Figure 10.171 – Coefficients obtained in eviews – first iteration - product LI5 
The sequence of removed variables was the following: 
 Drug age squared 
 Ln Avg number of products presented during the calls 
 Ipad / Tablet (% of times used in calls) 
 Ln Sales in DDDs lagged one period 
 Ln Sales in DDDs lagged two periods 




 Laptop based materials (% of times used in calls) 
 Increase / Will begin to prescribe (% of calls) 
 Ln Other marketing expenditures stock 
 Very useful (% of calls) 
Our model was the following (with the significant variables and the ones that are fixed, even 
non-significant), shown below in figure 10.172: 
 







Next, we looked at the VIFs of these variables, given our suspicion of multicollinearity 
originated by the interaction variables Ln Average drug price per DDD x Ln Detailing flow, 
Ln Average drug price per DDD x Ln Detailing stock, and Ln Average drug price per DDD x 
Drug age. The output is shown below in fiture 10.173. 
 
Figure 10.173 – VIFs for product LI5 with Eviews 
We proceeded by removing Ln Average drug price per DDD x Ln Detailing stock. We then 
removed Ln Competitive marketing expenditures flow (which had meanwhile became non-
significant), and computed the VIFs again and noted that the VIF of the interaction variable 
Ln Average drug price per DDD x Ln Detailing flow was 4068,516. We then removed this 
variable and ran the VIFs again, which resulted in very high values in three variables: Drug 
age (539,81), Ln Average drug price per DDD (138,59), and the interaction variable Ln 
Average drug price per DDD x Drug age (361,53). By removing this last interaction variable, 
the significance and signals of most of the variables became less logic. Therefore, we opted 
by keeping the variable in the equation, despite the very high VIFs. 





Figure 10.174 – Coefficients obtained in Eviews – final interaction – product LI5 
Next, we ran a Redundant Variable Test (figure 10.175) considering the full model and the 
simultaneous removal of all the variables we listed above. The variables are redundant 






Figure 10.175 – Redundant Variables Test in Eviews – all removed variables - Product LI5 
The next step was the analysis of the normality of residuals of our final model regarding 
product LI5, obtaining the output below (figure 10.176): 
 




With a Jarque-Bera output of 0,513663, there is no evidence to suggest that the residuals do 
not follow a normal distribution. 
Finally, we ran the quadratic and cubic Reset test (figure 10.177). 
 
Figure 10.177 – Quadratic Reset Test in Eviews for Product LI5 
Since the p-value of the quadratic term is higher than 0,05, the model does not appear to lack 
quadratic terms. When we performed the cubic Reset test we obtained the same error message 




Having solved the heterocedasticity issues, we faced a more serious problem: 10 out of the 15 products analyzed did not pass the Reset test, which 
tests for the good specification of the model. 
Table 10.89 below explicits the p-values of the Reset test in the two columns on the right, for both quadratic and cubic terms. All these outputs were 
calculated using SPSS, except for products LI4 and LI5. 





































BL1  ---  ---  ---  --- 23,987  --- 12,953 12,607  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---
BL2  --- 23,672  ---  --- 18,146  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---
PA1  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  --- 4,2% 4,3%
PA2  ---  ---  ---  --- 10,924  ---  --- 14,032  ---  ---  ---  --- 1,4% 1,4%
PA3  ---  ---  ---  --- 11,531  ---  --- 232,508 162,796  ---  ---  --- 0,0% 0,0%
PA5  ---  ---  --- 14,593 13,487  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  --- 0,4% 0,4%
HE1  ---  ---  ---  --- 13,613  ---  --- 25,956  ---  ---  ---  --- 0,0% 0,0%
HE2  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---
HE3  ---  ---  ---  --- 10,953  ---  --- 11,069  ---  ---  ---  --- 0,0% 0,0%
HE4 32,509 35,352  ---  ---  ---  ---  --- 10,218  ---  --- 0,033  --- 0,0% 0,0%
LI1  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---
LI2  ---  ---  ---  ---  --- 11,716  --- 12,927  ---  ---  ---  --- 0,1% 0,1%
LI3  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  --- 0,9% 0,9%
LI4  ---  ---  ---  --- 22,407  ---  --- 30,580  ---  ---  ---  --- (Eviews) 0,9% N/A

















In order to investigate the origin of the Reset test issues, we tried to find, among the variables 
used in Model 8.4 – and before the removal of eventual variables due to extremely high VIFs, 
the origin of the non-linearity. To do this, we activated, in the regressions, the option 
“Produce all partial plots” in Plots, in SPSS. We started with product PA3, the first we 
detected with strong problems with (PA1 had a p-value of 0,042 and PA2 had 0,014, whereas 
PA3 had 0,000001. The outputs are shown below (figures 10178, 10.179, 10.180, 10.181, 
10.182, 10.183, 10.184, 10.185 and 10.186). 
 
 
Figure 10.178 – Partial Regression Plot for product PA3 in Model 8.4 – Ln Sales in DDDs vs 





Figure 10.179 – Partial Regression Plot for product PA3 in Model 8.4 – Ln Sales in DDDs vs 
Ln Detailing flow 
 
Figure 10.180 – Partial Regression Plot for product PA3 in Model 8.4 – Ln Sales in DDDs vs 





Figure 10.181 – Partial Regression Plot for product PA3 in Model 8.4 – Ln Sales in DDDs vs 
Ln Mailing flow 
 
 
Figure 10.182 – Partial Regression Plot for product PA3 in Model 8.4 – Ln Sales in DDDs vs 





Figure 10.183 – Partial Regression Plot for product PA3 in Model 8.4 – Ln Sales in DDDs vs 
Ln Average drug price per DDD 
 
 







Figure 10.185 – Partial Regression Plot for product BL1 in Model 8.4 – Ln Sales in DDDs vs 
Drug age^2 
 
Figure 10.186 – Partial Regression Plot for product PA3 in Model 8.4 – Ln Sales in DDDs vs 




Based on the charts listed above, there was hardly any evident source of non-linearity in all 
the independent variables, except perhaps the variables Ln Detailing flow (calls), Ln Journal 
advertising flow, Ln Mailing flow, and Ln Average drug price per DDD (all with eventual 
signs of non-linearity). To perform a test, we ran one additional regression and performed the 
correspondent Reset tests, adding the variables: 
 Ln Detailing flow x Ln Detailing flow 
 Ln Journal advertising flow x Ln Journal advertising flow 
 Ln Mailing flow x Ln Mailing flow 
 Ln Average drug price per DDD x Ln Average drug price per DDD 
After computing the new variables, we ran the regression saving the unstandardized predicted 
values, squared and cubed them, and ran two regressions again. The reset test did not pass, 
again: 
 The quadratic unstandardized predicted values coefficient had a p-value of 0,001014 
 The cubic unstandardized predicted values coefficient had a p-value of 0,000997 
So that we could exclude the situation where product PA3 could be an “outlier” presenting a 
very unique behavior, we ran this analysis also for HE1, the next product with the lowest p-
value in the reset test (0,000001 in the quadratic coefficient and 0,000001 in the cubed 
coefficient). We show the outputs in figures 10.187, 10.188, 10.189, 10.190, 10.191, 10.192, 





Figure 10.187 – Partial Regression Plot for product HE1 in Model 8.4 – Ln Sales in DDDs vs 
Ln Sales in DDDs lagged one period 
 
Figure 10.188 – Partial Regression Plot for product HE1 in Model 8.4 – Ln Sales in DDDs vs 






Figure 10.189 – Partial Regression Plot for product HE1 in Model 8.4 – Ln Sales in DDDs vs 
Ln Detailing flow 
 
Figure 10.190 – Partial Regression Plot for product HE1 in Model 8.4 – Ln Sales in DDDs vs 






Figure 10.191 – Partial Regression Plot for product HE1 in Model 8.4 – Ln Sales in DDDs vs 
Ln Competitive global marketing expenditures flow 
 
Figure 10.192 – Partial Regression Plot for product HE1 in Model 8.4 – Ln Sales in DDDs vs 






Figure 10.193 – Partial Regression Plot for product HE1 in Model 8.4 – Ln Sales in DDDs vs 
Ln Average drug price per DDD 
 
 






Figure 10.195 – Partial Regression Plot for product HE1 in Model 8.4 – Ln Sales in DDDs vs 
Drug age^2 
In the case of HE1, we could find some evidences of non-linearity in the variables Ln Sales in 
DDDs lagged two periods, Ln Mailing flow, and Ln Competitive global marketing 
expenditures flow. To perform a test, we ran one additional regression and performed the 
correspondent Reset tests, adding the variables: 
 Ln Sales in DDDs lagged two periods x Ln Sales in DDDs lagged two periods 
 Ln Mailing flow x Ln Mailing flow 
 Ln Competitive global marketing expenditures flow x Ln Competitive global 
marketing expenditures flow 
The reset test did not pass, again: 
 The quadratic unstandardized predicted values coefficient had a p-value of 0,000001 
 The cubic unstandardized predicted values coefficient had a p-value of 0,000001 
The endeavors made to find the non-linearity in the relation between the dependent and the 
independent variables did not produce results in these two products. The non-linearity is 
relevant and in order to evaluate our options, we considered several important aspects: 
 There are more than 20 independent variables in Model 8.4 




 We used the main interaction and quadratic variables suggest by the theory of 
pharmaceutical marketing 
 There must be transformations in the variables that would allow the Reset test to pass, 
but we do not know which. It would be extremely time consuming to run all the 
combinations of interactions, squared and cubic terms of all variables, with no 
guarantee of success 
 Our percentage of products with misspecification (10 out of 15, or 66,6%) is aligned 
with results obtained by Wieringa & Leeflang (2013) in their research using similar 
data (between 51% and 92% misspecified products, with an average of 76% in the 
seven models tested). If we consider only the products with a Reset test p-value lower 
than 1%, then the percentage of our products with misspecification drops to 53,3% (8 
out of 15) 
Given all the above points, we decided to continue our analysis, further investigating Model 
8.4. The updated summary of good specification (after running LI4 and LI5 equations with 
Eviews) is shown in table 10.90 below. 
Table 10.90 – Summary of the good specification analysis – Model 8.after the use of Eviews 
in products LI4 and LI5 
 
10.6.4.2. Results 
It is now time to refresh the table with the summary of coefficients in Model 8.4, after using 
Eviews in the case of products LI4 and LI5 (table 10.91). 
BL1 BL2 PA1 PA2 PA3 PA5 HE1 HE2 HE3 HE4 LI1 LI2 LI3 LI4 LI5
Collinearity 
diagnostics
All VIFs < 10? No No Yes No No No No Yes No No Yes No Yes No No
| Skewness | < 0.5? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
| Kurtosis | < 0.5? Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No No No No
Shapiro-Wilk Sig. 
> 0.05?




Bera Sig. > 0.05?
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  ---  ---
Quadratic coeff. 
Sig. > 0.05?
Yes Yes No No No No No Yes No No Yes No No No Yes
Cubic coeff. Sig. > 
0.05?








Table 10.91 – Summary of coefficients in Model 8.4 – after using Eviews in products LI4 and LI5 
 
Coefficient cells highlighted in light blue have sig. < 0,05, and cells with darker blue have sig. < 0,10. 
Older Younger Older Older Younger Younger Older Older Older Older Older Older Older Younger Younger
BL1 BL2 PA1 PA2 PA3 PA5 HE1 HE2 HE3 HE4 LI1 LI2 LI3 LI4 LI5
-2,507 6,454 12,529 18,402 15,835 6,294 19,188 14,336 22,192 -0,817 16,977 26,458 12,752 -38,519 12,010
-0,360 -0,402 -0,377 0,518 -0,564
0,585 0,487 -0,350
Ln Detailing flow -0,205 0,063 0,032 0,002 -0,027 0,058 -0,001 0,024 -0,011 0,025 -0,023 0,010 0,019 0,054 0,078
Ln Journal advertising flow 0,005 0,005 0,000 0,003 0,002 0,001 0,006 0,001 -0,001 0,008 -0,003 0,003
Ln Direct marketing flow 0,001 0,002 -0,004 -0,001 -0,004 -0,006 -0,002 0,014 -0,005 -0,007
Competitive
Ln Competitive marketing 
expenditures flow
0,136
Ln Detailing stock 0,165 -0,011 0,195 0,076 0,214 -0,049 0,099 -0,082 0,053 0,018 -0,112 0,031 0,093 -0,010 0,221
Ln Other marketing expenditures stock
Competitive
Ln Competitive global marketing 
expenditures stock
0,631 0,406 0,206
Own Ln Average drug price per DDD -0,642 -1,471 -0,897 -0,637 1,475 1,675 1,048 -0,279 -1,769 -0,268 0,672 -1,903 -1,826 -78,24 -9,195
Competitors
Ln Average competitors drug price per 
DDD
-0,348 5,078 0,232 1,222





Adjusted R2 0,995 0,975 0,528 0,527 0,774 0,270 0,802 0,483 0,842 0,975 -0,064 0,492 0,357 0,905 0,719




Ln Drug price x Ln Detailing flow
Ln Drug price x Ln Detailing stock
Ln Drug price x drug age
Additional 
variables
Ipad / Tablet (% of times used in calls)
Laptop based materials (% of times used in calls)
Printed material (% of times used in calls)
Very useful (% of calls)




















As a subsequent step, we looked at the overall signals of the coefficients, seen below in table 
10.92 (selecting the six core variables, most frequently referred in the theory). 
Table 10.92 – Percentage of signals as expected – Model 8.4 
 
Source: own elaboration 
Globally, with the exception of Ln Direct marketing flow (mailing flow), the great majority of 
the products evidence a good percentage of signals as expected, based on previous theory. 
Table 10.93 compares Model 8.4 against Model 7 (our best model applied to our data, among 
those developed by previous researchers). We conclude that, despite the issues revealed in 
table 10.91 above, we can accept Model 8.4 as adequate. Model 8.4 has a substantially higher 








Market 1 - 
Blood
Market 2 - 
Pancreas
Market 3 - 
Heart
Market 4 - 
Liver
Global
Ln Detailing flow 50,0% 75,0% 50,0% 80,0% 66,7%
Ln Journal advertising flow 100,0% 75,0% 100,0% 60,0% 75,0%
Ln Direct marketing flow 100,0% 0,0% 50,0% 0,0% 30,0%
Ln Detailing stock 50,0% 75,0% 75,0% 60,0% 66,7%
Ln Average drug price per 
DDD
100,0% 50,0% 75,0% 75,0% 71,4%













Table 10.93 – Comparison of Model 8.4 against Model 7 (signals as expected) 
 
Source: own elaboration 
Despite the fact that Model 8.4 is not perfect and reveals several issues especially in the Reset 
test, we have evidence that it is acceptable, allowing us to continue our research. 
 
10.6.4.3. Separate regressions for period 1 and period 2 
The next step consisted of running separate regressions for Period 1 and Period 2 using SPSS, 
except for products LI4 and LI5, where we used Eviews. Below we present a series of tables 
summarizing the coefficients for all the eligible products in all four markets. Again, 
coefficient cells highlighted in light blue have sig. < 0,05, and cells highlighted with darker 
blue have sig. < 0,10. Table 10.94 summarizes the outputs of products in Market 1, table 








Model 7 Model 8.4 Model 7 Model 8.4 Model 7 Model 8.4
Ln Detailing flow 0,103 0,007 66,7% 66,7% 0,0% 20,0%
Ln Journal advertising flow 0,002 0,002 75,0% 75,0% 18,8% 16,7%
Ln Direct marketing flow -0,001 -0,001 35,3% 30,0% 0,0% 0,0%
Ln Detailing stock 0,204 0,060 77,8% 66,7% 0,0% 26,7%
Ln Average drug price per DDD -2,670 -6,150 64,7% 71,4% 0,0% 42,9%
Drug age 0,015 0,003 50,0% 64,3% 5,6% 50,0%
61,6% 62,3% 4,1% 26,0%
Average elasticities % signal as expected





Table 10.94 – Summary of the coefficients of Market 1 – Blood – Model 8.4 before and after 
detailing ceiling 
  
Source: own elaboration 
Period 1 Period 2 Global Period 1 Period 2 Global
2,668 6,699 -2,507 5,941 12,265 6,454
0,485 0,136 0,585
Ln Detailing flow -0,059 0,175 -0,205 -0,073 0,080 0,063
Ln Journal advertising flow 0,016 0,001 0,005 0,011 0,002 0,005
Ln Direct marketing flow 0,019 -0,001 0,001 0,006 -0,001 0,002
Competitive
Ln Competitive marketing 
expenditures flow
-0,025 -0,070 0,136
Ln Detailing stock 0,645 0,187 0,165 0,028 0,013 -0,011
Competitive
Ln Competitive global marketing 
expenditures stock
-0,114 0,058 0,631
Own Ln Average drug price per DDD 0,177 -1,911 -0,642 -0,422 -2,093 -1,471
0,085 0,068 0,080 0,029 0,008 0,002
Adjusted R2 0,981 0,996 0,995 0,967 0,756 0,975
Product BL2
Constant















Table 10.95 – Summary of the coefficients of Market 2 – Pancreas – Model 8.4 before and after detailing ceiling 
 





Period 1 Period 2 Global Period 1 Period 2 Global Period 1 Period 2 Global Period 1 Period 2 Global
10,070 18,876 12,529 19,935 21,260 18,402 20,307 16,949 15,835 7,375 7,365 6,294
-0,287 -0,522 -0,360 -0,571 -0,464 -0,402
Ln Detailing flow 0,031 0,088 0,032 -0,114 -0,045 0,002 -0,074 0,014 -0,027 0,057 0,064 0,058
Ln Journal advertising flow 0,006 -0,003 0,000 0,002 0,007 0,003 0,002 0,002 0,002 -0,004 0,006 0,001
Ln Direct marketing flow -0,007 -0,002 -0,004 -0,002 0,000 -0,001 0,003 -0,006 -0,004 -0,002 -0,013 -0,006
Ln Detailing stock 0,423 0,013 0,195 0,050 0,002 0,076 0,110 0,334 0,214 0,021 -0,099 -0,049
Competitive
Ln Competitive global marketing 
expenditures stock
0,440 0,329 0,406
Own Ln Average drug price per DDD -0,502 -22,316 -0,897 -4,703 1,208 -0,637 -4,228 -0,336 1,475 -4,048 2,498 1,675
0,013 0,003 0,003 0,003 0,006 0,005 0,093 0,006 0,041 0,001 0,011 0,009
-0,001 -0,00003 -0,0003
0,173 -0,216 0,145
Adjusted R2 0,522 0,396 0,528 0,221 0,517 0,535 0,617 0,576 0,774 -0,008 0,577 0,270
Product PA2 Product PA3 Product PA5
Constant




















Table 10.96 – Summary of the coefficients of Market 3 – Heart – Model 8.4 before and after detailing ceiling 
 




Period 1 Period 2 Global Period 1 Period 2 Global Period 1 Period 2 Global Period 1 Period 2 Global
-454,33 18,926 19,188 12,943 14,714 14,336 17,079 16,985 22,192 9,429 22,657 -0,817
-0,438 -0,515 -0,377 0,003 -0,173 0,518
0,609 -0,102 0,487
Ln Detailing flow 0,054 -0,005 -0,001 0,031 0,040 0,024 -0,001 0,007 -0,011 0,040 -0,0004 0,025
Ln Journal advertising flow 0,007 0,006 0,006
Ln Direct marketing flow 0,001 -0,005 -0,002 0,014 -0,003 0,014
Ln Detailing stock -0,010 0,077 0,099 0,031 -0,068 -0,082 0,001 0,186 0,053 0,038 -0,021 0,018
Own Ln Average drug price per DDD -595,59 -2,868 1,048 -0,703 -0,203 -0,279 -0,456 -2,256 -1,769 -1,287 1,107 -0,268
Competitors
Ln Average competitors drug price 
per DDD
-0,313 0,112 -0,348 0,791 -2,681 5,078
0,009 0,006 0,015 -0,010 -0,050 -0,030 -0,035 -0,018 0,002
0,104 0,162 0,198
Adjusted R2 0,404 0,618 0,802 0,193 0,187 0,483 -0,262 0,732 0,842 0,971 0,845 0,975
Product HE2 Product HE3 Product HE4
Constant
Lagged sales
Ln Sales in DDDs lagged one period


















Table 10.97 – Summary of the coefficients of Market 4 – Liver – Model 8.4 before and after detailing ceiling 
 
Source: own elaboration 
Period 1 Period 2 Global Period 1 Period 2 Global Period 1 Period 2 Global Period 1 Period 2 Global Period 1 Period 2 Global
11,42 16,513 16,977 27,542 23,893 26,458 11,389 13,613 12,752 -32,828 33,192 -38,519 7,829 11,654 12,010
-0,564 -0,618 -0,564
-0,428 -0,392 -0,350
Ln Detailing flow 0,149 -0,041 -0,023 -0,021 0,012 0,010 0,034 0,020 0,019 -0,004 0,097 0,054 0,115 0,061 0,078
Ln Journal advertising flow 0,010 0,0002 0,001 -0,002 -0,004 -0,001 0,007 0,008 0,008 0,001 0,002 -0,003 0,013 -0,001 0,003
Ln Direct marketing flow -0,001 -0,011 -0,005 -0,007 0,001 -0,007
Competitive
Ln Competitive marketing 
expenditures flow
Ln Detailing stock 0,199 -0,014 -0,112 -0,040 0,035 0,031 0,241 0,060 0,093 -0,149 -0,034 -0,010 0,391 0,164 0,221
Ln Other marketing 
expenditures stock
Competitive
Ln Competitive global 
marketing expenditures stock
0,014 0,025 0,206
Own Ln Average drug price per DDD -1,13 3,021 0,672 -1,443 3,786 -1,903 -0,991 -0,713 -1,826 -72,052 31,007 -78,24 -2,577 -3,421 -9,195
Competitors
Ln Average competitors drug 
price per DDD
0,307 -0,024 0,232 0,275 0,532 1,222
0,003 0,006 -0,002 0,003 0,0004 -0,001 0,002 -0,004 -0,003 0,001 0,017 0,008 0,018 -0,029 -0,093
0,048 0,056 0,173








Ln Drug price x Ln Detailing flow
Ln Drug price x Ln Detailing stock
Ln Drug price x drug age
Lagged sales
Ln Sales in DDDs lagged one period















10.6.4.4. Coefficient interpretation examples 
Table 10.98 below exemplifies how a series of variable coefficients (selected as an excerpt, 
representing all the independent variables types – logarithmized, non-logarithmizes, and 
percentage). 
Table 10.98 – Coefficient interpretation example – Model 8.4 
 
Source: own elaboration 
10.6.4.5. Chow test 
The next step was then to move to the Chow (1960) test. The computations were made in 
EXCEL, using the following formula: 
     (SSRC – (SSR1 + SSR2) / k       
Chow =  








Ln Detailing flow LI4 0,078
Each 1% increase in Detailing flow provokes a 0.078% increase in Drug sales, 
on average and ceteris paribus
Ln Detailing stock PA3 0,214 Each 1% increase in Detailing stock provokes a 0.214% increase in Drug sales
Ln Average drug price 
per DDD
HE3 -1,769
Each 1% increase in Average drug price per DDD provokes a 1.769% reduction 
in Drug sales
Ln Average 
competitors drug price 
per DDD
HE3 5,078
Each 1% increase in Average competitors drug price per DDD provokes a 
5.078% increase in Drug sales
Drug age PA3 0,041
Drug age squared PA3 -0,0003
Ipad / Tablet (% of 
times used in calls)
HE3 0,198
Each 1% increase in the percentage of times Ipad / Tablet are used during the 
calls provokes 0.198% increase in Drug sales, on average and ceteris paribus
Each 1 month increase in Drug age provokes a 1.03% increase in drug sales, on 






 SSRC = Sum of square residuals of the combined regression (using the 48 
observations) 
 SSR1 = Sum of square residuals of the regression before break (using the first 19 
observations) 
 SSR2 = Sum of square residuals of the regression after break (using the last 29 
observations) 
 K = Number of independent variables including the constant 
 N1 = Number of observations before break (19 months) 
 N2 = Number of observations after the break (29 months) 
To perform this test, we created table 10.99 and populated it with the data we extracted from 
the SPSS and Eviews outputs. The results are shown below: 
Table 10.99 – Chow (1960) test using model 8.4 
 
Having obtained the Chow result, we computed the p-value of the F test, using Excel. We 
used the Fdist(X;K;N1+N2-2K), where: 
 X = output of the Chow (1960) test 
 K = Number of independent variables including the constant 
 N1 = Number of observations before break (19 months) 
 N2 = Number of observations after the break (29 months) 
Four of the products evidence a p-value lower than 0,05, signaling that the two distributions’ 
coefficients (before and after the entry into force of the detailing ceiling) are different. 
BL1 BL2 PA1 PA2 PA3 PA5 HE1 HE2 HE3 HE4 LI1 LI2 LI3 LI4 LI5
SSRC 0,355 0,316 0,142 0,100 0,080 0,102 0,107 0,123 0,171 0,241 0,335 0,106 0,140 0,179 0,156
SSR1 0,063 0,065 0,045 0,041 0,032 0,049 0,050 0,051 0,050 0,041 0,060 0,038 0,044 0,061 0,052
SSR2 0,084 0,174 0,047 0,029 0,024 0,024 0,042 0,063 0,072 0,060 0,169 0,049 0,085 0,058 0,059
k 9 8 7 9 9 8 6 7 8 7 7 9 6 6 10
N1 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
N2 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29
Chow 4,7 1,3 2,6 1,4 1,4 1,6 1,0 0,4 1,6 6,7 2,2 0,7 0,5 3,0 1,1
Sig. F test 0,001 0,281 0,030 0,225 0,216 0,172 0,465 0,904 0,162 0,000 0,054 0,714 0,808 0,016 0,366
Final model (8.4)




However, we do have many variables that cumulatively impact the dependent variable (Ln 
Drug sales in DDDs). Our goal is to conclude whether the coefficients of our most important 
variable of interest – Ln Detailing flow (calls) – changed, to signal a change in prescription 
behavior. To do this, we ran additional regressions using the exact individual Model 8.4 
equations for each product, performing the following steps: 
 Step 1) We ran a regression with Ln Detailing flow (calls) as dependent variable and 
all the rest of variables of Model 8.4 as independent variables, using the 48 months of 
observations. We activated the option to save the unstandardized residuals. The idea is 
to capture the part of the unique contribution provided by Ln Detailing flow (calls) 
that is not explained by the other independent variables 
 
 Step 2) We ran three regression models (one with the full time series, one with Period 
1, and one with Period 2) using Ln Drug sales in DDDs as dependent variable and the 
unstandardized residuals from Step 1 as the unique independent variable, excluding 
the constant in SPSS options. The coefficient obtained for the whole dataset (full time 
series with 48 observations) was exactly the same as the one obtained in the normal 
regression with the full Model 8.4 for the variable Ln Detailing flow (calls) using the 
same 48 observations 
 
 Step 3) We ran the Chow (1960) test again, with the outputs obtained from step 2 
The goal of applying this procedure was to investigate eventual structural breaks 
motivated by the entry into force of the detailing ceiling, isolatedly in Ln Detailing flow 










Table 10.100 – Chow (1960) test using model 8.4 – Isolated impact of Ln Detailing flow 
(calls) 
 













Our findings are clear: since no Sig. F test was lower than 0,05, or by other words we did not 
reject the null hypothesis in any product, none of the products evidenced a structural break in 
the effect of our specific variable of interest (Ln Detailing flow (calls)), using August 2013 as 
a reference. These results demonstrate that - with the reserve of the misspecification as seen in 
the Reset test for a substantial percentage of products – there is no evidence that the Detailing 
flow elasticities are statistically different from Period 1 to in Period 2. Having in mind this 
irrefutable fact, we decided to nevertheless develop a group of tables (10.101 and 10.102) in 
order to help us gain additional insights and search for patterns in our results so far, for purely 
intellectual curiosity. The goal was to evaluate the extent to which our results show 
differentiated changes in detailing elasticities between products, according to their detailing 
intensities – analyzes that - if the Chow (1960) tested had produced significant results – 





BL1 BL2 PA1 PA2 PA3 PA5 HE1 HE2 HE3 HE4 LI1 LI2 LI3 LI4 LI5
SSRC 6480,5 8050,1 9746,6 9677,0 8953,9 8198,3 10382,5 10116,8 6715,0 10039,8 11240,4 8503,8 9602,7 8998,7 6624,8
SSR1 1930,0 2888,5 3802,7 3700,6 3489,8 3235,2 3790,3 3894,2 4187,8 4246,2 4330,9 3378,3 3816,4 3444,3 2618,4
SSR2 4506,5 5141,3 5882,6 5832,0 5443,5 4959,5 6255,9 6082,5 2418,1 5770,8 6746,0 5107,9 5785,9 5526,6 3996,3
k 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
N1 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
N2 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29
Chow 0,314 0,117 0,291 0,697 0,106 0,020 1,540 0,646 0,760 0,105 0,679 0,095 0,002 0,142 0,070
Sig. F test 0,578 0,734 0,592 0,408 0,746 0,887 0,221 0,426 0,388 0,747 0,414 0,759 0,965 0,708 0,793
Final model (8.4)




Table 10.101 – Average elasticities in Period 1, Period 2 and Global – Model 8.4 
 
This aggregate view does not provide sufficient detail. Therefore we created two additional 
tables. 
Table 10.102 – Average elasticities of highest and lowest detailing intensity – Model 8.4 
 
Source: own elaboration 
Table 10.102 above evidences the average detailing elasticities of products with the highest 
and lowest detailing intensity, in each market. In some markets, due to the proximity in 
detailing intensity, we chose two products. Liu et al (2016) suggested that drug sales 
Period 1 Period 2 Global Period 1 Period 2 Global Period 1 Period 2 Global Period 1 Period 2 Global
Average Detailing 
elasticity
-0,066 0,128 -0,071 -0,025 0,030 0,016 0,031 0,010 0,009 0,055 0,030 0,028
Blood Pancreas Heart Liver
Period 1 Period 2 Global
Drug(s) with the highest 
detailing intensity
BL1 -0,059 0,175 -0,205 No
Drug(s) with the lowest 
detailing intensity
BL2 -0,073 0,080 0,063 Yes
Drug(s) with the highest 
detailing intensity
PA2 -0,114 -0,045 0,002 No
PA1 0,031 0,088 0,032 Yes
PA5 0,057 0,064 0,058 Yes
Drug(s) with the highest 
detailing intensity
HE2 0,031 0,040 0,024 No
HE3 -0,001 0,007 -0,011 Yes
HE4 0,040 -0,0004 0,025 No
LI4 -0,004 0,097 0,054 No
LI1 0,149 -0,041 -0,023 Yes
LI2 -0,021 0,012 0,01 Yes
LI3 0,034 0,020 0,019 No
Drug(s) with the highest 
detailing intensity
Drug(s) with the lowest 
detailing intensity
Market 4 - 
Liver
Market 2 - 
Pancreas Drug(s) with the lowest 
detailing intensity
Market 3 - 
Heart Drug(s) with the lowest 
detailing intensity
Market 1 - 
Blood
Average Detailing elasticity Results aligned with 
Liu, Gupta, 





(measured in market share) may have differentiated impacts from a detailing ceiling, 
depending on their detailing intensity. Table 10.103 evidences the percentage of cases where 
results are aligned with Liu et al (2016) counterfactual simulations. 
Table 10.103 – Percentage of cases where results adhere to Liu et al (2016) predictions 
 
Source: own elaboration 
Our results suggest that drugs with the lowest detailing intensity (71,4% of the eligible cases, 
or five out of seven products) will see their detailing elasticities increased after a detailing 
ceiling. Again, these conclusions are however totally limited by the fact that the Chow (1960) 
test produced non-significant results for all the products in analysis. This is one of the main 
evidences obtained in our thesis, to help us answer our research question. 
 
10.7. Conclusions 
We divided the conclusions in three subchapters: Models 1 to 6, Model 7, and Model 8.4 (our 
final model). 
10.7.1. Models 1 to 6 
In Model 1 (Wittink, 2002 – simplified), detailing flow is the most impactful promotion 
instrument in terms of prescription behavior, for three of the four markets. Mailing flow and 
Journal advertising have positive global average elasticities, but of relatively low magnitude 
comparing to previous results from Leeflang & Wieringa (2010). Non-promotional variables 
evidenced however a much higher impact on prescription behavior than detailing: Public 
reimbursement (Market 1 only) resulted in a very influencial variable with an average 
elasticity of 1,995, and Loss of exclusivity (Market 3 only) had an average elasticity of -
0,062. 
20,0% 71,4%
Drug(s) with the highest detailing 
intensity evidenced a reduction in 
Detailing elasticity
% of cases where (from Period 1 to Period 2)…
Drug(s) with the lowest detailing 





In Model 2 (Wittink, 2002 – complete), detailing flow evidences global higher elasticities 
than Model 1, especially in the case of Market 1 (Blood), where the average elasticity is 0,084 
for the three products, and 0,287 for product 1 (the one with the elasticity signal as expected). 
However, and very curiously, Mailing and Journal advertising flows evidence higher average 
elasticities than detailing flow. Again, Public reimbursement (Market 1 only) is the most 
impactful variable to explain variations in sales in DDD (our dependent variable), followed by 
Loss of exclusivity (Market 3 only). 
In Model 3 (Rizzo, 1999) the average elasticity of Detailing flow reached 0,087, a value 
much higher than the one obtained in Models 1 and 2. Also, detailing stock elasticity obtained 
a very high elasticity (average of 0,146 for the 18 products). Such as in Models 1 and 2, 
Public reimbursement (Market 1 only) is the most impactful variable to explain variations in 
sales in DDD (our dependent variable), followed by Loss of exclusivity (Market 3 only). 
In Model 4 (Windmeijer et al, 2006) we obtained a higher number of coefficients as 
expected, comparing the results against the previous models (Sales in DDDs lagged two 
periods, Global marketing expenditures flow, Global marketing expenditures stock, Average 
drug price per DDD, Drug age, Drug age squared, Global marketing expenditures flow x Ln 
Average drug price per DDD, Public reimbursement, and Loss of exclusivity, all with more 
than 50% of the products’ elasticities with signal as expected. Ln Global marketing 
expenditures flow average coefficient reached 0,035, and Global marketing expenditures 
stock average coefficient was 0,247. Five products (BL1, HE4, HE5, LI4 and LI5) evidenced 
seven variables with the signal as expected, from a maximum of 11 main variables. 
In Model 5 (an adaptation of Model 4, with non-aggregated marketing investments) the 
average detailing elasticities reached 0,149, a much higher value than in previous models. 
Journal advertising and Direct marketing (mailing) lows evidenced almost zero elasticity, but 
detailing stock obtained a relatively high elasticity (an average of 0,271 for the 18 products). 
In Model 6 (an adaptation of Model 4, with new variables that help characterize the 
detailing initiatives), global marketing expenditures flow average elasticity reached 0,029, 
and Global marketing expenditures stock average elasticity reached 0,153. Average price 
elasticity reached -1.631, meaning that for each percentage point price increase in drug sales, 






10.7.2. Model 7 
Detailing flow - the most impactful promotion instrument - evidences a relatively small 
elasticity (average of 0,103 for the 18 products), reduces the price elasticity of drugs, 
especially in the case of younger drugs, shows carry-over effects, and is most impactful 
during the initial stages of product life cycle. Detailing stock is particularly stronger in the 
case of younger or much younger products. In eight out of 18 products competitive detailing 
negatively impacted own product sales. 
Journal advertising and direct marketing (mailing) flows showed almost null elasticities in our 
data, suggesting a low impact on physician prescription behavior measured with drug sales. 
Drug price has a very strong effect on drug sales, with an average elasticity of -2,67 for the 18 
products. Model 7 results suggest a powerful impact of policy changes in drug sales, seen in 
the positive effect of public reimbursement (Market 1 - Blood) and negative effect of loss of 
exclusivity (Market 3 - Heart). 
The usage of iPad / Tablets and printed materials during the calls show a positive coefficient 
in its ability to impact drug sales. There appears also to be a positive relation between drug 
sales and the percentage of physicians that declares he or she will increase his or her 
prescription of the detailed drug brand. Results also suggest that the higher the number of 
additional drugs presented during a call, the lower will the sales of the promoted drug be 
(average elasticity of -0,034, however non-significant results at sig. = 0,05). 
 
10.7.3. Model 8.4 
We focus the conclusions of Model 8.4 in the part related to the detailing ceiling and Chow 
(1960) test. In our data, the effect of Order 8213-B/2013 (that imposed a detailing ceiling) on 
prescription behavior measured through detailing elasticities was not significant. Not one 
single product evidence significant changes in its elasticities, before and after the entry into 
force of this ceiling (measured with a Chow (1960) test). Despite the fact that the elasticities 
are not significantly different from one period to another, there were some interesting patterns 
observed: 71,4% of the drugs with the lowest detailing intensity evidenced an increase in 







In order to provide additional detail, we separate the discussion in the case of Models 1 to 6, 
Model 7 and Model 8.4. 
10.8.1. Models 1 to 6 
Model 1 (Wittink, 2002 – simplified) results are globally aligned with the ones obtained by 
Leeflang & Wieringa (2010). Detailing flow elasticity is generally positive – but very small. 
Competitive marketing expenditures flow resulted in a positive average elasticity, such as the 
one obtained by Leeflang & Wieringa (2010). This result seems counterintuitive, and an 
explanation may be the fact that, by developing marketing initiatives, competitors end up 
stimulating the sales of the market as a whole. Drug price elasticity resulted in a negative 
average value of -0.172, as predicted by the theory. In the same wavelength, drug age 
(positive average coefficient) and drug age squared (negative average coefficient) produced 
results very close to the ones reached by Leeflang & Wieringa (2010). Globally, the average 
elasticities are reasonably close to the ones reached by Leeflang & Wieringa (2010). 
Model 2 (Wittink, 2002 – complete) evidences results globally aligned with what the theory 
suggests in terms of expected signal, especially in the case of detailing, Competitive direct 
marketing flow, Drug age, Drug age squared and Public reimbursement (all with more than 
50% of the products’ elasticities with signal as expected). However, the main promotion 
instruments average elasticities magnitudes are lower than what it would be expected, 
especially in the case of detailing, reaching an average (for the 18 products) of 0,02 (against 
an expected elasticity higher than 0,3, as found by Kremer et al (2008)). 
Model 3 (Rizzo, 1999) global results also observe, reasonably, the expected coefficient 
signals, especially regarding Detailing flow, Detailing stock, Drug age, Drug age squared, the 
interaction variable Average Drug price x Detailing flow, Public reimbursement and Loss of 
exclusivity, all with more than 50% of the products’ elasticities with signal as expected. In 
this model the average elasticity of Detailing flow reached a value much higher than the one 
obtained in Models 1 and 2, but still substantially distant from the typical, expected average 
elasticities such as the ones found by Kremer et al (2008). More interestingly, Detailing stock 
average elasticity is much higher than the one obtained in Detailing flow, as demonstrated by 




flow, only six products (three of which in Market 3 (Heart) had a signal as expected. In this 
case, the effect of detailing flow lowers the price elasticity of demand. 
Model 4 (Windmeijer et al, 2006) appears to globally observe the expected coefficients 
signals too. Global marketing expenditures flow average coefficient reached 0,035, and 
Global marketing expenditures stock average coefficient was 0,247, substantially higher than 
the ones obtained by Leeflang & Wieringa (2010), but noticeably lower than the ones 
predicted by Kremer et al (2008). 
Model 5 is, as seen before, an adaptation of Model 4, the main difference being the inclusion 
of non-aggregated marketing investments, in addition to additional interaction variables. 
Therefore, the comparison against a specific model is not directly possible. However, we can 
analyze the model results globally, concluding that it generally produces results as expected 
by the theory (globally, 11 out of 19 variables reveal at least 50% coefficient signals as 
expected by the theory). 
Model 6 consists of Model 4 with the inclusion of new variables that help characterize the 
detailing initiatives. In terms of comparison of Model 6 results against theory, it is quite close 
to the results of Model 4. 
10.8.2. Model 7 
We now analyze results from Model 7 in light of previous theory. Detailing flow has on 
average a positive, but modest effect on brand sales, which is consistent with previous 
research conducted by Kremer et al (2008), Stremersch & Van Dyck (2009), and Stremersch 
& Lemmens (2009). It also appears to be the promotion instrument that generates a higher 
effect on prescription behavior, in line with research performed by Pitt & Nel (1988), 
Narayanan, Desiraju & Chintagunta (2004), Narayanan, Manchanda & Chintagunta (2005), 
Kremer et al (2008), and Dave & Saffer (2012), to name a few. Detailing also appears to 
reduce price elasticity of drugs (reduces physicians' price sensitivy) as predicted by Rizzo 
(1999), Gönül et al (2001), Narayanan et al (2004), and Windmeijer et al (2006). In our case, 
this is especially evident in the case of much younger (quartile 1) and much older (quartile 3) 
products. Our data also suggest that detailing evidences carry-over effects, that is, the 
cumulative investment of detailing has a positive effect on drug sales, as demonstrated 
previously by Narayanan et al (2004), Zoltners, Sinha & Lorimer (2004), Yi (2008), Montoya, 
Netzer & Jedidi (2010), and Liu et al (2016). In our data, the effect of detailing stock is 




Manchanda & Chintagunta (2009) and Liu et al (2016), predicts that detailing efforts 
performed by competitor drug brands (competitive detailing) affect own brand number of 
prescriptions. In our data, this was partially seen, since it only was verified in eight out of 18 
products. Our data suggests that detailing efforts appear to have a higher effect on 
prescriptions at the initial stages of the product life cycle. This evidence is supported by 
previous research conducted by Narayanan et al (2003), Manchanda, Rossi & Chintagunta 
(2004), Manchanda & Honka (2005), Narayanan et al (2005), and Dave (2013). 
Detailing elasticities vary between therapeutic classes, in line Kremer et al (2008) and 
Stremersch & Van Dyck (2009). Average detailing elasticities from our Model 7 are 
substantially lower than the one expected by Kremer et al (2008). In the case of detailing 
flow, the average elasticities are approximately two thirds lower. 
Our results are also in line with previous research in the field of changes in pharmaceutical 
policy. This is seen in the case of public reimbursement, positively impacting drug sales as 
suggested by Scherer (1993), in our case seen in two of the three products in Market 1 
(Blood). The theory also suggests that loss of exclusivity negatively impacts drug sales 
(Aitken et al, 2013), which was also verified in our results for the two eligible products in 
Market 3 (Heart). 
10.8.3. Model 8.4 
With model 8.4 we obtained what we believe may be a more calibrated and adapted model to 
the specificities of our research. If by the one hand Model 8.4 produced elasticity magnitudes 
substantially lower than the ones suggested by previous work such as Kremer et al (2008) and 
Leeflang & Wieringa (2008), by the other hand the percentage of signals as expected and 
significant (sig. < 0,05) is substantially higher than than in previous research from Leeflang & 
Wieringa (2008). 
As seen during the analysis of the structural breaks in detailing flow elasticity, our results – 
contrary to what is suggested by the theory on pharmaceutical marketing (Liu et al (2016), 
Larkin, Ang, Avorn & Kesselheim, 2014; Larkin et al, 2017) - did not provide sufficient 
evidence to say that detailing elasticities were significantly different before and after the entry 
into force of the 2013 detailing ceiling. This conclusion is robustly backed by the fact that all 
15 eligible products in our analysis evidenced the same result: no significant differences in 
detailing flow elasticities from period 1 to period 2. We were intrigued by these unexpected 




behavior in Portugal. The qualitative phase, as described before, consisted of non-structured 
interviews (at the beginning of our research) and in-depth interviews (at a later phase). 
When analyzing detailing elasticities before and after the entry into force of the detailing 
ceiling in light of products with higher and lower detailing intensity, we found that 20% of the 
drugs with the highests detailing intensity evidenced a reduction in detailing elasticity, and 
71,4% of the drugs with the lowest detailing intensity evidenced an increase in detailing 
elasticity, which only tangentially observes previous findings from Liu et al (2016), given that 
these results from our research were not statistically significant. 
 
10.9. Contribution to the theory 
We describe the contribution to the theory separating Models 7 and 8.4, for a better 
organization. The reasons for this speration are two: by the one hand, Model 7 is closest to 
previous research in terms of the variables used to study detailing and pharmaceutical 
marketing, thus providing a better comparison against prior estimates on elasticities; by the 
other hand, Model 8.4 (our final model) had to be substantially adapted by removing a series 
of variables, given the break tests we had to perform. 
10.9.1. Model 7 
Our research with Model 7 includes several new contributions to the theory which, to the 
extent of our knowledge, have not previously been addressed. The first is the evidence that 
detailing appears to reduce price elasticity especially of much younger and much older drugs. 
A possible explanation, to be verified by further research, may be, for the first case, the 
higher receptiveness of doctors when receiving PSRs promoting more recent drugs and their 
natural willingness to test them; in the second case, may be explained by the cumulative 
capital of the relational building generated after years of loyal visits (previously described 
when addressing reciprocity). Our research also demonstrates that the carry-over effects 
appear to be much higher for more recent drugs. A possible explanation may be the fact that 
doctors may – again – be more receptive to initiate or reinforce prescription of drugs launched 
more recently in the market. 
The new variables used in our research also allowed us to generate new insights in the field of 
detailing. The first one is the apparent evidence that the use of tablets (such as iPads or 
equivalent devices) during the calls have, on average, a positive effect on drug sales, 




be the relatively novelty effect of this type of call in Portugal, resulting in a higher attention 
from doctors (the time series started in January 2012 and at that time iPads were not that 
common in the market). In the case of older drugs, this effect may be even higher, given that 
for years PSRs most likely did not use such devices, during the initial phases of the products 
life cycle. The second one is the evidence that laptop-based materials appear to have an 
average negative effect on drug sales, but a positive effect on older drugs. Again, this may be 
explained by the fact that older drugs were mainly promoted, for years, using printed 
materials. Our results also seem to suggest that the use of printed materials during the calls 
does not provoke a substantial impact on drug sales. One potential explanation may reside on 
the fact that delivering printed materials may no longer translate into a competitive advantage 
of the companies in relation to their competitors. Another contribution is the apparent 
suggestion that a higher declared intention (by doctors) of starting prescribing or increasing 
prescriptions of the detailed product to be positively associated with drug sales, but only for 
older products. This may be explained, as addressed above, by the sense of loyalty or 
reciprocity, rewarding PSRs that have been visiting them for longer (promoting drugs 
launched in the market many years before). Finally, another interesting contribution is the 
seeming conclusion that a higher average number of products presented during the calls 
negatively impacts drug sales of the product analyzed. This may be explained by the dilution 
of the message of the main product when other products are promoted during the call (doctors 
awareness of the message of the main product may be therefore lower, which may have a 
negative effect on his or her prescription of the main product). 
From a theoretical point of view, the new variables addressed above brought novel, fresh data 
to the study of pharmaceutical marketing and specifically detailing, as demonstrated by the 
deep analysis of the models, variables and conclusions of more than 40 quantitative papers in 
pharmaceutical marketing involving detailing. These variables are new, launched by IMS 
Health in the second decade of 2000, therefore with little time for analysis by previous 
researchers. 
10.9.2. Model 8.4 
Our research with Model 8.4 also includes new contributions to the theory on pharmaceutical 
marketing and marketing regulation policy. The main contribution is the evidence that the 
entry into force of a detailing ceiling may not directly lead to a significant change in physician 
prescription behavior (and therefore a significant effect on drug sales). This was clearly seen 




1960). Another contribution – consequence of the previous one – is the evidence that, from a 
pure statistical point of view, drugs with higher and lower detailing intensity do not always 
suffer differentiated impacts after the entry into force of a detailing ceiling. Our research 
demonstrated that seven out of 10 drugs with a previous lower detailing intensity saw their 
detailing elasticities grow, but this effect was not statistically significant. 
 
10.10. Limitations 
Our research incorporated a series of limitations, which we tried to summarize in the 
subchapters below. For a better interpretation, we separated the limitations to Model 7 and to 
Model 8.4. 
10.10.1. Model 7 
We start with a data procedure limitation (common to all models, including Model 8.4). For 
detailing stock calculation (starting from January 2012), detailing flow for the period of 
January 2011 to December 2011 may not fully represent the real investments made by 
manufacturers, since it was calculated using Rizzo (1999)’s and Windmeijer et al (2006) 
approaches. This limitation would only be fully solved by having access to more data, which 
was not possible given the specificities of IQVIA’s database (no monthly information 
available for promotional investments before January 2012). However, we believe the 
procedures observed are reliable and provided sufficient robustness for our detailing stock 
variable. 
Another limitation resides in the fact that the contribution to the theory allowed by Model 7, 
despite its global adherence to previous research conducted by many scholars investigating 
pharmaceutical marketing and detailing (especially in terms of the expected signals of the 
coefficients), is based mostly in non-significant coefficients, which limit the inference of our 
results. However, the percentage of coefficients that simultaneously have the expected signal 
and are significant is in line of Leeflang & Wieringa (2010). 
Another limitation is related to this previous one. Our option was to directly apply several 
models developed by other researchers in the past, and test the extent to which they would be 
adequate to our data. This decision – despite resulting in many non-significant independent 
variables coefficients, had to be made in order to compare our results against the outputs of 
the several models, allowing us to critically discuss the results in light of theory. We tried to 




significant variables, which we called Model 8.1. However, the results obtained in a sample of 
10 products demonstrated that almost all variables ended up removed from Model 8.1, 
suggesting that there is a very high degree of heterogeneity. We also did not test the 
robustness of models 1 to 8.3 in terms of collinearity, normality of residuals, 
homoscedasticity, and reset test, only performing it in Model 8.4, our final model, used to 
perform the Chow (1960) test. 
An additional limitation resides in the fact that we used, for promotion expenditures, data 
coming from a panel comprising a sample of physicians, whereas sales data almost perfectly 
represents the population. However, IQVIA guarantees sample representativeness in terms of 
specialties, regions and doctor characteristics, and therefore we assumed panel full 
representativeness for inference purposes. Such data from IQVIA was also used, as noted 
before, by a great number of researchers studying time series of drug sales and pharmaceutical 
promotion expenditures. By other words, the inferencial part is conditional to the assumption 
of the correct representativeness of IQVIA doctor panel. 
 
10.10.2. Model 8.4 and Chow test 
The model we used to run the Chow (1960) test suffered from severe misspecification (60% 
of products with p-values lower than 1%, and 73,3% with p-values lower than 5% in the 
Reset). This is the equivalent to say that our model lacks non-linear variables or interactions 
we were not able to capture, in line of the conclusions reached by Wieringa & Leeflang 
(2013) in their application of pharmaceutical marketing models. However, despite this 
important limitation, Model 8.4 was sufficiently robust to allow us to perform the analyses 
(seen in the percentage of product coefficients with signal as expected and statistically 










11. Empirical study - qualitative 
This chapter starts by exploring the fieldwork procedures and development, and then moves 
to the content analysis of the collected data. 
11.1. Fieldwork 
This sub-chapter is divided in two components: the non-structured interviews that took place 
at the beginning of the PhD thesis development, and the in-depth interviews made with a 
group of pharmaceutical industry stakeholders. 
11.1.1. Non-structured interviews 
These interviews occurred in December 2016, April 2017 and May 2017, and were made with 
pharmaceutical industry high officers to understand several aspects: 
 The main issues pharmaceutical companies face at the moment 
 Main communication channels and promotion instruments used by the pharmaceutical 
companies to interact with physicians 
 Implementation of the detailing ceiling in 2013 
 Existence of previous detailing ceilings before 2013 
The meetings took place in informal settings, and sound was not recorded. Manual notes were 
taken, written at the researcher’s physical notebook, and later written in digital format. 
The characterization of the interviewees is summarized below, in table 11.1. 
Table 11.1 – Characterization of the participants in the non-structured interviews 
 
Source: own elaboration 
11.1.2. In-depth interviews 
As described before, we selected a list of 15 high officers to interview. The next sub-chapters 
will describe the procedures, difficulties, and alternatives developed during this phase. 




1 M 45 to 54 IQVIA >20
2 M 45 to 64 IQVIA >20
3 M >64 Top pharmaceutical company >20




11.1.2.1. Initial procedures 
We used our personal and professional network to find officers that matched the defined 
profiles. We used face-to-face, phone, and digital communication interactions in order to find 
and invite a first series of officers. The contacts started at the last two weeks of December 




A first constraint was derived by the fact that the researcher was developing his professional 
activity in Barcelona, every Monday to Thursday, which significantly limited the window of 
opportunity to meet in Portugal (Fridays only). Then after a very strong first wave of 
interviews, we started facing difficulties to obtain more relevant profiles and their acceptance 
of the interviews. The main constrain was their availability to meet. For instance, only at the 
third attempt, and after more than 10 e-mail and phone messages, we were able to interview a 
very high officer from a top pharmaceutical company. In order to overcome this difficulty, we 
reached a reference consultant in the pharmaceutical industry (one of the interviewees), whom 
we have a very close professional relation with, to assist us with relevant profiles. Several 
names were then suggested, which we contacted, resulting in a few more interviews. This was 
also the officer who allowed us to reach a very high officer from the 21
st
 Constitutional 
Government’ Ministry of Health (which, following his recommendation, we reached at a 
social network, and surprinsigly answered us). 
We faced another difficulty, when we contacted Infarmed CIMI (Centro de Informação do 
Medicamento e Produtos de Saúde, or Medicine and health products center of information). 
We first received a request to send the script, which we did, and a few days after we received 
a phone call, arguing that Infarmed cannot provide us with the requested information. We 
recorded our feedback after this call, which we transcribe now: “Today is the 20
th
 of 
December 2018. I recently received a telephone call from Infarmed, by the person ------, who 
told me that Infarmed can not help me to answer the qualitative guide, because it is not part of 
the Infarmed roles to help in this scope, in doctoral thesis, in particular in the interpretation or 
commentary on the measures that have been taken in the field of health”. Given the 
impossibility to have Infarmed’s contribution, we decided to remove it from the list of 
institutions in our eligible profiles. 
Another difficulty we faced was also unexpected. We thought the less difficult target to reach 
would be the pharmaceutical sales representatives (reps), given that we have a relevant 




target to reach, and the main reason is simple: most pharmaceutical companies, through their 
legal and compliance departments, asked their PSRs to sign confidentiality and non-disclosure 
contractual terms, which prohibit them to speak about their professional activity. We even 
suggested reps to submit the transcriptions of their eventual interviews to their compliance 
officers, but that proposal was not accepted.  
The way we solved these issues consisted of three activities: the first was to ask a doctor we 
interviewed to provide us with a list of PSRs in the markets of interest (Blood, Pancreas, 
Heart, and Liver). To our amazement, after the interview, the doctor pulled his phone and 
contacted two PSRs, who immediately acceded to be interviewed (one of which cancelled the 
meeting a few hours before the scheduled time); the second was to ask contacts to a former 
colleague who we worked with at Cegedim and to a former client who we provided 
consulting services to, which resulted in two additional interviews with PSRs; and the third 
was to ask assistance to a reference operations director, whose professional network allowed 
us to interview two additional PSRs. 
The final difficulty was the inability to reach high officers from the 19
th
 Constitutional 
Government’ Ministry of Health. We identified three relevant profiles, reached them directly 
through social networks, and indirectly through contacts from our personal and professional 
network, but were not able to have a reply. These would surely be very interesting profiles to 
interview, but we believe this could partially be substituted by a deep analysis of the preamble 
of Order 8213-B/2013. Following the procedures prescribed in the study protocol, we opted to 
make some telephone interviews, on the second half of the fieldwork phase, in order to 
complete all profiles. 
11.1.2.3. Adaptations to the list of profiles to interview 
During the fieldwork, we added additional profiles to our list of officers, in order to both 
overcome the difficulties described in the previous sub-chapter, and to increase the robustness 
of our data collection, expanding the geographic scope to other areas than the Greater Lisbon 
(including South – Algarve and Alentejo, Greater Oporto, and Center). Also, one of our 
contingency plan PSRs accepted being interviewed. The goal was to increase the likelihood of 
finding regional patterns in the answers of the interviewees, and therefore increase the 
representativeness and robustness of this data collection step and content analysis. As a result, 




Therefore, the final list of interviewed officers is shown below, in table 11.2. 
Table 11.2 – Final list of interviewed officers – in-depth interviews 
 










Infarmed officer Greater Lisbon N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
High Officer from the XIXth Ministry of Health Greater Lisbon N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
I1 High Officer from the XXIst Ministry of Health Greater Lisbon 11-ene Face to face 0:35:09 M ≥45 PhD >20
I2 NHS ACES Functional Unit Coordinator Greater Lisbon 04-ene Face to face 0:55:38 F ≥45 Degree >20
I3 NHS Hospital Clinical Director Greater Lisbon 11-ene Face to face 0:54:16 F ≥45 MSc / MBA >20
I4 NHS + Private Practice General Practitioner (physician) Greater Lisbon 16-feb Face to face 0:44:22 M ≥45 Degree >20
I5 NHS + Private Practice General Practitioner (physician) Center 19-ene Face to face 0:50:08 M ≥45 Degree >20
I6 NHS + Private Practice General Practitioner (physician) Greater Oporto 16-feb Telephone 0:36:21 F ≥45 Degree >20
I7 NHS + Private Practice General Practitioner (physician) Algarve / Alentejo 11-mar Telephone 0:38:37 M ≥45 Degree >20
I8 NHS + Private Practice Hospital Specialist (physician) Greater Oporto 22-feb Telephone 0:45:54 F ≥45 Degree >20
I9 High Officer from a top pharmaceutical company Greater Lisbon 25-ene Face to face 0:28:37 F ≥45 Degree >20
I10 High Officer from a top pharmaceutical company Greater Lisbon 25-ene Face to face 0:55:36 M ≥45 Degree >20
I11 High Officer from APIFARMA Greater Lisbon 01-feb Face to face 1:19:53 M ≥45 Degree >20
I12 High Officer from APIFARMA Greater Lisbon 01-feb Face to face 1:19:53 M ≥45 PhD >20
I13 Rep Market 1 - Blood Algarve / Alentejo 09-mar Telephone 0:46:49 M ≥45 Degree >20
I14 Rep Market 3 - Heart Greater Lisbon 22-feb Face to face 1:04:48 M ≥45 Degree >20
I15 Rep Market 2 - Pancreas Algarve / Alentejo 06-mar Telephone 0:42:20 M ≥45 Degree >20
I16 Rep Market 2 - Pancreas Greater Lisbon 11-mar Telephone 0:53:41 F ≥45 Degree >20
I17 Rep Market 4 - Liver Greater Oporto 06-mar Telephone 0:45:06 F ≥45 Degree >20
I18 High Officer from IQVIA Greater Lisbon 04-ene Face to face 0:40:50 M ≥45 MSc / MBA >20
I19 High Officer from Lean Health Consulting Greater Lisbon 15-feb Face to face 0:41:46 M ≥45 MSc / MBA >20



















In the table above, we did not provide a higher detail on the age interval and years of 
experience in order to mitigate the possibility of identification of the participants. 
11.1.2.4. Sound recording, notes and researcher feedback 
All interviewees gave their consent to record the interview. For that, we used a smartphone 
with the app “REC Voice Recorder”, which generated MPEG-4 Audio files, then saved in the 
researcher’s laptop. The interviews duration ranged from (HH:MM:SS) 00:28:37 to 01:19:53, 
with an average of 00:49:41, globally inside the 45 to 60 minutes interval that was announced 
at the beginning of each interview. 
The researcher took hand-written notes whenever relevant, to gather impactful insights 
whenever they appeared. Finally, the researcher recorded his own feedback speech after each 
interview, at the same app, producing sound files with duration of between 1 and 10 minutes. 
11.1.2.5. Evolution of the number of in-depth interviews 
In nine of the 11 weeks between the beginning of January 2019 and the middle of March, 
there were in-depth interviews performed, whose evolution is shown below in figure 11.1 
(performed interviews and cumulative interviews in each week). 
 






The transcriptions of the face-to-face in-depth interviews were assisted by NVivo 
Transcription software. The quality of the automatic transcriptions may be considered 
reasonable, but it seems to be more calibrated to Brazilian Portuguese than to European 
Portuguese. Moreover, the automatic transcription did not use punctuation. All automatic 
transcriptions were adequately validated, to amend imprecisions and to include pontuation. 
Overall, despite these limitations, it helped reduce the transcription time by around 30%, 
according to our perception. The interviews made by telephone, given the pooerer quality 
when compared to the face-to-face ones, were not able to be automatically transcribed (the 
software did not appear to separate the natural background noise from human speech). 
Normal, fully manual transcriptions were made in these cases (seven out of 20 interviews). 
To the extent possible, we removed all references to names, pharmaceutical companies, and 
comments from interviewees that could nominatively identify them as participants or expose 
their companies or other companies. Therefore, the interviewees appear as I1 (interviewee 1), 
I2 (interviewee 2), and so on. These codes appear in table 11.2, shown a few pages above. 
 
11.3. Global metrics 
11.3.1. In-depth interviews 
We start this sub-chapter by briefly explaining the procedures observed at NVivo. We started 
by uploading a series of files: 
 Interviews transcriptions – 20 files 
 Interviews sound recording – 19 files (two interviewed officers at Apifarma, with one 
single sound file) 
 Researcher observations transcriptions – 20 files 
 Researcher observations sound recording – 19 files 
 Researcher observation transcription on Infarmed interaction – 1 file 
 Researcher observation sound recording on Infarmed interaction – 1 file 
 Legislation and related documents – 5 files 
We then created 23 cases, one for each of the 20 interviewees, one for Infarmed, one for the 
researcher, and one for the legislation. We then associated each file to the correspondent case. 




this case classification (to basically “explain” NVivo that 20 cases - interviewed people - 
correspond to interviewed persons). 
The cases can be seen in figure 11.2 below. 
 
Figure 11.2 – Cases loaded in NVivo 
 
The next procedure we implemented was to insert the structure of the conceptual model. To 
do this, we created a node called “Model” → “General Data” and added additional nodes to 






Figure 11.3 – Conceptual model operationalized in NVivo 
Next, we created the structure of the questionnaire, inserting all 28 questions. After this, we 
associated, one by one, all the answers of all interviewees to the corresponding nodes, that is, 
to each of the questions, reaching 20 files and initial references per question, as shown below 
in figure 11.4: 
 




The following step was the coding of the interviwee answers. To do this, we observed a 
question by question logic, exemplified below: 
 We started with question number one, by reading all answers (20 respondents), and 
coded, in the analysis model, the main groups (or nodes) we found relevant 
 Then we moved to question number two, reading all answers and then coding the 
relevant nodes 
 We continued this analysis until we reached question number 28 
During this process, we also associated interviews excerpts to the recently created nodes 
(codes). The coding process was interactive, given that we improved the previous coding by 
incorporating new insights gathered in subsequent questions. We then coded the researcher 
observations. 
The following step was the validation of the coding process, in order to find eventual 
inconsistencies and improve overall logic and robustness. To do this, we fully read all the 
references inside each node, and performed the following corrections or improvements: 
 Uncoding of “Literature” and “Informative material” references from “Mail” node 
(communication channels) – the references did not explicitely indicate they were sent 
by mail 
 Elimination of the node “Less sponsorships” and included the reference in 
“Utilization of less expensive channels”, which already had similar references from 
other cases 
 Uncoding of “Brochures” reference from “Mailing” node (promotion instruments) – 
the reference did not explicitely indicate brochures were sent by mail 
 Uncoding of “Presence at events” reference from “Congresses” node – the reference 
did not explicitly the events were congresses. A later comment from the same 
interviewee clearly indicated he or she was talking about congresses (and therefore 
instead of two references, we opted to having only the explicit one) 
 Uncoding of “Internet” reference from “E-mailing” node – the reference was not 
explicitly enough to be considered e-mailing 
 Uncoding two references of “Medical press” from “Medical literature”, given that it 
could be more precisely coded at “Journal advertising” – in one of the cases the 
reference was already there (at “Journal advertising”), and in another we coded it in 




 Renaming of the node “Generics shift from physicians to pharmacists” to “Generics 
promotion shift from physicians to pharmacists”, to better define its scope 
 Creation of sub-nodes inside the node “Control patterns”, to better represent the 
contributions from the interviewees (with the sub-nodes “By region”, “By type of 
institution”, “By type of HCO leadership”, and “By temporal evolution”) 
  Other amendments of lower magnitude 
 The result of this process can be schematically visualized in appendix 5, where we present a 
series of outputs obtained during the qualitative analysis with NVIVO (coding statistics, and 
additional tables and figures). 
 
11.4. Results 
In this sub-chapter we addressed the results of the non-structured interviews, and of the in-
depth interviews (including the researcher observations and all other relevant files). 
11.4.1. Non-structured interviews 
The main insights gathered during the non-structured interviews with pharmaceutical industry 
specialists are summarized next. 
 Compulsory prescription by INN 
o With the compulsory prescription by INN, there was an initial resistance from 
the pharmaceutical industry. Exceptions to the strict prescription bu INN (that 
is, without brand) were created, allowing physicians to select a specific brand 
of generics, given certain conditions 
 One was the existence of some side effects, which had to be previously 
reported to Infarmed (which represented a flat fall of the exception, 
given that the great majority of phsycians had not reported those 
aledged side effects previously) 
 Another was the case of chronic pathologies, given that these are the 
ones where physicians can justify the choice of a branded medicine (for 
these purposes, chronic conditions are the ones where patients are 
medicated for a period higher than 28 days, such as typically 
hypertension, diabetes, and other) 
o Pharmaceutical companies shifted their reps teams from phsycians to 




emptied, and the bargaining power shifted to pharmacies, which had to 
dispense the least expensive option from a list of three or five generics, but 
whenever they did not have none of these, they could ask the patient to sign the 
back of the doctor prescription, and thus accepting to be given other brand. 
Only one or two generics companies are now visiting some physicians, but 
mainly for prestige or institutional awereness (to demonstrate that the factories 
are safe, modern, and so on) 
 
 Compulsory electronic prescription - with the entry into force of the electronic 
prescription, the NHS adapted the prescription softwares to – purposely, as underlined 
by the specialists we spoke with during this phase – hamper the ability of phsycians to 
prescribe a specific brand of generics. The systems became much less user-friendly, 
and physicians have to scroll down until they find the generics brand they want to 
prescribe, and then apparently have several confirmation boxes asking “are you 
sure?”, “there is another option less expensive available. Are you sure you want to 
prescribe a more expensive one?”. Some physicians initially resisted to these changes 
in the softwares, but finally the great majority apparently was “beaten” by the systems, 
because at the end of one working day those extra clicks could represent a non-
insignificant amount of minutes which could be dedicated to assistencial tasks, rather 
than mouse clicking. Also, this option would also save doctors’ patience. Therefore, 
the majority of physicians ended up by prescribing the first option that appears in the 
system, which is the one with the lower price for a particular active principle. By other 
words, physicians subordinated their prescription to the price of medicines and to the 
prescription softwares 
 
 Shift from ambulatory (retail) to hospital - the main pharmaceutical companies are 
shifting their focus from ambulatory (retail) to hospital, given: 
o The absence of big blockbusters in the ambulatory pipeline 
o The loss of exclusivity suffered by many of the big drug brands 
o The increasing competition face by companies (other branded competitors, 
generics) 






 Excessive number of reps – until 2010/2011, there was a disproportionate number of 
reps promoting drugs in the NHS. Pharmaceutical companies fought to have a high 
share of voice, in the assumption that this would result in a higher prescription and 
market share. Some territories (groups of bricks) had seven or more reps of each 
company, which were using mirror visits, or “Lines”, as called in Portugal. This 
created stress on the NHS institutions and physicians 
 
 Economic crisis – with the successive problems and deficits registered by the 
Portuguese economy, and the request for financial assistance, Portugal was intervened 
by Troika, which imposed several measures on the economy, including the 
pharmaceutical industry, which resulted in a very violent crisis also in the 
Pharmaceutical industry. This contributed to a strong reduction in the number of reps, 
starting from around 2012 
 
 Legislation initiatives - there were several legislation initiatives mainly during the 
Government of José Sócrates, with the goal of reducing the health expenditure. These 
initiatives focused the prices (several compulsory price reductions), the 
reimbursements, the generics, and other aspects of the pharmaceutical industry 
 
 Higher control of marketing initiatives – Infarmed has now the ability to control the 
marketing activities of pharmaceutical companies (with an investment higher than a 
specific amount). Companies have the obligation to register, at Placotrans – the 
transparency platform at Infarmed – the sponsorships, speaker fees, invitations to 
congresses, sponsored training, consultancy, etc, to each recipient, physicians and/or 
institutions 
With all these changes, and in light of this new paradigm, the limitations imposed to the 
number of visits by Order 8213-B/2013 had a mere virtual effect, given that the previous 
reduction on the number of reps, the shift of the bargaining power to the pharmacies, and 
the other context variables referred above, had already provoked a very strong reduction 
on the number of visits to the NHS. 
The only probable exceptions of products that may have not suffered from this new 




others, and a few novel drugs such as new antibiotics, that still have the patent active and 
therefore are not suffering from the competition of generics. 
When asked whether there were already limitations to the number of visits to the NHS, 
some of the specialists argued that some institutions – a minority - had already put in 
place some form of control before Order 8213-B/2013, but this was not generalized to all 
institutions in Portugal. Some institutions apparently had implemented limits on the daily 
number of reps, but there was not an effective limitation on the number of visits per year a 
company could make. Moreover, with the lines – or multiplication of “virtual” companies 
with the umbrella of a bigger company – reps could multiply their visits to the same NHS 
institution, by being enrolled in a few virtual companies. 
 
11.4.2. In-depth interviews, researcher observations, and legislation 
We divided the results by main dimension, and then by sub-dimension. 
11.4.2.1. Pharmaceutical communication channels and promotion tools 
1.1 - Communication channels 
The most referred communication channels were face-to-face (with 32 references from 23 
sources), digital (16 references from 14 sources), mail (11 references from nine sources), and 
telephone (five references and sources). These results are aligned with previous literature on 
pharmaceutical marketing, where face-to-face promotion investments (especially on detailing 
are on the top of the ranking of the pharmaceutical companies, as noted by Gagnon & 
Lexchin (2008) and by IMS Health (2015a). The interviewees who contributed more to this 
sub-dimension were physicians, PSRs and high officers (analysis by position). Interviewees 
I5 (physician) and I14 (PSR) were the most active in terms of number of references. The 
researcher was not expecting such a high number of references to the phone communication 
channel (teledetailing), given that it was not referred quite often by previous research in 
pharmaceutical marketing. 
In terms of patterns in the previous five years, there is an undoubtful tendency to increase the 
utilization of digital communication channels (31 references by 17 sources), which appears in 
line with IMS Health: 3,2% of the total pharmaceutical industry investment in 2014 (IMS 
Health, 2015a) and 3,8% in 2015 (IMS Health, 2016). High officers from the NHS and from 




Institution). A clear example of this tendency can be seen with this excerpt from I20: «Digital 
channels will be, more and more - and despite having some limitations – the most positive 
way of making the information reach the physicians». Other tendencies referred were the 
growing utilization of less expensive channels and less face-to-face interactions, and less 
materials sent by traditional mail. Three interviewees (one physician, one hospital director, 
and one high officer from a pharmaceutical company – analysis by position) revealed they did 
not see any pattern change in the previous five years. 
 
1.2 - Promotion tools 
This sub-chapter resulted in a substantial list of promotion instruments referred by the 
interviewees. The most mentioned one – by far – was detailing (45 references from 26 
sources), which validates previous research (Yi, Anandalingamb & Sorrell, 2003; Gagnon & 
Lexchin, 2008; Datta & Dave, 2016). These references were particularly active in the case of 
PSRs, physicians and high officers (analysis by position). Other promotion instruments which 
complete the top five were e-mailing, congresses, medical literature, and webinars, raising the 
evidence for the importance digital promotion channels are gaining (two instruments in the 
top five). An important part of the references to e-mailing was made by physicians, as the 
main targets of this instrument. Other instruments were referred, with a lower magnitude in 
terms of references, and these include clinical meetings, journal advertising, mailing (direct 
marketing), e-detailing, and tele-detailing. The researcher was expecting a higher number of 
references to e-detailing (some interviewees alleged that there were some experiences made 
with this instrument, but apparently were reduced or discontinued – examples: «There were 
some pharmaceutical companies – not many – which tried to contact doctors through skype» 
(I15), «there were some experiences for many companies with remote detailing» (I18)). 
Regarding the patterns in the previous five years, the top five of the references include more 
digital promotion instruments (17 references from 15 sources), less detailing, a higher 
strategic, scientific and economic focus, a higher usage of tablets during face-to-face 
interactions with physicians, and the shift of promotion from physicians to pharmacists (in the 
case of generics). These tendencies are particularly evident in excerpts of the interviewee I1, a 
very high officer from the ministry of health (21
st
 Constitutional Government): «Nowadays 
we talk about digital marketing and therefore digital marketing allows a number of new 




traditional visit that was paradigmatic, for an approach more based on alternative 
mechanisms of communication such as those associated today to the digital era», «Ethical 
aspects can under no circumstances be ignored, and therefore in the last five years we have 
improved the ethics of selling or the ethics of communication», «Marketing started to have a 
more strategic and more associated component to value and results, than to the mere sale of a 
product for a price or a price».  
These contributions were especially rich from the mentioned high officer from the ministry of 
health, and from high officers from pharmaceutical companies. Other tendencies mentioned 
include less Mailing (direct marketing), a higher focus on ROI analysis, patient benefit as the 
main driver (or create value to patient), create value to physicians as a partner, higher 
compliance and ethics, a holistic approach (targets), and resistance to non-personal Push 
initiatives.  
As a global pattern, we can conclude that the traditional way pharmaceutical companies used 
to communicate with physicians (mainly based on the benefits of the product) is being 
substituted by a new, more holistic, scientific and ethical way of interacting with the doctors, 
more centered in the patient and the pathology, as partners.  
Examples of this evidence can be seen in the following excerpts: «What is important is to 
safeguard that this is done in a framework not only of legal and competitive legitimacy, but in 
favor of the patient. Patients can not be instrumented by poor communication, or by a poor 
understanding of the doctor's message that is transmitted to them, or by a promotional 
attitude I would call more aggressive or less ethically controlled, which may lead to over-
prescription or inappropriate prescription» (I1), «Clearly the industry appears here as a 
partner that aims to also contribute to the improvement of the health of the population. This is 
undoubtedly a primary objective, which is naturally linked to the achievement of certain 
commercial objectives» (I10), «Higher rigour of the promotional practices, good practices, 
codes of ethics, all to ensure that the promotion activity does not become distorted. As all 
heard horrible stories in the past, such as people who complained about a broken nail and 
came out of the medical appointment with three antibiotics and two anti-inflammatories, these 
bizarre thinbs happened, there were those who tried to do it and there were those who would 
accept it. And we all have sinned. Today, honestly I think it's over. And if it exists, it should be 
very marginal» (I14). 




This sub-dimension includes several other sub-dimensions, which we analyzed separately. 
Pharmaceutical companies’ goals 
With this topic we wanted to evaluate the extent to which interviewees would provide frontal 
answers, and to our surprise the great majority of the participants (except one very political 
answer from a high officer from a consulting company) expressed genuine and direct answers, 
which we divided in three groups. The first is a commercial goal (expressed in 29 references 
from 25 sources), to sell drugs and make a profit on that. We underline a very interesting 
answer from a high officer from APIFARMA: «The commercial objective has nothing wrong 
with it! Obviously, it's totally legitimate. And therefore the medical visit will always have to 
underlie also the idea of showing what is the added value of the prescription of that particular 
medicine. Therefore, none of this is ethically wrong, quite the contrary, provided that the 
added value of the product is explained in relation to other competitors. It is always a goal of 
prescription. It is legitimate, admissible and legal. And the doctor has to prescribe in 
consciousness, knowing what he or she is going to prescribe» (I12). The second is to share 
information and train phsycians on drugs and pathologies (expressed in 15 references from 14 
sources), which is aligned with research from Alkhateeb & Doucette (2008) and Prosser & 
Walley (2003b). The great majority of these references were expressed by high officers from 
the pharmaceutical industry and by physicians. And a third goal, which is to substsitute the 
omission of Ministry of Health on training provided to physicians (11 references from seven 
sources). Some of the contributions were quite intense, assertive, and direct, arguing that the 
efforts made by the State (through the Ministry of Health, by the allowance of a number of 
days which can be used by physicians for their training – that they usually have to pay or to 
get sponsorship from the industry) appear to be insufficient to contribute to an adequate and 
permanent training and update of physicians of the NHS. Therefore, and following the 
explanation of some interviewees, the pharmaceutical industry appears to compensate this 
omission, by providing physicians regular access to information, novelties, studies, through 
PSRs, and through sponsorships to the participation in clinical sessions and congresses. 
APIFARMA had the highest number of references in this third goal, followed by high officers 
from the pharmaceutical industry. We provide two excerpts to illustrate some of the opinions 
on this subject, from one doctor (I02) and from a high officer from APIFARMA (I11): «Given 
that the information I receive from the pharmaceutical companies is almost the only one that 
exists, it is blessed because of that, reason why we have to accept it, I have to accept it, and 




better» (I02), and «One of the things we have seen before is that the State does not fulfil, or 
fulfils only partialy, its obligation of training doctors. It grants doctors 14 days for their 
training, which is already a contribute, but not more than that (…) and the pharmaceutical 
companies combat the deficiency in the physicians training (…) it is important for the doctor 
to know the latest developments (…) there is a face (the rep) that helps him or her to respond 
to the insufficiencies of the State, medical training wise» (I11). 
Factors influencing Rx decisions 
The main factors influencing physicians’ prescription decisions, according to the primary 
research conducted, include drug price and economic status of the patient (the highest referred 
factor, with 17 references from 15 sources). This very interesting evidence follows previous 
research by Pitt & Nel (1988); Gönül et al (2001), Spiller & Wymer (2001) and Stros & Lee 
(2015). The top five of factors also include the quality of the product (in line with 
Venkataraman & Stremersch (2007), Fischer, Leeflang & Verhoef (2010), Stros & Lee 
(2015)), evidence & literature & guidelines (in line with Aronson (2006) and Huskamp, 
Epstein & Blumenthal (2003)), the relation with PSR and the pharmaceutical company (in 
line with Pitt & Nel (1988), and Stros and Lee (2015)), and own experience and habit (in line 
with Pitt & Nel (1988), and Spiller & Wymer (2001)). This last factor is mostly evident in the 
following excerpt: «Doctors tend to keep a portfolio of their own products, because they 
manage them well, give them security, do not have major problems, doctors have in their 
heads two or three or four standard analgesics, antipyretics, have a few antibiotics (…) there 
is a portfolio, which is personal» (I1).  
Other factors influencing prescription behavior include the physician profile, peers & 
scientific societies, the prescription software (in the scope of prescribing restriction policies 
highlighted by Spiller & Wymer (2001), and Schumock et al (2004), trust, confidence and 
prestige (pharmaco) (Pitt & Nel, 1988), adequacy to the clinical status, simplicity to the 
patient, and the patient him or herself. Two relevant analyzes can be made here: one regarding 
product quality, and one regarding physician profile. We divided the references related to 
quality into eight attributes, here listed: efficacy in terms of results to the patient, safety & 
minimal side effects, quality in general, drug backed by research & innovation, drug has 





We believe this division provides a better understanding of the umbrella word quality. 
Physicians were the highest contributors to the references regarding the quality aspects, and 
one of the top three contributors to the factors influencing prescription decisions, alongside 
with high officers from pharmaceutical companies and PSRs. Regarding physician profile, 
based on the analysis of the interviewees we were able to divide the references into five 
categories: there are many physician profiles, university where they got their degree, attitude 
in relation to the Rx of new drugs, GPs vs Specialists, and younger vs older physicians. The 
second of these categories was quite unexpected since to the extent of our knowledge it has 
not been addressed by previous research.  
An interesting excerpt sheds light on this: «First, there is an important factor that clearly is 
the school (university) to which the doctor belongs (Lisbon, Coimbra, Porto), and this is often 
perfectly noticed in the performance of the products, ie a certain product in Lisbon can have 
a certain performance and then we'll see in Porto and it's completely the opposite. We often 
look for the reason for this, and one of the reasons, of course, is that we realize that in that 
school specifically the University of Porto or the University of Lisbon there is an 
understanding that the treatment should be done in the form A and in Lisbon they understand 
that it must be done in the form B» (I10).  
The third category evidences the attitude in the prescription of new products, whether the 
doctor is more innovator or more conservative, and the fourth suggests that GPs and 
specialists may have distinct attitudes in the prescription («There are doctors who are 
conservative and like to keep their prescription, such as some GPs», I16). 
Influence of promotion instruments on prescription behavior 
Only one interviewee (I11, from Apifarma) declared that promotion instruments do not have 
an effect on prescription behavior. The general evidence is that these instruments have an 
effect on physician prescription behavior (12 references from 12 sources), of which five from 
PSRs. This influence can be detected in some of excerpts, such as «Historically, yes 
(promotion instruments do influence prescription behavior). To see that we can analize the 
pharmaceutical market and its evolution, where several approaches were taken» (I10), and 
«Clearly, yes (promotion instruments influence prescription behavior» (I17).  
We then analyzed the ways this influence can be expressed, and a series of reasons appeared. 
The most referred one was through novelties (where pharmaceutical companies and PSRs 




from a doctor, manager of a group of health centers in the Lisbon area: «(the influence) 
Mainly thought the novelties. Nobody likes not knowing the novelties, and the novelties 
naturally bring the will to try. It’s very obvious the effort that has been made in relation to 
certain drugs, such as oral antidiabetics, oral anticoagulants, etc» (I02).  
Other reasons to explain this influence include the assistance of physicians in their 
prescription decisions, the power of persuasion, the reduction of prescription risk of 
physicians, and awareness rising of the pathology. 
Most influential promotion instruments 
In this topic, and given that we are using a qualitative approach, we were not able to quantify 
the comparative influence of the promotion instruments listed by the interviewees. Therefore, 
we present here, by descending order, the tools by number of references. The most referred 
tool was, by a comfortable margin (26 references from 25 sources), detailing, which, despite 
the different scopes (qualitative vs quantitative research), is consistent with previous research 
conducted by Narayanan, Manchanda & Chintagunta (2003), and by Kremer, Bijmolt, 
Leeflang & Wieringa (2008). In second, third and fourth places in number of references there 
are congresses (19 references from 19 sources), clinical meetings (13 references from 13 
sources), and medical literature (six references from six sources).  
The last places in terms of number of references are journal advertising, e-mailing and 
webinars. It is not a trivial exercise to compare these tools against tools addressed by previous 
research, given the noted differences in methodology, but also due to the different aggregation 
of promotion instruments used by other researchers. When we analyzed these evidences in 
light of the characterization variable position, there are clearly much more references coming 
from PSRs and physicians (15 out of 26 references, which compares to 10 out 20 
interviewees). 
Importance of detailing to pharmacos 
Now entering into detailing as a promotional instrument, very stimulating evidence was 
gathered. Detailing has a decisive importance to pharmaceutical companies given that it 
allows them to explore the relation, the friendliness and friendship, and affectivity between 
their PSRs and the physicians they visit. This evidence received 32 references from 15 
different sources, and was particularly more obvious among PSRs (the major contributors, 




very revealing of this aspect, such as «(…) we create empathy, friendship, and then when we 
have two or three similar drugs, surely our preference will go to the one from the rep we 
establish a better connection with, a personal and friendship relation» (I04), and «I prescribe 
what I know, from the rep I have a closer proximity with, the relational component, the 
friendship (…) yes, it is important, there is affectivity over the years» (I06), and «Many years 
ago, back in the day, my daughters were little girls and my colleagues’ kids were also small. 
They grew together in many convivialities extra work organized – and I don´t mean 
sponsored – by pharmaceutical companies, and we had a very close relation with reps, which 
now we don´t see anymore. At all!» (I06).  
The importance of PSR friendliness was previously addressed by Andaleeb and Tallman 
(1996). Another reason to justify the importance of detailing to pharmacos is the exploration 
of reciprocity, previously addressed by Roughead, Harvey & Gilbert (1998) and Katz, Caplan 
and Merz (2010). Some of the most relevant excerpts include, from one physician and one 
PSR: «The big pharmaceutical multinationals helped me a lot in my career, by providing easy 
access to information, helping me to go to congresses, to which I would not be able to go 
without their support (…) so if there are five similar products, which one will I prescribe?» 
(I05), and «(…) there is reciprocity, and confidence. The common goal is to treat the patient 
the best way possible, and there is a relation of reciprocity there. I give information, the 
doctor receives it, the doctor reaches me with doubts, I clarify him or her, and if the doctor 
feels he or she has a partner helping him or her to get an adequate, impartial answer, then a 
relation of confidence will be set and the relation will grow, which is critical» (I13).  
Doctors and PSRs were the profiles (in terms of the characterization variable position) with 
the highest number of references regarding reciprocity (six each one). Another reason pointed 
out during the fieldwork was the personal contact (face to face) with the physicians, 
previously addressed by Prosser & Walley (2003b), in the sense that physicians retain 
information better in a face-to-face setting.  
The fourth and last reason to justify the importance of detailing to pharmacos was the fact that 
detailing allows the maximization of the share of voice (SOV), very evident in the following 
excerpt from a senior consultant: «Starting from the basics, detailing is important because 
when my products are being promoted during the visits, other products are not, and this is a 
very important aspect, which is to occupy space» (I20). The concept and importance of share 




Importance of detailing to physicians 
The importance of detailing to physicians can be seen in four reasons. The first two ones are 
the fact that PSRs provide novelties and continuous training (19 references from 13 sources) 
and provide convenience (through direct and quick access (32 references from 12 sources)). 
These reasons were previously discussed by Alkhateeb & Doucette (2008) and Prosser & 
Walley (2003b), and by Chimonas, Brennan & Rothman (2007). An excerpt from a physician 
is revealing of this importance: «I must thank to all the pharmaceutical companies that helped 
me to improve my professional career, because they gave me much more training than the 
State! Had it not been for the labs, clinically I wouldn’t be who I am today; I wouldn’t have 
the capacity to be who I am, as a doctor. Therefore I would give a thank you to the labs that 
helped me on that» (I06). The main contributors in terms of references were the phsycians (11 
references).  
Other reasons to justify the importance of detailing to phsycians include the reminder to older 
products, and the preference for personal contact (the latter referred by Prosser & Walley 
(2003b)). One interesting pattern we were able to detect, which we consider novel to the 
extent of our knowledge, is the clear distinction between younger and older physicians in their 
attitude towards detailing. Younger physicians – systematically identified by interviewee as 
having up to around 45 years old – tend to give a lower importance to detailing, being more 
difficult to reach by PSRs. As some PSRs and physicians noted, younger physicians tend to 
be heavy users of the internet, on-line communities where they share and dissecate new 
scientific articles, tend to have lower social and interaction abilities when dealing with 
patients, and only open their doors to PSRs when they need a sponsorship to a specific event 
such as a congress, but right after that event they tend to “forget” the sponsor and close the 
door to their detailing initiatives.  
Younger phsycians appear to be more sensitive to discuss the pathology rather than the 
product, and seem to be more sensitive to discuss medicine of evidence. In contrast, older 
physicians (systematically identified as having more than 45 years old) tend to appreciate the 
visits of PSRs, tend to value their regular assistance, since they are not as agile in seeking 
information on the web as their younger peers. Some excerpts are particularly clarifying about 
this attitude of younger doctors, such as «Those younger doctors don’t need to speak with the 
rep, and don´t even need to speak to other doctors! They don´t suffer from any doubt! Those 
doctors from Google, from the web, with less than 45 or 40 years old. I do urgencies and I see 




opinion, and now the younger doctors don´t need any opinion at all! They look into the 
evidence A, B and C, and that´s it. They go to Google, they check the level of evidence, and 
know everything» (I06), and «Nowadays new school doctors are smartphone doctors, they use 
tables, the web, while old school doctors typically receive information through the industry 
(reps) or through congresses, and that’s it! » (I10).  
Also, regarding the attitude of older doctors we selected the excerpts «Old school doctors, 
who were all their professional life in contact with the pharmaceutical industry, are persons 
much closer to the industry, because they grew with the industry, the industry participated 
immensely in their medical training. And this is quite evident today, where the rep has a much 
higher access to those doctors» (I10), and «Doctors older than 45 years old give a high 
importance to detailing, since detailing is a part to their daily activities, of their training, of 
their knowledge recycling, of their update» (I14). 
Importance of detailing vs different product scopes 
Detailing is perceived as more effective in the case of originator drugs, as opposed to generic 
drugs. This perception was particularly expressed by physicians and by PSRs. Some reasons 
for that include the fact that there is no point on continuing detailing doctors after a drug loses 
its patent, given that pharmaceutical companies will move their investments to the pharmacy 
channel, visiting pharmacists. The following excerpt enriches this perception: «No, (the 
importance) is not the same! It is higher regarding an innovator, or that at least appears in 
the market. Older products do not visit us anymore (…) nobody speaks about them anymore!» 
(I03). 
Detailing is also perceived as more effective in the case of younger versus older drugs. This 
perception is validated by previous research conducted by Narayanan et al (2003), 
Manchanda, Rossi & Chintagunta (2004), Manchanda & Honka (2005), Narayanan et al 
(2005), Dave (2013), and by our own research. Two revealing excerpts are now shown, from 
one high officer from a top pharmaceutical company (I09) and from a physician (I04): «The 
importance and interest (of detailing) is higher for new drugs. It makes more sense in new 
drugs than in old ones widely used and known and where there are many therapeutic 
alternatives, and where these visits become noisy, do not truly add value» (I09), and 
«Detailing old products does not make sense at all! The medicine is well known, there no use 




very boring... I apologize for introducing this language in your interview (laughs), but those 
reps are really like a mosquito» (I04). 
Doctor self-perception of detailing influence 
One relevant aspect we wanted to understand was doctor perception of the influence of 
detailing on their prescription decision. All seven physicians (five practicing physicians and 
two high officers from one hospital and one health center) noted that detailing can influence 
their prescription behavior. This evidence is somewhat converse to previous research 
conducted by Steinman, Shlipak & McPhee (2001), where they found that 60% of the 
physicians stated that pharmaceutical industry promotions and contacts did not have influence 
on their own prescribing. However, we do note that our sample is substantially smaller, and 
that additional research would be necessary to more clearly understand this topic, with a 
higher sample. The ways this influence is expressed, according to the seven interviewed 
doctors, includes five topics: they are influenced whenever PSRs bring them novelties, they 
are influenced due to the affective bond with reps, by reps alerting them to some specificities 
about the promoted drugs, by reminding them about the product, and by clarifying doubts 
(again, the principle of reciprocity addressed above is present). The following excerpt 
illustrates the recognition of the importance of affection, by a physician: «Yes it influences, by 
the help in training, by the relation with the rep, by the affective component» (I06). Curiously, 
one of the doctors, who as a first reaction stated that he was not influenced at all by detailing, 
later in the interview he admitted it can influence him by reminding him about existing 
products, that therefore can be chosen by the physician from a group of a few medicine 
alternatives. 
Doctor perception on comparative influence vs peers 
Another interesting aspect that we tried to capture during the fieldwork was the opinion of 
phsycians in relation to their perception of relative influence regarding detailing, in 
comparison to their peers. Five physicians argued they do not know how they compare to 
their peers, detailing influence wise. The other two phsycians argued that they are less 
influenced than their peers, which appears to be consistent with previous research developed 
by Sah & Fugh-Berman (2013), where physicians appeared to perceive themselves as more 
“immune” to detailing then their peers. Curiosly, these two physicians are the high officers 





Importance of new PSR competences 
A sub-topic that appeared in our research, which was not present in our script, addresses the 
importance of new PSRs competences, due to the changes that the Portuguese pharmaceutical 
market faced in the previous years. New PSR competences include the ability or sensitivity to 
evaluate the profile of each physician and adapt the approach and speech accordingly, which 
is aligned with findings from Rozell & Newman (2010) and Stros & Lee (2014), which 
underline the importance of the PSRs personality, emotional intelligence and customer 
orientation. New competences also include transparency and honesty in the sense that 
whenever he or she does not know how to answer a question he or she will say it. The ability 
to be didactic, be less aggressive, and engage into a good involvement with the doctors were 
also new PSR competences underlined during the fieldwork.  
Four of the five contributors to these insights were physicians, as the main evaluators of PSRs 
evolution over time. An explicating excerpt demonstrates some of the evidences described 
above: «I notice that lately reps are more informative, they bring (new information), they add 
value. This morning I had a presentation, and they are not really as aggressive as before, they 
do not make the suggestion to prescribe, except for one exception here and there, but I do not 
think they are so aggressive. Now they are more didactic, they try to bring more information, 
and therefore it is even more appealing to listen to them, I find them more informed, and in 
some areas they are much better prepared» (I08). 
Synthesis of the main findings – Dimension 1 
The main communication channel used to interact with physicians is still, by far, face-to-face, 
followed by digital, mail, and telephone. Whereas the market has been evidencing a reduction 
in the utilization of face-to-face, the digital channel has been growing especially since the 
beginning of the decade. Mail and telephone channels importance is being reduced. 
The most mentioned promotion tools currently being used in Portugal to promote medicines 
to physicians are detailing (as the clear leader, but losing some importance), e-mailing (which 
has been growting substantially in the last years), congresses, medical literature, and webinars 
(also noticing a growing utilization by pharmaceutical companies). Other instruments used 
include clinical meetings, journal advertising, mailing (tendentially falling into desuse), e-
detailing, and tele-detailing. Physicians – especially the younger generation – are more open 




Pharmaceutical companies’ main goal is to sell drugs (commercial goal), recognized as 
legitimate given that they are private companies operating in a competitive market, subject to 
a strict regulatory and ethical framework. Other goals include sharing information and train 
physicians on drugs and pathologies and substituting the State in the task of training NHS 
physicians. 
The main factors influencing physician prescription decisions include drug price and 
economic status of the patient, the quality of the product (including efficacy, safety and side 
effects, backed by research, innovation, precise indications, treatment breadth, fast and lasting 
effect), evidence, literature and guidelines, the relation with PSRs and with the 
pharmaceutical company, and own experience and habit. Other factors include the physician 
profile (including the university where they had their graduation, their specialization, their 
attitude, and their age group), peers and scientific societies, the prescription software, trust in 
the pharmaceutical company, adequacy the clinical status, simplicity to the patient, and the 
patients him or herselves. 
Promotion instruments can have a strong influence in physician prescription behavior, as 
noted by the great majority of interviewees, including all the PSRs, and this influence is 
consubstantiated by bringing novelties to physicians (new drugs, new studies), by persuasion, 
by the reduction of physician prescription risk, and by raising the awareness of pathologies. 
According to the insights gathered from the interviewees, the most influential promotion 
instruments are detailing, congresses, clinical meetings, medical literature. There were also 
references to journal advertising, e-mailing and webinars. 
Detailing is a very important promotion instrument to pharmaceutical companies, allowing 
them to explore the relation, the friendliness, friendship and affection between PSRs and 
physicians, and this evidence was backed by the majority of the interviewed physicians. 
Detailing also allows companies to explore the power of reciprocity, by providing easy access 
to information, and to explore the influence of the personal contact, given that many 
phsycians retain information better in a face-to-face interaction. Also, detailing allows the 
maximization of the share-of-voice. 
Physicians tend to value detailing given that it allows them to receive novelties and continuos 
training from pharmaceutical companies, providing convenience and reminding older 
products. Physician age group appears to have a strong impact on their attitude in relation to 




with the pharmaceutical industry and tend to value the assistance and regular presence of 
PSRs, younger physicians seem to attribute less importance to detailing, searching 
information in on-line communities, on-line journals, and at search engines, more focused on 
evidence than on the speech of PSRs.  
This is a challenge to the industry, to find the best approach to marketing and sales activities, 
adapted to these two very different doctor profiles. Detailing is more effective in the case of 
originator drugs (in comparison to generics), and more effective in the case of younger drugs 
(in opposition to older drugs). Doctors are aware of the influence of detailing on physician 
prescription behavior, and all admitted they can be influenced too. Two of the five physicians 
argued that they are less influenced than their peers, regarding the effect on detailing on their 
prescription choices. 
There is a growing importance of new PSR competences, including the ability to evaluate the 
physician profile, customer orientation, transparency and honesty, to be didactic and helpful, 
avoding commercial pressure on physicians. Interestingly, PSRs appear as the highest 
defensors of detailing, its importance, its usefulness to physicians, and its ability to impact 
physician prescription behavior. Perhaps these opinions may be somewhat biased given that 
the PSRs were defending and justifying their own “survival” in the industry, but the 
contributions appeared to be very genuine, direct, signaling that they strongle believe – and 
feel in the practice – their importance. 
 
11.4.2.2. Implementation of the detailing ceiling in the NHS 
Introduction 
By memory, we remind that there was already a detailing ceiling in force (Order 9630/2001, 
11
th
 April), but according to non-structured interviews conducted at the beginning of our 
research its application and control was not generalized through the country, and did not have 
a unique, centralized national control system with fixed criteria (Regional health 




 June) gave this national scope and clear and specific control 
procedures such as the obligation to register PSRs at Infarmed, a room dedicated to PSRs, and 




scheduling of visits and their control. Thses evidences are particularly clear in two 
contributions of a high officer from APIFARMA, with direct experience since the end of the 
decade of 1990 with legal activity from the successive ministers of health: «What does this 
2013 Order improve? A better control in hospitals and health centers, with the need for 
someone to have the responsibility of scheduling medical visits and controlling that 
scheduling», and «Infarmed did not want to control the PSRs because it was not within their 
competence ... but it ended up assuming this function at the request of the then Minister, a 
little unwillingly, because they centralized everything, instead of everything being dispersed 
by ARSs. It was the entity that could centralize this situation. From the moment INFARMED 
centralizes, I think that control starts to be more effective, because it ceases to be a paper, a 
list, an agenda that was easily scratchable, changeable... ‘take that name and put mine...’» 
(I12).  
The evidence of a previous detailing ceiling can be reinforced by contributions from some 
participants. When asked whether there was a previous detailing ceiling in place, we obtained 
confirmation from ten references (eight sources), but either the control was not generalized 
(six references from six sources) or there was not control at all (two references from two 
sources), also suggesting that each ARS (regional health administration) set their limits which 
were typically not generalized and national («Regional health administrations should 
establish standards for access to the facilities of hospitals and health centers, which will be 
duly publicized and respected by PSRs» (Legislation). Four references (from three sources) 
suggested that there was not detailing ceiling in place previous to Order 8213-B/2013. 
 
2.1 - Motivations and goals of the detailing ceiling 
Main goal 
We were able to find eight main goals of the implementation of the detailing ceiling in 2013 
(Order 8213-B/2013, 24th June), some of them somewhat related, but differentiated enough 
given the contributions of the interviewees. 
The most referred goal (with 30 references from 21 sources) was to reduce disturbance on 
health care organizations (HCOs) provoked by the presence of the PSRs. This can be seen on 
the following transcription excerpts: «I would not devalue a thing that I myself have also tried 




that) it is a factor of enormous disturbance» (I01), «(…) multitude of PSRs in the service and 
patients that are simultaneously the ones who will be the target of this... Anyway, it does not 
make sense. Let's just think a little, it's a fair! And a fair is what we need the least in a service 
with good competence» (I02), «everything was in excess, it looked like a fair (…)» (I08), «The 
aim was, in both Health Centers and hospitals, to avoid an amalgam of PSRs present in the 
various institutions» (I12), «I think it had to do with a regulatory effort that had to be made, 
because there was a lot of pandemonium up to that time ... I got to a health center to work 
and were 12 PSRs there (…) Aim to regulate, to avoid exaggeration, to avoid this nonsense» 
(I14), «I believe that the industry was to blame for this, because I remember being seven or 
eight PSRs in one HCO, it seemed a concentration for coffee rather than a health area» (I16), 
«The goal was to end the savagery. There was no control! Imagine a corridor with eight or 10 
PSRs! Often there was no privacy in the space where the doctor spoke with us, because they 
were patients there, all mixed up, it was not discrete at all and caused a great confusion (…) 
There were chaotic places» (I17), «It was an exaggeration. That is, it was an exaggeration in 
terms of the number of PSRs who walked in the institutions of the National Health Service» 
(I18). We can summarize some of the words associated with this goal: massive presence of 
PSRs, disturbance, multitude of PSRs, a fair, excess, amalgam, pandemonium, 
exaggeration, nonsense, concentration, savagery, confusion, and chaotic. 
The second most referred goal (with 27 references from 19 sources) was to reduce 
prescription (especially on newer, more expensive ones) and consumption, which reveals a 
very lucid and interesting perception that to an increase in the detailing intensity there can be 
an increase in prescription. Scientific articles in general were even referred by a few 
interviewees, as a proof of this relation (especially by a former high officer from the Ministry 
of Health of the 21
st
 Constitutional Government, PhD qualification). Some of the most 
revealing transcription excerpts evidence this goal: «(…) on the other hand because there was 
the perception - which I believe to be legitimate – that an overpushing in terms of 
promotional activity - and this comes in the literature – will induce more prescription» (I01), 
«I think it must have been in the sense of curbing what they (tutelage) obviously knew, that 
these visits influence prescription» (I03), « (…) lower prescription, and lower consumption» 
(I05), «(…) probably to lower prescription of newer and brand-name drugs» (I08), «Reduce 
spending on prescription, on the assumption that a higher number of PSRs visits is equivalent 
to a higher consumption of more expensive drugs and higher costs with reimbursement. No 
doubt about that» (I14), «The main thing I think was economical, because I remember several 




detailing and sales (prescriptions)» (I19). Curiosly, PSRs were in the origin of the highest 
number of references regarding this second goal, suggesting that they do know the impact 
they can have on the prescription behavior of physicians they visit. 
The third most referred goal (with 16 references from 15 sources) is related to the second: 
reduce commercial pressure of pharmaceutical companies (through their PSRs) on physicians. 
We opted to separate the second and third most referrerd goals given that the third is more 
generic, broader scope (reduce commercial pressure) and the second is more specific (reduce 
prescription). Some excerpts where this third goal is evident include «The implicit goal was to 
reduce the commercial pressure» (I01), «(…) avoid the excessive number of PSRs visits» 
(I09), «the goal was clear: to limit the promotion space of the industry» (I09). 
The fourth most referred goal (21 references from 14 sources) was to safeguard HCPs care-
related activity, allowing more time for assistential tasks, taking care of patients, instead of 
taking a non-insignificant amount of time dedicated to receive and excessive number of PSRs. 
Very interestingly, we found no contribution from PSRs to this goal, and the highest number 
of contributions came from physicians (nine references) and high officers (10 references, of 
which four from a high officer from the ministry of health very active in terms of health 
policy). Some of the transcription excerpts include «Do not harm the activities of care which, 
for me, is the most important aspect, do not harm the care activities or the patients rights (…) 
… do not interfere in the doctor-patient relationship and the quality of care» (I01), «Restrict 
the time PSRs may contact with doctors, so that it cannot take time dedicated to clinical 
activity» (I04), «Improve productivity (of doctors) (…) And the time PSRs ‘stole’, if we think a 
visit from a PSR can take ten minutes ... if we think about it... if I have three PSRs, it's 30 
minutes. If I have five PSRs, it's about one hour you get lost there, from one to the other. An 
hour of work a day is a lot of work that gets lost per day» (I05). Order 2013 preambule itself 
explicits this fourth goal: «The purpose of this Order is to establish the general rules 
governing the access of PSRs to NHS establishments and services and their contact with 
health professionals. In this way, the aim is to create the necessary conditions so that this 
activity does not interfere with, or in any way interfere with, the normal activity of the 
services, namely with regard to the provision of health care» (Legislation). 
The fifth most referred goal (25 references from 14 sources) was to discipline and dignify 
access to HCPs and HCOs. Many interviewees noted that an excessive presence of PSRs in 
the NHS institutions was also negative for PSRs, to their planning, to their work, and to their 




(confusion, noise, not dedicated space). For instance, this Order from 2013 foresaw the 
obligation of HCOs to have a dedicated room of space where PSRs could speak to physicians. 
Evidence from this fifth goal can be found in the following transcription excerpts «The 
purpose of the 2013 Order was first to discipline, to introduce some balancing and some 
common sense (…) so that there could be a period outside the assistance activity, and 
reserved areas, with a limitation of PSRs presence (…) even from the point of view of the 
dignity of the professional relationship, the work of industry professionals with physicians» 
(I01), «The goal was to normalize things a bit, because sometimes it would be too much. In 
other words, to define a norm, equality for all (…) There was some inequality between 
laboratories, in the access to doctors, in the opportunity for relationship, and thus this 
became more standardized, more equitable. Larger pharmaceutical companies were 
privileged, before» (I06). This fifth goal can also be seen in the preamble of the Order: «(…) 
ensure the necessary balance between the need to disseminate this information to health 
professionals in service in the establishments and services of the National Health Service, and 
the regular functioning of the same establishments and services» (Legislation). 
The last three goals received a lower number of references, but even though provide unique 
insights on the perception of inerviwees on the goals of the 2013 Order: calm public opinion 
(six references from six sources), stimulate the prescription of generics (seven references from 
four sources), and stimulate the usage of digital promotion channels (three references from 
two sources). Regarding the sixt goal, the following excerpts are revealing: «We often 
received complaints, complaints from patients, because they were waiting for the 
consultation, and because the PSRs entered first to speak with the doctor, and the industry 
itself is aware of this» (I01), «(…) the public opinion and the news that were being posted. I 
think this story, this image… I think doctors would also never be very happy with this, 
regarding the sponsorship they had, the trips and all these things… (…) the tutelage said 
‘Okay my friends, let us try to regulate this a little’» (I03). Interestingly, four of the references 
had origin in interviewees working at the NHS only. In relation to the seventh goal, we 
underline the excerpt «To minimize the impact of the companies' efforts, in order to 







2.2 - Implementation of the detailing ceiling 
Booking process 
This topic was not address directly on our script, but appeared systematicall during the 
interviews, and therefore we opted to give it visibility. The first evidence is that PSRs have to 
registery themselves at Infarmed, as foreseen by the 2013 Order (eight references from seven 
sources), here seen at a transcription excerpt from a high officer from APIFARMA: «As soon 
as the electronic registration becomes mandatory in Infarmed, the companies to which they 
are contractually bound have to register the names of the PSRs ... I think that from then on it 
becomes simpler, because the hospitals that have access to databases, whether the PSR is 
registered or not. And then it starts to be electronic» (I12).  
Other contributions to this evidence are expressed also in the following two excerpts: «We use 
an Infarmed website where we have a number, a name and a company, and it is in this portal 
that the number of visits we make to the establishments is marked» (I16), and «Article 3 - 
Registration, accreditation and identification: 1 - The accreditation of SIDs is obtained by 
registering with INFARMED» (Legislation). And the second is the need of PSRs to book their 
visits at NHS HCOs, typically with administrative staff or security, also as foreseen by the 
Order, in its article 6 – Visits scheduling: «1 - The appointment of visits in each establishment 
or service of the SNS is made in advance to the administrative staff that the respective head of 
the service indicate, in order to ensure its weekly schedule, being registered the identification 
data of the PSR, as well as the laboratory they represent» (Legislation). The great majority of 
contributions in terms of references were PSRs and physicians. 
Access process inside NHS institutions (HCOs) 
This topic was also not addressed directly in the script, but since it was referred by a 
substantial number of interviewees we opted to include it as well. We basically found three 
main topics: access cards are given to booked PSRs, security guards or administrative 
collaborators check whether the PSR is booked, and the fact that not all HCOs have allocated 
a room where PSRs and doctors can speak. A director of a group of health centers 
contribution was particularly revealing regarding the first topic: «There is an ID card, there 
are a limited number of ID cards, which are assigned to the PSRs who made the scheduling 
and therefore the HCO only receives the maximum limit of the number of PSRs per day, 
according to the detailing ceiling Order» (I02). Regarding the control check, a physician 




the security officer, he was asked not to let the PSRs enter and walk to speak with the doctors 
without being scheduled, and the security carries out this control at the entrance of the Health 
Center» (I07). 
Ceiling implementation process 
In this topic we wanted to understand whether the process of implementing the ceiling 
foreseen by Order 8213-B/2013 was put in place or not. Somewhat out of surprise, we 
realized a very low number of references to the full implementation of the ceiling (five 
references from five sources, from one consultant, three physicians and one high officer from 
a NHS HCO), here exemplified with the contribution of a director of a group of health centers 
in Lisbon: «Yes, it was implemented here. Every now and then I go through the scheduling 
and I see that! And the security guards are very... Of course the PSRs have some conversation 
with the security guards and so they have some familiarity with them... But since the security 
guards are not always the same... turns out to be difficult to create a relationship...» (I02).  
The main conclusion, based on the contributions of the interviewees, is that the ceiling was 
implemented partially only (15 references from 13 sources). Examples of this evidence can be 
seen in the following transcription excert: «I think it depended heavily on institutions. There 
were institutions that implemented the process scrupulously, and were those that even 
communicated the prevarications, because there is always! There were institutions that were 
a little more permissive and that gave less importance to the Order (…)» (I12).  
There were then four references (three sources) suggesting it was not implemented at all, 
including one clinical director of a big hospital in the area of Lisbon: «In this case, I have to 
say that no limitation was implemented. What we have done in our regulation (which has not 
yet entered into force at the time of the interview) was to follow exactly what was 
recommended in the Order, and obviously there will be situations that we consider to be 
exceptional. There may always be one exception or another...» (I03). There were then three 
references (three sources) to the fact that the implementation of the ceiling was not taken 
seriously: «In general, Orders are a virtual thing in the midst of thousands of other things 
that come in Diário da República. No one cares too much» (I14), «We know this is written but 
it was something that was not followed very much» (15), and «I think the pharmaceutical 





Ceiling control process 
In this sub-dimension our goal was to understand whether the ceiling control was made, and if 
so whether it was effective. The main evidence was that the ceiling is not easy to control (18 
references from 16 sources, mainly from PSRs and physicians), here expressed in these 
transcription excerpts: «I would say (…) that (the ceiling) it is not very easy to control» (I03), 
«I honestly doubt whether it was strictly controlled, and probably at the time there should be 
flaws» (I07), and «No, it was not controllable, it does not make any sense» (I13). The second 
main evidence suggests that different institutions had different control approaches (19 
references from 12 sources, interestingly mainly from PSRs and high officers from the 
pharmaceutical industry, and less from physicians – the likely reason may be that the former 
have a more broader view of the industry, given that they are in contact with several 
physicians and institutions, being able to more clearly detect patterns).  
The analysis of transcriptions reveals that there was not a unified, similar control process 
from institution to institution, in several aspects: the existence of a control of booked visits, 
the number of PSRs able to be at the institution every day, the need to identify the physicians 
to be visited, and other procedures, which can be seen in the following excerpt: «It depended 
heavily from institution to institution and this varied greatly... and those less rigorous 
institutions... In that sense, let us say that the law had no effect in some places» (I18).  
One interesting aspect is that there seems to be extremes in the interpretation and application 
of the Order. Some PSRs alleged that, by the one hand, some HCOs do not perform any 
control to the presence of PSRs, and by the other hand, some HCOs took a convenient 
interpretation of the letter of the Order, to basically signal pharmaceutical companies that 
PSRs are not welcome at all. This last evidence can be encountered in two transcription 
excerpts: «Here in Cascais, there is a very restricted schedule that is horrible, it's from 3:00 
p.m. to 4:00 p.m., but they do not control if there are 3, 4, 5 or 10 PSRs there. The Amadora-
Sintra Hospital... I think they replicate the Order obsessively, the PSRs do not go in, we can’t 
perform our work there because they interpret... they say they are two PSRs per day (to the 
whole Hospital), but in good faith they have to accept two PSRs per service per day, they can 
not impose a limit of two PSRs on the entire hospital. But Amadora-Sintra only allows two 
PSRs per day, this number of times (six) per year. That is useless, it does nothing, it's the 
same as saying to people (PSRs): do not come here! Do not enter here!» (I14), and «For 
example the Health Center of Lapa, I remember that it had a clearly prohibition and was very 




strict. The USF Fernão Ferro has written "No entry to dogs and PSRs" (laughs). Yes it does! 
There are extreme situations» (I19). 
The next evidence helps us to understand the previous two aspects: some institutions have no 
resources to fully control the ceiling (13 references from eigth sources). Some of the 
interviwees explained that when there are hardly sufficient administrative people to assist 
patients, it is very difficult or even impossible to allocate someone to the control of PSRs’ 
presence, especially in smaller health centers that do not have security guards.  
This is quite clear in the following excerpt from a physician working in a health center in the 
Center region (I05) and from a high officer from APIFARMA (I12): «In some hospitals and 
some health centers this can happen (ceiling control). But where? In those who have security 
guards. Those who do not have security guards, how do they do this? You get an 
administrative employee to take care of that? There are no employees to do the normal jobs, 
let alone to do this! The employee either is taking care of this, or taking care of citizens, 
helping them to solve their problems. So let's not have any illusions: a health center that has 
two floors, that have the left wing, the right wing... how are you going to control this?» (I05) 
and «The control was created, but the problem was what I was saying: there has to be 
someone in the institutions who makes the records, and there is a reduction of administrative 
staff, and the scheduling is not made, no one knows if the PSRs appear six or more times a 
year. The only thing that is controlled is the registration in Infarmed» (I12). This evidence 
was especially present in the interviews with PSRs (seven references).  
Also, there were references (four, from three sources, one physician, one medical director of a 
hospital, and one high officer from a consulting company) to the absence of inspections or 
audits, by the tutelage, to the implementation of the detailing ceiling in the NHS istitutions, 
which apparently was one of the reasons for the apparent lack of generalized control of the 
PSRs access to physicians. The following transcription is quite unique to understand this 
evidence: «Until 2014 nothing happened? No one checked? Nobody asked? No one asked? 
And nobody observed the Order? Then let’s go jaywalking (Portugues expression: vamos à 
balda)! Portuguese people are like that!» (I05). 
The next evidence, apparently as one of the consequences from the previous one, is the fact 
that non-booked PSRs may succeed to visit doctors inside the NHS institutions. There were 
references to colluding between PSRs (the non-booked ask permission to the booked ones to 




booked ones, and the fact that in many HCOs there are clearly more than three PSRs per day 
in the health centers, and more than two PSRs per day in each hospital service.  
The following transcription excerpts present relevant elements: «The coordination of the 
Health Center does not even know (laughs)... PSRs are in the public zone of the Health 
Center. They enter with the consent of the PSRs who are marked, and those who are marked 
speak first with the doctors. And the doctors accept or do not accept depending on the time 
available» (I04), «Sometimes there are clearly unmarked PSRs and there is no sense on their 
part... and sometimes we are six, seven PSRs... theoretically they can not speak before us! But 
they can get in and talk to the doctors» (I15), and «Even without being scheduled, I can get 
into the great majority of the NHS institutions, I can´t get in in only 10%. In the other 90%, if 
I am not scheduled but I am the first one not scheduled (that is, I am PSR number four on that 
day) I still have access. And if I am the fifth or the sixth PST I still have access, provided I 
have patience, even if I have to contact the physicians outside the health center. Doctors who 
no longer wanted to receive PSRs can now take refuge with what is written in the Order, and 
those who already wanted to receive them, are still willing to receive them» (I16). 
There were several references (nine, from six sources) defending that the Order is not adjusted 
to the reality. One relevant argument is that different pharmaceutical companies should have a 
different number of visits, according to their profile, either investigation companies with 
many original products to promote, or smaller companies or generics companies that have 
fewer novelties to promote. Other argument is based on the logic that companies promoting 
older products should be allowed to perform a lower number of visits.  
Some of the most insightful excerpts include: «There are different situations: a company that 
has three products to promote and a company that has 20 products to promote. Therefore, to 
say that the company has six visits to promote 20 products, or a company that has six visits to 
promote three products, is clearly discriminating in terms of scientific capacity and in terms 
of the ability to transmit or disseminate products with other applications and ethically and 
certainly with added value» (I05), and «We fell into this excess, in this madness of only being 
able to speak to eight physicians. Who created this regulation either is mean and knows that 
what is being imposed will create erosion, nerves, problems, or does not know at all what is 
being regulated, it was invented, it seemed logical, eight doctors per day seems a pretty 
number. It does not make any sense. That part (of the ability to visit a maximum of eight 




Additional insights (however with a lower number of references) include the idea that some 
NHS institutions – despite controlling the PSRs access – instituted some flexibility, by 
allowing one extra PSR per day, or accept some exceptional situations (such as when a PSR 
family member passes away and PSR may visit the physicians a few days after, without losing 
the previously scheduled visit). Another insight is that apparently no one in the NHS 
institutions controls whether PSRs visit up to eight doctors per day (it would be extremely 
difficult to monitor). 
A final topic addressed the eventual reporting of misconduct, if applicable. Ten different 
sources (with one reference each) alleged they were not aware of any case of misconduct 
(including five references from physicians and four references from doctors). Conversely, we 
captured seven references (from six sources) where allegedly there were cases of misconduct 
from PSRs (excess of visits to the NHS), but with no apparent formal, serious consequence 
for PSRs of for the pharmaceutical companies.  
The following transcription excerpt demonstrates this evidence: «I was aware of one situation 
or another, in which PSRs have been called to attention... (but) there has never been, as far as 
I know, a drastic consequence. At best, PSRs are called to attention, or were invited to leave 
the HCO and behave accordingly» (I10). Interestingly, the notion that there were cases of 
misconduct reported has its origin almost entirely on high officers from the pharmaceutical 
industry (including two officers from consulting companies and two high officers from 
pharmaceutical companies, suggesting, again, that they may possess a broader view of the 
market). 
Control patterns 
This topic resulted from the coding and interpretation of several contributions from the 
interviewees, and is focused on the identification of different approaches to the control of the 
detailing ceiling, in light of several perspectives. The first perspective is the temporal 
evolution, which suggests that the 2013 ceiling was more controlled in the first months after 
its entry into force, up to six months to one year after implementation, and after that (at 
around 2014/2015) the control started to become less present and effective.  
This was the aspect with more references (24, from 13 sources). The following transcription 
excerpts add insights to this finding: «During some time yes, it was controlled, at the 
beginning, in 2013/2014, but currently there is some condescendence» (I04), «In 2013 and in 




getting adapted to it. The Order entered into force, was fresh… and then disappeared, faded-
away. In 2013 and 2014 there was a reduction but in 2015 it got back to normal in relation to 
the number of PSRs, just like that. When it entered into force, everybody was afraid of 
eventual audits (…) Nobody inspected this!» (I05), «During the transition phase, in 2013, and 
during one or two years, the reduction in the number of PSRs was high, but then it got 
diluted, the Hospital expanded the number of authorized PSRs visits, and now I don´t even 
know if today PSRs even have to schedule their visits, but they try to be more discrete and 
organized, they avoid being a group of PSRs standing there in the hospital, and have the 
initiative to “dilute” themselves through different hospital services» (I08), «At the beginning, 
all institutions were more concerned in not allowing more PSRs than those allowed by the 
Order (…) the control was made for around one year (…)» (I13), and «We already knew, 
according to the spirit of that HCO, that it would take a few months until things got loosened 
again» (I14). All these references – except one, from a consultant who is in daily contact with 
PSRs – came from PSRs and from physicians. 
The second perspective is the region. Ceiling control seems to be more intensive in the north 
and center regions (six references from five sources), clearly noted in the following 
transcription excerpts: «The control is more selective in the North hospitals and health 
centers. Even today, a citizen does not enter São João or Santo António Hospital without ID, 
whereas in São José and Santa Maria Hospitals we enter there as we want and nobody asks 
us anything» (I19), and «In the center region things are more complicated, the health centers 
have a higher control (of the PSR activity)» (I15). Ceiling control appears to be less intensive 
in the south and interior regions (nine references from seven sources), as seen in these 
excerpts: «Some NHS institutions were more permissive and gave less importance to the 
Order, especially the hospitals in the Interior, smaller hospitals, where limitations were less 
visible» (I12), and «I remember when the Order got into force, in 2013… when we went to 
meetings we commented with our PSRs colleagues from the south and we got really impressed 
because they didn´t have any difficulty, they had free access, and we didn´t (in the North), we 
had to run, to hide, we were always distressed» (I17). And the ceiling control appears to be 
more intensive in bigger population centers (six references from three sources), here shown in 
the following transcription excerpts: «In the bigger population areas there is a higher control, 
there are more PSRs and the need to control» (I13), and «There are areas where the control 
is stronger, it´s more complicated, such as for instance Lisbon» (I15). Globally, the 




The third perspective is by type of institution. Ceiling control appears to be lower in 
hospitals (in comparison to health centers or USFs), as seen in the following excerpts: «In 
external medical appointments PSRs were not as controlled as in other places, because these 
consultations were made in extrernal pavilions, where the control was less effective» (I08), 
and «In hospitals there is no control» (I14). Ceiling control seems to be higher in USFs, 
mainly due to a more professionalized management, with stricter rules, where phsycians have 
quotas of number of patients to see and prescription budgets to observe (depending on the 
type of USF). This patter can be seen in the following excerpts: «Tendentially, USFs will be 
more and more difficult to visit, as USFs grow, they start getting tighter rules regarding our 
(PSR) presence» (I15), and «(there is a) Higher control in USFs» (I16). The third evidence is 
even more interesting and seems to be a consequence of the implementation of the 2013 
ceiling: private HCOs (such as hospitals and clinics) created their own restrictions to PSRs 
visits, in result of the substantial increase in the number of visits in private settings, after the 
entry into force of the detailing ceiling in the NHS. The following excerpts help better 
visualize this pattern: «During the transition phase (after 2013) we tried to increase the 
number of visits in physicians’ private practice, but we were not able to, because private 
institutions raised access limitations too» (I16), and «There was an increase of visits to the 
private practice of phycisians, after 2013, a huge increase. Indeed, this started being a 
problem by that time, because private practice became strongly saturated (with PSRs), and 
private HCOs reacted, by imposing some rules too, which didn´t exist before that» (I17). Such 
as with the previous topics regarding control patterns, the great majority of contributions in 
this scope (type of institution) were given by PSRs. 
The fourth and final perspective is by type of HCO leadership. The political quadrant of the 
direction of the NHS seems to be relevant in the way it manages and controls PSRs access to 
their infrastructure. A certain political quadrant and /or personal personality appear to be very 
critic to the activity of pharmaceutical companies and their work through the PSRs and appear 
to either simply block the presence of PSRs, or by making it extremely difficult.  
The following excerpt supports this finding: «And then I believe there is a question of a 
political faction with an extremely anti-industry attitude, with some persons highly in favor of 
such measures (…) They are anti-industry, and try to create barriers to the emotional impact 
of the visits. For instance, Fernão Ferro USF only allows on PSR on Mondays, only one 
physician on Mondays. And then this physician shares the information the PSR shared, with 




control also appears to be dependent on ACES (groups of health centers) management. This is 
seen in the following excerpts: «More importante than the Order are ACES regulations, when 
the ACES coordinator issues regulation about the subject, sending it to the coordinators of 
each unit (health center). This could in fact have impact» (I14), and «For instance NHS 
HCOs in Lisbon have a higher control, in Santarém probably too, but (the control attitude) 
mostly depends on the ACES» (I13). 
Perception of detailing ceiling implementation on other NHS institutions 
We found another pattern which we did not address when developing the script, but that 
appeared during the coding process: the perception of some of the interviewees about the 
implementation of the detailing ceiling on other institutions. Despite the reduced number of 
references, we highlight five references from four sources suggesting that the majority of the 
NHS institutions did not implement the detailing ceiling, and one reference suggesting that 
the ceiling was in fact implemented (but not observed) on other institutions. 
2.3 – Pharmaceutical companies’ reaction 
This subtopic was one of the ones we had the highest curiosity with, content analysis wise. 
Very interestingly, the majority of contributions were originated from high officers from the 
pharmaceutical industry, including top pharmaceutical companies and reference consulting 
firms. Seven references (from seven sources) suggest that companies had no reaction, as seen 
in the following transcription excerpts: «Companies adapted to new situation, basically» 
(I10), and «Our officers devalued the situation. They told us ‘do not worry about it, do the 
work you have to do, and leave the rest with us’» (I15). But the great majority of participants 
(32 references from 17 sources) suggested there was a reaction from the companies, which 
consisted of six main behaviors, addressed in the following paragraphs. 
The first most referred reaction one was to increase the investment in group sessions (six 
references from six sources). This was a very interesting reaction with a simple logic: bring 
the doctors to the companies, now that the access to the NHS is more controlled. The 
following excerpt adds visibility to this first reaction: «This is a bit like Darwin's law: those 
that can adapt are those that can survive. Naturally, companies are looking for alternatives 
that do not clash with the law. Nothing prevents me from picking up a group of doctors and 
organizing a clinical session to promote my product. I am not going against the law, I am just 
complementing my promotional activity. And so, somehow, it has made industry reinvent itself 




The second most highlighted reaction consisted of visiting doctors in different settings (six 
references from five sources), such as other places where the doctor also works at and other 
settings (which we will further detail a few rows below). One of the most curious 
contributions was this one: «Through subterfuge! They (companies) give PSR a goal to visit 
between 8 and 11 doctors per day. Unleash yourself! Where you have to go, the problem is 
yours, you have to visit them! Go to the parking lot, go to the cafe, go to the private service 
where the doctor also works...» (I05). 
The third most noted reaction appeared to be protesting (six references from five sources). 
One high officer from a top pharmaceutical company explained that the tutelage did not 
involve the industry in the discussion of the Order, and that provoked dissatisfaction among 
companies: «They (companies) reacted badly! They reacted badly to what I was saying just 
now. First because it was not a transparent process, they were not involved in the measure, 
and therefore did not understand the scope. It was a somewhat disrespectful measure of the 
activity of a company, any private company is entitled to have a commercial activity, so at 
heart they establish rules of the game which are anti-commercial in terms of the activity of 
companies... even legally this is a gray field, isn´t it? To what extent does the Government 
now manage and make decisions about what is the commercial activity of the companies? So 
I think that instead of gaining goodwill from the industry, even to find new ways to interact 
with health professionals, there was even an unwillingness to collaborate. I don´t mean the 
industry did not collaborate, I believe there was a lot of collaboration, but I think that, as with 
all measures that are implemented without industry involvement, they are not well received 
because they have an impact on the commercial activity of companies» (I09). 
The fourth most mentioned reaction consisted of a higher investment in digital channels 
and promotion tools, such as e-mailing and webinars, due to the lower cost and easiness of 
access. The following excerpt explains this reaction: «Digital has certainly grown at the 
expense of this Order. And so on the one hand I think we should always look at things in a 
positive way and realize: ‘OK, we have a barrier here! How are we going to get past it?’ I 
have to create legal alternative channels, without going against what that barrier» (I10). 
The fifth most referred reaction consisted of the reduction of the sales force (four references 
from four sources), that is, firing PSRs, but curiously two of the four references signal that 
these collective terminations were only partially explained by the entry into force of the 
Order. One interviewee even suggested that some companies used the Order as an argument 




«There was some concern and there were one or two companies that at the time justified the 
reduction of PSRs with this measure» (I19). 
The sixth most mentioned reaction consisted of the usage of Medical Science Liasions 
(MSLs), as a strategy to minimize the impact of the entry into force of the Order. Interviewee 
I19, a senior consultant with more than 20 years of experience in sales (including experience 
as a PSR), explained this reaction: «MSLs have gained a great prominence, because PSRs can 
not speak off-label, but MSLs can; PSRs can not talk about products or studies not yet 
published, but the MSLs can; and MSLs do not count in the medical visits. So I think there 
was a structural change. There were companies that were very clear (multinationals): in an 
initiative of an MSL, a PSR can not be present, in order to avoid mixing promotional and 
scientific activity. But in the doctor's head this is associated» (I19). 
There was one very unique and curious insight: one PSR stated she was asked to sign a 
document where she declared she would not exceed the maximum allowed number of visits, 
«(…) in other words to protect the company. Imagine that I go to a hospital to make 
unscheduled visits and I'm kicked out... the company washes its hands, you see? But on the 
other hand, the company asks us for a certain average of visits per day and we have to visit 
the doctors, so we always walk here on a tightrope» (I17). 
Tactics used by the pharmaceutical industry to adapt to the detailing ceiling 
During our fieldwork, and according to our script, we asked interviewees whether 
pharmaceutical companies used some “tricks” (allways with the commas reference) to adapt 
to the detailing ceiling. The word “trick” was not well received by some of the participants, 
especially high officers from top companies, who preferred to use the word “tactics” instead, 
which does not have a negative meaning or interpretation. This topic received, in total, 99 
references from 27 sources, and the most referred tactics were four, here described below. 
The first most referred tactic was visiting physicians at their private practice (24 references 
from 17 sources), to keep the same number of visits as before Order 8213-B/2013, without the 
control of the NHS. This contribution from a high officer from APIFARMA adds visibility to 
this tactic: «Companies can visit doctors in their private clinics, in their private offices, and 
there is no control and there is no knowledge of the NHS. At the end of the workday, after 
making the medical visits in the public (NHS), PSRs can still visit doctors in their private 
practices, this has to do with the guidance of each company and is totally legitimate. It is not 




the private, of course. PSRs take advantage of it and visit physicians in their private 
practices» (I12). 
The second most mentioned tactic consisted of using mirror visits (usually referred to, in the 
daily jargon of the pharmaceutical industry, as Lines, or “satellite” companies). 
Pharmaceutical companies use Lines to multiply the number of visits their PSRs can perform 
to a given NHS institution. The mother company creates smaller, “virtual” companies (legal 
entities with VAT numbers), or uses former companies that resulted from acquisitions and 
mergers which were kept fiscally active, and enrolls PSRs to each of the smaller companies, 
which at some extent reached five or more lines. Then each company can perform six visits 
per year to a NHS institution times the number of Lines it has.  
Initially, during the 2000’s, companies were able to enroll PSRs to several Lines (i.e., PSR 
José could visit health center X today representing the mother company A, and then visit the 
same health center one week later representing the virtual company A1, then visit again one 
week later representing vritual company A2, and so on, thus multiplying the share of voice of 
the promoted product(s). One of the goals of Order 8213-B/2013 was to end the ability of 
PSRs to represent multiple Lines at once, by imposing one single registry, either at the mother 
company (marketing authorization holder), or at the company responsible for the lanch or 
promotion of the products (according to article 3, number 1). As a high officer from 
APIFARMA explained, PSRs did not easily accept being registered, at Infarmed, at virtual 
companies, afraid of losing benefits and assuming higher risks in layouts, and this led to a 
reduction on the number of Lines as compared to the 2000’s. 
These two concepts (before and after Order 8213-B/2013) are illustrated below in figures 11.5 






Figure 11.5 – Illustration of Lines before Order 8213-B/2013 
Source: own elaboration 
 
Figure 11.6 – Illustration of Lines after Order 8213-B/2013 
Source: own elaboration 
However, companies kept using Lines (or mirror companies) even after the entry into force of 
Order 8213-B/2013, now to a substantially lower extent. Typical examples of Lines: 
Cardiology Line, General Practice Line, Respiratory Line, and so on. Each line promotes its 
own products, but it is usual that each line shares one common product with the other lines, 
allowing the multiplication of points of contact with physicians and therefore the 




Examples of insightful transcription excerpts include: «For me, Lines are exactly the same 
thing. That is, I have a certain mother company X, which then has, in fiscal terms, six 
(smaller) companies. That is, one PSR is assigned to company X, another to company X1, 
with different names, but in reality they all promote... That is, it is the same thing as having a 
multi-bedroom house, but all rooms belong to same house and are administered precisely by 
the same person. Even today Lines are used. I would not say that this is ‘piercing’ the limit, 
because all this we are saying is perfectly legal. I can establish a company ABC Lda with 
which I will promote the product XYZ, the Infarmed validates it. All this we are talking about 
is an activity perfectly standardized, regulated, legal, without any problem. Bigger companies 
use more Lines than smaller companies, clearly» (I10), and «All companies have multiple 
Lines, but Lines do not always promote the same products. For example, I work with diabetes 
and my colleague works with respiratory products, with four products each, and we only have 
one product in common. And there are other companies that also have lines, but they do not 
always promote the same products» (I15). 
The third most addressed tactic consisted of waiting for the doctors in the parking or HCO 
entrance, to keep PSRs goals in terms of daily number of visits (26 references from 14 
sources). The great majority of the references were originated in contributions from PSRs and 
from physicians. Given that some NHS institutions do control the number of visits PSRs can 
make per year, PSRs use this tactic to keep the share-of-voice of the products they are 
promoting. Some physicians revealed they even have some sympathy for the PSRs effort, by 
waiting hours and hours for the doctors, «come hell or high water» (I16). PSRs wait for the 
doctors early in the morning when they arrive to the HCO, or at the break time in the middle 
of the morning, or at lunch time, or at the end of their consultations. Additional insights are 
presented next, in the following transcription excerpts: «The PSR is forbidden to go inside 
(the NHS institution), but nobody prevents him from being outside... in the parking lot, or 
near the coffee machine, nobody prevents him from being there, and he can make visits there. 
If the doctor smokes, he comes outside to smoke, and the PSR is there to smoke a cigarette 
with him... there is one visit, it counts as a visit, but it is not properly declared» (I05), «There 
are now more contacts outside the health center than inside it» (I06), «There were more 
contacts outside the Health Center, which were difficult to control by the Health Center's 
management» (I07), and «PSRs work there in the parking lot, sometimes in the rain, to have 
access to the doctor in that physical space that he walks from his car to the Health Center, to 




The fourth most mentioned tactic is similar to the previous one, and consisted of waiting for 
the physicians at the bar, or at the restaurant, and speak with him or her there, during their 
break time. This tactic was almost totally referred by PSRs and by physicians. Examples of 
excerpts include: «Doctors are people and take breaks, we can leave the Health Center, have 
a coffee, talk to the PSR in the cafe, and as we know each other we talk about the medicines, 
but without opening the computers and the leaflets. The number of contacts inside cafes 
increased» (I07), and «It's true that I also noticed... there are common areas like the bar, 
which we use, and at mid-morn we go to the bar, and sometimes there were PSRs at these 
areas, taking advantage of our presence there… they tried to get around the Order a bit» 
(I08). 
As the fifth more referred tactic, there was a very astute change in the way some 
pharmaceutical companies registered their PSRs’ interactions with physicians. When PSRs 
reach the daily limit of eight visits to NHS physicians (observing the Order), further visits are 
classified as contacts, which can be described as informal exchanges of interaction with 
physicians, and therefore are not classified as normal visits. This tactic protects companies 
should the tutelage decide to audit CRM systems. This tactic was mentioned by three sources 
with a total of six references, all from PSRs. Examples of excerpts include: «I know some 
companies that register the interactions as visits up to the daily threshold, and above that they 
register the interactions as contacts» (I13), and «Those are contacts, they are not visits, I can 
not consider them as visits. The entry into force of the Order provoked an increase in the 
number of contacts» (I16). 
Another tactic (the sixth most referred one) consisted of using back doors (or “horse doors”, 
the Portuguese expression) to contour the control made by some NHS HCOs, which was 
mentioned by two PSRs and by one service director of a top hospital in the Lisbon area. The 
following excerpt, from a PSR, is demonstrative of this tactic: «(…) There is always a "horse 
door" (back door) where the security guard does not see us. I know the Ministry of Health 
lives on numbers ... all right, let's say yes, (the Order) it has reached the goals ... but this is 
not true, because no one controls anything very much. Even in those hospitals like Santa 
Maria and São João, where access is more difficult, there are also "horse doors"! (laughs)» 
(I17). 
Two other tactics were referred, however with a low number of references: the first consists 
of asking permission, from scheduled PSRs, to be able to visit doctors in a given institution. A 




scheduled PSRs there, and ask their permission (as a form of respect) to make his or her own 
visits too, after the scheduled ones finish their work; and the second, especially applied in 
hospitals, consists of booking visits to a specific service (for instance Cardiology) and then 
take the opportunity to visit phsycians in adjacent services (for instance Neurology, Internal 
Medicine), given that this tactic is very difficult to control. 
Synthesis of the main findings – Dimension 2 
The most mentioned goals of Order 8213-B/2013 were the reduction of disturbance on health 
care organizations (HCOs) provoked by the presence of the PSRs, the reduction of 
prescription and consumption (especially on newer, more expensive ones), the reduction of 
the commercial pressure of pharmaceutical companies on physicians, the safeguard HCPs 
care-related activity allowing more time for assistential tasks (such as taking care of patients, 
and the discipline and dignity of PSRs’ access to HCPs and HCOs).  
Three other goals (with fewer references) were calming public opinion stimulating the 
prescription of generics, and stimulating the usage of digital promotion channels. Order 8213-
B/2013 preamble highlighted goals number four (safeguard HCPs care-related activity) and 
number five (discipline and dignify PSRs’ access to HCPs and HCOs). 
PSRs have to register themselves at Infarmed, and then have to book their visits at NHS 
HCOs, typically with administrative staff or security. On the day of the visit, access cards are 
given to booked PSRs, after security guards or administrative collaborators having checked 
whether the PSRs are booked for that day. 
There were a very low number of references confirming to the full implementation of Order 
8213-B/2013, suggesting it was implemented partially only, and in some cases it was not 
implemented at all (such as in one big hospital in the Lisbon area). According to a vast 
majority of interviewees, the detailing ceiling (Order 8213-B/2013) was not easy to control, 
and different institutions had different control approaches and not a single and unified control 
process (while some HCOs did not any control at all, others had a convenient interpretation of 
the letter of the Order, to basically almost prohibit the presence of PSRs). If by the one hand 
the ceiling control appears to be active in many NHS institutions, by the other hand there 
seems to be total absences of control of the number of physicians PSRs have contact with in 




At the base of the apparent lack of control of the implementation of Order 8213-B/2013 
seems to be the lack of resources (administrative, security) to fully control the ceiling, 
especially in smaller HCOs. Also, it appears that there were no audits made by the tutelage, 
which gave a certain idea of lack of control, and non-booked PSRs may succeed to visit 
doctors inside the NHS institutions. It appears that HCOs that control the access of PSRs 
admit one or more non-booked PSRs, daily. Other HCOs are strict in allowing three PSRs 
only, but in two shifts (three in the morning and three in the afternoon, in a total of six per 
day). PSRs allege they are able to enter in the vast majority of NHS HCOs, even not being 
scheduled.  
Several interviewees declared that Order 8213-B/2013 is not adjusted to the reality, given that 
different pharmaceutical companies should have a different number of visits, according to 
their profile (investigation versus generics), size, number and type of products promoted 
(newer versus older). A substantial number of sources (ten) alleged they were not aware of 
any case of misconduct (including five references from physicians and four references from 
doctors), while six sources confirmed that there were cases of PSRs misconduct reported (but 
with no major consequence). 
Order 8213-B/2013 had apparently a higher strength (in the sense of application and control) 
during a limited time (up to one year, according to several sources), after which the control 
decompressed and PSRs had a higher access to the NHS HCOs, and the perception today is 
that the majority of the NHS institutions did not fully implement the detailing ceiling. The 
control of the 2013 ceiling appeared to be more intensive in the north and center regions, in 
opposition to the Interior and south (Alentejo and Algarve).  
Ceiling control appears to be lower in hospitals, in comparison to health centers or USFs. 
Likely related to the entry into force of Order 8213-B/2013 is the fact that private HCOs (such 
as hospitals and clinics) created their own restrictions to PSRs visits, after 2013, to combat the 
higher number of PSRs visiting NHS in different settings. Finally, the political quadrant of the 
direction of the NHS institution or region (through the ACES) appears to influence the way it 
manages and controls PSRs access to their infrastructure. 
While a few sources suggested that pharmaceutical companies had no reaction to the entry 
into force of Order 8213-B/2013, the great majority of sources suggested there was a reaction 




number of visits in different settings, protesting, increasing the investment in digital channels 
and promotion tools, reducing their sales force, and increasing the usage of MSLs.  
Pharmaceutical industry appeared to use several tactics to mitigate the effect of the 2013 
detailing ceiling, including visiting physicians at their private practices, using mirror visits (or 
Lines), waiting for the doctors in the parking or HCO entrance, or at the bar or restaurant, the 
registry of some of the PSRs’ interactions with physicians as contacts and not as visits, and 
using back doors in HCOs. 
We underline the contribution of a high officer from APIFARMA, summarizing the 
implementation and control process of pharmaceutical companies and PSRs with NHS 
institutions and physicians: «Over the past 20 years, compliance with the various Orders has 
been gradual, as control methods have been increasing, with a shift from paper-to-digital 
control systems and from digital to digital units to digital network» (I12).  
This high officer then finalized with a very unique interpretation of the situation regarding 
this Order: there is a triangle between the tutelage, the physicians and the pharmaceutical 
industry, where every stakeholder seems to be relatively comfortable. First, «The tutelage 
does not manifest regarding this Order» (I12), and «The only thing that is controlled is the 
registration in Infarmed» (I12). Second, the physicians likely keep benefiting from the 
assistance from PSRs (if we broaden the scope to their practice practice too), and «(…) no one 
compains about not being visited» (I12). Second, pharmaceutical companies – despite having 
to adjust themselves after a very challenging period starting in the middle of the 2000’s, and 
especially after 2010 -, appear to be relatively comfortable too, as «(…) everyone has adapted 
to it and the medical visit continues to be made (…)» (I12). So, according to this high officer, 
the pharmaceutical industry does not appear to benefit from “raising waves” regarding this 
Order. 
 
11.4.2.3. Effect of the detailing ceiling to the NHS 
3.1 – Effect on PSRs 
We counted 34 references from 19 sources on this topic. Seven different sources (totaling 
nine references) suggested that the entry into force of the Order did not provoke a major 
impact on PSRs job or daily activity (most of these references come from PSRs), as seen in 




everything is done, maybe in other ways, but everything is done the same, the eight daily visits 
are performed such as before (…) The entry into force of the Order in 2013 changed 
rigorously nothing in my work as a PSR, nothing, in the number of visits to the NHS, in the 
frequency of visits, nothing» (I17).  
Then we found other interesting contributions. The first effect (especially mentioned by high 
officers from the pharmaceutical industry, including pharmaceutical companies, APIFARMA 
and consulting companies, totaling 12 references from eight sources) was the higher 
effectiveness and efficiency of the PSRs, and therefore of the visits, as seen in the following 
excerpts: «PSRs now bring news, they not only present the product in a simplistic way, but 
they add something, such as a study, or another situation that adds value, that is, in summary, 
they are now more informative» (I08), «From the moment there is a limitation on the number 
of contacts, for example, I know that if I could do 20 contacts in a year with a doctor, and 
now I can only do six, I have to find a strategy that allows me in those six to be as effective as 
possible, because I know I will not have more antenna time» (I10), and «Visits today are more 
conscientious, probably take longer, and need to have content. They have to be effective 
because you do not know when to go back there, visits are more effective now» (I14).  
Other effect noted by four sources (five references) was the dismissal of PSRs. Based on the 
contributions from the interviewees, we noted mixed interpretations about his effect. By the 
one hand, some participants suggest that the effect of the Order was so strong that its 
consequence was the drastic reduction of the number of PSRs in the market, here explained 
by one physician: «There were dismissal of PSRs» (I04). By the other hand, there are 
suggestions that the dismissals were a consequence of the crisis the industry had already 
started to suffer before the entry into force of the Order, here explained by one PSR: «I think 
that, at that time, (the Order) it had an impact because it coincided with a restructuring of the 
industry and many PSRs were fired» (I17).  
Another effect was the fact that PSRs had to try to find and visit physicians in other settings, 
as addressed previously (at their private practice, at the parking, at restaurants). 
 One more effect appeared to be the increase in the area (or size) of the territories for each 
PSR. According to some interviewees, this was the reaction of companies to the reduction in 
the number of PSRs, where the ones that stayed had now to increase their regions – not 
necessarily the number of physicians to visit – and now it appears to be easier to have fully 




effect was explained by one PSR: «Territories have increased in size, because once the 
access to health professionals has been limited by the six annual visits, some companies have 
either been conditioned by this or have taken advantage of this to reduce the size of the PSRs 
teams, because if each health professional can only receive six visits a year, some PSRs do 
not really have work to do on a day-to-day basis. And what was the consequence? The zones 
or territories have increased a lot! The specialization was reduced, for example, I used to 
visit hospitals only, and now I also visit General and Family Medicine (at the Health Centers 
/ USFs). At that time I used to visit Hospital Santa Maria only and then I started to cover all 
Lisbon and Azores. Well, if I'm in Lisbon, I can hardly keep up with my clients in Azores!» 
(I16).  
Another effect on PSRs was higher compliance on the work performed (two references from 
two sources, both physicians). The relation with physicians is not more formatted, more 
compliant, there are more courses and training on ethical and deontological aspects (to which 
contributed the internal code of APIFARME, whose members have to comply with). 
3.2 – Effect on pharmaceutical companies 
The effect of Order 8213-B/2013 on pharmaceutical companies can be seen especially in two 
aspects: the first was an increased usage of other channels and tools to complement detailing 
(16 references from 10 sources), and the second was the reduction in the frequency of visits 
inside NHS institutions (ten references from ten sources). Regarding the first effect – 
apparently not entirely due to the Order but likely in part related to - companies started using 
more digital channels such as e-mailing, webinars, and other types of visits such as clinical 
meetings.  
A high officer from a top pharmaceutical companies explained this tendency: «There has 
been a progressive reduction in the number of PSRs in the industry, with the investments 
increasingly being allocated and focused on other channels, namely digital and new 
technologies» (I09).  
Concerning the second effect, companies increased the number of interactions of physicians 
outside the NHS infrastructure, such as mentioned previous in their private practice, and other 
settings outside the HCOs. Curiosly, there were three sources (with five references) 
suggesting that the total number of interactions with physicians is the same as before the entry 
into force of the Order, if considered the sum of visits inside the NHS HCOs and the visits 




this thesis, which may help us to understand the results obtained in the quantitative 
section of our research.  
A contribution from a PSR allows a clear conclusion about this evidence: «As for the effect of 
the Order, if we divide the total annual number of visits and contacts by the number of 
working days, we will get the same number as we had before the entry into force of the Order. 
I have fewer visits, but I also have more contacts» (I16). There were two additional effects 
with a reduced number of references: companies adapted to the new reality («I think that 
institutions and entities have adapted and created the mechanisms of time and space, and of 
the discipline of this contact, I think there was no special problem» (I01), and companies 
broadened their scope to include other stakeholders to visit, such as pharmacists and other 
health care professionals. 
This topic also addressed eventual differences in the effect of the Order depending on the size 
of the pharmaceutical company. Only one interviewee mentioned that the effect was equal to 
all companies, bigger and smaller. The great majority of participants (11 references from 10 
sources) mentioned that companies more dependent on detailing and companies with higher 
compliance suffered more intensely, as explained by one physician (I08) and one PSR (I13): 
«I think those who had the higher intensity of visits were not benefited because if they know, 
from their research, that detailing has an impact on sales of the product associated with a 
certain number of visits, then at that time maybe they have not benefited from the Order» 
(I08), and «The Order did not impact companies in the same way. Compliant companies, or 
companies with a higher conscience of compliance, suffered a higher impact. There are 
companies that do not comply, which make more than six visits per year to each institution, 
there is a fraction that does not comply. Companies with a higher intensity of detailing 
suffered more» (I13).  
Another evidence is the fact that bigger companies adapted better to the entry into force of the 
Order. This seems eventually incoherent with the previous evidence, but it is not, since bigger 
companies – typically more detaling intensive – were the ones that suffered more with the 
detailing ceiling, but at the same had a better capacity to adapt to it, using their bigger 
resources, both administrative (for all the work of registering PSRs at Infarmed) and 
commercial (using tactics such as the previously mentioned Lines, and by complementing 




A PSR working in the Lisbon provides additional visibility on this topic: «Those who were 
already big, are still big, defended themselves better. Anyone who was already small, maybe 
did not defend himself so well, lost, because when you lose SOV, you lose. Whatever is born 
of this interpersonal relationship begins with this SOV. The more times I get there, to speak, 
to remind my brand, my name, everything else comes from there. So if I'm big and we're four 
PSRs, we visit doctors less often after the Order, but we’re still four PSRs. If I was already 
small, and I had only one or two PSRs, I suffer more... so some companies defended 
themselves better than others» (I14). 
3.3 - Effect on NHS institutions 
Six sources (with one reference each, from PSRs, physicians and consultants) noted that there 
was no major impact or no impact at all on the organization and daily activity of NHS HCOs. 
However, eight sources (with a total of nine references) suggested that Order 8213-B/2013 
had indeed a substantial impact, by regulating and discipline PSRs access and activity in the 
NHS, by creating procedures for PSR enrollment, visits scheduling, and visits control. The 
following contributions from interviewees permit additional visibility of this effect: «I admit 
there has been more regulation and regulation of this kind of interaction because, as I said, 
there were many complaints about the people being in a waiting room, and then seeing a 
gentleman come in with a briefcase, and then the gentleman arrives with the briefcase. An 
interesting measure could be to evaluate the number of specific complaints on this topic, 
whether they increased or decreased, or else to make a small panel with some ACES 
directors, or even hospitals» (I01), and «The main goal was to allow / create rules and create 
medical visitation schedules so that the PSRs did not stand at the doctor's door saying, ‘Look, 
I'm here! When is it my turn?’ And listen that that first there are the consultations, or first 
there are hospital visits, then the visit to the service, and then is the medical visit. And if I am 
limiting the time, if I create limitations of visits, then of course I am in some way creating 
rules of good procedures and speed of the daily activity of health institutions. I believe so. But 
it does not mean that there are no loopholes, certainly there are. But I believe that the great 
goal has been achieved» (I12). 
Another effect noted by four sources (two of them physicians) was a reduction in the number 
of PSRs and visits inside NHS institutions, and we underline the word “inside”, as previously 
explored during this content analysis. One physicians from Algarve mentioned that «Yes, 
there was a noticeable change in the Health Center, regariding the number of visits, the 




grow again recently, as noted by three sources (two physicians and one PSR), starting at 
around the year 2015 and registering a stronger increase in the last two years. 
3.4 - Effect on NHS physicians 
By the one hand, we found references of effects which seem to be aligned with some of the 
goals of Order 8213-B/2013: better assistential quality to patients and higher objectivity and 
concentration of physicians. The most mentioned one was having more time to assistential 
tasks with patients, with nine references from eight sources (including four physicians, one 
PSR and one consultant former PSR). Interviewees reasoned that less time dedicated to 
receiving PSRs equals more time dedicated to patients, allowing phsycians a higher 
productivity (number of medical consultations per day), which, by itself, may answer to some 
of the goals of the tutelage, as noted by a physicians working at a health center in the Lisbon 
region: «Over time, the number of PSRs declined, which meant a reduction in the time spent 
by doctors on conversations with PSRs. And this was positive because doctors have more time 
for patients» (I07).  
Even a PSR accepted the detailing ceiling brought benefits to patients: «A schedule (for PSRs’ 
visits) was created, for the benefit of patients» (I15). The effect of the detailing brough also 
higher objectivity and concentration to physicians, according to three sources (three 
references, from two physicians and one consultant), which seems coherent with the previous 
effect. One of the physicians explained: «I think the impact (of the Order) was beneficial, 
because quantity is inimical to quality, and maybe we didn´t pay so much attention (to the 
visits), we didn´t value things so much, and now I prefer the current situation, because I can 
filter things better, there’s no need to have a lot of people (PSRs there)» (I08). 
By the other hand, we found references to an affect that appears to be negative to physicians, 
which is the fact that they now receive less information and less updates on novelties (new 
drugs, new combinations, new studies, and so on), mentioned by five sources (with six 
references), including three physicians and a high officer from IQVIA. The following 
transcription excerpts from two physicians are quite elucidative: «If we’re talking about a 
product of recognized value, approved by Infarmed, if the doctor does not get to know about it 
because it has not been sufficiently publicized (due to the restrictions to PSRs), because 
doctors do not always go to university and they (the new products) have already appeared 
after they (doctors) left university. And if the therapeutic concepts change with the studies and 




National Health Service and for the benefit of the patients. Yes there is!» (I05), and «But it 
was also negative because we had less information, because PSRs do not only bring us 
information with a commercial objective in mind, with the company goal of making money 
derived from a higher prescription of their product… They bring us information and we gain 
from it, such as being able to use a new drug, or use a drug in other domains but safely, and 
so I think both parts have lost, pharmaceutical companies and physicians» (I07).  
It was also very interesting to understand the perspective of the pharmaceutical companies, 
especially the contributions of a high officer from a top company in Portugal, here she 
suggested that PSRs are not the main cause for the physicians lack of productivity or 
conditions to work. She explained that «(…) the bureaucracy of the health professional is so 
great, and has grown so much, that maybe even today it is more difficult for the doctor to 
exercise what is the noble activity that is seeing patients and talking to patients and 
diagnosing them and to treat them well, as a result of excessive bureaucratization, lack of 
automation, inefficiency of systems, this may turn out to be a much greater obstacle than 
interaction with the pharmaceutical industry, which ultimately brings structured and 
prepared information, assisting health professional to be a better professionals, because we 
also bring what the doctors need and when they need. How often do we provide doctors with 
medical research upon their request?! How often do we take questions to the companies, to 
bring the answers ... Scientific literature, additional documentation that is requested, 
evidence, and assistance in creating bridges with other colleagues who already have 
experience, organization of meetings... I mean, we ended up being a facilitator of scientific 
knowledge. So I do not see PSRs as a hindrance, but rather as a facilitator if you do a good 
job (…) The idea is that PSRs are facilitators of the work of the health professional, who help 
him or she to be a better professional. And I think a lot of things happened in SNS. These, 
indeed, made the activity difficult. And if we asked the doctors what makes their activity more 
difficult: it is the PSR, or it is the lack of efficiency of the system, the computers that do not 
work, the networks that do not work, the papers that are requested, the calls... Anyway! I am 
sure that the doctor would list many other things that make their work more difficult than the 
effect of PSRs’ visits» (I09). 
We also found five sources (totaling six references, two of them from PSRs) mentioning that 
the entry into force of Order 8213-B/2013 did not have a substantial effect or had no effect at 




their contacts with physicians (either inside or outside the NHS infrastructure), and the effect 
to physicians many have not been relevant, daily activity wise. 
Structural impact of Order 8213-B/2013 on physician prescription behavior 
This topic was one of the most expected insights from our research, given the need to 
understand the results from the quantitative phase of our thesis. The great majority of the 
interviewees (13 sources with a total of 14 references) alleged the detailing ceiling did not 
have a structural change in the way physicians prescribe, and several resons were pointed out.  
The first one was maintenance of prescription habits either by the physician initiative («I 
prescribe with the same criteria as I used to before the ceiling» (I06), or by influence of 
colleagues and HCO guidelines («We run a lot with service meetings, with clinical case 
presentations, with presentations of new studies that have come out now, the possibility of one 
product being able to be associated with another. There are those internal meetings between 
us that are a complement, that is, our information does not come only from the PSRs» (I08). 
The main sources of this opinion were physicians, PSRs, and high officers from the industry, 
including APIFARMA («Doctors will prescribe depending on the assessment / diagnosis they 
make, and not on the number of PSRs visits» (I12)). 
We then found five references (five sources) suggesting that the entry into force of the 2013 
detailing ceiling may have had a marginal impact, but was surely not the main influencer of 
the physicians prescription behavior. A contribution from a high officer from IQVIA allows a 
better understanding of this point: «If I had less access to physicians, it is likely that this can 
contribute to the change on my prescription profile» (I18). Interestingly, three high officers 
from the NHS (a hospital clinical director, a director of a group of health centers, and a former 
high officer from the ministry of health) suggested that the 2013 ceiling may have had a 
«marginal impact» (I01) on physician prescription behavior. 
There were then five other references to an eventual structural impact on prescription 
behavior. Three references (two physicians and one industry consultant) mentioning that the 
detailing ceiling must have provoked a delay in the beginning of the prescription of novelties, 
the reason being that physicians do not have the same access to new studies, new 
presentations, new drug combinations, and new launches, as they used to have, and therefore 
will start prescribing later on the product launch phase (less innovators and early adopters, 
and more late adopters). Interviewee I04 explained that «There may have been some delay in 




terms of therapeutic novelties, so this is a negative point of having less visits (…) Maybe 
prescribe an innovative product later» (I04). We also found two references suggesting that 
the 2013 detailing ceiling contributed to a lower prescription of medicines, vision obtained 
from two PSRs. The first one mentioned that «(the effect was) less prescription and less 
(medicines) consumption» (I14), and the second one explained that «By limiting the access of 
PSRs to the doctors, there will be a lower prescription. Often PSRs influence prescription. 
And by limiting PSRs’ access to the doctor, he or she will prescribe less (medicines). I do not 
know if it is true or not, but we have commented among ourselves that this has indeed 
happened. Yes, there has been some change in prescription behavior» (I15). 
 
 
3.5 – Goals attained 
With this topic we wanted to evaluate whether the 2013 detailing ceiling reached the tutelage 
goals, from two perspectives: one was the real impact on the field (that is, in NHS settings), 
and one was the extent to which tutelage goals may have been achieved. 
In respect to the eventual impact on the field, 11 interviewees (with 12 references) mentioned 
that indeed the 2013 ceiling resulted in a reduction in the number of PSRs visits inside the 
NHS infrastructure. As noted previously, we underline the word “inside”. This evidence was 
curiously noted mostly physicians, high officers from the pharmaceutical industry, directors 
of NHSs, but not by many PSRs (only one mentioned this aspect). The other four PSRs 
mentioned that the 2013 ceiling had no practical impact on the field, on the territories they 
had to cover. Interviewee I16 explained that «I do not think there has been an impact on 
reducing the number of visits and contacts» (I16), where we underline the part “visits and 
contacts”.  
Apparently, such as approached in the topic “Control patterns” above, the practical effect of 
the 2013 ceiling appeared to be felt during a certain period only, in the first 1 year after its 
entry into force (two references, from one physician in the Center region, and one PSR in the 
North region). There was one reference (from one physician) to an impact which was the 
allocation, after 2013, of a room where PSRs can speak with doctors.  
Finally, there were three very interesting references from two sources (probably two of the 




initiatives in the last years, in Portugal), explaining us a very simple logic: if the Order 
entered into force, then it must have had an impact on the field. The following excerpt is very 
clarifying: «If the Order entered into force, (then) it had to have impact (laughter), that 
question is easy to answer, the law is to be observed, as I used to say, joking with my team. If 
the law was observed, (then) it had to have impact» (I01).  
Finally, a very unique insight gathered during the interview with one of the high officers from 
APIFARMA, regarding the true effect and reach of Order 8213-B/2013: «I do not monitor 
this Order, that is, I do not know if it is more observed now than in was back in 2013. Let it be 
in place, everyone has adapted to it and the medical visit continues to be made and no one 
complains about not being visited. Did I answer you?» (I12). 
In respect to the ability of Order 8213-B/2013 to reach the tutelage goals, we obtained one 
major evidence (with 12 references from 11 sources), and four other evidences with a lower 
number of references. The main insight gathered suggests that the 2013 ceiling contributed to 
the regulation and limitation of PSRs access to the NHS infrastructures and physicians, which 
had been mentioned as one of the goals the tutelage wanted to attain. It does not seem 
plausible however that this effect was totally felt in all the territory of Portugal and in all 
institutions (mainly hospitals and health centers and USFs), based on the findings we were 
able to gather, and therefore we can cautiously consider this goal was partially reached.  
Two other goals were mentioned as attained by the tutelage: raise ethical standards in the 
relation between the industry (through their PSRs) and physicians, and lower the prescription 
of more expensive medicines. The former received two references, one from I02 and one from 
I02. Both contributions were very elucidative: «It is a relationship that, being commercial, 
has clinical, scientific and ethical dimensions» (I01), and «It reached the goals of the 
tutelage, in the sense of ethics and a matter of change of attitude of the pharmaceutical 
industry itself and the doctors... I think so ... I think that was the reason. It was ethics and it 
was effectiveness» (I02).  
Then we detected a substantial number of references with a critical view of the effectiveness 
of the 2013 detailing ceiling: four sources noted that it did not reach the tutelage goals at all 
(three PSRs and one high officer from a pharmaceutical company), given that the tutelage 
allegedly does not make any endeavors to control it («(…) they do not control this at all!» 
(I17), and that there are other channels and tactics the industry is using to mitigate the access 




goals, because we are Portuguese and we are really very creative (laughs), and we adjust 
ourselves according to the necessities we encounter. The visit in the traditional format is 
probably conditioned, but we continue to have other forms of access. For example, suppose 
I've had six visits to a doctor this year, and I need to talk to him one more time about a study 
that came out or a clinical case, I'll probably send him a webinar, I'll try to schedule him a 
contact outside of the traditional format of the visit, and I will try to discuss such a study or 
clinical case with him, and invite him to drink some coffee (laughs). This is the way!» (16).  
And four sources (with six references) mentioned, in a somewhat ironic manner, that the 
tutelage is convinced the Order is being applied and control, which is not the case. These 
references were originated from a physician, a PSR, a high officer from a pharmaceutical 
company and a high officer from APIFARMA). The most relevant contributions were 
«Politically they can say Yes, (it was implemented and it is controlled)» (I09), «The 2013 
Order had the great benefit of the economic crisis, which facilitated the compliance with the 
Order. It is much easier for the Ministry of Health to say that it is totally observed» (I12), and 
a delicious contribution from a PSR: «They (the tutelage) might even think they succeeded, 
but they control nothing! Strictly nothing! Let's say yes for the tutelage to be content, but it 
does not strictly control anything. Even today I was in a service, in a hospital, where we were 
five PSRs, and not one was scheduled! Everyone came in through the ‘horse door’ (back 
door), you see? Security guards? Administrative staff? So there isn´t a ‘horse door’? There is 
always a ‘horse door’ where the security guard does not see us. I know the Ministry of Health 
lives on numbers... all right, let's say yes, the Order has reached the goals... but this is not 
true, because no one controls anything very much. Even in those hospitals like Santa Maria 
and São João, where access is more difficult, there are also ‘horse doors! (laughs)» (I17). 
 
3.6 – Adjustments to the detailing ceiling 
At the last topic of our script we wanted to understand what would interviewees do in terms 
of adjustments to the detailing ceiling, should they be given the authority to do so (that is, if 
they were the minister of health or secretary of health back in 2013). We obtained several 
ideas and contributions, but the one that stands out is the recognition that they would set a less 
restrictive limit (10 references from nine sources). And what is curious is that, in the sources 
(excluding the research observations made by the researcher), we only found physicians, 




detailing (PSRs on the side of the industry, because they surely want to keep their jobs, and 
phsycians from the side of the NHS, because they do find detailing as an important source of 
information, assistance, and training) are the ones defending a higher number of visits per 
year (eight to ten visits per year per NHS institution, instead of the current six set by Order 
8213-B/2013).  
Examples of ideas given by interviewees on this scope include: «It seems the current ceiling 
is a little too low. These things also, when you want them very controlled, always end up 
escaping in another way. I have to think in a number of visits per year… once a month ... I 
would say 10 visits» (I03), and «I would be more condescending (laughs), would set a less 
tight limit, with more visits, at least nine a year. I think that with these restrictions we are 
condemning a professional career (PSRs). And indeed the preamble of this 2013 Order, in my 
opinion, is shameful, this is a personal opinion, that preamble is such a thing... it is shameful» 
(I04). 
The second most mentioned change was the involvement of stakeholders in the tutelage 
decision making process, to obtain opinions, reactions, being able to improve the text of the 
law, and communicate the rationale of setting the limits as six visits per year, per NHS 
institution. A high officer from a top pharmaceutical company in particular was very clear 
about this change: «I would had heard more actors, heard more people, and analyzed the 
situation before implementing it. I would have communicated it differently. Would have found 
more partners and allies in what was the primary goal, because eventually this might not be a 
solution as well. There could be other solutions. Maybe I’d had a different strategic approach 
and more stakeholder involvement ... I call into question the purpose of this process. What 
was the original purpose?» (I09).  
Another high officer from a pharmaceutical company was aligned with this reasoning: 
«Definitely yes! (laughs) I think everything in life should be done in partnership. And clearly 
the State here can not have... I realize the position of the State and there are many measures 
that maybe if I were in the Government I would also take. I think we have to look at the 
people who work with us from a partnership perspective. And there is a lot that the industry 
can do today for the State, which it is not doing» (I10). These two high officers contributed 
with half of the references. 
The third most referred idea was to keep the same limits, as they were set by Order 8213-




director, and one from a physician who expressed satisfaction for the organization of PSRs 
visits the Order allowed. The former had this very curious reaction to the question: «I think 
that was great! (laugher) I tought it was great that there were not more than three PSRs per 
day» (I02). Curiously, this director (doctor, by training), disclosed, on more than one occasion 
during the interview, the fact that she is not a big fan of pharmaceutical marketing, especially 
of detailing. 
The fourth most mentioned idea was especially insightful to the researcher. It consists of 
setting different visit limits depending on several factors, including the type of products (and 
companies) promoted, the size of the company, and the number of products promoted. 
Investigation companies promoting new products or novelties would be granted a higher 
number of visits per year, in contrast with companies promoting older products or generics, 
whose need for detailing – from a scientific and physician training point of view – is less 
important. Another idea shared – related to this one – was to set different limits according to 
the pharmaceutical company size, in terms of portfolio and number of collaborators. These 
ideas had three sources: a high officer from a top pharmaceutical company, a physician, and a 
PSR.  
The following transcription excerpts provide visibility on these ideas: «I would have probably 
done it a little differently. I would distinguish between relevant products in which I would 
allow PSRs to bring useful and important information, and less relevant products where 
information was no longer useful. Because they cut in all, everyone! They cut in those who 
brought useful information, and those who only brought information about the existence of 
the product, just to remind the physician about the product, even if the information was not 
useful. (…) The companies who bring more information are the large labs, which do research 
and studies, and the little ones do not do that, they are just selling. In other words, I would 
have differentiated the access of the PSRs or the number of visits of companies with research 
and new products, from the others that are only interested in selling» (I07), «(…) the 
legislation should take into account the size of the pharmaceutical company, its portfolio and 
the number of employees» (I09), and «I would have mainly regulated the number of 
professionals that each company can have, creating a ratio appropriate to the number of 
medicines that the company is promoting. That would be very wise. Because having two drugs 
and four PSRs in each zone does not make sense, but for example having 20 drugs and two 




The following ideas have a lower number of references – two or one – but still provided very 
relevant insights that helped us understand interviewees’ reservations and contributions to an 
eventual better Order – should it be revised in the coming years. One of the ideas (with two 
references, from a physicians and a PSR) is to allow certain flexibility in the scheduling and 
control process. Two examples were given: first, a situation where the doctors would not be at 
the NHS institution (they may have gone to a training event, or missed work, or got sick), and 
second, a PSR whose mother had passed away. In these situations, both interviewees 
proposed some flexibility to allow PSRs to re-schedule their visits without losing a “credit”, 
that is, those visits would not count as an additional visit (to the limit of six visits per year, per 
NHS institution).  
Another idea (mentioned by a physician with coordination experience, I05) was to define a 
daily limit of visits only, without a year limit, which would put on the pharmaceutical 
companies’ hand the need to organize themselves to set which PSRs from which companies 
would visit which NHS institutions daily. Other idea (expressed by a former PSR, now a 
senior consultant) was to prohibit the Lines (which was regulated with Order 8212-N/2013, 
but not to a prohibition extent). One interviewee – a high officer from IQVIA – stated that he 
would have launched the Order sooner, given that the situation needed to be regulated.  
And a final idea was to change the concept of collective visits, allowing more group visits. A 
high officer from APIFARMA explained that «(collective visits) are extremely important, 
defining very well their content, their concept, because they are the most important for 
knowledge and for global information to health professionals. And as there is so much the 
issue of visiting doctor to doctor... There could be a discussion forum with more doctors at 
the same time, which is good, sharing knowledge. I would have bet a lot more on those visits» 
(I12). 
Synthesis of the main findings – Dimension 3 
The entry into force of Order 8213-B/2013 apparently did not provoke a major impact on 
PSRs job or daily activity, suggesting that PSRs were able to keep the number of visits (or 
contacts) per day, as before the 2013 detailing ceiling. However, given the fact that the access 
to NHS institutions and physicians was now more controlled, pharmaceutical companies had 
to provide their PSRs new competences, so that they could become more effective and 
efficient, with a more scientific approach, with more content, now that the total number of 




A limited number of interviewees linked the Order to the dismissal of thousands of PSRs, but 
others alleged that the Order coincided with the peak of the financial and economic crisis. 
PSRs daily organization appeared to have changed following the entry into force of the Order, 
increasingly visiting, at the transition period, doctors at their private practices, and at other 
settings such as the HCOs parking or bar, or restaurants nearby. Likely related to the 
reduction to the number of PSRs – and not necessarily to the Order itself – was the expansion 
of PSRs territories, now covering higher areas, and the reduction in PSR specialization 
(targeting both primary and secondary care). 
The effect of Order 8213-B/2013 was noted to impact pharmaceutical companies in two main 
aspects: an increased usage of other channels and tools to complement detailing (with a 
substantial increase on digital), and the reduction in the frequency of visits inside NHS 
institutions. While the first does not seem to be a direct consequence of the Order, but 
certainly concurrent, the second looks like a direct consequence of it.  
Some sources suggested that companies and their PSRs were able to keep the same 
number of visits as before the 2013 Order, having however to be creative and meet the 
physicians in other settings as noted before. As underlined previously, this single insight is 
one of the most important evidences capturedto help us to understand the results obtained in 
the quantitative section. There was a consensous about the facts that companies more 
dependent on detailing and companies with higher compliance were more exposed to the 
detailing ceiling, and that bigger companies adapted better to the entry into force of the Order. 
Order 8213-B/2013 appears to have helped NHS institutions to regulate and discipline PSRs 
access and activity inside their infrastructure by creating procedures for PSR enrollment, 
visits scheduling, and visits control. This likely was an important factor – alongside with the 
economic crisis and other events such as the INN prescription – to the reduction of the 
number of PSRs and visits inside NHS institutions. A substantial number of sources (six) 
suggested that 2013 ceiling effect on NHS institutions was at most marginal, if any. 
Order 8213-B/2013 seems to have allowed physicians working at the NHS higher levels of 
concentration and productivity, with more time for assistential tasks with patients. The Order 
also appears to be linked – at least to some extent – to negative effects on NHS physicians, in 
the sense that they now receive less information and less updates on novelties, including new 





As suggested by a great majority of sources, Order 8213-B/2013 apparently did not 
provoke a structural change in physician prescription behavior, and this is another of 
the main conclusions of the qualitative phase of our research. Prescription behavior 
changes are more likely linked to other measures – such as the INN prescription, highly 
formatted prescription systems, expense ceilings, and other – than to the Order itself. 
Conversely, a lower number of sources (five) proposed that there must have been a change in 
prescription behavior with the entry into force of the 2013 ceiling, likely seen in a delay in the 




We summarized the ability of Order 8213-B/2013 to reach its goals, in table 11.3 below. 
Table 11.3 – Ability of Order 8213-B/2013 to attain tutelage goals 
 







Achievement level Evidence level Empirical grounding
Goal 1
Safeguard HCP care-related 
activity (assistencial tasks)
"(…) create the necessary conditions so that this 
activity does not interfere with, or in any way 
interfere with, the normal activity of the services, 
namely with regard to the provision of health care” 
Partially achieved High
The Order likely contributed to the reduction of the disturbance on 
NHS HCOs provoked by the presence of the PSRs, but was not 
likely the main factor (INN prescription, economic and finantial 
crisis, …)
Goal 2
Discipline and dignify 
access to HCPs and HCOs
"The purpose of this Order is to establish the 
general rules governing the access of PSRs to 
NHS establishments and services and their 
contact with health professionals"
Partially achieved High
Order implementation and control processes do not appear to be 
generalized through the entire territory of Portugal (different regions, 





N/A Marginally achieved Moderate
There might have been some delay in the beginning of the 
prescription of newer, more expensive medicines. The number of 





N/A Partially achieved HIgh
Order by itself presumably contributed to this goal, but was not 
likely the main cause (prescription by INN, economic crisis, …)
Goal 5
Calm public opinion
N/A Partially achieved Low
The apparent link between the entry into force of the Order and an 
eventual reduction of the number of complaints from patients could 
not be made. However, a higher control of PSRs access is likely to 
have mitigated the occurrence of conflicts with patients
Goal 6
Stimulate the prescription of 
generics
N/A Not likely achieved Low
The change in the behavior in physician prescription in relation to 
generics (increased penetration) behavior is likely more linked to 
the compulsory prescription by INN and to the economic crisis
Explicit
(mentioned in the 
preamble of Order 
8213-B/2013)
Tacit
(inferred from both 
the interpretation of 







The majority of sources suggested that – if they had the ability to improve the Order – they 
would have set a less restrictive limit in the number of visits per year, to each NHS institution 
(a more balanced number would be eight to 10 visits per year). Also, they would have 
involved the stakeholders in the decision making process, to obtain opinions, reactions, and 
contributions, and set a different number of visits per year according to the type of company, 
its size, the type (investigation versus generics, newer versus older) and number of products 
promoted. Other suggestions include some flexibility in cases where PSRs are not able to visit 
physicians due to variables not linked to their work. 
11.4.2.4. Paradigm shift 
This was a new dimension, not present in the script, resulting from the interpretation of the 
content analysis of dimensions one, two and three, where we found very clear patterns. As the 
main insight (with 27 references from 13 sources) there is the evidence that physician 
prescription behavior and the very strong reduction in the number of visits and PSRs were not 
linked to Order 8213-B/2013 alone, suggesting the Order’s impact was at best marginal, on 
top of many other changes the industry had been suffering.  
The following transcription excerpts help us understand this topic: «To link the reduction in 
the number of visits to the legislation only, I do not think it is a good conclusion, I do not 
know if it is a conclusion that I can draw» (I09), «These measures (Order) turn out to be, as 
Jorge Jesus would say, "peenars" (laughs). They end up being peanuts» (I10), «The reduction 
in the number of PSRs was much more provoked by the situation than by the Order» (I14), 
«So that's what I say, this was the marriage of various interests» (I16), «Now, I say again that 
I do not know if it is because of the limitation of visits, if it is due to other limitations» (I19), 
and «I do not know if the reduction in the number of visits and PSRs was directly provoked by 
this measure (Order), but it helped» (I20).  
We then tried to find the patterns and measure what could have explained the previous 
conclusion. The highest contributors to these insights, in terms of references, were 
pharmaceutical Industry officers, PSRs, and Consultants. We then tried to find possible 
evidences to help us explain the insight described above, here structured below in four topics: 
legislative and regulation initiatives (63 references from 21 sources), market dynamics (25 
references from 14 sources), economical and finantial conjuncture (15 references from nine 




A highly mentioned evidence was a series of legislation initiatives from the ministry of 
health to control the expense with medicines, especially between 2005 and 2014. At the 
source of these references we found mostly consultants, PSRs, high officers from the 
pharmaceutical industry, and physicians. The initiatives included, according to insights from 
the intervieess: 1) INN compulsory prescription (23 references from 12 sources); 2) 
Compulsory electronic prescription (17 references from 12 sources); 3) Increased regulation 
of promotion initiatives (eight references from six sources); 4) Prohibition of the Lines; 5) 
Successive price cuts and reduction in margins; and 6) Expenditures cap. According to a 
substantial majority of the interviewees, the compulsory prescription by INN (which entered 
into force in 2012 with Law 11/2012, regulated by ordinance 137-A/2012) was likely the 
strongest influencer of the reduction in the number of PSRs and visits to the NHS.  
Interestingly, the highest number of references (10) were originated during itnerviews with 
PSRs, where some of the transcription excerpts include: «There was also the issue of INN 
(DCI in Portuguese), which very sincerely I believe would have been the main reason for the 
restructuring (dismissals) of the sales teams, because in reality if the doctor now prescribes 
by INN, then he or she does not need the influence of the company brand that you're behind 
(…) I think it was the INN decision that had a real impact on the prescribing behavior of 
doctors, and had much greater impact than the Order itself» (I16), «The impact in 
prescribing is mainly due to the things doctors are exposed to, with generics, having to 
prescribe by INN, the very tight systems (…) They weigh much more than other things» (I17), 
and «The main one, as was mentioned at the beginning, has to do with the entry of the INN 
(…) With the entry into force of the prescription by INN, the clear message that was passed to 
health professionals is that, since there was the molecule, doctors would have to prescribe by 
the molecule and passing that decision to the patient... (…) This Order appears more or less 
at the same time as the INN. And if we are reminded by then, when this INN issue was 
launched, it was to encourage doctors to prescribe generic drugs. And once there were many 
sales forces prescribing branded products (…) I think the main measure, which affected the 
way doctors prescribe, was the entry of the INN» (I18).  
The second most mentioned factor that impacted prescription behavior and the number of 
visits and PSRs in the NHS was the electronic prescription and the prescription softwares 
(with PSRs and high officers from the pharmaceutical industry as the main contributors in 
terms of references). A former high officer from the ministry of health explained that «For 




referee video, introduces a transparency enhancing effect, and so the actors know that their 
footprint is getting registered. So if I have ten cardiologists in the hospital with an average 
prescribing standard and there is one who is an outlier, looking at that outlier I have to 
realize if he/she has special patients and makes a special prescription to those patients, 
perfectly explained or not, has the same patients as others do but has a pattern and attitude 
that only prescribes more expensive medications or another type of response. I think that 
electronic prescription in Portugal and in whole Europe is much more determinant in this 
aspect than a higher or lower number of PSR visits» (I01).  
Several interviewees also noted that NHS prescription softwares were purposely very closed 
to the prescription of branded medicines (when there were generics available, of the same 
active principle). These limitations included several clicks to select a branded drug, several 
confirmation boxes (“Are you sure you want to prescribe a brand where there is a less 
expensive generic available?”, and similar), limitations to the search of the brand drug 
(medicines are sorted from the lowest price to the highest price), which likely had a very 
important role in changing physicians prescription behavior. Some interviewees recognized 
that at the beginning doctors wanted to keep their prescription independence but after a few 
months they were beaten by fatigue or tiredeness of having to execute so many boring 
procedures to select branded drugs, which is clearly seen in the following transcription 
excerpts: «The doctor, in order to prescribe a certain product, often has to go through 500 
thousand windows, to say yes. ‘But are you sure? But are you sure? And yet, do you really 
think that it is this product? Look there is a cheaper one!’. It was not done innocently, 
clearly! The great limitation often to prescription is exactly this, that is, it is the barriers and 
difficulties that the authorities themselves – consciously – are creating» (I10), «Computer 
systems also condition the doctor because when prescribing by INN the process is much faster 
than when prescribing by commercial name, so the system itself also leads the doctor to 
prescribe by INN» (I15), and «Doctors surrender more to this new way of being, prescribing 
more what is suggested to them by the system, by INN. Doctors today have changed their 
behavior a lot, even those of the old generation... they were overcome by fatigue, they were 
so, so pressed... And some who are even people who always had a fondness for the figure of 
the PSR get tired and were overcome (beaten) by fatigue» (I14).  
The increased regulation on promotion activities – the third most mentioned topic 
regarding the legislative or regulation initiatives – was also mentioned to have had an effect 




APIFARMA code of conduct, and the obligation of public disclosure of incentives in excess 
of 60€ (at INFARMED’s Placotrans platform). Some excerpts where these insights appeared 
include: «Obviously today we are very limited by the APIFARMA’s Code of Conduct» (I10), 
and «But I do not know if these promotional or alternative events were a consequence, that is, 
I do not know what has contributed most to it, whether it was the limitation to the medical 
visit (detailing ceiling), or whether it was the rules that limited the supports to the doctors. I 
would say that probably what contributed most to the appearance of new promotional forms 
was the limit created for the support of physicians and HCOs (report obligation in 
Placotrans, of values above 60€)» (I19). 
Another important legislative initiative – which was incorporated in Order 8213-B/2013 – and 
here referred above, was the limitation of the Lines, which also may have provoked an 
impact in the number of PSRs. Interviewee I11 – a high officer from APIFARMA – adds 
visibility to this topic: «This change (the detailing ceiling) and when they ceased to authorize 
the ‘daughters’ companies, or Lines, I think it was simultaneous. The contract is with the 
parent company. A PSR of company X (big), that goes to the line / to the virtual company... 
This finished and it diminished the number of visits of the pharmaceutical companies» (I11).  
The successive cuts in prices and in margins was also mentioned (especially by PSRs) as an 
important factor to explain the reduction on the number of visits and PSRs, as explained by a 
PSR: «Then the profit margins also fell a lot. Even continuing to sell a lot (in quantity), there 
was now a smaller profit margin, and that has led to cuts (dismissal of PSRs included)» (I17).  
A final topic which was mentioned at the legislative and regulation scope was the successive 
medicines expenditure caps negotiated since the intervention of Troika (mostly referred by 
consultants). The cap was negotiated between APIFARMA and the NHS, and was set a two 
thousand million Euros of expenses per year in its first year. Should the year amount of NHS 
expenses with medicines be higher than that threshold, pharmaceutical companies would pay 
back the differential to the NHS, based on their market share. A high officer from IQVIA 
explained the effect of the cap on the number of PSRs: «The State, as regulator and payer of 
the drug, capped the market at two thousand millions, and by capping the market companies 
that had no growth had to drastically reduce sales forces» (I18). 
Another highly mentioned evidence was the changes in the market dynamics, which 
included: 1) The generics promotion shift from physicians to pharmacists (14 references from 




medicines (eight references from six sources); and 3) Portfolios getting older and companies 
with less pipeline (new drugs) in the ambulatory market (three references from two sources).  
The first and second ones (mostly mentioned by consultants and high officers from the 
pharmaceutical industry, especially from APIFARMA), were likely a consequence of the 
entry into force of the prescription by INN, given that the patient has now the ability to ask 
for a specific brand of generics (or follow the suggestion the pharmacist gives to the patient). 
Pharmaceutical companies promoting generics mostly stopped visiting physicians, moving 
their efforts to pharmacists, which probably contributed to a very strong reduction in the 
number of PSRs (the logic is simple: there are more than 30 thousand active physicians in 
Portugal, and only approximately 2.900 pharmacies).  
These changes contributed to the rise in the protagonism (and power) of the pharmacists, in 
terms of the attention (and support) they receive from the industry. Some of the transcription 
excerpts help us understand these points: «And for example the history of generic medicines, 
they stopped visiting us, they now visit pharmacies» (I04), «And so the pharmaceutical 
companies, quite simply, turned their needle. ‘Okay, if the decision is no longer on the doctor, 
then I will not promote generic drugs to the doctor, I will promote them at the pharmacy’. So 
today, companies that have generics are focused exclusively - there may be one exception 
here or another - in the pharmacy business. And so, of course, the space with the doctor is 
exclusively for the branded drugs» (I10), «There was some transfer of visits from doctors to 
pharmacies, namely the companies that were promoting very old products already settled in 
the market, and those of generics» (I12), and «You get to the pharmacy, the doctor may have 
prescribed a specific brand of generics, and the pharmacist decides to make the switch. And 
that’s it» (I20).  
The third one was the recognition that, by the one hand, portfolios were getting older, and by 
the other hand, there were a very limited number of new drug lunches, which in conjunction 
implied the need of a substantially lower number of PSRs. In addition to this, many 
companies are shifting their focus to secondary care (hospital), using KAMs and MSLs in 
their communication with HCPs and other hospital stakeholders, instead of typical PSRs. The 
next transcription excerpts from one high officer from a pharmaceutical company (I10) and a 
consultant (I19) help us understand this: «Companies have invested less in sales force, but I 
think this is also a reflection of something else. Nowadays, the portfolios of the companies 
themselves or at least of the main companies, nowadays ... it’s an older portfolio. That is, we 




is completely different. And the need to have more people on the ground and promote certain 
products is no longer so significant» (I10), and «There was a phase – around 2013/2014, 
when there was no pipeline of outpatient (ambulatory) drugs, and the new pipeline is very 
targeted to hospital care» (I19). 
A third evidence we were able to identify was the decisive effect of the economic and 
finantial conjuncture (with high officers from APIFARMA, IQVIA and Lean Health as the 
main sources of references). Portuguese economy has suffered, since 2005, two main negative 
impacts: the first one was the 2009 international crisis, provoking a decline of 3% in the GDP 
in that year; the second was the impact of budget austerity measures imposed by the Troika 
composed by the International Monetary Fund, the European Commission and the Central 
European Bank, after Portugal’s request for budget assistance in April 2011.  
The austerity resulted in three consecutive years with negative GDP growth rates, reaching –
1,8% in 2011, -4,0% in 2012 and -1,1% in 2013. The economic and finantial crisis, according 
to several interviewees, had a very powerful effect on pharmaceutical companies, 
tremendnously reducing their commercial and marketing budgets, and therefore standing out 
as one of the main contributors to the reduction on the number of PSRs (and therefore visits to 
the NHS). This effect (Troika and both Economic and Financial crises) received 15 references 
from nine sources), especially from hight officers from the pharmaceutical industry 
(pharmaceutical and consulting companies). We selected some transcription excerpts we 
found more relevant: «2013 is the time of the financial crisis (…) What had an impact (on the 
reduction on the number of PSRs and visits) was the economic context» (I12), «Troika and the 
economic crisis in Portugal (…) these two factors have reduced the traditional channel (PSR 
visits) by almost 50%. At the moment it recovers a little, it is true, but in this period of five 
years there was a reduction of practically 50% of the traditional channel» (I18), and «Due to 
the crisis, due to the saturation of the activity itself and if you realize that SOV (share of 
voice) is not a growing line without end...» (I19). 
A fourth evidence appears in the scope of the NHS administrative ecosystem, mainly 
consisting of administrative changes especially at health familiar units (or USFs) with their 
expense ceilings (with PSRs as the main contributors in terms of references). These expense 
ceilings had been addressed by Fischer, Koch, Kostev & Stargardt (2017), where physician 
prescription budgets can contain pharmaceutical spending, as the most direct way of 
interceding in the prescribing process. Type B USFs have tight goals in terms of expenditures 




degrees of freedom, and typically are more professional managemed than traditional health 
centers. The number of type B USFs grew from 69 (in 2008) to 181 (in 2013), which 
contributed by the one hand to a higher consciousness of phsycians (more alert to prescribe 
less expensive options), and by the other hand to some limitations to the activity of PSRs, in 
the sense that a higher number of PSRs at the USFs would imply a lower performance in 
assistential care indicators (number of patients seen, and other), as suggested by one of the 
interviewees.  
The following excerpts provide relevant insights on this topic: «An USF is a healthcare unit 
that has a budget to operate. It works by levels. The more the USF can operate within the 
budget that is given to it, the more it evolves in its level, and by evolving, gains independence. 
And gaining independence is what? ‘I give you this full glass for you to run for 1 year. And 
you can drink all it’s left’. Therefore the USF does a self-management of costs. And that goes 
by what you prescribe, that has impact» (I10), and «Physicians are increasingly controlled in 
relation to health costs, their prescription, and health units, especially USFs, are now subject 
to cost evaluation and mandatory prescribing by INNs...» (I16).  
Synthesis of the main findings – Dimension 4 
The main conclusion of the fourth dimension is the realization that Order 8213-B/2013 was 
not the cause of the very strong reduction in the number of PSRs (almost 50% according to a 
high officer from IQVIA) and visits to the NHS. At most it may have marginally contributed 
to this result. At the origin of this reduction was a “perfect storm” in the Portuguese 
pharmaceutical market, with the center of the hurricane in the period of 2010 to 2013.  
The gravitational power generated by the confluence of several exogenous factors hitting the 
pharmaceutical companies (including the economic and financial crisis, the intervention of 
Troika, medicine expenditures caps, the compulsory prescription by INN, very limiting 
prescription softwares, changes in market dynamics and in the NHS administrative 
ecosystem) resulted in a clear new paradigm, pulling down the number of PSRs in an 
unprecedented magnitude. A high officer from APIFARMA explained that «Order 8213-
B/2013 had the great benefit of the economic crisis, which facilitated compliance with the 
Order. It is much easier for the Ministry of Health to say that it is all fulfilled. But upstream 
also the number of PSRs was reduced, due to factors external to the Order, the Order 
benefited from this situation, because had it not be this way I have many doubts the Order 





Figure 11.7 below is an attempt to describe, schematically, the complexity of the forces the 
pharmaceutical market has suffered especially in the period from 2005 to 2013. 
 
 
Figure 11.7 – Paradigm shift in the Portuguese pharmaceutical industry 
Source: own elaboration 
 
 
This paradigm shift can not only be seen in the evidences gathered from the qualitative study 
we developed, but also in the evolution of the expenses with medicines, incurred by the 




2010, period after which there was a strong medicines sales reduction, apparently aligned 
with a substantial increase in legislation activity. Figure 11.8 explores the evolution of 
published legislation and costs incurred by the NHS with medicines. 
 
Figure 11.8 – Published legislation vs Costs incurred by the NHS with medicines 
Source: PORDATA (2019) | Own elaboration 
 
Analyzing the CAGR for five year periods (figure 11.9), we clearly see double digit growth 
during the nineties, then reducing to 6,8% between 2000 and 2005, then 2,5% between 2005 
and 2010 (where most of the legislation activity has occurred in terms of administrative 
compulsory price cuts and reimbursement changes), and finally -6,3% from 2010 to 2015. If 
we isolate the period between 2010 and 2013, the CAGR drops to -10,9%, which resulted in a 





Figure 11.9 – CAGR evolution of costs incurred by the NHS with medicines (Continental 
Portugal) 
Source: PORDATA (2019) 
 
11.5. Conclusions 
The main communication channel used to interact with physicians is still, by far, face-to-face, 
and the most mentioned promotion tool is detailing, apparently more valued by older than by 
younger physicians. Promotion instruments – especially detailing, congresses, clinical 
meetings and medical literature - seemingly can have a strong influence in physician 
prescription behavior. Detailing allows companies to maximize their SOV, explore the 
relation and affection between PSRs and physicians, and take advantage of the power of 
reciprocity. Physicians tend to value detailing given that it allows them to receive information 
about novelties and regular assistance from companies. PSRs competences have been 
evolving, with a higher scientific approach and a communication focused on the pathology 
and on the benefit to the patient. 
Order 8213-B/2013 main goals were likely the reduction of disturbance on health care 
organizations, the reduction of prescription and consumption, the reduction of the commercial 
pressure of pharmaceutical companies on physicians, the safeguard of HCPs care-related 
activity allowing more time for assistential tasks, and the discipline and dignity of PSRs’ 
access to HCPs and HCOs. Most likely, Order 8213-B/2013 was not entirely implemented on 
a national basis, given the difficulty to control PSRs access to the NHS in a conjuncture of 




visits’ scheduling process does not likely observe the same procedures from NHS institution 
to institution, and in some cases the detailing ceiling was not implemented at all (at the date of 
the interviews). PSRs are able to make visits inside NHS institutions where they are not 
booked, where at most they will receive a reprehension, but will not likely be banned.  
This 2013 ceiling had a higher effect during the first year, then losing effectiveness due to 
some decompression of the control. The North, Center, and high population regions 
apparently had a higher control than the South (Alentejo and Algarve) regions. Control is 
apparently higher in certain political scenarios (in ACES). Pharmaceutical companies reacted 
to the ceiling mainly by increasing the investment in group sessions, in digital channels and 
tools. Companies appeared to use several tactics to mitigate the effect of the 2013 detailing 
ceiling, including visiting physicians at their private practices, using mirror visits (or Lines), 
waiting for the doctors in the parking or HCO entrance, or at the bar or restaurant, the registry 
of some of the PSRs’ interactions with physicians as contacts and not as visits, and using back 
doors in HCOs. There was already a detailing ceiling in place, in some NHS institutions, but 
it was not highly controlled, it was not centralized, and it did not include a maximum number 
of visits per year, per NHS institution. 
Order 8213-B/2013 apparently did not provoke a major impact on PSRs job or daily activity. 
Very likely, companies and their PSRs were able to keep the same number of visits as 
before the 2013 Order. Companies more dependent on detailing and companies with higher 
compliance were more exposed to the detailing ceiling. The Order apparently helped some 
NHS institutions – the ones that implemented and control it - to regulate and discipline PSRs 
access and activity inside their infrastructure. Physicians working at the NHS were likely 
benefited in terms of concentration and productivity, with more time for assistential tasks. But 
physicians can suffer from the detailing ceiling by not receiving novelties and support as often 
as they did before 2013.  
Order 8213-B/2013 apparently did not provoke a structural change in physician 
prescription behavior (at most, it may have marginally impacted the beginning of the 
prescription of new medicines). Changes in this behavior are much more likely linked to other 
measures including INN prescription, highly constraining prescription systems, expense 
ceilings, the economic crisis, and other. Globally, the goals of the tutelage for the 2013 
detailing ceiling were partially or marginally reached, only. Improvements to the detailing 




different number of visits per year according to the type of company, size, type of products, 
and number of products promoted. 
Order 8213-B/2013 cannot be blamed for the strong reduction in the number of PSRs and 
visits to the NHS. At most, it may have had a marginal effect only, while the main 
contributors were a series of exogenous events that occurred especialy between 2010 and 
2013, including the economic and financial crisis, the intervention of Troika, medicine 
expenditures caps, the compulsory prescription by INN, very constraining prescription 
softwares, changes in market dynamics and in the NHS administrative ecosystem, which 
resulted in a new paradigm, where new competences, new approaches, and new methods are 
needed. 
When we compare the conclusions from the non-structured interviews and the ones from the 
in-depth interviews we have just listed, we realize that there is a very high, unexpected and 
very interesting proximity between both, especially regarding the effect of the the economic 
crisis, the Troika intervention, the INN compulsory prescription, the switch in detailing from 
physicians to pharmacists (in the case of generics), the very constraining compulsory 
electronic prescription systems (where physicians were beaten by fatigue, subordinating their 
prescription to price and to the options suggested by the systems), market dynamics including 
the shift in focus from ambulatory to the hospital market, the legislation initiatives, and a 
higher control of the tutelage on marketing initiatives. 
 
11.6. Discussion (qualitative part) 
As explored during the content analysis of the first dimension of our script (Pharmaceutical 
communication channels and promotion tools), our results are aligned with previous research 
on detailing and pharmaceutical marketing in general. Detailing is the main promotion tool 
used by pharmaceutical companies, as noted by Gagnon & Lexchin (2008), Yi, 
Anandalingamb & Sorrell (2003), Gagnon & Lexchin (2008), and Datta & Dave (2016), and 
appears to be the instrument with the highest effect on physician prescription behavior 
(Narayanan, Manchanda & Chintagunta, 2003; by Kremer, Bijmolt, Leeflang & Wieringa, 
2008). 
The main factors influencing physicians’ prescription decisions include drug price and 
economic status of the patient (Pitt & Nel, 1988, Gönül et al, 2001; Spiller & Wymer, 2001; 




Leeflang & Verhoef, 2010; Stros & Lee, 2015), evidence & literature & guidelines (Aronson, 
2006; Huskamp, Epstein & Blumenthal, 2003), the relation with PSR and the pharmaceutical 
company (Pitt & Nel, 1988; Stros and Lee, 2015), and own experience and habit (Pitt & Nel, 
1988; and Spiller & Wymer, 2001), the physician profile (including the university he or she 
got the medical diploma from), peers & scientific societies, the prescription software (Spiller 
& Wymer, 2001; Schumock et al, 2004), trust, confidence and prestige (Pitt & Nel, 1988), 
adequacy to the clinical status, simplicity to the patient, and the patient him or herself. 
In our research, we were able to verify that detailing is important to pharmaceutical 
companies because it allows them to explore reciprocity (Roughead, Harvey & Gilbert, 1998; 
Katz, Caplan and Merz, 2010) and use the PSRs to create friendly relations with physicians 
(Andaleeb and Tallman, 1996), exploring the face-to-face contact (Prosser & Walley, 2003b) 
to maximize the share-of-voice (Zolterns, Sinha & Lorimer, 2004; Kumar, 2015). Detailing is 
also important to physicians, by providing novelties (Alkhateeb & Doucette, 2008; Prosser & 
Walley, 2003b; Chimonas, Brennan & Rothman, 2007), remind about older products, 
preference for personal contact (Prosser & Walley, 2003b).  
Detailing is perceived as more effective in the case of younger versus older drugs (Narayanan 
et al, 2003; Manchanda, Rossi & Chintagunta, 2004; Manchanda & Honka, 2005; Narayanan 
et al, 2005; Dave, 2013), and by our own quantitative research. Somewhat conversely to 
research performed by Steinman, Shlipak & McPhee (2001), our results suggest that 
physicians are aware and recognize the effect of detailing on their prescription behavior, but 
apparently are less influenced than their peers (in line with Sah & Fugh-Berman, 2013). PSRs 
need new competences, including the ability or sensitivity to evaluate the profile of each 
physician and adapt the approach and speech accordingly (Rozell & Newman, 2010; Stros & 
Lee, 2014), be transparent, honest, and didactic. 
Our findings in the qualitative phase only partially confirm previous research on the effects of 
detailing ceilings. The first evidence was that the detailing ceiling may have had a marginal 
effect only, on the levels of detailing, while research conducted by Larkin, Ang, Avorn & 
Kesselheim (2014), Liu et al (2016) and Larkin et al (2017) suggested a substancial impact. 
Another evidence was that, with a detailing ceiling policy, the drugs with the largest detailing 
frequency are more exposed to the effects of the ceiling, suffering more in terms of market 





11.7. Contribution to the theory 
Our qualitative research also allowed several contributions to the theory on pharmaceutical 
marketing and drug promotion regulation, as – to the best of our knowledge – the first one to 
address detailing ceilings using a mixed methods approach.  
The first contribution – adding to previous research conducted by Alkhateeb, Khanfar, & 
Clauson (2009) and Gönül & Carter (2012) on the profile of physicians more prone to 
detailing – is the evidence that older physicians (generally older than 45 years old) are likely 
more prone to receive PSRs and appreciate their regular visits, while younger physicians 
appear to be less dependent on detailing, using instead other information sources such as 
digital ones (general search engines such as Google, on-line medical communities, academic 
search engines, and other). Older phsycians have “grown” with the support from PSRs, are 
more used to receive them, and seem to be less independent in the search of scientific 
information (new studies, new evidence) in comparison to their younger peers.  
Another contribution is the evidence that physicians appear to be aware of the effect of 
detailing on their prescription behavior. While Steinman, Shlipak & McPhee (2001) found 
that more than 60% of physicians do not consider that detailing can influence them, all our 
interviewed physicians (seven) recognized the influence of detailing on their prescription 
behavior through drug novelties, the affective component, alerting to some specificities, 
reminding old drugs, and clarifying doubts. We also contribute to the literature on influencers 
of physician prescription behavior by adding the university where physicians received their 
diplomas from. This was mentioned by two different sources during our research, explaining 
that different medical schools appear to have slightly diverse approaches regarding the 
prescription of some drugs.  
We also provide additional insights on direct factors which appear to influence physician 
prescription behavior, which are the INN compulsory prescription, and the limitations of the 
prescription softwares when physicians try to prescribe an original drug when a generic with 
the same principle is available, contributing with specificities to previous research developed 
by Spiller & Wymer (2001) and Schumock et al (2004) on drug prescribing restriction 
policies. Likewise, we contribute with additional visibility on the importance of detailing to 
pharmaceutical companies, to physicians and to PSRs, adding relevance to this promotion 
instrument in the scope of pharmaceutical marketing. Moreover, we provide new insights on 
PSRs valued competences specifically transparency and honesty, adding to Rozell & Newman 




Regarding drug promotion regulation, we provide unique and novel insights on a real, 
nationally-wide detailing ceiling implementation and supervision. Perhaps the most important 
ones are the evidence that without a proper and regular control, a detailing ceiling may not be 
taken seriously by some stakeholders in the pharmaceutical industry, and the insight that a 
detailing ceiling may not fully reach the goals that led to its implementation, especially on its 
ability to impact physician prescription behavior (which was, in our research, only mentioned 
in the case of newer drugs, whose beginning of prescription may be delayed with a detailing 
ceiling when it is controlled).  
Our research also provides new insights on the difficulties on the implementation and control 
of a detailing ceiling from several perspectives including the NHS infrastructure, the 
pharmaceutical companies and their PSRs, and the physicians, as well as reactions to the 
ceiling from the pharmaceutical industry in general, and possible tactics pharmaceutical 
companies and PSRs may use to mitigate or circumvent the effect of the ceiling.  
We also contribute with new theory on the effect of a detailing ceiling on physicians, on NHS 
institutions, on PSRs, and on pharmaceutical companies. Finally, we add new insights about a 
pharmaceutical market impacted by severe exogenous shocks, resulting in a paradigm shift, 
also helping to understand the combined effect of these shocks on the number of PSRs and 
detailing dynamics. 
 
11.8. Empirical model – synthesis of the qualitative study 
The qualitative empirical model (figure 11.10) was built based on the data gathered at the 
qualitative phase of our research (non-structured and in-depth interviews). 
The qualitative empirical model incorporates not only our three initial dimensions 
(Pharmaceutical communication channels and promotion tools, Implementation of the 
detailing ceiling in the NHS, and Effect of the detailing ceiling to the NHS), but also a fourth 
dimension we detected during the non-structured interviews initial step and then especially 
during the in-depth interviews phase. The empirical model figure demonstrates the 
complexity of the pharmaceutical market and evidences the need to observe a broader 
analysis. We are convinced that the mixed methods approach fully demonstrated its scientific 









In the scope of the qualitative empirical model, we also present the qualitative empirical model explanatory table, where we can find a brief definition 
and additional information on each of the dimensions and sub-dimensions proposed (table 11.4). 





Means or vehicles through which the 
message moves (sender to receiver)
Most usual communication channels (face-to-face, on-line, telephone, mail) used by pharmaceutical companies to 
vehiculate their messages, and pattern changes in the last years
Instruments used by companies to 
develop interactions with clients
Main promotion tools (detailing, mailing, congresses, e-mailing, medical meetings, journal advertising, e-detailing, and 
other) used by pharmaceutical companies to interact with physicians, and pattern changes in the last years
Impact of promotion tools on 
physicians prescription behavior
Factors influencing physician prescription decisions | Effect of promotion tools on physician prescription behavior | 
Perception of detailing influence on own prescription decisions | Importance of detailing to companies and to physicians
Motivations and objectives of the 
tutelage for the detailing ceiling
Main motivations of the tutelage to launch the 2013 detailing ceiling
Process of implementation, on the 
field, of the detailing ceiling
Perception of adequacy of implementation of the 2013 detailing ceiling | Perception of the effectiveness of the control (if 
any) made by NHS institutions | Knowledge of cases of PSRs misconduct reported and measures taken by the tutelage
Reaction of the companies to face the 
entry into force of the detailing ceiling
Pharmaceutical companies reaction to the entry into force of the 2013 detailing ceiling, and eventual reactions to it
Effect of the detailing ceiling on PSRs 
activity
Effect of the 2013 detailing ceiling on daily PSRs activity (number of visits, contacts, reactions, tactics used
Effect of the detailing ceiling on 
companies promotion decisions
Effect of the 2013 detailing ceiling on companies decisions to allocate investments in other promotion tools
Effect of the detailing ceiling on the 
activity of the NHS institutions
Effect of the detailing ceiling on NHS institutions' daily activity (productivity, concentration, organization). Effect of detailing 
ceiling on companies with different detailing intensity
Effect of the detailing ceiling on the 
activity of NHS physicians
Effect of the detailing ceiling on NHS physicians (organization, productivity), positive and negative
Existence of any structural impact on physician prescription behavior of the entry into force of the 2013 detailing ceiling
Ability of the detailing ceiling to reach 
the tutelage goals
Perception of whether the 2013 detailing ceiling has reached the inferred tutelage goals | Practical impact on the field
Eventual adjustments to the detailing 
ceiling to make it more effective
Adjustments to the detailing ceiling, to make it more adequate and better to the market and NHS reality and needs
Prices Regulation on medicines pricing Regulatory initiatives to control and reduce medicine prices (compulsory cuts, and other)
Prescription Regulation on medicines prescription Regulatory initiatives to regulate medicines prescription (electronic, INN, softwares)
Promotion Regulation on medicines promotion Regulatory initiatives to regulate medicines promotion (including 2013 detailing ceiling)
Market dynamics Influence of exogenous and endogenous variables from the market (loss of exclusivity, drug pipeline, competition)
Economic and financial constraints Effect of the international and national crises and Troika intervention
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11.9. Limitations of the qualitative phase 
One of the limitations of the qualitative phase is the fact that there were not young physicians 
in the list of interviewees, not allowing us to triangulate their opinions with the ones from 
senior physicians, in relation to different attitudes of younger versus older doctors about 
pharmaceutical marketing in general and especially about detailing. This option was taken in 
order to guarantee a specific profile of physician, with both public and private practice, and a 
substantial experience allowing physicians to comment on the evolution of detailing and 
pharmaceutical marketing, at least since the year 2005. 
Another limitation is the fact that we were not able to interviewee very relevant stakeholders 
such as INFARMED and a high officer from the 19
th
 Constitutional Government, that is, the 
one that launched Order 8213-B/2013. The contribution from INFARMED would have 
allowed us to understand, from the point of view of the controlling institution, how the 
processes of PSRs enrolment and registry work. We made several endeavors to obtain 
INFARMED’s contribution, yet ended up receiving a negative response. In order to mitigate 
the lack of a high officer from the 19
th
 Government, and after waiting for an answer (which 
did not came), we analyzed the preabule of Order 8213-B/2013. 
A higher number of interviewees, especially from more regions of Portugal (including the 
Islands), mainly physicians, PSRs and high officers from the NHS infrastructure, would have 
allowed a higher representativeness. However, in order to observe very demanding timings 
regarding the development of this thesis and considering that we have a reasonable 
representation of the main stakeholders, we limited the number of interviewees to 20 











12. Discussion (global) 
Our results globally adhere with previous theory on pharmaceutical marketing. Taking Model 
7 as a reference, detailing flow effect on drug sales is consistent with previous research 
conducted by Kremer et al (2008), Stremersch & Van Dyck (2009), and Stremersch & 
Lemmens (2009). It also appears to be the promotion instrument that generates a higher effect 
on prescription behavior, in line with research performed by Pitt & Nel (1988), Narayanan, 
Desiraju & Chintagunta (2004), Narayanan, Manchanda & Chintagunta (2005), Kremer et al 
(2008), among others. Detailing also appears to reduce price elasticity of drugs (reduces 
physicians' price sensitivy) as predicted by Rizzo (1999), Gönül et al (2001), Narayanan et al 
(2004), and Windmeijer et al (2006). In our case, this is especially evident in the case of much 
younger (quartile 1) and much older (quartile 3) products. Our data also suggest that detailing 
evidences carry-over effects, that is, the cumulative investment of detailing has a positive 
effect on drug sales, as demonstrated previously by Narayanan et al (2004), Zoltners, Sinha & 
Lorimer (2004), Yi (2008), Montoya, Netzer & Jedidi (2010), and Liu et al (2016). In our 
data, the effect of detailing stock is especially strong among younger or much younger 
products. The theory, including Dong, Manchanda & Chintagunta (2009) and Liu et al (2016), 
predicts that detailing efforts performed by competitor drug brands (competitive detailing) 
affect own brand number of prescriptions. In our data, this was partially seen, since it only 
was verified in eight out of 18 products. Our data suggests that detailing efforts appear to 
have a higher effect on prescriptions at the initial stages of the product life cycle. This 
evidence is supported by previous research conducted by Narayanan et al (2003), Manchanda, 
Rossi & Chintagunta (2004), Manchanda & Honka (2005), Narayanan et al (2005), and Dave 
(2013). 
Table 12.1 below shows average elasticities reached in Model 7 against expected elasticities 
found by Kremer et al (2008), and Leeflang & Wieringa (2008). In the second case, we used 
Leeflang & Wieringa (2008) results from their application of a simplified version of Wittink 
(2002), the one which has average elasticities available in the article. The theory, mainly 
Kremer et al (2008) and Stremersch & Van Dyck (2009), demonstrates that detailing 
elasticities depend on the therapeutic or disease classes, which was seen in our data, with four 
different magnitudes of elasticities in the four markets analyzed. Interestingly, Market 1 
(Blood) appears to observe the pattern suggested by Kremer et al (2008), with a slightly 




Table 12.1 also suggests that average elasticities from our Model 7 are substantially lower 
than the one expected by Kremer et al (2008). In the case of detailing flow, the average 
elasticities are approximately two thirds lower. In order to compare Advertising elasticities, 
we averaged the results from Journal advertising and Mailing (direct marketing), which, 
again, evidence much lower average elasticities versus Kremer et al (2008). The expected 
effect of non-US was not verified, that is, European-level elasticities are not higher than US-
level ones, in our data. 
Table 12.1 – Average elasticies in Model 7 vs theory 
 
Source: own elaboration 
Our results are also in line with previous research in the field of changes in pharmaceutical 
policy. This is seen in the case of public reimbursement, positively impacting drug sales as 
suggested by Scherer (1993), in our case seen in two of the three products in Market 1 
(Blood). The theory also suggests that loss of exclusivity negatively impacts drug sales 
(Aitken et al, 2013), which was also verified in our results for the two eligible products in 
























Market 1 - Blood 0,392 0,295 N/A N/A N/A 0,118 -0,001 0,007 0,003
Market 2 - Pancreas N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0,166 0,002 0,0003 0,001
Market 3 - Heart 0,392 0,295 N/A N/A N/A 0,005 -0,004 0,003 -0,001
Market 4 - Liver N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0,131 -0,003 0,002 -0,0004
Average 0,326 0,123 0,014 0,007 0,027 0,103 -0,001 0,002 0,001
Kremer et al (2008)
Leeflang & Wieringa (2010) 
application of Wittink (2002) simplified




Table 12.2 – Summary of the critical analysis of our results vs theory – Model 7 
 
Source: own elaboration 




(Model 7 as a reference)
The effect of detailing on brand prescriptions is significant 
and on average positive, but modest
(Kremer, Bijmolt, Leeflang & Wieringa, 2008; 
Stremersch & Van Dyck, 2009; Stremersch & 
Lemmens, 2009)
Yes Especially in Market 1 (Blood), Market 2 (Pancreas), and Market 4 (Liver)
Detailing appears to be the promotion instrument that 
generates a higher effect on prescription behavior
(Pitt & Nel, 1988; Narayanan, Desiraju & Chintagunta, 
2004; Narayanan, Manchanda & Chintagunta, 2005; 
Kremer et al, 2008; Dave & Saffer, 2012)
Yes
Detailing elasticities are many times higher than Mailing and Journal 
advertising elasticities
Detailing appears to reduce price elasticity of drugs 
(reduces physicians' price sensitivy)
(Rizzo, 1999; Gönül et al, 2001; Narayanan et al, 
2004; Windmeijer et al, 2006)
Partially 6 out of 18 products, mainly in Market 3 (Heart) and Market 4 (Liver)
Detailing seems to evidence carry-over effects (stock)
(Narayanan et al, 2004; Zoltners, Sinha & Lorimer, 
2004; Yi, 2008; Montoya, Netzer & Jedidi, 2010; Liu, 
Gupta, Venkataraman & Liu, 2016)
Yes 14 out of 18 products evidence a positive elasticity in Detailing stock
Detailing elasticities depend on the therapeutic or disease 
classes
(Kremer et al, 2008; Stremersch & Van Dyck, 2009) Yes
Market 4 (Liver) > Market 2 (Pancreas) > Market 1 (Blood) > Market 3 
(Heart) (average elasticities)
Detailing efforts performed by competitor drug brands 
(competitive detailing) affect own brand number of 
prescriptions
(Dong, Manchanda & Chintagunta, 2009; Liu, Gupta, 
Venkataraman & Liu, 2016)
Partially 8 out of 18 products, mainly (5) in Market 3 (Heart)
Detailing efforts appear to have a higher effect on 
prescriptions at the initial stages of the product life cycle
(Narayanan et al, 2003; Manchanda, Rossi & 
Chintagunta, 2004; Manchanda & Honka, 2005; 
Narayanan et al, 2005; Dave, 2013)
Yes
On average, younger products (less time being commercialized) evidence 
higher detailing flow and detailing stock elasticities. This pattern was also 
verified in the case of Journal advertising flow and Direct mailing flow
Public reimbursement positively impacts drug sales Scherer (1993) Partially
2 of the 3 products that were subject to public reimbursement significantly 
increased their sales








































With model 8.4 we obtained what we believe may be a more calibrated and adapted model to 
the specificities of our research. If by the one hand Model 8.4 produced elasticity magnitudes 
substantially lower than the ones suggested by previous work such as Kremer et al (2008) and 
Leeflang & Wieringa (2008), by the other hand the percentage of signals as expected and 
significant (sig. < 0,05) is substantially higher than than in previous research from Leeflang & 
Wieringa (2008). 
As seen during the analysis of the structural breaks in detailing flow elasticity, our results – 
contrary to what is suggested by the theory on pharmaceutical marketing (Liu et al (2016), 
Larkin, Ang, Avorn & Kesselheim, 2014; Larkin et al, 2017) - did not provide sufficient 
evidence to say that detailing elasticities were significantly different before and after the entry 
into force of the 2013 detailing ceiling. This conclusion is robustly backed by the fact that all 
15 eligible products in our analysis evidenced the same result: no significant differences in 
detailing flow elasticities from period 1 to period 2. We were intrigued by these unexpected 
findings, which demanded further research to identify the potential explanations for this 
behavior in Portugal. 
When analyzing detailing elasticities before and after the entry into force of the detailing 
ceiling in light of products with higher and lower detailing intensity, we found that 20% of the 
drugs with the highests detailing intensity evidenced a reduction in detailing elasticity, and 
71,4% of the drugs with the lowest detailing intensity evidenced an increase in detailing 
elasticity, which only tangentially observes previous findings from Liu et al (2016), given that 
these results from our research were not statistically significant. Table 12.3 summarizes this 










Table 12.3 – Summary of the critical analysis of our results vs theory – Model 8.4 
 
Source: own elaboration 
Results from our qualitative phase are aligned with previous research on detailing and 
pharmaceutical marketing in general. Detailing is the main promotion tool used by 
pharmaceutical companies, as noted by Gagnon & Lexchin (2008), Yi, Anandalingamb & 
Sorrell (2003), Gagnon & Lexchin (2008), and Datta & Dave (2016), and appears to be the 
instrument with the highest effect on physician prescription behavior (Narayanan, Manchanda 
& Chintagunta, 2003; by Kremer, Bijmolt, Leeflang & Wieringa, 2008). 
The main factors influencing physicians’ prescription decisions include drug price and 
economic status of the patient (Pitt & Nel, 1988, Gönül et al, 2001; Spiller & Wymer, 2001; 
Stros & Lee, 2015), the quality of the product (Venkataraman & Stremersch, 2007; Fischer, 
Leeflang & Verhoef, 2010; Stros & Lee, 2015), evidence & literature & guidelines (Aronson, 
2006; Huskamp, Epstein & Blumenthal, 2003), the relation with PSR and the pharmaceutical 
company (Pitt & Nel, 1988; Stros and Lee, 2015), and own experience and habit (Pitt & Nel, 
1988; and Spiller & Wymer, 2001), the physician profile (including the university he or she 
got the medical diploma from), peers & scientific societies, the prescription software (Spiller 
& Wymer, 2001; Schumock et al, 2004), trust, confidence and prestige (Pitt & Nel, 1988), 
adequacy to the clinical status, simplicity to the patient, and the patient him or herself. 
In our research, we were able to verify that detailing is important to pharmaceutical 
companies because it allows them to explore reciprocity (Roughead, Harvey & Gilbert, 1998; 







(Model 8.4 as a reference)
Entry into force of a detailing ceiling 
may impact physician prescription 
behavior (measured through detailing 
flow elasticities)
No
The Chow (1960) test revealed that detailing 
elasticities before and after the entry into 
force of the 2013 detailing ceiling were not 
statistically different
Entry into force of a detailing ceiling 
may have a differentiated effect on 
the competing drugs, depending on 
their previous detailing intensity
No
71,4% of drugs with the lowest detailing 
intensity did see an increase in their 













































(Andaleeb and Tallman, 1996), exploring the face-to-face contact (Prosser & Walley, 2003b) 
to maximize the share-of-voice (Zolterns, Sinha & Lorimer, 2004; Kumar, 2015). Detailing is 
also important to physicians, by providing novelties (Alkhateeb & Doucette, 2008; Prosser & 
Walley, 2003b; Chimonas, Brennan & Rothman, 2007), remind about older products, 
preference for personal contact (Prosser & Walley, 2003b). Detailing is perceived as more 
effective in the case of younger versus older drugs (Narayanan et al, 2003; Manchanda, Rossi 
& Chintagunta, 2004; Manchanda & Honka, 2005; Narayanan et al, 2005; Dave, 2013), and 
by our own quantitative research. Somewhat conversely to research performed by Steinman, 
Shlipak & McPhee (2001), our results suggest that physicians are aware and recognize the 
effect of detailing on their prescription behavior, but apparently are less influenced than their 
peers (in line with Sah & Fugh-Berman, 2013). PSRs need new competences, including the 
ability or sensitivity to evaluate the profile of each physician and adapt the approach and 
speech accordingly (Rozell & Newman, 2010; Stros & Lee, 2014), be transparent, honest, and 
didactic. 
Our findings in the qualitative phase only partially confirm previous research on the effects of 
detailing ceilings. The first evidence was that the detailing ceiling may have had a marginal 
effect only, on the levels of detailing, while research conducted by Larkin, Ang, Avorn & 
Kesselheim (2014), Liu et al (2016) and Larkin et al (2017) suggested a substancial impact. 
Another evidence was that, with a detailing ceiling policy, the drugs with the largest detailing 
frequency are more exposed to the effects of the ceiling, suffering more in terms of market 
share, in line with previous research developed by Liu et al (2016). 
Table 12.4 summarizes the critical analysis of our results against the theory, in the qualitative 










Table 12.4 – Summary of the critical analysis of our results vs theory – Qualitative part 
 
Source: own elaboration 
Brief description Theoretical grounding (non-exhaustive)
Demonstrated 
 by our 
research?
Comment
Detailing is the pharmaceutical promotion tool with 
highest total investment magnitude, used by 
pharmaceutical manufacturers to interact with physicians
(Yi, Anandalingamb & Sorrell, 2003; Gagnon & 
Lexchin, 2008; Datta & Dave, 2016)
Yes
Detailing received the highest number of 
references
The effect of detailing on brand prescriptions is significant 
and on average positive, but modest
(Kremer, Bijmolt, Leeflang & Wieringa, 2008; 
Stremersch & Van Dyck, 2009; Stremersch & 
Lemmens, 2009)
Yes
Detailing was recognized as having na effect on 
prescription behavior (higher number of 
prescriptions of the promoted drugs)
Detailing appears to be the promotion instrument that 
generates a higher effect on prescription behavior
(Pitt & Nel, 1988; Narayanan, Desiraju & Chintagunta, 
2004; Kremer et al, 2008; Dave & Saffer, 2012)
Yes
Detailing had the highest number of mentions 
regarding as being the most effective instrument
Detailing efforts appear to have a higher effect on 
prescriptions at the initial stages of the product life cycle
(Narayanan et al, 2003; Manchanda, Rossi & 
Chintagunta, 2004; Narayanan et al, 2005; Dave, 2013)
Yes
Detailing effectiveness was recognized as having 
a higher strenght in the case of new drugs
Detailing may have a different impact on different medical 
specialties (specialists vs generalists)
(Chung, Kim & Park, 2017) Partially
There were some references to the different 
impact of detailing on GPs and on specialists
Gifts and meals associated with detailing may impact 
prescription behavior
(Katz, Caplan & Merz, 2010; Bergman, 2017; Carey, 
Lieber & Miller, 2017; King & Bearman, 2017)
Partially
Some references suggest that these investments 
may influence prescription behavior
Pharmaceutical companies may benefit from the principle 
of reciprocity with their detailing initiatives with doctors
(Roughead, Harvey & Gilbert, 1998; Katz, Caplan and 
Merz, 2010)
Yes
Both physicians and PSRs were globally aware 
of the power of reciprocity and its potential 
impact on prescription behavior
Recipients of the detailing activities (prescribers) do not 
consider themselves as influenced as their colleagues
(Steinman, Shlipak & McPhee, 2001; Sah & Fugh-
Berman, 2013; Riese et al, 2015; Salmasi et al, 2016)
Partially
Some of the physicians argued that they feel 
less influenced than their peers regarding detailing
Certain physician profiles and situations increment the 
likelihood of a more frequent interaction between 
physicians and PSRs
(Alkhateeb, Khanfar, & Clauson, 2009; Gönül & 
Carter, 2012)
Yes
Older doctors are more open to detailing 
activities, according to a substantial number of 
sources
Entry into force of a detailing ceiling may impact 
physician prescription behavior
(Liu, Gupta, Venkataraman & Liu, 2016) Partially
Changes in prescription behavior may have (at 
most) marginally impacted prescription behavior
Entry into force of a detailing ceiling may have a 
differentiated effect on the competing drugs, depending on 
their previous detailing intensity: the drug with the largest 
detailing stock effect and the highest detailing frequency 
suffers the most (market share and profit decreases)
(Liu, Gupta, Venkataraman & Liu, 2016) Yes
The drugs with the highest detailing intensity end 
up suffering more with a detailing ceiling, despite 
the fact that they may be able to adapt their 

































































13. Contributions (global) 
In this topic we present, in the scope of both quantitative and qualitative phases, our research 
novelty and uniqueness, and our contributions to the theory, to the practice, and to policy. 
13.1. Relevance and Originality 
In terms of relevance, our research answers to several scholars in the field of pharmaceutical 
marketing and regulation / policy. We answer to Stremersch & Van Dyck (2009)’s suggestion 
for future investigation on regulation of detailing policies given scant scholarly research 
available, and add to Liu et al (2016) findings using real data from a national-wide detailing 
ceiling, and not theoretical results using counterfactual simulations. Our research also answers 
to Wieringa & Leeflang (2013) call for additional contributions to build empirical evidence 
whether the European pharmaceutical market is less or more responsive to marketing efforts 
than the US market. 
In terms of originality, we also provide several novelties in the field of pharmaceutical 
marketing and regulation / policy. This is the first investigation of this type in Portugal -, as to 
the best of our knowledge the majority of the papers published so far have covered mainly the 
US (as seen in Wazana (2000), Kremer et al (2008), and Spurling et al (2010) reviews), and a 
high-income country, while Portugal is a medium-income country and may involve a different 
reality in terms of health infrastructure, the duration of the sales representatives’ visits, the 
frequency of contact with physicians, the type of sales calls, and other aspects such as the 
specific regulation of pharmaceutical companies marketing activities. The work performed in 
this thesis also allows scholars to analyze the results in light of several quantitative models 
previously previously applied by other researchers, likewise answering to Kremer et al (2008) 
suggestion to analyze data from Western Europe.  
Our research, by isolating the detailing investments, also provides additional insights to help 
clarify the apparent lack of unanimous association of detailing and physician prescription 
behavior, as highlighted in previous research using European databases, some of them using a 
macro variable of global marketing investments (sum of detailing and other marketing 
activities investments). Our research also adds insights to answer to Wieringa & Leeflang 
(2013) notes for future research, as a contribution to build empirical evidence whether the 




market. One important novelty of our research is the calibration of previous models by 
adapting them to the Portuguese reality (models 8.1 to 8.4).  
Our research likewise studies the effect of unique, novel variables not used in previous 
research, such as the effect, on physician prescription behavior, of the number of products 
presented during the calls, the percentage of calls where physicians declared they would 
increase or start prescribing the detailed product, the use of printed materials during the call, 
and the use of tablets during the call. 
Our research also provides novelty by exploring detailing elasticities in a new class – which 
we called “Blood” (respecting the request made by IQVIA for anonymity of classes and 
products) -, comprising very expensive recent drugs that noticed a substantial growth in terms 
of sales, and which represents, growingly from 2011-2012, a big burden on NHS budget.  
We also argue this is the first study of a pancreas-related class, to the best of our knowledge 
and the first work performed using a mixed method approach in the same research, to help 
understand the quantitative results in light of the specific market, social, economical and 
regulatory reality of the country and pharmaceutical industry, involving in excess of 20 
participants from different stakeholders (pharmaceutical sales representatives, physicians, 
high officers from the NHS tutelage, NHS health care organizations, and pharmaceutical 
companies, physicians, and consultants).  
It is also the first time the effect of a nationally implemented detailing ceiling and its impact 
on physician prescription behavior is measured using both quantitative and qualitative data, 
and the first time the implementation and control of a detailing ceiling is addressed, to the 
best of our knowledge. 
 
13.2. Contribution to the theory 
In terms of results, we contribute with several insights to management and marketing fields of 
knowledge, by confirming, by the one hand, previous research on detailing conducted by Pitt 
& Nel (1988), Berndt et al (1995), Narayanan et al (2003), Narayanan, Desiraju & 
Chintagunta (2004), Narayanan, Manchanda & Chintagunta (2005), Kalyanaram (2008), 
Leeflang & Wieringa (2010), among others and, by the other hand, generating new evidence 
e.g. a stronger impact of detailing on price elasticities of younger versus older drugs, building 




Windmeijer et al (2006)), and the finding that detailing carry-over effect on drug sales is more 
intense in the case of younger drugs, building on previous work from Narayanan et al (2004), 
Zoltners, Sinha & Lorimer (2004), Yi (2008), Montoya, Netzer & Jedidi (2010), and Liu et al 
(2016). 
Our research also contributed by studying novel, fresh data in the study of pharmaceutical 
marketing and specifically detailing, as demonstrated by the deep analysis of the models, 
variables and conclusions of more than 40 quantitative papers in pharmaceutical marketing 
involving detailing. These variables are new, launched by IMS Health in the second decade of 
2000, therefore with little time for analysis by previous researchers. These new variables 
build on previous research developed by authors such as Pitt & Nel (1988), Berndt et al 
(1995), Narayanan et al (2003), Narayanan, Desiraju & Chintagunta (2004), Narayanan, 
Manchanda & Chintagunta (2005), Kalyanaram (2008), Kremer et al (2008), Kalyanaram 
(2009), Dave & Saffer (2012), and many other in the field of pharmaceutical marketing. 
Our research also contributed with the discovery of the inexistence of a significant statistical 
effect of the detailing ceiling on physician prescription behavior, which goes against previous 
theory developed by Brotzman & Mark (1992), Brotzman & Mark (1993), Liu et al (2016), 
Karas et al (2016), and Larkin et al (2017). By analyzing this effect using also qualitative 
research we help the academy to discover the limited reach of 2013 detailing ceiling, with 
insights from multiple stakeholders on the process of implementation, control, impact and 
improvement of a detailing ceiling. This also builds on previous research conducted by 
Campo et al (2006), Chimonas, Brennan & Rothman (2007), Prosser & Walley (2013a), 
Prosser & Walley (2013b), Grundy, Bero & Malone (2016), Skandrani & Sghaier (2016), and 
Saavedra, O’Connor & Fugh-Berman (2017), which studied detailing using qualitative 
research, but not addressing however detailing ceilings. 
Our research evidenced the limited or non-existent effect of a detailing ceiling in the apparent 
absence of a central, firm and regular monitoring of the number of PSRs and visits, in the 
scope of the almost impossibility to block PSRs’ access to NHS physicians in alternative 
settings (parking, bar, restaurant, private practice, phone, and other). This evidence is 
particularly relevant by building on previous research by Liu et al (2016), Karas et al (2016), 
and Larkin et al (2017). 
Our research evidenced that the detailing ceiling benefited from several exogenous variables 




ceiling itself, again contributing with relevant and unique specificities to research conducted 
by Liu et al (2016), Karas et al (2016), and Larkin et al (2017). Finally, our research allowed 
the detection of two very different profiles of physicians, in relation to their attitude towards 
detailing and pharmaceutical marketing in general, thus building on research developed by 
Alkhateeb, Khanfar, & Clauson (2009) and Gönül & Carter (2012). 
The following tables condense the contributions to the theory allowed by our research: table 
13.1 summarizes the main evidences and contribution of our research to the theory on 
pharmaceutical marketing, generated from our Model 7; table 13.2 reviews the main 
evidences and contribution of our research to the theory on pharmaceutical marketing, from 
our Model 8.4; and table 13.3 recaps the main evidences and contribution of our qualitative 




Table 13.1 – Summary of the contributions to the theory – Model 7 
 
Source: own elaboration 
Brief description
Demonstrated 
 by our 
research?
Comment
(Model 7 as a reference)
Detailing appears to reduce price elasticity of older drugs 
more intensely than of younger drugs
Yes
We reached this conclusion by analyzing the 
average elasticities of younger and older drugs
Detailing carry-over effect on drug sales is more intense in the 
case of younger drugs
Yes
We reached this conclusion by analyzing the 
average coefficients of younger and older drugs
The use of tablets (such as iPads or equivalent) during the call 
appear to have, on average, a positive effect on drug sales, 
especially of older drugs. Laptop-based materials appear to 
have an average negative effect on drug sales, but a positive 
effect on older drugs
Yes
We reached this conclusion by analyzing the 
average coefficients of younger and older drugs
The use of printed material during the calls does not appear to 
have a substantial impact on drug sales
Yes
We reached this conclusion by analyzing the 
average coefficients of younger and older drugs
Higher declared intention of starting prescribing or increasing 
prescriptions of the detailed product appear to be positively 
associated with drug sales, but only for older products
Yes
We reached this conclusion by analyzing the 
average coefficients of younger and older drugs
The average number of products presented during the calls 
negatively impacts drug sales of the product analyzed
Yes
The higher the number of products presented in 
addition to the product being analyzed, the lower the 























Table 13.2 – Summary of the contributions to the theory – Model 8.4 
 






(Model 8.4 as a reference)
Not all detailing ceilings may impact 
physician prescription behavior
Yes
Detailing elasticities before and after the 
entry into force of the 2013 detailing 
ceiling were not statistically different
Entry into force of a detailing ceiling 
may not have a differentiated effect on 
the competing drugs, depending on 
their previous detailing intensity
Yes
The differences in drug elasticities of high 
and low intensity detailed drugs were not 






















Table 13.3 – Summary of the contributions to the theory – qualitative part 
 
Source: own elaboration 
Brief description
Demonstrated 
 by our 
research?
Comment
Older physicians are more prone to receive PSRs and appreciate 
their regular visits, than younger physicians (which are less 
dependent on detailing)
Yes
Several references suggesting that older physicians are more dependent on 
detailing and the benefits they receive in terms of information and support
Physicians appear to be aware of the effect of detailing on their 
prescription behavior
Yes
Our interviewed physicians recognized the influence of detailing on their 
prescription practice
The University the physician got their medical diploma from may 
influence physician future practice as a doctor
Yes
Different medical schools appear to have slightly diverse approaches regarding 
the prescription of some drugs, and this passes to the medical students
The difficulties proposedly created by NHS software on the 
prescription of original drugs when generics are available substantilly 
impact prescription behavior
Yes
Doctors appear to be overcome by fatigue when trying to prescribe original and 
more expensive drugs when generics with the same principle are available
Detailing appears to be valued by physicians, pharmaceutical 
companies, and PSRs
Yes
The importance of detailing to several stakeholders was highly mentioned in 
our research
PSRs need to have several competences, especially transparency 
and honesty
Yes
Transparency and honesty were mentioned as critical competences PSRs 
must have, adding to previous studied competences
Entry into force of a detailing ceiling may impact physician 
prescription behavior
Partially The detailing ceiling may delay the beggining of prescription of newer drugs
Entry into force of a detailing ceiling may have a differentiated effect 
on the competing drugs, depending on their previous detailing intensity
Yes
High intensity detailed drugs will probably suffer more with the entry into force 
of a detailing ceiling
Without a proper and regular control, a detailing ceiling may not be 
taken seriously by some stakeholders in the pharmaceutical industry
Yes
Some NHS institutions did not implement and control the detailing ceiling, and 
the ones who did reduced the control pressure one year after implementation
Several stakeholders (NHS institutions, NHS physicians, 
pharmaceutical companies, and PSRs) face unique challenges and 
effects from a detailing ceiling
Yes
Multiple stakeholders can be positively and negatively impacted by the entry 
into force of a detailing ceiling
A detailing ceiling may originate reactions and tactics from 
pharmaceutical companies and PSRs to mitigate its effectiveness
Yes
A series of reactions and tactics were developed by companies and PSRs in 
order to mitigate the impact of the ceiling
The effect of a detailing ceiling may be small next to the impact of 
other types of regulation initiatives and exogenous shocks
Yes
The complexity of the economic, financial, regulatory and administrative 
context may have a much stronger effect on the number of PSRs and detailing 



























































13.3. Contribution to the industry practice 
Our research also contributes to the practice, considering several stakeholders scopes. The 
first one is regarding pharmaceutical companies, through a series of reasons. It allows a better 
understanding of the effect of several promotion tools (including detailing) on physician 
prescription behavior, using a European database, which can assist marketing and sales 
officers in their decisions to select the most effective promotion instruments and optimize 
their magnitude. These insights are therefore of decisive importance to generate a higher 
understanding of sales force effectiveness and its implications for sizing, targeting, and call 
planning strategy in pharmaceutical companies.  
Companies can also benefit from the analysis of the effect of a nationally implemented 
detailing ceiling on the signal and magnitude of the association between detailing and 
prescription behavior, adjust their tactics in light of these results, and more effectively prepare 
eventual changes in future updates in Order 8213-B/2013.  
Marketing departments from pharmaceutical companies can benefit too from the analysis of 
results from both quantitative and qualitative phases, with insights that may assist the 
communication and promotion activities, in order to meet stakeholders’ (especially 
prescribers) expectations. The new variables used in our research provide critical insights for 
pharmaceutical and biotechnological companies in the scope of promotion and salesforce 
effectiveness. 
By understanding the impact of using tables (ipads or similar) during calls, versus providing 
printed information or laptop-based information, companies can more easily plan and 
organize their detailing efforts. 
By monitoring the doctors’ intention of increasing the prescription of the promoted drugs, 
companies can more easily build an early warning system, to signal potential issues with their 
current detailing tactics. Companies can also be more aware of the necessity of balancing the 
number of products promoted during the calls, since the higher the number of other products 
promoted, the lower the sales of the promoted product, which is critical in terms of the 
efficiency of the salesteam (PSRs). 
Associative institutions – such as APIFARMA – can benefit from the insights generated in 
our research, allowing them to be better prepared and backed by empirical evidence on the 
areas where the detailing ceiling may be improved, in the scope of future negotiations with 




Physicians – the sole stakeholder with the authority to prescribe in Portugal - can benefit too 
from our research, by confirming the existence, in several products analyzed, of a clear effect 
of detailing on prescription behavior, allowing doctors to become aware of this influence and 
be better equipped to interact with PSRs and the pharmaceutical industry in general. Physician 
chambers and associations can have a stronger intervention along with their members, 
through specific training or information initiatives to raise awareness on this effect. 
We believe other stakeholders may find our research useful from a practice point of view. 
Pharmaceutical sales representatives can benefit from our research, by confirming their 
influence on prescription behavior, and obtaining unique insights on the new competences 
needed to provide physicians what they need and meet their expectations.  
Pharmacists and pharmacists’ chamber may have interest in the results of this research, since 
pharmacies would theoretically obtain financial benefits should the assumptions of higher 
detailing being associated with higher number of prescriptions be applicable in Portugal – 
which was confirmed by our research -, and in this scenario, considering an economical point 
of view only, higher medication consumption represents higher revenues to the pharmacy.  
Another stakeholder that may interested in our research is the Health insurance private sector, 
as a higher number of more expensive drugs prescribed may imply a higher cost to be 
reimbursed to patients, meaning a higher cost borne by insurance companies. Finally, patients 
and patients’ associations may benefit from our research, helping them become more aware of 
the instruments used by pharmaceutical companies to interact with physicians, and its effect 
on physician prescription behavior. 
13.4. Contribution to the public policy 
Policy makers may benefit from our research by a series of reasons. The first is the realization 
that detailing initiatives do impact physician prescription behavior in Portugal, especially in 
the case of more recent (and typically more expensive, and reimbursed) drugs.  
This evidence may raise the attention on the topic of pharmaceutical marketing in general, in 
a scenario of very constrained budgeted costs with medicines, and also considering the 
opportunity costs to the public health, induced by the time doctors spend receiving PSRs at 
their NHS professional practice. The tutelage also can realize the extent to which Order 8213-
N/2013 reached the goals described in its preamble and other inferred goals such as its effect 
on prescription behavior and medicines consumption, and whether the implemented cap was 




The tutelage can also understand that the ceiling may have not been totally implemented and 
controlled, allowing the study and launch of eventual corrective measures, incorporating 
suggestions to improve the ceiling in a future regulatory initiative. At the same time, the 
tutelage may also realize the importance of detailing and other promotion and information 
instruments used by pharmaceutical companies, complementing the apparently very limited 
physician training sponsored by the ministry of health.  
Therefore, the tutelage can clearly benefit from analyzing the delicate equilibrium between 
the need to regulate PSRs’ access to physicians and NHS HCOs, and the need to continue 
benefiting from the pharmaceutical companies assistance in training, raising awareness on 
pathologies, and assisting doctors on a regular base. Finally, based in our research the tutelage 
can evaluate the pertinence of introducing or reinforcing pharmaceutical marketing modules 
or training in medical courses, raising awareness, among medical students, of the effect of 
pharmaceutical marketing (especially detailing) on physician prescription behavior, and 

















14. Answer to the research question 
We recall our research question: 
 What is the impact of a detailing restriction policy on physicians’ prescription 
behavior? 
Making the bridge now with our conceptual model, our research did not confirm the results 
expected by previous work by Liu et al (2016), by not finding quantitative evidence to 
confirm the existence of changes in detailing flow elasticities before and after the entry into 
force of the 2013 detailing ceiling. This is backed by the fact that all eligible products (15) did 
not evidence a significant change in their detailing flow coefficients, using a series break-test 
(Chow, 1960). By other words, and making the bridge with our research variables, the entry 
into force of the policy measure consisting of a detailing ceiling (moderating variable) did not 
provoke statistically significant changes in the elasticities of the detailing intensity (measured 
as Ln Detailing flow), as previous literature supported. 
  
Therefore, in the quantitative phase we were also not able to conclude whether products with 
different detailing intensities are impacted differently by a detailing ceiling, on their detailing 
elasticities.  
The qualitative phase helped us to shed some light on the results of the quantitative phase, by 
providing insights facilitating the understanding of the impact of several exogenous variables 
that probably may have mitigated and diluted the potential effect of the detailing ceiling. The 
qualitative phase results suggested that, at most, the detailing ceiling may have potentially 
delayed, for a small period of time, the beginning of the prescription of newer, more 
expensive drugs, but as a general insight there is strong evidence to suggest that physician 
prescription behavior (analyzed in drug sales) may have not be considerably impacted by the 








15. Conclusions (global) 
As explored during the literature review phase, pharmaceutical companies’ R&D investment 
in the development of new therapies reaches millions of dollars each year, and only a small 
number of new drugs are approved for human usage. In order to disseminate information 
about new and current drugs to prescribers – including dosage, studies, and side effects 
information – pharmaceutical companies develop marketing activities targeted mainly to 
physicians – the main prescribing class -, with instruments such as detailing, e-detailing, 
medical meetings, congresses, continuous medical education programs, gifts and meals, and 
other instruments and initiatives.  
While pharmaceutical companies’ representative associations engage into efforts to 
demonstrate the positive effects of pharmaceutical marketing and detailing on physicians 
education and overall public welfare, the scientific community has been demonstrating, in 
most articles, a relevant association between marketing initiatives and prescription behavior, 
with some positive and negative aspects, evidencing an association between different levels of 
this promotion instrument and physician prescription behaviors and attitudes.  
As a general conclusion, higher intensity of detailing appears to be associated with a higher 
number of prescriptions of the promoted drugs - selective demand effects, where a drug is 
preferred over other alternative drugs, but not to higher number of prescriptions in the drug 
category, suggesting a prescription switch from other drugs to the promoted ones.  
While it is understandable and legitimate that pharmaceutical companies have interest in 
improving the effectiveness of detailing and other marketing initiatives to reach a higher 
share-of-voice, market share and revenues using optimal combinations of marketing and 
salesforce investments, the discussion spills to other pharmaceutical stakeholders especially to 
policy makers, given that pharmaceutical marketing and particularly detailing might, on the 
one hand, impact spending on drugs and therefore potentially increase the burden with 
medicines expenditures, and negatively influence, on the other hand, physicians’ available 
time allocated to patients’ assistencial care.  
Several countries have initiated policy measures to regulate the burden with medicines, 
including manufacturer price regulation, regulation on physician prescription budgets, patient 
payment policies, regulation of direct-to-consumer advertising, and regulation of marketing 




limits to the number of visits (calls to physicians) a pharmaceutical sales representative can 
make per day, including the United Kingdom, Spain and Portugal.  
Since there is scant research on the impact of detailing restriction policies on prescription 
behavior, our work offers a contribution to pharmaceutical marketing and regulation policy 
using a mixed method approach, conducted using Portuguese data, covering 19 months before 
and 29 months after the implementation of Order 8213-B/2013, a detailing restriction policy 
by the competent health authority, in the quantitative phase, and 20 pharmaceutical industry 
interviewees in the qualitative phase. 
Detailing is still the most used promotion instrument to interact with physicians, and generally 
the preferred one by physicians, especially more experienced ones, who tend to value the 
regular contact of PSRs and benefit from delivery of novelties and the prompt clarification of 
doubts. Detailing flow is on average the most impactful promotion instrument, with evidence 
coming both from the quantitative and qualitative steps of our research.  
Other promotion instruments such as congresses, clinical meetings and medical literature - 
can also have a substantial influence in physician prescription behavior. Pharmaceutical 
companies pursue, through detailing, the maximization of their SOV, and the exploration of 
both the face to face relation and affection between PSRs and physicians, and the power of 
reciprocity.  
The effect of detailing appears however to be smaller versus the effect observed in previous 
studies mainly conducted in the USA. Nevertheless, it appears that it will continue to be used 
as the main promotion instrument. Detailing is especially impactful in the case of younger 
drugs, which is consistent with the fact that most companies invest more heavily in detailing 
activities during the first stages of the drugs lifecycle. Also, detailing reduces the price 
elasticity of drugs, especially in the case of younger drugs. By other words, detailing appears 
to immunize, to a certain extent, doctors’ awareness and perception of drug price at the 
moment they prescribe a drug.  
Detailing is not only important in the case of current investments: past investments made in 
detailing activities generally have a positive impact on drug sales (carry-over effects of 
detailing), again especially in the case of younger or much younger drugs, while physicians 
are more prone to receive information about novelties. Detailing initiatives performed by 
competitor brands, or competitive detailing, generally have a negative impact on the own 




The usage of iPads / Tablets grew during the period of our analysis (2012-2015) and appears 
to bring positive effects to the sales of the promoted drugs, probably given the novelty effect 
of this new communication technology, with interactive screens. However, there are some 
signs that this visit aid may start to saturate physicians, by limiting the spontaneity typically 
present in a face-to-face interaction. Printed materials including scientific articles also appear 
to positively impact promoted drug sales. Physicians revealing more positive future 
prescription intentions regarding the promoted drugs are more likely to promote them.  
Another interesting conclusion is the suggestion that a high number of promoted drugs during 
a sales call may negatively impact the main drug promoted. We believe this may happen due 
to the effect of the dilution of the key messages when a higher number of products is 
promoted, where physicians have a limited ability to retain messages regarding several 
products, passed during a small period of time (the duration of a visit from a PSR). PSRs 
competences have been evolving, with a higher scientific approach and a communication 
focused on the pathology and on the benefit to the patient. 
Other promotion instruments did not reveal a positive and significant effect on prescription 
behavior measured through elasticities, including journal advertising and direct marketing 
(mailing), showing almost null elasticities in our data. Many interviewees noted the 
perception of a negative growth of the investments in these instruments, in the interactions 
between companies and prescribers.  
Globally, the most impactful variable on drug sales was the marketing mix variable drug price 
(average elasticity of -2.67). We speculate whether this strong effect may have been 
magnified by the deep crisis the Portuguese economy was facing during the period of our 
times series (2012-2015). Policy changes also strongly impact drug sales, as seen in the case 
of Market 1 (Blood) after the reimbursement of drugs (strong positive effect), and in Market 3 
(Heart) after the loss of exclusivity (strong negative effect). 
Based on the reading and analysis of Order 8213-B/2013 and on the interpretation of 
contributions from the interviewees, the 2013 detailing ceiling main goals were likely the 
reduction of disturbance on health care organizations, the reduction of prescription and 
consumption, the reduction of the commercial pressure of pharmaceutical companies on 
physicians, the safeguard of HCPs care-related activity allowing more time for assistential 




Most likely, Order 8213-B/2013 was not entirely implemented on a national basis, given the 
difficulty to control PSRs access to the NHS in a conjuncture of reduced administrative and 
security staff, and with no apparent audits from the tutelage. The visits’ scheduling process 
does not likely observe the same procedures from NHS institution to institution, and in some 
cases the detailing ceiling was not implemented at all (at the date of the interviews). PSRs are 
able to make visits inside NHS institutions where they are not booked, and if exposed at most 
will receive a reprehension only.  
The 2013 detailing ceiling had a higher effect during the first year, then losing effectiveness 
due to some decompression of the control, apparently absent to many of the interviewees. The 
North, Center, and high population regions apparently had a higher control than the South 
(Alentejo and Algarve) regions. Control is likely higher in certain political scenarios (in 
ACES). Pharmaceutical companies reacted to the ceiling mainly by increasing the investment 
in group sessions, in digital channels and promotion tools.  
Companies appeared to use several tactics to mitigate the effect of the 2013 detailing ceiling, 
including visiting physicians at their private practices, using mirror visits (or Lines), waiting 
for the doctors in the parking or HCO entrance, or at the bar or restaurant, the registry of some 
of the PSRs’ interactions with physicians as contacts and not as visits, and using back doors in 
HCOs. There was already a detailing ceiling in place, in some NHS institutions, but it was not 
highly controlled, it was not centralized, and it did not include a maximum number of visits 
per year, per NHS institution. 
Order 8213-B/2013 apparently did not provoke a major impact on PSRs job or daily activity. 
Very likely, companies and their PSRs were able to keep the same number of visits and / or 
contacts as before the 2013 Order. Companies more dependent on detailing and companies 
with higher compliance were more exposed to the detailing ceiling, which was evident in our 
qualitative results, but not in our quantitative ones.  
The Order apparently helped some NHS institutions – the ones that implemented and control 
it - to regulate and discipline PSRs access and activity inside their infrastructure, and 
physicians working at those institutions were likely benefited in terms of concentration and 
productivity, with more time for assistential tasks. But physicians can suffer from the 
detailing ceiling by not receiving novelties and support as often as they did before 2013.  
As seen in our quantitative phase with our time series, Order 8213-B/2013 apparently did 




detailing flow elasticities, given that not one single product evidence significant changes 
in its elasticities, before and after the entry into force of this ceiling, which represents 
the main conclusion of our thesis. At most, as addressed during the qualitative phase, it may 
have marginally impacted the beginning of the prescription of new medicines, less promoted 
in some NHS institutions. Much stronger than the detailing ceiling by itself are likely other 
measures including INN prescription, highly constraining prescription systems, expense 
ceilings, the economic crisis, Troika intervention, among other, who in fact created the 
ground for a new paradigm in the pharmaceutical industry, in Portugal.  
Globally, it appears that the goals of the tutelage for the 2013 detailing ceiling were partially 
reached, only. Apparently there is room to improve the 2013 detailing ceiling, not only by 
readdressing the threshold of visits, but also by setting a different number of visits per year 
according to the type of company, size, type of products, and number of products promoted. 
It was quite interesting to verify that, on one side of the scalar dish, the tutelage needs 
pharmaceutical companies’ regular assistance to complement the sparse training it apparently 
provides to NHS physicians; on the other side of the dish, the tutelage needs to guarantee an 
organized and limited access of PSRs to its physicians and institutions, to assure operational 
efficiency and assistencial time to its patients; and physicians (especially the most senior) 
appreciate a regular contact with PSRs. Based on the total amount of information we were 
able to gather, analyze, and interpret during our research, there is the notion that this triangle 
of interest and collaboration will not likely be weakened in the coming years. 
Table 15.1 below summarizes the accomplishment of the general and specific research goals. 


















Determine the impact of a detailing 
ceiling on physician prescription 
behavior, measured through detailing 
flow elasticities
Yes
No quantitative evidence was found to confirm the 
existence of changes in detailing flow elasticities before 
and after the entry into force of the 2013 detailing ceiling
Assess the relation between detailing 
flow and drug prescriptions
Yes
Higher intensity of detailing appears to be associated with 
a higher number of prescriptions of the promoted drugs. 
Detailing elasticity however smaller than previous research
Assess the patterns of this relation 
among different therapeutic classes 
(markets) and products typologies
Yes
Products from different markets evidence difference 
detailing elasticities; detailing elasticities higher in new vs 
mature products; competitive detailing negatively affects 
own promoted drugs sales
Assess the extent to which previous 
quantitative models are adequate to a 
Portuguese pharmaceutical industry 
dataset
Yes
Some models more adequate than others. New, adapted 
models were developed demonstrating a higher fit to the 
data used in the quantitative phase
Evaluate whether the moderating effect 
of a detailing ceiling negatively affect 
detailing flow elasticities
Yes
No effect was observed in detailing elasticities, through 
the usage of a series break test (Chow test)
Generate a broader, holistic 
understanding of the Portuguese 
pharmaceutical market and the 
dynamics of the implementation of a 
detailing ceiling
Yes
Multiple forces shaped the pharmaceutical industry in 
Portugal in the last 20 years, strongly impacting 







16. Limitations (global) 
A first limitation of our work is the fact that we did not perform a full, systematic literature 
review to identify the total number of papers covering pharmaceutical marketing and 
regulation policy. This decision was made considering two main aspects: first, there are 
already literature reviews performed by Wazana (2000), Kremer et al (2008), and Spurling et 
al (2010), which are references in the academic community; second, we believe the 
methodology we observed (described earlier in our thesis) was adequate and robust, having 
identified the main articles in these research communities. Another limitation related to the 
first one is the fact that we mainly searched for literature in English, with a limited number of 
articles in French. We decided this after several attempts to find relevant literature in other 
languages, with very limited success. 
As described previously in our quantitative research limitations, we had to develop a 
procedure to be able to calculate the detailing stock in the first 12 months of observations 
(from January 2012 to December 2012) using two methods, therefore this variable does not 
fully represent the real detailing stock for those initial months. However, as explained we 
believe the approach was robust and adequately performed, allowing us to use this important 
variable in multiple quantitative models with our data. 
When analyzing the contribution to the theory, we based our critical analysis on Model 7 
which, despite its global adherence to previous research conducted by many scholars 
investigating pharmaceutical marketing and detailing (especially in terms of the expected 
signals of the coefficients), has mostly non-significant coefficients, which limit the inference 
of our results. Nevertheless, the percentage of coefficients that simultaneously have the 
expected signal and are significant is in line of Leeflang & Wieringa (2010). Another 
limitation is the fact that our option was to directly apply several models developed by other 
researchers in the past, and test the extent to which they would be adequate to our data. This 
decision – despite resulting in many non-significant independent variables coefficients -, had 
to be made in order to compare our results against the outputs of the several models, allowing 
us to critically discuss the results in light of theory. We tried to overcome this limitation by 
applying Model 7 and step by step manually remove the non-significant variables. We also 
did not test the robustness of models 1 to 8.3 in terms of collinearity, normality of residuals, 
homocedasticity, and reset test, only performing it in Model 8.4, our final model. 
Another limitation resides in the fact that we used, for promotion expenditures, data coming 




represents the population. However, IQVIA guarantees sample representativeness in terms of 
specialties, regions and doctor characteristics, and therefore we assumed panel full 
representativeness for inference purposes. Such data from IQVIA was also used, as noted 
before, by a great number of researchers studying time series of drug sales and pharmaceutical 
promotion expenditures. By other words, the inferencial part is conditional to the assumption 
of the correct representativeness of IQVIA doctor panel. 
The model we used to run the Chow (1960) test suffered from severe misspecification (60% 
of products with p-values lower than 1%, and 73.3% with p-values lower than 5%). This is 
the equivalent to say that our model lacks non-linear variables or interactions we were not 
able to capture, in line with conclusions reached by Wieringa & Leeflang (2013) in their 
application of pharmaceutical marketing models. Despite these problems, Model 8.4 was 
sufficiently robust to allow us to perform the analyses, with a substantial percentage of 
product coefficients with signal as expected and statistically signiticant at 0,05. 
One of the limitations of our qualitative phase is the fact that there were not young physicians 
in the list of interviewees, not allowing us to triangulate their opinions with the ones from 
senior physicians, in relation to different attitudes of younger versus older doctors about 
pharmaceutical marketing in general and especially about detailing. This option was taken in 
order to guarantee a specific profile of physician, with both public and private practice, and a 
substantial experience allowing physicians to comment on the evolution of detailing and 
pharmaceutical marketing, at least since the year 2005. 
Another limitation is the fact that we were not able to interviewee very relevant stakeholders 
such as INFARMED and a high officer from the 19
th
 Constitutional Government, that is, the 
one that launched Order 8213-B/2013. The contribution from INFARMED would have 
allowed us to understand, from the point of view of the controlling institution, how the 
processes of PSRs enrolment and registry work. We made several endeavors to obtain 
INFARMED’s contribution but ended up receiving a negative response. In order to minimize 
the lack of a high officer from the 19
th
 Government, and after waiting for an answer (which 
did not happen), we analyzed the preabule of Order 8213-B/2013, thus mitigating the absence 
of this critical source. 
A higher number of interviewees, especially from more regions of Portugal (including the 
Islands), mainly physicians, PSRs and high officers from the NHS infrastructure, would have 




regarding the development of this thesis, and convinced we have a very reasonable 

























17. Further Research 
We believe our research provides a critical and relevant contribution to specific aspects of 
pharmaceutical marketing and health policy. Nevertheless, we are aware of future avenues of 
research, and now provide suggestions for forthcoming work. Future quantitative 
investigations could address the effect of a detailing ceiling on competitive detailing, to see 
the extent to which pharmaceutical companies adapted their detailing strategy (targeted 
physicians, detailing frequency, detailing volume) and may chose alternative promotion 
instruments to complement detailing efforts, thus following research performed by Liu et al 
(2016). Related to the previous topic, we also highlight the utility of studying the detailing 
ceiling impact on share-of-voice and on market share, to compare against results from 
research conducted by Liu et al (2016). 
Additional quantitative research in the scope of detailing ceilings in other countries or regions 
is also needed to help verify the results of Liu et al (2016) counterfactual simulations which 
predicted that the impact on market share will be higher on drugs with a previous higher 
detailing intensity, whereas less detailed drugs will expand their market share. 
Future quantitative research could also continue to explore the effect of a detailing ceiling on 
prescription behavior studying other therapeutic classes or markets in real settings. Further 
usage of datasets from Western European countries would be extremely valuable, given that 
research on this topic is still sparse in this geographic area (in line with Kremer et al, 2008), 
with the goal of allowing a higher generalization. 
Further research is also welcome to understand different physician behavioral and attitudinal 
patterns in relation to pharmaceutical promotion instruments – especially detailing – 
according to their age interval or seniority in their clinical practice, given that the conclusions 
obtained in our research on this topic do not allow a total generalization considering the 
specific limitations highlighted on interviewed doctors’ profile. 
The insights gathered in relation to the real effect of Order 8213-B/2013 demands additional 
initiatives to study its full implementation and control, especially in the sequence of an 
eventual future adaptation of the Order. Further work can also study more deeply the effect of 
the several exogenous variables (including the GDP growth, unemployment rate, and other) in 
the evolution of medicines sales, from a quantitative point of view. 
Finally, an interesting topic for future work is the analysis of the content and duration of PSRs 




would contribute to research in the field of call duration (following contributions from 
Bernewitz (2001), Steinman, Harper, Chren, Landefeld & Bero (2007), and John (2008)), and 
in the field of detailing ceilings (following contributions from Larkin, Ang, Avorn & 
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